Sure, but that's a different thing though. I haven't claimed that there is a rational explanation for that; I am claiming that Einstein's discoveries involved abductive reasoning, that is involved thinking of new possibilities, theories, that he conjectured might turn out to be explanatory of what is observed.

For example a newly conjectured hypothesis or theory might be explanatory of anomalies that Newtonian physics could not explain, such as the observed procession of the perihelion of Mercury. — Janus

Yes, agreed. Knowledge is rational, even though the mental discovery process of which knowledge is the output, is itself not rational.

:up:

No, those aren't beliefs. You can call them beliefs, but that won't make them beliefs. Beliefs have to be believed. And only minds - subjects of experience - can believe things.

For example, imagine that your dog wags its tail and knocks a bottle of ink all over a piece of paper and, by pure chance, the ink streaks form a pattern that says "it is sunday". Is that a belief? No. Is that even an expression of a belief? No. It is an 'apparent' expression of a belief, not the real thing.

I think anyone who denies that has lost their reason. I mean, whose belief would it be? that paper's? The dog's tail?

Nobody, apart from someone in the grips of a theory, would think that the lucky pattern expressed a belief.

So your view is plain and simply false.

You can be a moral realist and deny the categoricity of moral norms and values. — Bartricks

Yes

You can be a moral nihilist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms (most do, in fact) — Bartricks

Yes

You can be a moral realist and affirm the categoricity of moral norms. — Bartricks

Yes

What has any of that got to do with my assertion that your premise is moral realism?

You're just ignorant and don't understand the difference between moral realism and the claim that moral norms are categorical. — Bartricks

How do you know this? I've asked you several times now to justify your claims of intellectual superiority, but you've failed to even address the argument. I obviously think I have a perfectly adequate grasp of the difference, you think I don't. We can't both be right. It is therefore possible for someone like us to be wrong about this kind of thing. How do you then know it's not you? You can't use your own reason to prove this because my reason proves that I am right, so you must appeal to something outside of your own judgement. You've not provided any sources, citations, even names of other academics who agree with you on this.

And as for empirical data - go and read some moral philosophers writing about morality.

IN other words, I refer you to moral philosophy. — Bartricks

Why would you refer me to moral philosophy? If you are using the agreement of epistemic peers as justification that your premises are reasonable, then how do you explain the fact that only a tiny number agree with your conclusions. You can't coherently claim simultaneously that the reasoned application of skilled thinking yields results which we should trust as sound for our premises, but then claim a conclusion which does not concur with those same thinkers as being sound too.

Either the collective agreement of moral thinkers is worthy of taking as sound (in which case you could reasonably refer me to them as evidence), or it is not (in which case you cannot and will have to argue your premise from prior axioms). If the former, then you'll need to explain why it is that these thinkers whose conclusions you have just declared trustworthy, largely do not agree with your conclusions. If the latter, then your argument fails as one of its premises has no justification.

I have to be honest, I was initially impressed by all those symbols and I thought I was done and dusted, for they were all Greek to me. And so I replied as best I could, fearing that I would face a tirade of more symbols. Perhaps I still will, though I warn you in advance that I don't understand them at all. Not even a tiny bit. But what of the argument? You are clearly more educated than me in these matters. But isn't it true that if gold and water are the same, then if I have some gold necessarily I have some water? And so isn't it also true that if moral values and my values are the same, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable? And isn't it also true that if I actually have some gold I do not necessarily have some water? And isn't it also true that if I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable? And isn't it true that I can validly conclude on that basis that therefore water and gold are not the same, and that my values and moral values are not the same? That seems true when expressed in English, but is it true when expressed in the strange symbol language you were using earlier?

I am a moral realist, yes. That, I think, has never seriously been in doubt. Your point?

For I said that most moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical. I did not say that most moral philosophers are moral realists (although they are that too - even the contemporary ones).

You're just ignorant and don't understand the difference between moral realism and the claim that moral norms are categorical. — Bartricks
How do you know this? I've asked you several times now to justify your claims of intellectual superiority, — Isaac

Ah, because I said that most moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical and you sought to refute me by, bizzarely, providing me with data showing that most moral philosophers are moral realists. That, to my mind, demonstrated that you did not know the difference between believing that moral values and norms are categorical and being a moral realist. For you seemed to think that the fact only slightly more than 50% of contemporary moral philosophers are moral realists demonstrated that it was false of me to say that the overwhelming majority of moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical.

I am a moral realist, yes. That, I think, has never seriously been in doubt. Your point?

For I said that most moral philosophers agree that moral norms and values are categorical. I did not say that most moral philosophers are moral realists (although they are that too - even the contemporary ones). — Bartricks

You claiming that your premise is merely categorical (rather than realist) and your premise actually being categorical (rather than realist) are not the same thing, do you understand that distinction?

I am arguing that the premise you were talking to Janus about, the one you claim is merely categorical, is, in actual fact realist in the context you are using it. It therefore cannot be supported by your claim that nearly every moral philosopher agrees with you.

A categorical claim can be just that the 'ought' is universalised, applies to all others. If your premise is merely that moral values are categorical, then your conclusion doesn't follow. There is no logical reason why values taken to apply to others must necessarily be not your subjective ones. Some of your subjective values you may consider apply to others, some may not.

I value good whiskey, but I don't care if others don't because I generally want them to be happy and I recognise that whiskey makes some people happy and others not.

I also value not mugging people, but I do care if others don't value this because I generally want the people around me to be happy and being mugged seems to make pretty much everyone unhappy. It's therefore a value which I want others to have.

Your premise that there exist such universal-seeming values does not therefore necessarily lead to a conclusion that such values must be held by some other entity. Only a moral realist set of values would lead there (presuming you also thought morals had to be values).

I know more than you do about how value works. — Bartricks

What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?

hat is exactly what "isomorphic" refers to. It does not mean that two things are identical.

It just means that the mapping is structure preserving with regards to particular operations on both sides. For example, a Google map is isomorphic with the territory that it depicts, with regards to connecting points on both sides and measuring distances. If a one-inch line on the map corresponds to one mile in the territory, then a two-inch line will correspond to two miles.

So, a language expression is meant to be isomorphic with a belief with regards to logical operations that you could perform on both sides. — alcontali

So are you now saying that beliefs aren't literally a part of expressed language?

I know more than you do about how value works. See my argument for details (although take a course in logic first or it won't make sense) — Bartricks

I'd appreciate it if you would type it syntactically in first order predicate logic and define your domains of variables (or constants as the case may be) — Happenstance

Happenstance
No, I can't do that. — Bartricks

Are you really that arrogant, or is it something you think people are impressed by?

1. If my values are moral values, then if I value eating ice cream then necessarily it is morally valuable for me to eat ice cream. — Bartricks

Is it possible for me to have some values that are not moral values? I.e., are there different types or categories of values?

No, those aren't beliefs. You can call them beliefs, but that won't make them beliefs. — Bartricks

Language expressions that correspond to beliefs are meant to communicate beliefs. In the definition of knowledge as a Justified (true) Belief (JtB), no distinction is made between both. Still, that distinction only becomes relevant when there is noticeable problem with the correspondence between belief and language expression. As soon as a belief is expressed in language, it can be shared and can acquire some measure of objectivity.

So are you now saying that beliefs aren't literally a part of expressed language? — Terrapin Station

I think that language can express beliefs. However, the precise details of the correspondence is probably a question mark. We do not necessarily know anything about someone beliefs if he does not communicate them.

I think you are an arrogant one, I really do. But to be honest i couldn't care less what you think of me - as should be obvious - and i am surprised you, like others, keep feeling the need to tell me. I am just trying to listen to reason not strike a pose. So again, address my argument not me.

So again, address my argument not me. — Bartricks

Your behaviour is far more interesting to me than your micky-mouse argument. I, along with about six other posters, have already addressed your arguments. We've all, in various guises, been told we don't understand the terminology, the opinion of other moral philosophers, or sometimes even just logic itself. On no occasion have you provided a shred of evidence to support your assertion that you have the 'right' interpretation in these disputed cases, and you've repeatedly failed to respond substantively to any of my counter-arguments (the moral realism of your premise, the epistemic peer argument with regards to disputed reasoning, the selective use of appeals to authority) and yet here you are talking about my approach instead. Hardly leading by example in the "address the argument not the person" stakes are you?

I am not sure I understand your question. None of our values - that is no valuing of ours, no valuing activity that we may be engaged in - are moral values. That's what the argument established. What we sometimes call 'a person's moral values' are just what we think that person takes to be morally valuable.

I appreciate your honesty and would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? I taught myself and am only an amateur and so I'm quite open for my syntactic interpretation to be questioned, even to the point of being totally ripped apart by someone more knowledgeable than me; not so impressive really. Logic btw is just an epistemic tool that I use for rationalizing my (or other people's) reasons and so stating that an argument is valid or sound via some natural deductive rule (such as modus ponens or modus tollens) says nothing in itself about what is ontologically so, which to me, is what's important.

In the spirit of honesty, I admit to not being a very good philosopher but will say that if I don't understand anything pertaining to its ontology then I tend to lose interest in the discussion. When I asked you about the domain of a variable, I'm really asking you what is the ontological status of a predicated subject, in this case, moral value. I asked for it syntactically because then I will semantically interpret the predicated subjects myself in coherence (or incoherence as the case may be) with my own ontological beliefs. This is a useful utility I do find with formal logic; stripping semantic arguments down to syntactics (its what you do yourself in stating: p→q; ¬p therefore ¬q). And what I mean by ontological status is where does it reside? What type of substance is it? Or am I showing a bias in these specific questions due to my lack of philosophic skills?

Btw, I'm in the emotivism camp concerning morals and apologies if I don't attend to your replies immediately due to being in work at the moment!

How about answering "What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?"

I am not sure I understand your question. None of our values - that is no valuing of ours, no valuing activity that we may be engaged in - are moral values. That's what the argument established. What we sometimes call 'a person's moral values' are just what we think that person takes to be morally valuable. — Bartricks

So I don't understand you and you don't understand my question. Seems like we are having some trouble communicating :smile:

Let me try another approach - let's go back to your statement #1, and take just the first part (what you are calling P):

1. If my values are moral values, then . . . . — Bartricks

What do you mean when you use the terms my values vs the term moral values? My assumption (which could be wrong) is that both of these terms identify sets of statements / assertions / propositions (which ever term best works for you).

So - just for example - I could loosely define the set my_Values like this:

my_Values = {"Ice cream is good", "Murder is wrong", "Chairs without cushions are better than chairs with cushions", etc etc etc}

Now you just said that none of my values are moral values. So how do we define the set moral_Values?

By the way, if he thinks that no valuing of ours are moral values, then re the "P" of "If my values are moral values," we have to assign "false" to it. So our conditional truth table. One upshot of this, and I'm not sure how it impacts the formal argument (I'd have to go back and look at the argument again), is that the truth value of Q is irrelevant to our conditional.

To be valuing something is to be adopting some kind of positive attitude towards it.

So, when you say "ice cream is good' that is not a value, that is a judgement. You are judging that ice cream has value. Either that it is valuable to you, or that it has moral value.

To be valuing ice cream is to be adopting a pro-attitude towards it. It may be more complex than that, but it is that whatever else it is.

Perhaps it will help to imagine someone who believes nothing is right or wrong, good or bad. Well, that person can and will still value things. They do not believe in morality - so they do not make any moral judgements (or don't if they are consistent and sincere). But they may still value ice cream.

What moral values are is what the argument tells you. We know that some things are morally valuable, for our reason - and the reason of most others - says so. And even if we disagree about which particular things are the morally valuable ones, we agree that some things are morally valuable.

What is moral value, though? We don't just stipulate, we investigate.

Are moral values my values? I mean, I know I value things. I am a valuer, among other things. Valuing is something I do. But are moral values my valuings? That is, is something - anything - morally valuable just if it becomes the object of one of my pro-attitudes? Any of my pro-attitudes?

No and no. That is clear to my reason and clear to yours too, surely?

So premise 2 - the one that says "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable" - is self-evidently true.

Premise 1 simply expresses a conceptual truth that cannot be denied, namely that if moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

The conclusion that follows from these is that moral values and my values are not synonymous.

But as I know that moral values must be the valuings of someone - for how can something be valuable if it is not the object of a valuing attitude? - then I can conclude that moral values, though not constituted by my values, are nevertheless constituted by someone's values.

"What would be any reason to believe that value could obtain independent of an individual valuing something?" — Terrapin Station

I don't understand the question

The argument is more interesting than me.

The argument is more interesting than me. — Bartricks

Go on then. Let's hear your counter to any of the positions I've put forward in opposition to it. I've listed them in my post above for your convenience.

We've all, in various guises, been told we don't understand the terminology, the opinion of other moral philosophers, or sometimes even just logic itself. On no occasion have you provided a shred of evidence to support your assertion that you have the 'right' interpretation in these disputed cases, and you've repeatedly failed to respond substantively to any of my counter-arguments (the moral realism of your premise, the epistemic peer argument with regards to disputed reasoning, the selective use of appeals to authority) and yet here you are talking about my approach instead. Hardly leading by example in the "address the argument not the person" stakes are you? — Isaac

Yes, that is my position and I think it is well supported.

I keep telling you that I am a moral realist. I am unclear how you think you're making a 'counter-argument' by pointing out that I am a moral realist. And you confused believing that moral values are categorical with being a moral realist. So I think I have excellent evidence that you don't now what you're talking about.

As for evidence in support of my position - well, here it is again:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me, but someone else entirely
7. If moral values are made of your valuings, then if you value something necessarily it will be morally valuable
8. If you value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
9. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me, and not you, but someone else entirely.

Now, note that at no point in that argument have I expressed the truth of moral realism. The above argument simply demonstrates what it would take for moral value to be a reality. It does not say that it is.

But I did say that moral values exist - I am a moral realist - and that it follows from this that the subject in question exists.

For convenience then:

10. If some things are morally valuable, then the subject described in 9 exists
11. Some things are morally valuable.
12 Therefore the subject described in 9 exists.

So, there exists a subject - a person, a mind, a subject-of-experience - whose values constitute moral values. He/she is not me, not you, but he/she exists.

Now, the argument is valid whether you like it or not. And so you must deny a premise - but note, simply denying one does not constitute a refutation. I know many of you think that if you think something it must be true. But that isn't actually true. And so just thinking that one of my premises is false is not sufficient to show it to be. You need to argue that one is false, or even that a reasonable doubt can be had about one, by showing how its negation is implied by premises more prima facie plausible than mine.

None of you have done that, or even seriously attempted to, so far as I can tell.

The argument is more interesting than me. — Bartricks

It's interesting that you decided to put up Reason as the source of morality without realizing that you need to put that into an ontological context.

The argument itself: stuff has meaning to a subject, and is therefore subjective: not so much.

ONce more, I stress that you and others blankly stating that something is false does not constitute counter-evidence. You're not gods - thank god - and so what you think doesn't determine what's true. You need to address a premise and show how its negation is implied by premises that are more powerfully self-evident than mine.

What do you mean by an 'ontological context'? What am I not realizing?

What is Reason?