What do you mean by "numerically distinct"? If there are differences, what are the difference between them? These differences could amount to the act being morally unacceptable on one and morally acceptable on the other.

Well, I mean they are not one and the same world. So, they differ either in terms of their spatial or temporal properties (or both).

Doesn't your reason tell you that the two acts must be morally identical?

Doesn't your reason tell you that the two acts must be morally identical? — Bartricks

No, because the acts are carried out on different planets with differences between them so reason tells me that they are not identical. If they are not identical acts, then why say that they are morally identical?

They differ either temporally or spatially or both, that is true. So you are saying that two acts that differ in no non-moral way at all apart from temporally - one occurs at 3pm and the other at 4pm - can differ morally?
And/or that two acts that differ in no non-moral way at all apart from spatially - so, one happens to your left, the other to your right - can differ morally?

A similar act in different circumstances cannot be called the same act. They may have different intent. Therefore it is possible that they could differ morally.

No, they have the same intent. Again: imagine two acts that are identical in every way apart from spatially and or temporally. Not hard.

I mean, if I ask you to imagine a car identical to yours in every way apart from it is in another location, would you find that difficult? Would you say "er, but then it is not the same car" - yes, I know. Not the same car. But similar in every way - apart from it is over there.

Am I in a primary school? Are you 5? Imagine two acts - two, not one, two - that are identical in every non-moral way apart from spatially or temporally. Will they be morally identical as well? So, if act A is wrong, does act B have to be too.

Again: imagine two acts that are identical in every way apart from spatially and or temporally. Not hard. — Bartricks

Yes it is hard. I find it to be impossible. This is like saying imagine two people who are exactly alike except they are different. It's nonsense.

I mean, if I ask you to imagine a car identical to yours in every way apart from it is in another location, would you find that difficult? Would you say "er, but then it is not the same car" - yes, I know. Not the same car. But similar in every way - apart from it is over there. — Bartricks

Cars don't have intention. Anyway, I'd say that the two cars were not exactly alike, they have a different serial number to begin with, and they've both been used in different ways with different wear and tear.

Imagine two acts - two, not one, two - that are identical in every non-moral way apart from spatially or temporally. — Bartricks

Sorry, but I find that you are asking me to imagine the impossible, like a square circle. It's nonsense, it can be said, but not imagined.

Yes, all excellent points. Have you considered joining the army?

No, they have the same intent. Again: imagine two acts that are identical in every way apart from spatially and or temporally. Not hard.

I mean, if I ask you to imagine a car identical to yours in every way apart from it is in another location, would you find that difficult? Would you say "er, but then it is not the same car" - yes, I know. Not the same car. But similar in every way - apart from it is over there.

Am I in a primary school? Are you 5? Imagine two acts - two, not one, two - that are identical in every non-moral way apart from spatially or temporally. Will they be morally identical as well? So, if act A is wrong, does act B have to be too. — Bartricks

Aren't you familiar with nominalism?

Imagine that Tim smacks Susan in the face for a laugh. That act is wrong, right? — Bartricks

It depends on who you ask, of course.

In my personal view, it actually depends on just how the one person smacks (or whatever they do to) the other. If it's not something that would leave macro-observable effects past, say, 72 hours, then no, I wouldn't say that's wrong.

I think people overreact and tend to have ridiculously draconian policies about this sort of stuff. Not every nonconsensual act, no matter how minor, is morally wrong or should be legally prohibited.

No. Don't tell me about it.

Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything. Twin acts, as it were. If one is wrong, mustn't the other one be too?

Just answer that question and resist the temptation to try and educate me.

Oh good grief.

Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything. Twin acts, as it were. If one is wrong, mustn't the other one be too? — Bartricks

On my view--I'm a nominalist--numerically distinct things can not be identical in any respect.

Re the ethical question, things are only wrong or not wrong to a particular individual. There's nothing to say that a given individual couldn't judge act 1 morally wrong while judging numerically distinct but similar (what we could loosely call "the same") act 2 not morally wrong. If we can't figure out why that individual might judge them differently, we can ask them.

Oh blimey.

Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. — Bartricks

Problem is, these are not two acts. You are referring to one and the same act, and calling it "two acts". That's why your premise is self-contradicting.

Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything. — Bartricks

This presupposes that intentions and consequences are "non-moral respects." Does anyone actually believe that?

no it doesn't. It just means that when I stipulate that the two acts are identical in all respects apart from spatially and/or temporally I am not stipulating that they are morally identical. They are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences. Now if one is wrong the other will be too. Or so says the reason of those capable of imagining such thing. Two acts that are non-morally identical will be morally identical too.

when I stipulate that the two acts are identical in all respects apart from spatially and/or temporally I am not stipulating that they are morally identical. — Bartricks

So two acts must be spatially and/or temporally identical in order to be morally identical?

They are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences. — Bartricks

In order to claim that two acts are not morally identical, even though they are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences, one must presuppose that intentions and consequences are non-moral respects--as I said before.

Two acts that are non-morally identical will be morally identical too. — Bartricks

Because you say so? According to your own rules, you need to provide a valid syllogism with this as its conclusion and premisses that are confirmed by rational intuitions.

Oh my goodness!! Focus.

First, a wholly non-moral example. Imagine two physical objects. Two, note, not one. But imagine that these objects occupy the same amount of space and have the same composition and the same colour.

Do they have to have the same shape? That is, if two objects occupy the same amount of space, do they have to have the same shape?

Well, no. Obviously not. Two physical objects can be identical in every way apart from having different shapes, yes?

Now, imagine two actions. These two actions have the same consequences (they both result in an innocent person's death, say). They are both performed with the same intentions. Now, do they both have to have the same morality? That is, if one is wrong, must the other be wrong too?

Don't - don't - say "oh, but one might have an extra consequence that the other didn't" or 'oh, but one was performed with a different intention". No, I have stipulated that this is not so, just as I stipulated that the two physical objects occupy the same amount of space.

Now, given that they are identical in terms of their intentions and consequences, must they have the same morality?

Virtually everyone - I mean, virtually everyone - gets the rational intuition that they do. And this is expressed in the following way: two acts that are identical in all of their non-moral features will be morally identical as well.

What does this tell us - or seem to tell us? Well, it seems to tell us that actions have their morality of necessity, not contingently.

Return to shape - two objects can be identical in every way apart from shape. That is, there can be brute shape differences. We can say of A and B - well, they are identical in every way, apart from shape.

But we can't do that in terms of moral properties. We do not seem able coherently to say that two acts can be identical in every way apart from that one was right and the other wrong.

One act can be wrong and the other right, but there must be some non-moral difference between them to account for that difference.

So, if act A is right and act B is wrong, then either act A was performed with a different intention or it had different consequences - and that explains why it is right whereas B is wrong.

But someone who said "no, A and B are exactly the same apart from morally" seems to be confused.

Also, try and follow the dialectic here. The thesis above - the thesis that two acts cannot differ in their moral properties alone - is a thesis that poses a serious problem for MY view.

it is the thesis whose truth undergirds the Euthyphro problem.

For if moral properties are necessary properties, then my view is in trouble, as if my view is true then moral properties are contingent properties.

If you are already convinced that moral properties are contingent properties, then you cannot consistently think that the Euthyphro criticism works. And in that case I simply refer you to the arguments I used to establish the truth of my view - a view you now have no basis for rejecting.

On the other hand, if you think that moral properties are indeed necessary properties, then you will think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one.

must they have the same morality?

Virtually everyone - I mean, virtually everyone - gets the rational intuition that they do — Bartricks

To the extent that you've actually done a survey on this--posting your present comments in this thread, it seems like no one other than you thinks they must have the same morality.

Now, imagine two actions. These two actions have the same consequences (they both result in an innocent person's death, say). They are both performed with the same intentions. Now, do they both have to have the same morality? That is, if one is wrong, must the other be wrong too? — Bartricks

Good and bad are measured by degree, that's why there are differing punishment sentences for "the same" criminal act. It is the fact that each of these acts in your example, results in an innocent person's death which makes them both wrong. But the degree of wrongness may vary such that one is worse than the other.

Now, given that they are identical in terms of their intentions and consequences, must they have the same morality? — Bartricks

No, there could still be other factors specific to the circumstances which makes one worse than the other, therefore they would not have the same morality.

Virtually everyone - I mean, virtually everyone - gets the rational intuition that they do. — Bartricks

So this is false, by the argument above. I think virtually everyone would get the idea that one act would be worse than the other, depending on the circumstances.

But we can't do that in terms of moral properties. We do not seem able coherently to say that two acts can be identical in every way apart from that one was right and the other wrong. — Bartricks

Just as you did before, you are misrepresenting morality. Morality is based in judgements of degree, so it is not the case that every good act is morally equivalent to every other good act, nor is it the case that every morally bad act is morally equivalent to every other morally bad act. So the fact that two similar acts are both morally bad doesn't imply that they are morally identical.

In conclusion, just because two acts are bad doesn't mean that they are morally identical.

So, if act A is right and act B is wrong, then either act A was performed with a different intention or it had different consequences - and that explains why it is right whereas B is wrong. — Bartricks

But act A may differ morally from act B even if they are both bad. So you start from a false premise, that if two acts are bad, they are morally identical.

You have the internet. Do some research.

Omg, this is just too painful. No, there can't be 'other factors'. The whole point is that the two acts are identical in every way apart from that one is right and the other wrong.

Now that, to most people, is impossible. Two acts cannot be identical in every way apart from morally.

If two acts differ morally, then they must differ in some other respect as well - they must have been performed with different intentions, have slightly different conseequences and so forth.

You are confirming this without realizing that you are.

Omg, this is just too painful. No, there can't be 'other factors'. The whole point is that the two acts are identical in every way apart from that one is right and the other wrong. — Bartricks

How can you not see that you're talking nonsense? If they are identical then they are not two acts but one and the same act. You are starting with an impossible premise.

So two meals can't be identical? It is called qualitative identity rather than quantitative identity.

Imagine two acts that are identical in terms of the intentions with which - nope, not bothering. I've written it umpteen times and your comprehension skills are just below the level needed to grasp this kind of thing.

Again, have you considered the army? Pick up a crayon, put it in your fist and fill out an application form. It's all yes/no questions, or you can just put in a smiley face for yes, and a sad face for no.

So two meals can't be identical? It is called qualitative identity rather than quantitative identity. — Bartricks

If we're talking about qualitative identity, then only one quality need be the same in order that we call it "the same", the same colour, the same weight, the same length, etc. Or even if two things appear similar we might say that they are the same. But you said that everything describable about the supposed "two" acts are the same, so you clearly weren't talking about qualitative identity.

Face the facts Bartricks, you're trying to put forward an argument which fails, as unsound, because it begins in an impossible premise.

Crayon. Fist. Application form. The front line of a war somewhere is crying out for you.

You have the internet. Do some research — Bartricks

You've got a keyboard. Be able to support claims that you forward.

Citation please.

Citation please. — Bartricks

You're saying you don't have a keyboard? Or maybe you don't know if you do?