In reality anyone can value anything without making it morally valuable. — god must be atheist
Think of it this way: Two blind chickens are pecking at the ground, picking up small pebbles, hoping that one of the pebbles will be an edible piece of grain. One will find grain pieces repeatedly, the other will never find the grain. (Say, within a time period of an hour.) Do the grain exist, and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the one chicken that finds it see it justified to believe that the grain and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the second one find that? No. Yet the grain exists. — god must be atheist
I agree. If you value your car, it is not necessarily morally valuable. — Bartricks
My point is that the truth conditions of those judgements - so, that which would make the judgement true - is not our own valuing activity, but the valuing activity of Reason. — Bartricks
One line of reasoning may be used to establish premises for a different line of reasoning. I think you are looking at reason in too linear a fashion; it is more of an infinitely complex web or network. There is no ultimate first point in such a complex. It would be like asking which point is the centre of the universe.Note, however, that "reason" is not capable of discovering what premises to use, nor what conclusion to reach, nor what should be the derivation path between premises and conclusion. — alcontali
One line of reasoning may be used to establish premises for a different line of reasoning. I think you are looking at reason in too linear a fashion; it is more of an infinitely complex web or network. There is no ultimate first point in such a complex. It would be like asking which point is the centre of the universe. — Janus
For example, yes, I agree that morality is not empirically available. — Bartricks
According to our definitions, which is immediately sufficient for any valuings... — Mww
...not a clue what you're talking about. — Bartricks
The truth-maker of a judgement such as "Helen values X" is a valuing attitude in Helen. — Bartricks
Close but no...
Not all Helen's valuing attitudes are valuing X. — creativesoul
I said the truth condition of the judgement that Helen values X — Bartricks
I said the truth condition of the judgement that Helen values X, is a valuing attitude of Helen's. That's true. Obviously true. — Bartricks
Suit yourself. — creativesoul
a judgement such as "Helen values X" — Bartricks
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