For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued — Bartricks
It is you - not I - who keeps mentioning God. My argument leads to the conclusion that moral values are the values of a subject, Reason.
She is a god. Why? Because she's Reason. It's that way around. She's a not a god and so she's Reason. She's Reason and so she's a god. 'A god' not 'God'. Again, it is you - your ears - that are hearing 'God' every time I say 'a god'. It derails things as it invites a discussion of religious matters not relevant to my case.
I am interested in what's true. I am interested in what moral values and prescriptions are. I have simply discovered that they are the values and prescriptions of a person. And because moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of Reason, I have discovered that Reason is a person.
That person, precisely because she is the one whose values constitute moral values, and precisely because she is the one whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of reason, is a god. I mean, she determines what's morally valuable. We have reason to pursue our own interests because and only because she says so. And what's true seems to be constitutively determined by her as well. For what is truth apart from what Reason asserts to be the case?
So Reason, this agent, this subject who is herself and not anyone else, seems to me to be omnipotent. She can make anything true. She can do anything. So, I think it is beyond dispute that she's a god. But 'God'? Well, I don't know and I don't care. But 'a god' certainly.
And as for the Euthyphro question, well I have started a thread on it as it is the only concern that, in my view, is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about my case's soundness. Ultimately it fails to do this, I think, but for not-immediately-obvious reasons. On its face, then, it seems like a good objection.
The answer to the Euthyphro question is, of course, not open to negotiation - the god determines what's right. I mean, that's just the view.
The 'problem' that this raises is that it means that moral values and prescriptions (and the other prescriptions of Reason) will be variable.
I don't think that is a problem, but I admit that it appears to be. — Bartricks
1. if being loved by Superman is one and the same as being loved by me, then if I love you necessarily Superman loves you
2. If I love you Superman does not necessarily love you
3. therefore being loved by Superman is not one and the same as being loved by me. — Bartricks
It also refutes any subset of human valuings that you may care to try and identify moral values with. — Bartricks
...to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww
To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability. That's your words.
— creativesoul
No, actually, they are not. Not quite.
(To be defined).....is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground.....
Those are my words. Please recognize the temporal displacement native to the statement.
——————— — Mww
Identify a subset then - a subset of your values - and let's see if it works. — Bartricks
Say which subset of your values you want to identify moral values with and we'll take it from there. — Bartricks
And I've been saying OVER AND OVER that I'm talking about whether it's physically possible for there to be something not "able" to be either positively or negatively valued. — Terrapin Station
The brain (which does the valuing) is just a machine. I can't think of any good reason at all not to think that the limits and trends we observe in psychology are limits and trends imposed by the physical make up of that machine.
Valuing is a thing that machine does, so I don't see any reason not to presume that the limits and trends we observe (with respect to valuing) are not limits and trends imposed by the machine.
We have not yet observed an undamaged brain morally valuing a pile of sick, we have a sound theory as to the mechanism that might cause such a limit, so it's completely reasonable to hold the theory that a pile of sick is not morally valuable (ie cannot be valued by the machine that does valuing). — Isaac
I asked you why you were bringing up the idea of "healthy"/"undamaged" (I know why, but I want you to address the crap you're trying to "sneak in"), and you first responded with some oblique nonsense without answering the question, and here you bring it up again. — Terrapin Station
I'm saying that moral valuing can reasonably be said to be an activity that healthy, undamaged minds do. Healthy, undamaged minds are machines, the range of possible functions of which are limited. It is not unreasonable to form theories about what those limits might be based on our observations. One of those theories might well be to do with the limits of what it is possible for these brains to morally value. — Isaac
So what would be something that you believe it would be physically impossible to positively or negatively value? — Terrapin Station
I'd say it's impossible for an undamaged infant brain to negatively value it's caregiver. — Isaac
all of this Aspieish crap, and you don't answer one friggin question. — Terrapin Station
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