What if I can only know that I don't know what I should do, and therefore I can't be sure whether I should hope at all? — Kazuma

We are not born knowing the answers to the Kant's three questions, or Camus' challenge, and therefore we have to labor over these questions if we are going to find any answers. That is what life is about, is it not?

We answer these questions through study and thoughtful living. Maybe the answers come from the way we live.

The "know" question is about the certainty you can place in your knowledge. The "do" question is about ethics. You have to decide what it is right and proper for you to do. If we live our lives deliberately, study and learn, think about the kind of people we think we ought to be, we may answer the first two questions reasonably well.

What you can hope for perhaps derives from what you can know and what you should do.

How could he impart the concept of hope in the ultimate questions if the questions haven't been answered yet? — Kazuma

Did Kant intend to impart hope in his three questions?

Good parenting sets children on the path of learning, proper behavior, and hope. Later in life the child-become-adult has to decide whether what he learned, what was proper, and what could be hoped for is now adequate. Maybe the parents taught that the child should hope for eternal life in heaven or a fortunate reincarnation. The adult may decide that he can not know about heaven or reincarnation, and toss that hope out the window. Maybe the adult concludes that there is no hope for human progress, or conversely, that there is much hope. What people think they can know, what they should do, what they may hope often changes over time. The child may have been taught that he should make a lot of money. The adult may decide that he should not do that.

I hope pursuing these questions makes like meaningful.

It's a problem that can be a most serious one in particular cases. Treating it as a general, abstract--"philosophical"--problem renders it a mere intellectual exercise, which is to belittle it.

Good parenting sets children on the path of learning, proper behavior, and hope. Later in life the child-become-adult has to decide whether what he learned, what was proper, and what could be hoped for is now adequate. Maybe the parents taught that the child should hope for eternal life in heaven or a fortunate reincarnation. The adult may decide that he can not know about heaven or reincarnation, and toss that hope out the window. Maybe the adult concludes that there is no hope for human progress, or conversely, that there is much hope. What people think they can know, what they should do, what they may hope often changes over time. The child may have been taught that he should make a lot of money. The adult may decide that he should not do that. — Bitter Crank

Hope sounds very desperate to me. It seems to be a comfortable approach to problems that would eventually end up without any solution. Hoping and believing is what Camus classified as ''philosophical suicide''.

I'm not sure if Kant meant it this way, but it seems it would make more sense if it was: ''Before abandoning hope, one must first start hoping.''

I hope pursuing these questions makes like meaningful. — Bitter Crank

Assuming we need a meaning in life.

Hope sounds very desperate to me. — Kazuma

“Hope” is the thing with feathers -
That perches in the soul -
And sings the tune without the words -
And never stops - at all -

And sweetest - in the Gale - is heard -
And sore must be the storm -
That could abash the little Bird
That kept so many warm -

I’ve heard it in the chillest land -
And on the strangest Sea -
Yet - never - in Extremity,
It asked a crumb - of me.

Emily Dickinson 1830-1886

Hope sounds very desperate to me. It seems to be a comfortable approach to problems that would eventually end up without any solution. — Kazuma

I hope you won't always view life negatively.

Sure, sometimes life presents us with desperate situations and we can only hope for the best while fully expecting the worst. But not all of life is miserable and not all hope is desperate. We hope for everything from the trivial to the sublime.

We can hope that the bakery has not sold all the cinnamon rolls. We can hope to find someone to love and marry. We can hope to do well in life. We can hope for the resurrection. We can hope to get through the day without going crazy. We can hope that death will come quickly. We can hope the person calling us is not our super-annoying sister-in-law. We can hope that even one out of 100 publishers will accept our manuscript. We can hope that that it snows on Christmas Eve.

Assuming we need a meaning in life. — Kazuma

Trust me: we need meaning in life.

Your purchases are not really my concern. — unenlightened

"I don't buy," in other words equals, "That's wrong"

However, if you look both ways before crossing the street, you are implicitly valuing not getting run down, and you don't need to explicitly articulate this value to yourself. — unenlightened

People do not want to explicitly want to not be hit by a car when they look both ways before crossing a street?? lol

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of. — Moliere

Camus criticizes existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Jaspers for recognizing the absurd situation and then, as he sees it, betraying their realization. From the perspective of the rational intellect, life has no inherent meaning. Camus recommends that we should live passionately in the light of this rationalist vision of the meaninglessness of existence, that we should not deny it but rather rebel against it, in the sense of live in despite of it, in a kind of paroxysm of human pride.

Personalty, I find Camus to be, as a philosopher, both callow and shallow. He has capitulated to the objectified, scientistic vision of nature, and to the limitations of a carping rationalism that would set the limits, not only of itself, but of the spiritual. What he fails to see in Kierkegaard's vision of the absurd is the role of faith; he does not see that his valorization of the nihilistic vision of meaninglessness is itself both as much an imputation of meaning and a question of faith as is any spiritual vision of meaning and transcendence.

"Existentialist" has tended to be like "hipster."

Everyone denies that they are one, whether that's the case or not.

I'm mostly just focusing in on the text, in this case, rather than cultural affect of Camus' writing.

I sometimes wonder about the particular lives he uses to elucidate the absurd man. My take on it was that he's using extreme cases which are counter to the general attitudes of moral living in order to demonstrate that the absurd man, while it is a kind of ethic, is not the sort of ethic which many are concerned with. He does, though I grant that it's curious that all of his examples are rather romantic, say:

Do I need to develop the idea that an example is not necessarily an example to be followed (even less so, if possible, in the absurd world) and that these illustrations are not therefore models?...A sub-clerk in the post office is the equal of a conqueror if consciousness is common to them. All experiences are indifferent in this regard

So, just at his word, at least, he's speaking against the notion that one must follow the examples he uses. In addition, he states explicitly that complacency is exactly what the absurd man does not allow -- this is his criticism, in a way, of both suicide and existentialism. They are ways of escape from the absurd, ways towards complacency with the absurd world -- whether that be through the church, the knife, or plunging into the irrational.

Perhaps he does. But, even so, it's worth noting that he's speaking about Kierkegaard from the perspective of the absurd man. They are legitimate to themselves, but -- according to Camus -- they negate the absurd, which the premise of the essay (Can we, and if so how, do we live with an absurd world?)

Mystical thought has familiarized us with such devices. They
are just as legitimate as any attitude of mind. But for the moment I
am acting as if I took a certain problem seriously. Without judging
beforehand the general value of this attitude or its educative power,
I mean simply to consider whether it answers the conditions I set
myself, whether it is worthy of the conflict that concerns me

...

What is perceptible in Leo Chestov will be perhaps even more
so in Kierkegaard. To be sure, it is hard to outline clear
propositions in so elusive a writer. But, despite apparently opposed
writings, beyond the pseudonyms, the tricks, and the smiles, can be
felt throughout that work, as it were, the presentiment (at the same
time as the apprehension) of a truth which eventually bursts forth
in the last works: Kierkegaard likewise takes the leap. His
childhood having been so frightened by Christianity, he ultimately
returns to its harshest aspect. For him, too, antinomy and paradox
become criteria of the religious. Thus, the very thing that led to
despair of the meaning and depth of this life now gives it its truth
and its clarity

...

It is not for me to wonder to what stirring preaching this
attitude is linked. I merely have to wonder if the spectacle of the
absurd and its own character justifies it

Also, while Camus is certainly a rationalist, I don't find any good reason to attribute scientism to his philosophy. One can conclude that the world is absurd without attributing metaphysical status to scientific propositions, and Camus doesn't rely upon science to sketch absurdity in the beginning or to define it directly thereafter.

What makes you say otherwise?

I don't know. I realize that suicide is very serious. But I'd say that it helps to have ways of thinking about serious problems.

I mean, what's the way of thinking about suicide now? Isn't it actually pretty complex? And it's mostly placed within a medical context, too -- thereby depriving the victim of much say in the cure. That isn't to say that it shouldn't be done, but I wouldn't exclude it from the realm of philosophy either tout court.

I don't know. I realize that suicide is very serious. But I'd say that it helps to have ways of thinking about serious problems.

I mean, what's the way of thinking about suicide now? Isn't it actually pretty complex? And it's mostly placed within a medical context, too -- thereby depriving the victim of much say in the cure. That isn't to say that it shouldn't be done, but I wouldn't exclude it from the realm of philosophy either tout court. — Moliere

There are sick people, people in trouble because of "real life" problems, desperate people who contemplate suicide. They're not putting the back of their hands to their foreheads and moaning about ennui. Their dilemmas merit study, yes, but I doubt that what they grapple with is the kind of philosophical problem Camus refers to, and is best addressed in context.

Certainly addressing a particular case of suicide requires context, and generalizing to understand the motives for suicide requires one to reference the context (since the reasons are many, after all).

But I don't see how that's a reason to exclude suicide from philosophical contemplation. I don't see how you could argue Camus' essay belittles suicide, even if we could imagine that there are ways of belittling suicide by way of philosophical reflection.

In addition, he states explicitly that complacency is exactly what the absurd man does not allow -- this is his criticism, in a way, of both suicide and existentialism. — Moliere

Well indeed, it is this equivalency of the sub-clerk and the conqueror that allows The Dude and Peter Gibbons to be the middling existential hero... Both the extreme absurdist model (the actor, seducer, and conqueror), and the subdued version of it (the sub-clerk who knows the absurd situation but still roles with it because he is free in his mind).. Are both bad version of the revolt of existence.

The three examples of the extreme version are clearly destructive to others, despite its irony in its own pursuit of quantity of experience (oh so hip)..

The examples of the subdued "everyday" man, living the absurd life but in the everydayness of things...because well, it is just complacency..despite if one is self-aware of the absurdity..

A revolt comes not when one sees the absurd and decides to live life in this full good faith view. But rather, the revolt comes when one sees the many harms one is exposed to, and the ever-present pendulum of one's own psyche- moving from survival as cultural upkeep and boredom turned into entertainment seeking.. The fact that we must rely on hope and "flow" experiences to try to sustain us or give us "justifications" for why every day is not so bad.. It is realizing that hope and flow are just ways to isolate the fact that life can be quite harmful, causes much stress, and forces us to constantly deal with our homeostatic/cultural thing. It is a burden or series of burdens that most constantly be confronted. If we can see this aspect, and not flinch, and not try to run away from it with more flow activities and distraction, that is the revolt.. If one can actually bitch about it without resigning to thinking that they are a smiling Sisyphus.. Then they are actually revolting.. Sisyphus smiling is simply the status quo. Accepting fate, Nietzschean and Camus style may be hip and in vogue amongst those who care about that, but it's not revolt.

I don't see a problem with being hip or in vogue. Even if something is hip or in vogue, that doesn't stop it from being what it is. Lady Gaga is a musician, whether she is hip today or not so tomorrow. What does it matter if someone is self-aware that they are revolting against the absurd, that they are smiling, that they reference Nietzsche, that they think of themselves in a Sisyphean manner? How does that take away from the Absurdists revolt?

I don't think there's some kind of real revolt to uphold people to. I think that this is the solution to the problem, the result of the absurd reasoning. It seems to me that you're saying a person has to hide that they feel a certain way from themselves, and purposefully go against the "status quo" in order to revolt. For one, I'm rather uncertain that absurdism is the status quo. But just granting the premise, if it were -- the revolt isn't predicated against numbers or others. It's a revolt against the absurd. So insofar that you follow the absurd reasoning, then the act of revolt is a way to be joyful.

On a side note -- hope is one of those terms frequently spoken against in The Myth of Sisyphus. Hope is a form of nostalgia which one gives into to nullify one of the two terms which results in the absurd, at least as it is used in the essay. I mean, you're free to posit what you want obviously, but it struck me as odd to say that Camus hopes and feels very hip and cool about hoping when he speaks explicitly against hope, at least.

Now, I gather that your revolt may not be Camus' revolt. But from what I can tell you're not an absurdist, either -- you're not following the absurd reasoning, or at least not believing in it. So, insofar that you're not the absurd man, that you don't feel that your desires can not be met by the world and you continue to desire anyways, that the world has meaning (if a pessimistic one) -- the result of all of this would amount to saying: "I don't just disagree with your reasoning, but the premise upon which your reasoning starts". Which, of course, I don't see a problem with that, but I don't see it as a strike against Camus either. After all -- the absurdist can say the same to you, since they started their premise with the absurd.





The concept of "quantity of experience" is one of those that I'm rather uncertain on in the essay. He uses the example of 40 vs 60 years. But I am rather prone to think there is a depth of life, myself. So it's a part of his argument that I find hard to either follow or buy into, and actually wonder what he's getting at (after all, how does one measure quantity of life? Just in years? But then why the number of women being emphasized, the number of characters you play, the number of foes you vanquish? Not quite sure what to make of it. Though the same sort of questions could apply to depth, too)

'Ability to accept what is' - That's what Camus described as 'philosophical suicide'. By finding something transcendent, one can get too complacent. Camus argues that we don't know and that we can't possibly know. That's why accepting means creating an illusion and then accepting the illusion in order to feel more comfortable.

His mythical man accepts the conditions of his existence in almost stark rebellion as he trudges up and down his hill. How does he do this, how does he maintain his rebellious attitude, in spite of his eternal condemnation to this absurd task. He can do it because he is his own man, he is not sorry about anything. Man can scorn anything.

In Camus's Plague there is a scene where the doctor (Rieux) and a priest (Paneloux) spend a whole night with a child dying from the plague. The child dies a horrifically painful death while neither of these men can't do anything but watch. The child was an innocent the doctor screams at the priest, who says that we cannot understand the ways of God's love and the doctor says he wants no part of that kind of love.

What drives the doctor? He says his concern is with health. He says:

"What does it matter? What I hate is death and disease, as you well know. And whether you wish it or not, we're allies, facing them and fighting them together... Rieux was still holding Paneloux's hand."

The absurd death of the child cannot be justified, just as there is no justification for luck, the contingencies of life. How does one react to life's contingencies? Camus doctor in The Plague has no choice, there is no meaningful answer, he works to help the sick because they are sick and he is a doctor...and that is what he does.

The indifference which Camus imputes to the universe is based on a view which sees it as brutely material and not at all as spiritual, both in essence and origin. I think this is fundamentally a rational empiricist view. This kind of presuppositional perspective is the metaphysical essence of scientism.

But where does Camus state that the universe is brutely material in essence and origin?

I would say that the context in which the essay is written explains more how the universe appears indifferent. 1940 France is when Paris was taken by the Fascists. In 1955 Camus states:

For me "The Myth of Sisyphus" marks the beginning of an idea which I was to pursue in The Rebel. It attempts to resolve the problem of suicide, as The Rebel attempts to resolve that of murder, in both cases without the aid of eternal values which, temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary Europe. The fundamental subject of "The Myth of Sisyphus" is this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide face teo face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate. Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism

In the opening paragraph to the essay, so written around 1940 he writes:

But it is useful to note at the same time that the absurd, hitherto taken as a conclusion, is considered in this essay as a starting-point. In this sense it may be said that there is something provisional in my commentary: one cannot prejudge the position it entails. There will be found here merely the description, in the pure state, of an intellectual malady. No metaphysic, no belief is involved in it for the moment. These are the limits and the only bias of this book.

So I would say there's even reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is posited not on the basis of a metaphysical outlook, since he eschews metaphysics in the opening -- and that, given the events in which the essay was written in, there's also reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is acutely felt due to said events. (And it is even admitted that eternal values may only be temporarily absent or distorted).

The above is also why I don't think ennui is exactly an appropriate description of the emotion from which the essay is written, either. Camus was a part of the resistance. The unsatisfied desire is the desire for justice, and the realization that what we might consider evil, what we would consider unjust was winning the day.

In our own day we have a war fought on an invented casus belli, and we know that the perpetrators of said lies will never be brought to justice, as well as a financial crisis for whom the same can be said, and a right-wing populist who -- even if his campaign was all bluster -- certainly helped to organize hate-groups.

I wouldn't say that the topic of suicide is exactly the result of listlesness, but the genuine wondering at whether all the pain of life is worth going through when you know what you consider to be evil will dominate and win.

I don't see a problem with being hip or in vogue. Even if something is hip or in vogue, that doesn't stop it from being what it is. Lady Gaga is a musician, whether she is hip today or not so tomorrow. What does it matter if someone is self-aware that they are revolting against the absurd, that they are smiling, that they reference Nietzsche, that they think of themselves in a Sisyphean manner? How does that take away from the Absurdists revolt? — Moliere

I didn't mean it's wrong because it is in vogue.. If Schopenhauer was in vogue, he wouldn't be wrong.. People would just be more right :D. But what I was really saying is that these themes seem to be the Zeitgeist for a long time and THOUGH it is popular, that doesn't necessarily mean it is right. That's all.. However, being popular does not negate something's truthfulness either.

I don't think there's some kind of real revolt to uphold people to. I think that this is the solution to the problem, the result of the absurd reasoning. It seems to me that you're saying a person has to hide that they feel a certain way from themselves, and purposefully go against the "status quo" in order to revolt. — Moliere

No not really.. What I am saying is that "revolt" in the context of how Nietzsche and Camus explained it, is simply acceptance of the situation said in a different way. This "joy" is actually not the life lived..which is as I explained the pendulum swing and contingent harms. It is another false escape hatch...The Zen absurdist hero- more artistic than realistic.

On a side note -- hope is one of those terms frequently spoken against in The Myth of Sisyphus. Hope is a form of nostalgia which one gives into to nullify one of the two terms which results in the absurd, at least as it is used in the essay. I mean, you're free to posit what you want obviously, but it struck me as odd to say that Camus hopes and feels very hip and cool about hoping when he speaks explicitly against hope, at least. — Moliere

I wasn't speaking there about Camus' notion of hope per se, but about a common notions people have to find a reason to keep going. Like relationships, flow, aesthetics, the onward march of science and technology..it's just one of those human reasons for continuing themselves and procreating future people so they can too can continue themselves for those reasons. Hope, in particular is the carrot and the stick.

So, insofar that you're not the absurd man, that you don't feel that your desires can not be met by the world and you continue to desire anyways, that the world has meaning (if a pessimistic one) -- the result of all of this would amount to saying: "I don't just disagree with your reasoning, but the premise upon which your reasoning starts". Which, of course, I don't see a problem with that, but I don't see it as a strike against Camus either. After all -- the absurdist can say the same to you, since they started their premise with the absurd. — Moliere

At the end of the day, you still must deal with survival and entertainment, in other words, the structure of one's very willing nature. The instrumentality of existence.. and how we are forced everyday to deal with our wants, needs, and contingent harms. I have sympathies with Camus' idea of the absurd, as indeed the idea of instrumentality, the absurd feeling we get when we realize our constant need to put forth the energy to pursue goals and actions in waking life. This feeling can make us question the whole human enterprise itself of maintaining upkeep, maintaining institutions, and pursuing any actions that takes up our free time simply because we are alive have no other choice. My disagreement is with his conclusion that all is well in the joyful Zen-like Sisyphus accepting his fate.

But where does Camus state that the universe is brutely material in essence and origin? — Moliere

Granted he may not state it, but I think the presumption is implicit in his view.

I would say that the context in which the essay is written explains more how the universe appears indifferent. 1940 France is when Paris was taken by the Fascists. In 1955 Camus states:

"The fundamental subject of "The Myth of Sisyphus" is this: it is legitimate and necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of suicide face to face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate. Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism".

The declaration that it is legitimate to wonder whether life has a meaning is precisely the declaration that the question should be asked and answered by the discursive rational intellect, rather than by intuition and the leap of faith. The contradictory implication in Camus is that the question both can and cannot be answered by the rational intellect. He sees this as the "absurd" situation. But what is the point of asking and attempting to answer a question using a faculty that cannot answer (and hence arguably deceives itself in even thinking it can ask) the question?

This is why Kierkegaard's 'absurd' is so very different from Camus'. It is not because K has capitulated to settle for an illegitimate answer as C would have it. It is rather that K's 'absurd' was never the characterization of the situation of the inability of the material universe to answer our intellectual questions about its meaning, but rather about our radical freedom to believe and the anxiety that freedom produces. K's 'absurd' is essentially that of the subjective condition of absolute freedom, and C's is essentially that of the absolute subjection (that is, really, the elimination or denial) of freedom to the objective condition. The two 'absurds' are actually polemical opposites.

So I would say there's even reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is posited not on the basis of a metaphysical outlook, since he eschews metaphysics in the opening -- and that, given the events in which the essay was written in, there's also reason to believe that the indifference of the universe is acutely felt due to said events. (And it is even admitted that eternal values may only be temporarily absent or distorted).

I don't find this convincing. I think there is a metaphysical presumption of the indifference of the universe or the Real, that is based on the demand that if it were not indifferent that it then should be obvious to the rational intellect that it is not indifferent, and that since such a situation is not obvious at all, that it must be concluded that the Real is indifferent and that we should henceforth live our lives in a kind of radical rebellion against this absurdity, in the light (or darkness) of the nihilism produced by that purported 'insight', rather than capitulating to believing what we are understood to have no evidence for; a capitulation that is seen as 'giving in to wishful thinking'.

For me it is ultimately an adolescent and facile conclusion, and an utterly artificial 'solution' to a pseudo-problem that has come about due the modern obsessive embrace of objectified rational conceptualization and the abnegation of our intuitive and mytho-poetic faculties.

Certainly addressing a particular case of suicide requires context, and generalizing to understand the motives for suicide requires one to reference the context (since the reasons are many, after all).

But I don't see how that's a reason to exclude suicide from philosophical contemplation. I don't see how you could argue Camus' essay belittles suicide, even if we could imagine that there are ways of belittling suicide by way of philosophical reflection. — Moliere

There is nothing called "suicide" which can be subjected to philosophical contemplation (whatever that may be). There are suicides, each of them different as they involve different individuals and circumstances. Perhaps a scientific investigation into suicides may provide some insight. But I personally feel that very few of them result from philosophical contemplation, as it seems Camus himself realized, so I wonder just how philosophical contemplation would be useful in that case.

I doubt those who seriously consider suicide would benefit at all from the philosophical contemplation of suicide. They would more likely benefit from medical/psychological contemplation and action than being told by some philosopher that they want to kill themselves because life is absurd.

There are suicides, each of them different as they involve different individuals and circumstances. Perhaps a scientific investigation into suicides may provide some insight. But I personally feel that very few of them result from philosophical contemplation, as it seems Camus himself realized, so I wonder just how philosophical contemplation would be useful in that case.

I would say that your wondering how is still not an argument against. There are clearly things we all don't understand -- but that's not a reason to exclude someone from a topic using a particular style of writing.

I doubt those who seriously consider suicide would benefit at all from the philosophical contemplation of suicide. — Ciceronianus the White

How would you measure such benefit or lack thereof, considering that you propose science as the path to possible usefulness, and that each suicide is actually terribly specific?

You doubt -- but what is your reason for doubt?

They would more likely benefit from medical/psychological contemplation and action than being told by some philosopher that they want to kill themselves because life is absurd.

I don't think you'd find anyone here who would disagree with that.

I would say that your wondering how is still not an argument against. There are clearly things we all don't understand -- but that's not a reason to exclude someone from a topic using a particular style of writing. — Moliere

But I'm not contending Camus and others shouldn't philosophically contemplate suicide. They may do so to their hearts' content (though Camus may have hesitated to assert he was content with anything). Similarly, they may contemplate the question "What is the meaning of life?" which Camus called the most important philosophical question in the same essay. I simply think suicide is a medical/psychological problem, not a philosophical one, and think philosophical contemplation of it would be no more useful than the philosophical contemplation of any mental or physical disease or condition.

You were, however, contending that to do so is to belittle suicide, no?

Without some shared agreement on what is useful I don't know if we could actually productively argue over whether this or that is useful. What, after all, would you say philosophy is useful for at all?

In the first comment you stated:

It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self. — Cavacava

However, in your excerpt of Camus' Plague there is no acceptance of anything ''beyond one's self''. There is a mere realisation that at that moment he is a doctor. Because there is no such thing as he is a doctor, or any other profession for that matter.

The doctor accepts his role as a doctor in spite of his inability to escape the absurdity of this role in the face of the irrational force of the Plague. He does not despair, he does not seek the safety of a transcendental god, he is not an existentialist, he is the ultimate realist who embraces the absurd for what it is, and he keeps on trudging up and down his own hill.

You were, however, contending that to do so is to belittle suicide, no?

Without some shared agreement on what is useful I don't know if we could actually productively argue over whether this or that is useful. What, after all, would you say philosophy is useful for at all? — Moliere

I do contend that, yes--in the same way that "philosophical contemplation" of bipolar disorder or cancer would belittle them. It would be contemplation for the personal satisfaction of the contemplator, quite unassociated with treatment of the disease and those afflicted by it. Treatment of the disease is useful; whether someone who doesn't have the disease thinks it has implications for his/her thoughts on the meaning of life (Camus' most important philosophical question) is not.

How does that square away with this:

But I'm not contending Camus and others shouldn't philosophically contemplate suicide. — Ciceronianus the White