Eh? No, the judgement is about something featuring as the object of one of Helen's attitudes - a valuing attitude.

Eh? No, the judgement is about something featuring as the object of one of Helen's attitudes - a valuing attitude. — Bartricks

Justification means that our view on Helen's attitude necessarily follows from it. What justification could you ever produce? Anything solid? Anything that other people would not be able to trivially reject?

If you cannot produce such justification, then claims about Helen's attitude must be excluded from the domain of knowledge.

As ever, I do not know what you are talking about. I think you run everything you say through a filter of prejudices about the nature of reality and this turns it into goblydigook.

As ever, I do not know what you are talking about — Bartricks

Whatever you say about Helen's attitude, it is not possibly knowledge, because there is no way in which you could ever justify it.

Yes, definitions are sufficient to value, for to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability, in this case, re: to value. Nothing inconceivable can be thought, therefore can never be valued.

But the capacity to value is not the same as to place a value. The former, as a function of understanding, and therefore the possible cognition of an object to which this particular activity would apply, is a relation category of which the principle of necessity has no part......
(If I cognize the subsistence of thing, or think the content of an idea, does not necessitate a value be inherent in it)

.......the latter, the placement or assignment of some value, as mere judgement a priori, is a modal category, of which the principle of necessity may have a significant part, for the reality of that which is to be given a value must already be presupposed, and depending on its form, or its content, may indeed require a very specific value to be assigned to it.
(When I judge a thing as beneficial for me, I absolutely must value it as good)

It still remains, as to whether there exists something valued necessarily in and of itself, something of value necessarily in and of itself, without regard to definition, form or content.

Yes, definitions are sufficient to value, for to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

And being defined/conceived...

What does that take?

For humans, self-consciousness and a rational methodology.

Well, that's just false. But do you have anything to say that actually addresses the argument of the thread? For either you agree with my argument's conclusion or you do not. If you do not then you must either think at least one premise is false or you must not realize that it is deductively valid. If the former, then say which one and present an argument - not a pronouncement - 'justifying' your doubt. If the latter, well, good luck in the world.

Well, that's just false. — Bartricks

In what way will you justify your claim about Helen's attitude?

You have absolutely no certainty about what she really values. Helen may possibly not even know it herself. Neither what you say about what Helen values, nor what Helen herself says about that, can be considered knowledge.

You would need to present two documents:

document 1) What does Helen value? Explain.
document 2) Justification for document 1

There is simply no way in which you can produce a legitimate document 2. Therefore, document 1 will always end up being considered unsubstantiated.

In what way will you justify your claim about Helen's attitude? — alcontali

I won't. Not until you justify something - say something that addresses my argument. And don't just blankly state things as if you're saying them makes them true. Appeal to some supposed self-evident truths of reason and try and raise a doubt about a premise of my argument.

Not until you justify something - say something that addresses my argument. — Bartricks

I think moral values are demonstrably subjective. — Bartricks

The term "moral values" describes rules which decide what behaviour is permissible and what is not. If these rules can be expressed in language, then they can be shared. At that point, they become shared values between people who subscribe to the same rules.

Only a subject can value something — Bartricks

"To value" in this context means "to accept a rule". If the rule is expressed in language, then even a machine can accept it. There is no need for a human subject for that. Morality expressed in (formal) language as a system of rules can perfectly be used by a machine to determine what behaviour is permissible and what is not.

What else than "to accept a rule" can "to value" mean in the context of morality? Is there any reason why you would deny that a moral "value" is simply a moral "rule"?

Those were some clever insults there - nicely done.

But seriously, I’m a kumbaya kind of person. When I see a someone assert something that looks obviously wrong, my first impulse is to find common ground and/or to try to re-phrase what that person is trying to say in my own words so as to better explain to that person how they are mistaken. I prefer not to start out by being critical, since that puts the other person into a defensive position and it makes it harder to communicate.

That said, I can see where my approach could be perceived as being disingenuous. So let me start from the beginning.

You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken.

However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic. In order to do this I will be asking you a series of questions - some of which may seem really stupid - but I have to ask them in order to make sure that there is no mis-understanding.

In asking these questions I will be dealing strictly with the underlying logic. Many other folks out here have pointed out that there are some serious semantic issues with your terms, but I will not deal with those. I will be treating your terms as abstract logical variables - so there should be no need to give any real life examples.

If you are willing to do this, then my first question is this:

Going back to your #s 1->3:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable (if P, then Q)
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable (not Q)
3. Therefore moral values are not my values (therefore not P)

We need to start off with the term “moral values”. For purposes of analyzing your logic, this must be defined as a set of individual moral values; let’s call this set Moral_Values.

Moral_Values = {mv1, mv2, . . .}

This implies that there is at least one additional set of values that are not moral; let’s call this Not_Moral_Values (for want of a better term). There is then a third set called Values which is the union of Moral_Values and Not_Moral_Values. If, for your purposes, you need to further sub-divide Not_Moral_Values into, say, Un_Values & Miscellaneous_Values, that’s OK, as long as we agree that every moral value is a member of at least one sub-set and that the set Values is the union of the subsets.

I’m using italics here so the variables stand out, but if you prefer to use a different nomenclature and/or different names for these sets and variables that’s fine.

Are we in agreement so far? If not, please clarify. BTW - if you want to continue insulting me? That’s fine too.

So prior to our first cognition... we need definitions, self-awareness, and a rational methodology.

Does that sound right to you?

Seems quite evidently wrong to me.

I have answered lots of your questions, and I still think they are not in good faith.

Anyway, be so good as to answer some of mine.

Do you think this argument is valid?

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery
2. If Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter did not necessarily go to the grocery.
3. Therefore, Bartricks Potter is not Superman.

Or do you need to put some things in sets? Or is there something wrong with the semantics?

If you think it is valid and understand what the premises mean, then just swap 'Bartricks Potter' for 'moral values' and 'Superman' for 'my values' and you've got my argument.

I have no idea what a 'hidden variable' is. And I have no idea why you think you need to talk about sets.

The word 'are' in my first premise identifies moral values with my values. That is, it means they're the same - one and the same.

I have answered lots of your questions, and I still think they are not in good faith.

Anyway, be so good as to answer some of mine.

Do you think this argument is valid?

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery
2. If Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter did not necessarily go to the grocery.
3. Therefore, Bartricks Potter is not Superman.

If you do, then just swap 'Bartricks Potter' for 'moral values' and 'Superman' for 'my values' and you've got my argument — Bartricks

Not the same argument. The original was false(not necessarily true). The new one is always true. The old lacks proper quantification. The new does not.

All your valuings count as valuings. Not all people count as superman.

Not the same argument.

It is the same argument. There is only one me.

I'll put it in terms you understand.

1. if bag of turnips is wife, then if wife go market, necessarily bag of turnips go market
2. If wife go market, bag of turnips not necessarily go market
3. Therefore, bag of turnips not wife.

The OP invokes a particular dichotomy. The objective/subjective distinction is incapable of accounting for that which is existentially dependent upon and consists in/of both, and thus is neither.

Truth. Meaning. Thought. Belief. World-views. Understanding. Etc.

If you're answering honestly... I'm sorry, but evidently you do not see where you've went wrong. Your last reply is irrelevant.

What about this argument , or did I went wrong again?


1. If picture in paper of General Mszveslescvi - war criminal wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising - is picture of me as young handsome man, then if I go to the pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, then necessarily General Mszveslescvi, war criminal wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising went to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport
2. If I go to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, General Mszvelescvi did not necessarily go to pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport.
3. Therefore, picture in paper of General Mszveslescvi is not picture of me. (I General Slvednicodo, also wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising)

There are two arguments on the table already.

There's also a chicken on it.

You're picking an individual out to the exclusion of all others... sometimes. You did not do that in the original argument.

Have no idea what the chicken reference is doing here.

If I go to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, General Mszvelescvi did not necessarily go to pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport. — Bartricks

Nonsensical meaningless use of the term "necessary". If I go somewhere, I am necessarily there.



Freudian slip?

:lol:

Got a tie?

1. if bag of turnips is wife, then if wife go market, necessarily bag of turnips go market
2. If wife go market, bag of turnips not necessarily go market
3. Therefore, bag of turnips not wife. — Bartricks

Only one wife, yeah?

:brow:

I understand the terms just fine. If wife go to market, wife is necessarily at the market.

Not the same argument as the ones being objected to. Some ad hocs are better in that some are always true.

Oh, I was just imagining lots of chickens about the place.

They are the same. Change "bag of turnips" for "moral values". Then change "wife" to "my values". It then follows that as moral values and my values are one and the same values, if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable. Note, moral values are valuings, and my values are valuings. So moral values - or valuings if you prefer - and my values - or valuings - are being identified.
If the bag or turnips and your wife are one and the same, then if your wife went to market necessarily the bag of turnips did.

I think the problem with you lot is that you in your minds - but not in my posts - you are confusing moral values with things such as moral judgements, or moral evaluations. But, like I say, that's what you're doing, not what I'm doing.

They are the same. Change "bag of turnips" for "moral values". Then change "wife" to "my values". — Bartricks

Only if all your values are moral values. Are all bags of turnips your wife?