But what I'm saying doesn't have to be objectively correct for it to be right over and above the opinion of someone who says something completely barmy, and in addition to that, erroneously suggests that all opinions are equal, when they're not. — S
The problem clearly isn't that the opinion of someone who thinks that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "M" is different to mine. I don't believe for a second that you can't see what the actual problem is. Think about the consequences! — S
I'm not saying anything like "all opinions are equal." I'd say that they're objectively equal, but that's a category error. Nothing objective evaluates opinions.
They're subjectively unequal. But that doesn't make one subject correct versus another subject when it comes to opinions. — Terrapin Station
They'd have a different opinion than you about the consequences. That's the whole point. — Terrapin Station
I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not having any crimes based on "psychological harms," and I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not banning any speech. — Terrapin Station
You suggested that they're equal when you suggested that anything goes. — S
And you suggested that when you said that the view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" would pass the test, — S
Their opinion wouldn't matter. — S
It would cause problems in terms of the consequences whether they recognise that or not. — S
How subjective of a problem is drowning, for instance?It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. — Terrapin Station
Anything goes when it comes to opinions not being correct or incorrect. That doesn't imply that I agree with them all. My disagreement, that I feel a different way, that I prefer something else, doesn't amount to me being correct.
It could pass the test of really being how an individual feels. That certainly wouldn't be impossible. — Terrapin Station
There's no correct claim re "This is a problem." It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. Different people think that different things are a problem or not. They can't get that correct or incorrect. It's not a matter of rationality. It's a matter of someone's disposition, how they feel, what they prefer. — Terrapin Station
I wasn't merely talking about whether a statement, such as, "There shouldn't be any crimes beginning with the letter 'm'", matches someone's feeling that it's right. — S
whereas I can easily point to the overwhelming evidence of how much mayhem the implementation of legalising all crimes beginning with "m" would cause. — S
Problems are undesirables. Drowning is undesirable to one's health. — Shamshir
I didn't say that's what you had in mind. I said that that was the only thing that I would think would work as a "test." — Terrapin Station
So what the heck would a "proper test" be? — Terrapin Station
A person who believes there should be no crimes starting with the letter "M" wouldn't agree that the objective facts re consequences are undesirable. — Terrapin Station
That's just like I don't agree that the objective facts re consequences of not banning speech, or not having crimes based on psychological harm are undesirable. — Terrapin Station
But it very obviously wouldn't work as a test, because it would allow all kinds of nonsense, such as no crimes beginning with "m". And if you're taking what I said out of context and talking instead about a test of whether that matches someone's feeling, then you're committing a fallacy of relevance. — S
Obviously something other than a "test" which passes literally anything conceivable, so long as it matches someone's feeling. That's a minimal requirement that you're failing on. I don't have to provide you with a more detailed proposal of how to a test should be performed to be right about that. — S
Irrelevant. — S
Things desire to move. That's obvious. — Shamshir
Another way to look at it is that I think that the idea of a "test" for one's moral stances is incoherent if one is a metaethical subjectivist/noncognitivist. — Terrapin Station
Or it's incoherent aside from "testing" that one's stances are really how one feels. — Terrapin Station
So why should I believe that there's some sort of "test" for moral stances where the idea of that would be coherent, if you don't even know an example of one? — Terrapin Station
All this is amounting to is that some stances are really, really different than anything you'd think, and you can't accept that someone might think something, feel some way, that's really, really different than how you are. — Terrapin Station
??? That's the whole nut of whether they'd think it's a problem or not. This is just the same as the discussion we've been having with schopenhauer. There are plenty of people who don't see hunger as a moral problem. schopenhauer doesn't care about that. It's a moral problem simply because HE says it is. That's the same thing you're doing here. Whether something is a problem to someone depends on how they feel about it. — Terrapin Station
I don’t think either of them are referencing an objective world with desires/subjective feeling, but rather an objective standard that makes sense from a premise or axiom.
So you are focused on how one values or feels about, say, not dying. They are talking about what makes sense (regardless of feeling) with the subjective value as the premise or axiom. Once you (subjectively) determine the value of not dying, certain things either make sense to that end or do not, and can be correct or incorrect on whether it leads to dying.
In moral terms, replace “not dying” with something like “flourishing well being of mankind” or “maximum happiness”. Even if you think those terms are nebulous, what is meant by each can be refined case by case and what it means to achieve or service that premise either makes sense or it doesnt. — DingoJones
That's suggests that anyone who is a metaethical subjectivist or noncognitivist must adhere to the senseless 'anything goes' version which you yourself adhere to. — S
You have a burden to either argue against that or concede, — S
No, that's a fundamental misunderstanding on your part. I've already made it crystal clear that I understand and accept that there are different stances, including those which are really, really different. — S
because it's a problem beyond the disagreement you're pointing to. It doesn't even have to be objective — S
Descriptively, at least potentially anything could go. In other words, someone could have just about any imaginable stance. — Terrapin Station
Evaluatively, no one thinks "anything goes," because people always have preferences. Our preferences can't serve as a test of correctness for other people unless we're unbelievably egotistical/self-centered. — Terrapin Station
In terms of correct/incorrect, we could say "anything goes," but the realm of "correct/incorrect" is the wrong realm for this stuff. That's the whole idea of noncognitivism. — Terrapin Station
Based on . . . .? — Terrapin Station
The test you proposed above has no motivation or support behind it aside from the fact that you find the idea of that stance too different. — Terrapin Station
So what's the beyond? Is this just you kowtowing to the crowd again? — Terrapin Station
You are just referencing back to the subjective premiss. Sure, if you dont want to be consistent, or be rational, or operate within reason then there is nothing that forces you to do so. These are things that are subjective, choices based on how you feel about something if that's the way you want to put it.
Im not talking about that, and I dont S is either. — DingoJones
You're talking past me again, — S
You would need to successfully argue the point that those terms can't apply in the way that I think they can. — S
Based on proper conduct — S
That's not true. — S
We call things problems if they're generally considered problematic based on a number of things a large enough number of people have in common. You're doing that thing again where you act as though you haven't a clue about ordinary language use. — S
Yes, that's more or the less a problem we've been having. I'm saying, sure, metaethical subjectivism, but let's be sensible. He's basically saying, no, that's not metaethical subjectivism, metaethical subjectivism must not be sensible. Some people aren't sensible, and a test fit for purpose should pass those views, not reject them as sensible people would. — S
There's nothing else to talk about, though. — Terrapin Station
There is though, — DingoJones
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.