How many times have I made it clear that you need to address my premises, not just say things.

Once more, my premise 2 says this: "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable"

So, what you need to do is construct an argument that has "If I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable" as its conclusion. I don't know what premises you'd need to put together to get that conclusion, but I am extremely confident - like 99% - that there will be one that is laughably false.

That's my bet. But by all means prove me wrong.

What did you do that for - you need to address my argument. Stop trying to take me to school. I don't need edumacating.

Once more, my premise 2 says this: "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable" — Bartricks

Do you understand that I don't agree with that premise?

There are reasonable and unreasonable definitions. To offer a definition of morality that says that it is not concerned with personal interrelations would be an unreasonable definition.

How about this: do a search and see if you can find a definition of morality that says it is not concerned with interpersonal relations, or even one in which interpersonal relations could be interpreted to be irrelevant.

Yes, do you understand that you're not a god and your opinions don't determine what's true.

Show me that the premise is false by constructing an argument that has its negation as a conclusion. Then we'll look at your premises together. One of them, I guarantee, will be bonkers.

So, what you need to do is construct an argument that has "If I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable" as its conclusion. I — Bartricks

If morality is only mental dispositions, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.
Morality is only mental dispositions.
Therefore, if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.

Yes, do you understand that you're not a god and your opinions don't determine what's true. — Bartricks

Right, what the world is like determines that. What the world is like is that morality is only mental dispositions.

I am having lunch now, I will get back toyou

There are reasonable and unreasonable definitions. — Janus

Reasonable and unreasonable according to whom?

One can construct a modus ponens argument in about two seconds to support any arbitrary thing, by the way.

One could also construct a valid argument in about two seconds that's simply in the form of (1) P (2) ~P therefore Q. Of course that wouldn't be sound (outside of paraconsistent logical interpretations, perhaps) but you don't really care about soundness, or at least your approach is simply to assert that the premises are self-evident, which anyone could do with any arbitrary modus ponens argument. That's not going to convince folks who disagree with one of the premises, but you don't seem to care about that. You're using the tactic of simply calling them unreasonable, insane, etc.

It's not a matter of opinion as to what's reasonable otherwise there could be no basis for reasonable discussion.

As to alternative definitions of what morality is concerned with; can you offer one from a search, or even one of your own devising?

Well it is nice to have opinions. — Bartricks

Reason needs to stick to what it is meant to do, i.e. to verify a conclusion from its evidence.

The idea that you could discover new knowledge by reasoning is preposterous, especially, taking into consideration that it would imply the existence of a purely mechanical procedure to achieve that. Such procedure cannot possibly exist.

Any arbitrary knowledge statement can be encoded as a natural number. The question then arises: Can we run through all natural numbers, and check if the number represents a knowledge statement that is logically true? This procedure cannot possibly exist because it would also solve Alan Turing's halting problem, while we have another proof that guarantees that this cannot be done.

That procedure cannot possibly exist. Assume that we have a sound (and hence consistent) and complete axiomatization of all true first-order logic statements about natural numbers. Then we can build an algorithm that enumerates all these statements. This means that there is an algorithm N(n) that, given a natural number n, computes a true first-order logic statement about natural numbers, and that for all true statements, there is at least one n such that N(n) yields that statement. Now suppose we want to decide if the algorithm with representation a halts on input i. We know that this statement can be expressed with a first-order logic statement, say H(a, i). Since the axiomatization is complete it follows that either there is an n such that N(n) = H(a, i) or there is an n' such that N(n') = ¬ H(a, i). So if we iterate over all n until we either find H(a, i) or its negation, we will always halt, and furthermore, the answer it gives us will be true (by soundness). This means that this gives us an algorithm to decide the halting problem. Since we know that there cannot be such an algorithm, it follows that the assumption that there is a consistent and complete axiomatization of all true first-order logic statements about natural numbers must be false.

Therefore, the approach to use a rational procedure revolving around reason in order to discover new knowledge is nonsense. It cannot possibly work. Knowledge is produced by other, unknown mental faculties that are essential to the discovery of knowledge. Reason alone cannot possibly achieve this.

If morality is only mental dispositions, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.
Morality is only mental dispositions.
Therefore, if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me. — Terrapin Station

Well that's a weak argument and its first premise is garbled.

Note, you need to say that if morality is YOUR mental dispositions, otherwise the second bit simply isn't true and the premise is false. Furthermore, you need to identify moral values with your valuings, or again the second bit won't be true and the premise is false.

So, basically, for the first premise to be true, it needs to be the same as my first premise. YOu know, the one you kept telling me I hadn't written properly!

That'll make premise 1 undeniably true.

The problem, however, is that your argument has a conclusion that conflicts with the self-evident rational representations of most of us.

Now that doesn't mean it is false, but it is prima facie evidence that it is and so your premises need to be powerfully self-evident to justify drawing it.

Your first premise is true (well, it is if you adjust it so that it is). But your first premise is the same as mine.

Your second premise, however, is demonstrably not true.

Why? Well, first it has no support from reason. That is, it is not a self-evident truth of reason that moral values are your mental states. I mean, how many reflective people get the impression that moral values are 'your' mental states? Er, none at all - not even you, I'd wager.

So, it has no evidential support whatsoever. And in combination with a true premise - premise 1 - it leads to a self-evidently false conclusion.

That means all you've done is demonstrate the falsity of your second premise. Good one!!

And yes, you can construct these arguments for anything, but when you do so it becomes apparent what you need to assume to get to your desired conclusion - and if you find that what you need to assume is self-evidently false, or has no support from reason and entails something that is self-evidently false, then you've discovered that your assumption is false and that you need to revise your conclusion.

It's called 'reasoning' and most people find it incredibly irksome and so they don't bother doing it and when another does it and proves them wrong about things they care about they execute the one who did it.

Reasonable and unreasonable according to whom? — Terrapin Station

Reason. According to Reason.

So, if it is your opinion that 2 + 3 = 9876543, but this appears self-evidently false to virtually everyone else, then you are not reasonable - not remotely - if you persist in believing that 2 + 3 = 9876543.

perhaps everyone else is wrong and you're right. Possible. But not remotely reasonable to believe.

Similarly, if it is your opinion - because your desire to refute me has committed you to it - that if Himmler approves of gassing people then it is necessarily morally good for him to do so, yet this same claim is self-evidently false to the reason of virtually everyone else, then you're not reasonable if you continue to think you're right and everyone else is wrong.

Not unless you've got good independent reason to think that everyone else's reason is malfunctioning on these issues. But to show that, you'd once more have to appeal to self-evident truths of reason that are widely corroborated or you will just be guilty of supporting your unreasonableness unreasonably.

So if I'm following you, then the way you are defining these, the intersection between the set of things that I value and the set of things that are morally valuable is the null set. Am I getting this correctly?

I don't know what that means.

What on earth is a null set and how can it be that you will only understand me if I express myself in terms of null sets?

Imagine you order a pizza and after eating it your waiter asks you what, if anything, you valued about your dining experience. Are you going to reply "I am not really understanding what you are asking me. Do you mean that the intersection between this dining experience and the things I value is the null set?"

I mean literally what are you finding hard to understand? If moral values are my values - that is, if my valuing something makes it morally valuable - then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

That really can't be hard to understand. No need to bring null sets into this. IF you DO need to bring null sets into this - whatever they are - then I think you're beyond my help, to be perfectly honest.

Anyway, you are either a tedious troll and are exploiting the human default of taking people at face value, or your comprehension skills are beyond my reach.

There are things that I value. That is a set of things.. Call that set my_Values. I asked you for some examples of things that are in this set. I'm still not clear on exactly what you mean by this, but I believe you gave me one example: "The person I love."

Next there are things that are morally valuable. That is a set of things. Call that set moral_Values. I asked you for some examples of things that are in this set. I believe you gave me a longer list here:

you are morally valuable, I am morally valuable, character traits, such as kindness, generosity, honesty- these are morally valuable (usually). Happiness is often morally valuable — Bartricks

What I am asking you is very simple. If you were to draw a Venn Diagram of these two sets of things, would they be disjoint, would they overlap somewhat (some items are in both sets, some are only in one or the other), or would they be identical?

Just do be clear, we are only talking about your P from #1.

1. If moral values are my values, then Q — Bartricks

We are not talking about Q or #2 or #3.

No, no, no. You understand perfectly well, or you don't but then, like I say, I have no interest in engaging with you as it will be nothing but frustrating from my end and entirely fruitless from yours. I mean I can't explain myself more clearly and any subsequent attempts will be no more clear than before. So this delightful relationship between us is, I am sorry to say, null.

What I am asking you is very simple. If you were to draw a Venn Diagram of these two sets of things, would they be disjoint, would they overlap somewhat (some items are in both sets, some are only in one or the other), or would they be identical? — EricH

You seem pretty unflappable, but I just wanted to confirm that what you are saying should make sense to most people. I just didn't want you to get too discouraged by the infinite loop of assertions and insults, hidden beneath the occasionally decent argument, that is bartricks.

Oh, you want some now do you?!

He is asking questions to which the answers are blindly obvious.

For example, here is the first premise that he is having such a hard time understanding:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.

He's asking - in an extremely painful and convoluted way (probably intentionally so, for a laugh - I hope so anyway, otherwise he's going to have terrible difficulty navigating the world and other people) - whether I mean by "if moral values are my values" "if moral values are 'among' my values" or 'if moral values are my values". Now I wonder if you can figure out which it might be? You know, do I mean what I said, or do I mean something quite different.

Now do you have a criticism of my argument, or are you just one of those who wants to express their disapproval of my inability to suffer fools gladly?

And you realize you - you - just insulted me, yes?

I mean I can't explain myself more clearly — Bartricks

The word "more" there is redundant.

No, Unnecessary J, it is not. I can't.

Note, even if I can't explain myself clearly, it is still true that I can't explain myself more clearly than I did. Hence the 'more' is needed.

Well we disagree again it seems. If I can't see something at all, for example, it makes no sense to say that I can't see it clearly. To say that would be to imply that I can see it, though not clearly.

To say that you can't explain something more clearly implies that you explained it at least somewhat clearly, or at the very least somewhat. I don't believe you have explained the idea that Reason is a subject at all; you have merely said the words in the from of a stipulation 'Reason is a subject'.

Something that has been explained not clearly at all can be explained more clearly. So, it is entirely consistent if - if - my explanations lack clarity for me nevertheless to say that I cannot explain them more clearly.

But my argument is clear. What's clear is that some - many - do not recognise it for what it is, namely a deductively valid argument, for they do not recognise that they need to raise a reasonable doubt about a premise before they're entitled to dismiss the conclusion.

For instance, I don't think you understand that. For you keep saying I have stipulated, as if saying it will make it so, when I have argued for the controversial conclusion from extremely uncontroversial premises.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. — Bartricks

Has ANYONE conceded this premise yet? It seems that so far, everyone but you has some problem with this premise.

And you realize you - you - just insulted me, yes? — Bartricks

I am not convinced that I did anything but state fact...do you mean this:

I just didn't want you to get too discouraged by the infinite loop of assertions and insults, hidden beneath the occasionally decent argument, that is bartricks. — ZhouBoTong

Are you saying that you don't make the occasional good argument?

Are you saying if I go back through this thread and read your posts I won't find assertions and insults along with a couple decent arguments?

And I think what is also clear is that many think that if they do not understand something, that is sufficient to have established that it does not make sense.
And yet others think that if they disagree with something, that is some kind of evidence that it is false.

And yet others think that rather than addressing my argument they are free to change the premises and attack their own totally different premises rather than mine.

And yet others think that they can endlessly ask me banal questions and that if I eventually stop answering them that somehow constitutes a refutation of my case.

And others think that if they dislike me and my tone that this serves to demonstrate that my argument fails.

And so on and so on.

And many - perhaps the bulk - think, like you, that if they say something then it is true. So, you say - and that's all you do, just say - that I have no explained something, or not defended something, then that suffices to make it so. That is the recurring theme from this end.