...a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww
Did I answer your initial question to your satisfaction? — creativesoul
What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily? — Mww
It needs only to meet our definitions. — creativesoul
No, as I have pointed out repeatedly, you have presupposed that by defining the terms accordingly. An objectivist maintains instead that some things are morally valuable by virtue of possessing intrinsic value, regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone.I have established that moral values must be the values of a subject. That is, to be morally valuable is to be being valued by someone. — Bartricks
No, I think that anyone who claims to have accomplished this is either joking or delusional.You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — Bartricks
↪Happenstance
I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. But what you've said seems plainly false.
Q says "if I value something, [then] necessarily it is morally valuable"
The negation of Q is not "if I don't value something, necessarily it is not morally valuable". That's not the opposite of Q at all, but Q again.
The negation of Q is "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable" — Bartricks
IF C THEN NECESSARILY D
~Q = ~(IF C THEN NECESSARILY D)
No, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to have that property regardless of whether anyone actually values it at all.For something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to be being valued for its own sake. — Bartricks
No, there does not; that is what "intrinsic" means. Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. Likewise, the earth is round(ish) even if no one actually ascribes the property of roundness to it. In other words, the objectivist holds that there are real moral facts, much like real physical facts.There still needs to be a valuer. — Bartricks
That indicates a lot more about you than about the arguments.I used to be an objectivist about moral value. Then I discovered the arguments I have presented above. I could not refute them. — Bartricks
I have told you repeatedly--#1, since the intrinsic property of being morally valuable does not require actually being valued by anyone. When you begin by defining the terms in accordance with subjectivism, of course you wind up with a conclusion that affirms subjectivism.Which premise do you deny? — Bartricks
You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — BartricksNo, I think that anyone who claims to have accomplished this is either joking or delusional. — aletheist
It's obvious to me that the compendium of behaviours and attitudes we associate with the word 'morality' is a function of the forces which govern interelationships vital to humans as a cooperative species. — fresco
No more so than your definition of "valuable" as "being valued." As I keep pointing out, the debate is not about the arguments, but the premisses--in this case, the definitions of key terms in the first place.That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. — Bartricks
No, to insist that being valued by something/someone is a strict prerequisite for anything to be valuable is to beg the question. The subjectivist must maintain that all moral values are subjective in that way. By contrast, the objectivist need only maintain that some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not a matter of why something is valued, but of whether it has to be valued at all in order to be morally valuable.Thus, to insist that intrinsic moral value is 'objective' - to build that into the definition, when clearly we od not need to as we can distinguish between our own intrinsic and extrinsic valuings - is to beg the question. — Bartricks
Other than the multiple times I have explained that being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. Your whole argument hinges on this contested definition.And you have yet to point to any one of those numbers that does not correspond to something reason clearly says. — Bartricks
Right back at you.So at this point I think you're very unreasonable. — Bartricks
That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. — BartricksNo more so than your definition of "valuable" as "being valued." As I keep pointing out, the debate is not about the arguments, but the premisses--in this case, the definitions of key terms in the first place. — aletheist
How many times do I have to repeat that I deny your #1 because I reject the definitions of terms that it presupposes? Here is my deductively valid argument, since you seem to think that providing one makes a difference.If you want to deny a premise, do so - but say which one you are denying and then provide a deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion. — Bartricks
There are only two possibilities where moral value is concerned: it is subjective or objective. — Bartricks
On the contrary, my #2 is not substantively different from what I have been repeatedly saying all along:Ah, well done for changing what you're saying and then thinking I won't notice! — Bartricks
being morally valuable is a quality that is external to any subject ... regardless of whether anyone properly recognizes it. — aletheist
there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist
actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist
to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist
"being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist
some things are morally valuable ... regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone. — aletheist
Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. — aletheist
some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them ... being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. — aletheist
2. Some things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued. — aletheist
Sigh. I never once said that your argument was valid. But you're engaging in many cross discussions, so perhaps you mixed me up with someone else.Now, in plain English, once more, is the argument I made valid? You have said that it is. — Bartricks
You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken. However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic — EricH
I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. — Bartricks
you have made it clear that not only are deeply ignorant of basic Predicate and First Order Logic but that you have no desire to educate yourself. That's a shame.I don't know what a truth table is — Bartricks
if I am already entirely familiar with the content of my rationality by my inescapable acquaintance with it, why in the hell do I have to think about it in terms of their respective definitions, which you explicate as “thinking about one’s own thought/belief”? Only in the telling, methinks, never in the doing. — Mww
So.....tell me all about the subjectivity of moral values. In 30 words or less. — Mww
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