No, I don't think anyone has accepted that premise. What do you think that shows? That I am up against quality interlocutors or people who don't realize an unquestionable premise when they see one? I only ask.

My argument is sound. That's the best kind of argument. Any argument must have at least one premise that is asserted. So yes, I have made assertions becusae you have to in order to argue for anything. Mine at least have the merit of either being self-evident truths of reason or conceptual truths that can't be denied by those who understand them.

Note, too that you can insult someone by accurately describing them. For example, let's say you're very ugly and I say "Hello. You are ugly". That's an insult, yes? Yet accurate.

What do you think that shows? — Bartricks

You are the way, the truth and the light?

Nuh.

Oh hello you - read the Euthyphro yet?

One of my arguments proves the exact opposite - that Reason, not I, not you, is the way, the truth and the light (though that's not how I'd express it). But have a cookie for trying.

Indeed. Long ago. Still cannot see how your comments relate to it. So I let the slide, too.

The analytic style of the OP is what interested me in your thread. As things stand, you are perhaps too defensive to take on board the genuine criticism presented by folk who have been here long enough to show that they have done a bit of philosophy.

You are far from the first vexatious litigant to drop by.

I don't know what you mean by 'take on board'. I'm happy to abandon my conclusion the instant someone shows me what's wrong with the argument.

So you can't see how the famous criticism that derives from that dialogue might be relevant to my argument? Right. Okay then. I mean, it is the basis upon which most moral philosophers reject my kind of view. But okay.

I have argued for the controversial conclusion from extremely uncontroversial premises. — Bartricks

Considering reason to be a sentient subject (and incidentally Reason would also need to be a sapient subject in order to be valuing things, even though you have denied this) is not only controversial, it also seems unintelligible. I don't know what it could mean, and you certainly seem to have made no effort to explain what it means; which leads me to conclude that you cannot explain it.

Maybe I'm wrong, maybe you can explain it; but if so, why don't you? Do you want others to understand your argument? If you don't care then why present it in the first place?

So I have judged that you have not explained your conclusion, and you want to claim that I believe that it must be a true judgement just because that is what I have judged. I am not claiming it is certainly a true judgement, but merely that it is likely a true judgement, that it is a reasonable judgement, given that I have seen nothing from you that I could count as an even as an attempt at explanation, and also given that no one else who has participated in this thread has said that they understand what you are talking about when you say reason is a sentient subject.

You're just saying things again.

You're just saying things again. — Bartricks

:wink:

Right, and you're just saying nothing again.

We’ve had enough of this guy now...right? I understand that he presents a philosophical puzzle that tempts that philosophical part of the brain that brings us all here but its an illusion.
Please, in the name of baby jeebus and Almighty Oprah above, someone please tell me Im not the only one who sees that?!
Its an illusion, both his argument, and the thought that this guy is going to listen. Illusion. Seems real...not real.
Anyone?

Based on what has transpired in this thread you will get no argument from me!

At first I thought he was a confused novice attempting to work through something and as you say there seemed to be something of a puzzle there, somewhat analogous to the Ontological Argument when you first encounter it.

I was hoping that he would at least explain what he means by saying that Reason is a sentient (if not sapient) subject; but even there, disappointingly, nothing was forthcoming. And he doesn't listen...so...there really seems to be nothing at all to be gained here.

I suspect a 4chan high level troll or somesuch, work has gone into the illusion I alluded to.
Ill grant that it was a pretty good fake (suckered in two of the more high level posters), but surely we’ve had a good enough look now?

suckered in two of the more high level posters — DingoJones

Oh, you mean me and...? :joke:

Seriously, though I actually don't believe he is a troll; I think he is just incredibly powerfully wedded (or welded) to his arguments.

Maybe not, always hard to tell. Regardless, complete waste of time. I dont think its how wedded he is to his argument though, there is something else going on there.
I don't know what's wrong with him and I don't really care, Im just irritated that so many are acting as though its a discussion, its not. My motivation is purely selfish, lets get back to something interesting for me to read over :razz:

Fair enough! :smile:

I was hoping that he would at least explain what he means by saying that Reason is a sentient (if not sapient) subject; but even there, disappointingly, nothing was forthcoming. — Janus

I think I saw Reason once. Far away and hunched over a bit as though engaged in some activity. I approached but then the bastard turned a corner in the street - and I never got to find out what the guy was up to.

Um, so it’s known, the above is my sense of dry humor … with a bit of self-deprecation thrown in, granted.

I think they don't agree with my conclusion because they are not aware of my argument and/or they think that that there is better evidence that the conclusion is false than that it is true, for most contemporary moral philosophers seem to think that the Euthyphro dispatches it. — Bartricks

Right. So if most moral philosophers think that Euthyphro dispatches it (not that I agree at all with your assessment there), then it must be the case that despite both you and {all of moral philosophers} having possession of exactly the same evidence (you've advanced no previously unknown empirical data). They have reached, using nothing but their rational thought, a conclusion which you think is wrong. This proves unequivocally that it is possible for your epistemic peers (and I'm generously putting you in the same camp as all other moral philosophers here), in possession of the same material facts can nonetheless apply their reasoning faculties and reach the wrong conclusion.

If one part of your argument relies on the fact that it is possible for the majority of moral philosophers to apply their reasoning faculties to the empirical evidence they have at hand and reach the wrong conclusion, you can't coherently, in the same argument, support your premise by arguing the exact opposite, that what most moral philosophers have concluded after applying their faculties of reason to the empirical evidence they have to hand is most likely to be right.

Not that I agree with your assessment of what most moral philosophers think with regards to your premise anyway...

I think most moral philosophers would agree that if something is morally valuable, its moral value is not constitutively determined by our valuings. — Bartricks

...may well be true, but that's a weaker position that the one you're using in your argument.

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks

Most moral philosophers would disagree with this, for example. Especially those who are moral realists. Thus making the moral value you talk about as being categorical distinct from the moral value that most philosophers talk about as being categorical (where they talk that way). Kant, for example. the archetype of categorical morality, saw a moral value as a rule specifically that one did not value anyway. Otherwise, for him, it would not be moral. So your starting premise, the one on which you hinge your conclusion that categorical moral values must be valued by someone, is not one which most philosophers agree with. A standard which you've previously used to justify their prima facae acceptability.

:lol: I suspect you're a bit more familiar with the guy (or gal if you follow Barty) than you are letting on.

:grin: cheers

It's not a matter of opinion as to what's reasonable otherwise there could be no basis for reasonable discussion. — Janus

The basis is how individuals reason. Not everyone reasons the same way.

Re definitions of morality, I've relayed mine many times here:

Morality is how one feels about interpersonal behavior that one considers to be more significant than mere etiquette. And specifically, it's feelings about whether behavior is "good" or "bad" or in a more fine-tuned analysis, whether it's permissible, obligatory, recommended, etc.

Well that's a weak argument — Bartricks

It's a modus ponens (If P then Q. P. Therefore Q.) That's what you always use.

its first premise is garbled. — Bartricks

If we're allowed to examine the semantics of the premises, then let's get back to that with respect to your argument.

Note, you need to say that if morality is YOUR mental dispositions, otherwise the second bit simply isn't true and the premise is false. — Bartricks

No, morality is not just MY mental dispositions. I'm not the only one who has the mental dispositions in question.

I come to this forum to learn new things and to understand how I can integrate philosophical thinking into my life. Most of the people on this forum are far more knowledgeable about philosophy than I - and I have benefited from following and occasionally interacting with them.

When I first read your OP it seemed incoherent to me, but it looked like there were some interesting ideas in there. I said to myself that maybe I was simply not understanding what you were saying - or perhaps you were not expressing yourself clearly.

So I have been making a good faith effort to understand what you are saying - in particular I have been trying to get some clarity re how you are defining your terms.

I have not been trolling you.

I respectfully suggest that if you cannot communicate your ideas to a reasonably smart person who is making a good faith effort to understand you, then you should re-consider your situation.

I know that's why I said it was weak rather than invalid. Weak because it has a conclusion that we have evidence is false and a premise that has no support from reason. Conclusion - that premise is false.

And if you keep premise one as it is then that premise is just plain false too. So a valid argument with two false premises and a conclusion that conflicts with reason.

My argument, by contrast, is also valid but both of its premises are true. The first is a conceptual truth that only those who don't grasp things will deny and the second has overwhelming support from reason. It's conclusion does not contradict reason either. So it is sound. Yours is not.

My argument, by contrast, is also valid but both of its premises are true. — Bartricks

Not at all. Again, it couldn't be clearer that morality only occurs as mental states that individuals have. All the evidence we have show that that is what it is, and there's zero evidence that it's something aside from this.

Well I am skeptical about that. I can't argue with someone whose comprehension skills are so poor they don't understand my first premise. Your fake humility doesn't wash with me. You decided - decided - that my position didn't make sense right at the outset and nothing I can do will get you to revise that view. I have patiently provided you with answers to your questions and all you'very donew is ask furthere inane ones so determined are you not to grasp what you don't want to grasp.

So again, and just for the record, when premise one says that 'If my valuings are moral values, then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable" that does not leave open the possibility that moral values are a subset of my values. Not if you understand English anyway.

If you want to identify moral values with a subset of your values, that's fine for the argument will still work. It works for the whole set so it works for a subset.

For example, if I said "if EricH has asked questions of Bartricks, then those questions are not in good faith' then asking me endlessly whether I mean all of your questions or just some of them shows that you lack comprehension skills. All of them - like it says. But what's true of all of them will also be true of a subset.

So your questions are fake, so obvious are the answers to them all. Or so I charitably think. So drop the whole wounded fawn 'oh, but I only want to understand and learn from others' routine, I don't buy it.

Your argument is unsound. Obviously so. My argument is sound.

Moral values are not made of our values. Again, for the umpteenth time, if they were, then if you valued raping someone necessarily it would be good for you to rape them. That's absurd. No-one sensible thinks that's correct. To think that's correct is as silly and unworthy of rational respect as the view that if you think 3 x 2 = 90 then it is.

If you value raping someone - guess what, that doesn't mean it is good for you to rape them.

If you value me raping someone - guess what, that doesn't mean it is good for me to rape them.

If you value someone else raping you - guess what, that doesn't mean it is good for someone to rape you.

And so on and so on.

Your view is absurd. Outrageous. It has nothing - nothing - to be said for it. That you hold it - that it exists in your head - is not evidence it is true.

Your view is demonstrably false. This argument demonstrates its falsity - this argument that has a first premise that cannot coherently be denied and a second premise that is self-evidently true to everyone who isn't determined that Bartricks is wrong because Bartricks is mean and that's how the world works:

1. If my valuings are moral values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, my valuings are not moral values.

That's a valid argument. It always was valid. When you thought it wasn't valid, it was valid.
When you thought the first premise was not expressed correctly - and it was and is expressed correctly, unlike your first premise which is false - it was valid.

It is valid. It's premises are true beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not a remotely controversial argument.

But when coupled with another argument - the argument that moral values must be someone's, it gets us all the way to divine command theory.

And you - and most others here - don't like that. And because you seem to have the mentality of six year olds and think that if you don't like something it isn't true, you reject it.

But the whole argument is valid. And its premises appear to be true beyond reasonable doubt.

The only threat to it - the only thing that suggests otherwise - is the Euthyphro argument. That argument has the negation of my conclusion as its conclusion and premises that appear to be as strong as mine.

But no-one has pressed it!

Again, for the umpteenth time, if they were, then if you valued raping someone necessarily it would be good for you to rape them. — Bartricks

If Joe thinks it's morally permissible to rape Jane, then is it not the case that, to Joe, it's morally permissible to rape Jane?

We've gone through this already.

According to your view - which you clearly don't understand - if Joe values (values - VALUES - values, values. V. A.L.U.E.S) raping Jane, then it will necessarily be good for Joe to rape Jane.

That view is just incredibly stupid. It really is. And it is your view. Join the dots.

Right. So if most moral philosophers think that Euthyphro dispatches it (not that I agree at all with your assessment there), then it must be the case that despite both you and {all of moral philosophers} having possession of exactly the same evidence (you've advanced no previously unknown empirical data). They have reached, using nothing but their rational thought, a conclusion which you think is wrong. This proves unequivocally that it is possible for your epistemic peers (and I'm generously putting you in the same camp as all other moral philosophers here), in possession of the same material facts can nonetheless apply their reasoning faculties and reach the wrong conclusion. — Isaac

First, why don't you agree with my assessment? It is correct. What, you think the Euthyphro is not the main basis upon which contemporary moral philosophers reject divine command theories??? It is. If you don't believe me, e-mail one or just pick up an introductory book on ethics and read what it says about divine command theory. So I think only ignorance could explain your scepticism about my assessment.

Most moral philosophers are going to accept that it appears to be a truth of reason that if we prescribe or value something it is not necessarily morally right or good. I mean, that's why the vast bulk are not subjectivists about ethics.

Most moral philosophers are also going to accept that it appears to be a truth of reason that if an act is right, then it is necessarily right. Which also appears incompatible with morality being subjective. So this too seems to be apparent evidence that morality is not subjective.

I agree - I agree that it appears to be a truth of reason that if we prescribe or value something it is not necessarily morally right or good.
And I agree that it appears to be a truth of reason that if an act is right it is right of necessity.

It's what my reason says too. It is what the reason of most moral philosophers says. And it is what mine says.

Does yours?