yes.

Unless she issued a contradictory prescription.

But let's just say yes.

OK, good. So being prescribed by reason and being right are the very same.

yes. That's what I said a while back.

So you avoid the Euthyphro using "it is not possible for an act to be both prescribed by reason and also not right".

OK, so far so good.

Of course you did. It was hidden there all the time.

yes, if reason prescribes it it is right, if she proscribes it it is wrong. And if neither, then it is permitted.

SO I will move on and make use of the Open Question argument.

Given that it is not possible for an act to be both prescribed by reason and also not right, doesn't it follow that "being prescribed by reason" and "being right" mean exactly the same thing?

yes, repeatedly. Lots and lots of times. I'm still waiting for the problem.

Well, doubtless you will disagree, but this last looks to me to be just wrong.

I can quite happily contemplate the notion that is prescribed by reason is also not right.

That is, when I contemplate what is prescribed by reason, I do not seem to also be contemplating what is right.

What do you say?

it doesn't follow, no. Water is H2O but water doesn't mean H2O. Superman is Clark Kent but 'superman prescribes x' doesn't mean the same as 'Clark Kent prescribes x'

what I just said. I agree they don't mean the same

Ah. So off into modality.

Water is H2O but water doesn't mean HBO. — Bartricks

Not sure what that means.

Superman is Clark Kent but 'superman prescribes x' doesn't mean the same as 'Clark Kent prescribes x' — Bartricks

Nor this.

I agree they don't mean the same — Bartricks

SO - to deal with these modal concepts, what model will we use?

I'm for Possible World Semantics. Will that do? Or will you suggest something else?

someone could be quite sure superman prescribes X yet it remain an open question for them whether Clark Kent does. For they may not realize superman and Clark Kent are the same person.

likewise, someone can be quite sure xing is wrong yet it could remain an open question for them whether reason proscribes it. If that is an open question then that does not establish that wrongness and being proscribed by reason are not one and the same. Your objection fails.

I agree they don't mean the same — Bartricks

Looks like a mistake. I must have misunderstood.

You agreed that in every case, what is prescribed by reason is what is right.

But now you are also saying that there may be cases in which what is prescribed by reason is not right.

Are you sure?

Again, will you accept possible world semantics as a suitable way to approach these modal questions?

So in some possible world, Superman might not have been Clark Kent.

And in some possible world, an act can be prescribed by reason and yet not right.

you are conflating different claims.

I have not said that 'right' means the same as 'prescribed by reason'. I have said that if reason prescribes something it is right. Rightness and reason's prescriptions are one and the same, just as Clark Kent and superman are one and theven same. But Clark Kent doesn't mean superman which is why you van know that clark Kent likes pasta at the same time as not being sure ifor superman does.

no, in all possible world Rightness is made of reason's prescriptions.

Hmm.

Seems you might be setting back on track. Rightness and reason's prescriptions are the very same thing in all possible worlds. But there may be a world in which Superman is not Clarke Kent.

Do you agree?

I don't think there can be a possible world in which Reason doesn'the exist.

↪Banno no, in all possible world Rightness is made of reason's prescriptions. — Bartricks

OK, so back to my discomfort.

It seems to me that when I contemplate Clark Kent, I might not be contemplating Superman.

And it seems to me that when I contemplate what is right, I might not be contemplating what is prescribed by reason.

That is, even as "Clark Kent" does not have the very same meaning as "Superman", "Prescribed by reason" does not have the very same meaning as "right".

(Edit: correction.)

Sure; I will not disagree.

no I think superman rigidly designates Clark Kent. I just thought I ought to mention that I think reason exists in all possible worlds.

no I think superman rigidly designates Clark Kent. — Bartricks

But hang on - so it is not possible that Clark Kent is not Superman?

that's a side issue - you can leave it as moot if you like.

@Bartricks

SO you are saying that "what is right" rigidly designates "what is prescribed by reason"?

@Bartricks


...because for me, given an act prescribed by reason, it still remains that I might ask "is it right?"; and yet, it seems you must deny this.

We might stop there while we have a think.

Such a rebel Banno, arguing with God's Reason's prescriptions.

Come on, you gotta listen to the commands of Reason.