The Subjectivity of Moral Values

Happenstance

@Echarmion is right, your argument is valid (known as a reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof, not modus tollens) but it is trivial. All you're basically stating is that not all values are moral values and the example of liking cats rather than dogs is enough to show that what you're saying is trivial. To paraphrase Leonard Euler: sometimes an example is as good as a proof.

You seem to be using value intransitively thinking that it is independent from a subject and then using value transitively, justifying subjective, thinking it 'refutes all subjectivist views bar mine' if the argument is valid, which is just baffling. Logic is a great tool for rational discourse and so is a hammer a great tool, but I don't think everything is a nail!

↪EricH

Yeah typing all them symbols out is tiresome but, like yourself probably, I read what seems as @Bartricks nay-saying all talk of semantics and so I decided to tackle the syntactic of his arguments but this seems of no use either. :sad:

Mww

↪creativesoul

You are correct about the spatial ordering of the words of the statement. I asked you to be aware of a temporal order.

I apologize for not making it understood I meant the temporal order native to the statement to reference the cognizant temporal order the terms of the statement represent.

If that makes no difference, we can either drop it, or you might explain to me what is so damn problematic, and why it is so.

creativesoul

...a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

That's the problem because it is not true. Consider when one is thinking about one's own thought/belief. I know you come from a Kantian framework. Kant can't account for the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Not a big deal.

Did I answer your initial question to your satisfaction?

Mww

Did I answer your initial question to your satisfaction? — creativesoul

On pg 24, my initial question was......

What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily? — Mww

......and you answered.....

It needs only to meet our definitions. — creativesoul

......then, sorry, no. Well......sorta. I understand you must define such a value before you could tell me what you think it is, and, subsequently, I must conceive the object you’ve defined in order to understand if I possess it.

Irrespective of a Kantian framework, I submit it is a natural condition of being human that there exists a sub-system of intrinsic values necessarily incorporated into the cognitive apparatus, and furthermore, its reality and my use of it can’t in any way be concerned with how I define it. And would I ever define it at all, if I had no occassion to talk about it? Why would I, when I already know all about it by acquaintance.

Which inevitably leads us to the crux: if I am already entirely familiar with the content of my rationality by my inescapable acquaintance with it, why in the hell do I have to think about it in terms of their respective definitions, which you explicate as “thinking about one’s own thought/belief”? Only in the telling, methinks, never in the doing.

So.....tell me all about the subjectivity of moral values. In 30 words or less.

Bartricks

↪Happenstance

It isn't trivial. I have established that moral values must be the values of a subject. That is, to be morally valuable is to be being valued by someone. I have then established that the valuer is not you or I. How is that trivial?
I cannot conceive of a less trivial conclusion! I think you have no grip on what is and is not significant. You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?!

aletheist

I have established that moral values must be the values of a subject. That is, to be morally valuable is to be being valued by someone. — Bartricks

No, as I have pointed out repeatedly, you have presupposed that by defining the terms accordingly. An objectivist maintains instead that some things are morally valuable by virtue of possessing intrinsic value, regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone.

You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — Bartricks

No, I think that anyone who claims to have accomplished this is either joking or delusional.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

You are going to say that about any argument that has any premises - so, you know, all arguments. Any argument for anything whatsoever - no matter how profound and important that argument - all you are going to do is point out that it has assumptions.

All. Arguments. Make. Assumptions. The issue is whether those assumptions can reasonably be denied.

In the case of my argument, they can't. Which is, you know, kinda significant.

You talk about intrinsic value. So, er, 'moral' value, then! My argument is about what that value is - what it is made of. I know that some things are intrinsically morally valuable. Where have I denied that? I am showing what it is made of, not denying its existence.

For something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to be being valued for its own sake. There still needs to be a valuer. And the valuer is demonstrably not me or you. Same argument. Same conclusion.

Imagine I have said that cheese is made of milk. You say "ah, but Edam is cheese". Yes. I know. And it is made of milk.

You then say "ah, but those who deny that cheese is made of milk will deny that it is made of milk"

Yes, but I have this evidence that it is made of milk - it is demonstrably made of milk.

You: yes, but those who deny that cheese is made of milk will deny it.

on and on.

Anyway, you don't get to speak on behalf of others. Why assume that an objectivist will reject my argument?

two points.

A) why think they will? If they're proper philosophers and they cannot refute the arguments I have presented, then why think they'll stubbornly stick to their original thesis? You're assuming they're all like you. That is, so wed to their original view that they won't give it up for love nor money. But they may not be.

I used to be an objectivist about moral value. Then I discovered the arguments I have presented above. I could not refute them. I concluded that moral value is therefore subjective and that I had quite the wrong view about it.

Why think that objectivist moral philosophers won't do that?

B) Obviously - obviously - an objectivist must deny a premise of my argument. I mean, that's why the argument disproves objectivism!

Which one and on what basis? Don't just keep telling me about what an objectivist will or will not do. Put some skin in the game. Challenge a premise.

And don't think you're doing that by just mentioning intrinsic value. Again, intrinsic value is a kind of moral value and my argument is about every kind - every kind - of moral value.

Which premise do you deny?

EricH

↪Happenstance
I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. But what you've said seems plainly false.

Q says "if I value something, [then] necessarily it is morally valuable"

The negation of Q is not "if I don't value something, necessarily it is not morally valuable". That's not the opposite of Q at all, but Q again.

The negation of Q is "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable" — Bartricks

Your last statement is incorrect. That is not the negation of Q. Statement Q is an inference - it is in the form

IF C THEN NECESSARILY D

Notice that I am keeping the word necessarily in here, per your insistance,

In order to negate an inference (your Q) you need to negate the full inference, not just part of it. This means that

~Q = ~(IF C THEN NECESSARILY D)

In plain language that translates to "It is not the case that if I value something, [then] necessarily it is morally valuable"

This is very different than "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable". If you set up the truth tables you can verify this for yourself.

If you do not believe me or otherwise think I'm wrong, please google negating an inference and show me a logical framework that says otherwise.

Bartricks

↪Echarmion

Premise 2 is self-evidently true.

Consider this premise: if I say something is true, it is not necessarily true.

Does that need justifying, in your view? No, it doesn't. It is obviously true - that is, its truth is manifest to reason.

imagine someone saying "ah, but what about a subset of things I say"

Okay - what subset? (And you can't invoke truth, of course, for that would be circular).

Identify the subset and let's test it.

Things you say on Saturday? Are things you say on Saturday 'necessarily' true just by dint of you saying them on Saturday? Nope.

And on and on.

Justifications have to come to an end, otherwise nothing will be justified. What is the appropriate stopping point? When you have found that your view is manifest to reason.

It is manifest to reason that this argument form is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. therefore not P.

Now, that does not mean it is valid. But it does mean that in terms of justifying our belief in its validity, its self-evidence suffices.

If someone held that that argument form is invalid, then they would have the burden of proof. They may be able to discharge it. But note, in discharging it they too would have to appeal to some self-evident truths of reason, including the self-evident truth of reason that contradictions cannot be true.

So the currency of arguments is self-evident truths of reason.

Premise 2 is self-evidently true.

You want to deny it. Be my guest. But provide an argument. That is, show me that the self-evident truth of 2 conflicts with some even more abundantly self-evident truth of reason.

aletheist

For something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to be being valued for its own sake. — Bartricks

No, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it to have that property regardless of whether anyone actually values it at all.

There still needs to be a valuer. — Bartricks

No, there does not; that is what "intrinsic" means. Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. Likewise, the earth is round(ish) even if no one actually ascribes the property of roundness to it. In other words, the objectivist holds that there are real moral facts, much like real physical facts.

I used to be an objectivist about moral value. Then I discovered the arguments I have presented above. I could not refute them. — Bartricks

That indicates a lot more about you than about the arguments.

Which premise do you deny? — Bartricks

I have told you repeatedly--#1, since the intrinsic property of being morally valuable does not require actually being valued by anyone. When you begin by defining the terms in accordance with subjectivism, of course you wind up with a conclusion that affirms subjectivism.

Bartricks

↪EricH

potato, potarto.

The argument is valid, yes? Or do we have to go through this again. I don't know what a truth table is, but I do know not to trust what you say about arguments.

Now, in plain English, once more, is the argument I made valid? You have said that it is. Are you now changing that position - because I am getting fed up of having my premises either changed (and then told that the changed one means the argument is invalid) or being told a lot of technical stuff about arguments only to eventually have it turn out that my argument is valid.

You know how I test whether an argument is valid? I don't use symbols or truth tables or anything like that. I think about it. I use my reason.

Now, my argument is valid. Put brackets here there and everywhere, change where you put the word necessary - either you will be changing the meaning of my premise, in which case it is not the same argument you are assessing, or you're going to find that it is still valid. That's my bet. So far I have been winning my bet.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. (Although I agree that we have the intuition that those things that are intrinsically morally valuable are morally valuable irrespective of whether anyone values them, and I agree that that presents a challenge to my case - but that's different).

We can distinguish between subjective and objective intrinsic value. That is, the 'objective/subjective' distinction is orthogonal to the 'intrinsic' 'extrinsic' distinction. (Hence why you have begged the question).

To see this, forget moral values and focus instead on our valuing activity.

Some things are valuable as means. Money, for example. I value money, but not in and of itself (I could - some people do - but I don't). I value it because of what it can do for me. So for me money has value extrinsically.

And then there are some things that I value not as means, but just in themselves. I value them just because of what they are, rather than what they can do for me. that is, I value them in virtue of their intrinsic properties, rather than their extrinsic properties.

So, there are things I value extrinsically, and there are things I value intrinsically. And the former presupposes the latter - that is, to value anything extrinsically there would seem to need to be some things you value intrinsically that the things you value extrinsically are means to.

The distinction, then, between intrinsic value and extrinsic value is not a distinction between a valuing being objective or subjective, but between the nature of the valuing - that is, whether it is a valuing of something for its own sake, or a valuing of something for what it can achieve.

Thus, to insist that intrinsic moral value is 'objective' - to build that into the definition, when clearly we od not need to as we can distinguish between our own intrinsic and extrinsic valuings - is to beg the question.

fresco

I'm bemused by the longevity of this 'logical claptrap' from so called 'proper philosophers' !

It's obvious to me that the compendium of behaviours and attitudes we associate with the word 'morality' is a function of the forces which govern interelationships vital to humans as a cooperative species. Our understanding of those relationship vectors may have 'objective' genetic correlates in terms of survival value, and 'subjective' social correlates in terms of idiosyncratic variation of 'moral behaviour' within and between groups and individuals on different occasions. It is totally pointless to argue for the predominance of either side of the subjective-objective dichotomy on the basis of 'value', as value, like that of 'currency' depends on the shifting contexts of usage.

Obviously, the investors in the ongoing language games about this (the 'proper philosophers' :razz: ) will be annoyed by interruptions to their recreatIonal activity. Let them carry on by all means,...after all, they can always consign dissenters like me into the 'improper philosophy' polar region !

Bartricks

↪aletheist

You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — BartricksNo, I think that anyone who claims to have accomplished this is either joking or delusional. — aletheist

If someone did that - that is, actually did lay waste every metaethical theory bar one with five simple, self-evident premises - how would you tell?

If someone thinks they have won the lottery with 5 numbers, then the chances are very low that they have - probably a million to one or something.

Does that mean that if someone says they have won the lottery you are justified in disbelieving them?

if someone said "I am going to win the lottery tonite" then, I grant you, it is not reasonable - not remotely - to believe that they will, no matter what degree of confidence they have in the matter. For the odds are just too low.

But if someone says "I have won the lottery" and then shows you their ticket, and you can see that their ticket appears to have written on it the numbers that appear to have just been called on the lottery draw, then I think you are unreasonable if you continue to believe that they haven't just because the odds of that having happened were so low. Don't you? I mean, they appear to have won. They have all the marks of a winner.

Now, I have said that I have won the lottery. And I have outlined the five winning numbers - the five that, together, lead to something amazing (or 'trivial' if you are Happenstance). And I have asked you to check that they correspond to things reason says. And you have yet to point to any one of those numbers that does not correspond to something reason clearly says.

So at this point I think you're very unreasonable. You've rendered yourself incapable of recognising lottery winners when they come along. And, indeed, incapable of recognising when or if you've won the lottery.

Bartricks

↪fresco

It's obvious to me that the compendium of behaviours and attitudes we associate with the word 'morality' is a function of the forces which govern interelationships vital to humans as a cooperative species. — fresco

Well that's precisely why you shouldn't sniff glue. Things that are false - indeed, incoherent - will appear obviously true to you and other things (such as why no-one else is listening to what the lamppost is saying) will bemuse you and seem like just so much 'claptrap' as you put it.

I have presented a deductively valid argument that establishes an astonishing conclusion. But you're a continental wannabe and so you're already convinced you know it all and that the Enlightenment was a bad thing and that reasoning is just a tool nasty westerners use to oppress tribes and everything would be so much better if we all just found a guru - someone who's bald and wears sunglasses, or perhaps someone who sniffs glue and lives under a bridge - who knows next to nothing but who makes up for it with alarming confidence and charisma. Something like that - that's the gist, isn't it?

aletheist

That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. — Bartricks

No more so than your definition of "valuable" as "being valued." As I keep pointing out, the debate is not about the arguments, but the premisses--in this case, the definitions of key terms in the first place.

Thus, to insist that intrinsic moral value is 'objective' - to build that into the definition, when clearly we od not need to as we can distinguish between our own intrinsic and extrinsic valuings - is to beg the question. — Bartricks

No, to insist that being valued by something/someone is a strict prerequisite for anything to be valuable is to beg the question. The subjectivist must maintain that all moral values are subjective in that way. By contrast, the objectivist need only maintain that some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not a matter of why something is valued, but of whether it has to be valued at all in order to be morally valuable.

And you have yet to point to any one of those numbers that does not correspond to something reason clearly says. — Bartricks

Other than the multiple times I have explained that being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. Your whole argument hinges on this contested definition.

So at this point I think you're very unreasonable. — Bartricks

Right back at you.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. — BartricksNo more so than your definition of "valuable" as "being valued." As I keep pointing out, the debate is not about the arguments, but the premisses--in this case, the definitions of key terms in the first place. — aletheist

No, I am not going patiently to explain again why the 'intrinsic/extrinsic' distinction is quite different from the 'objective/subjective' distinction. If you don't want to engage with my explanations, that's fine - well, no it isn't, it is rude - but there's really no more I can do for you on that front.

My argument is not question begging. But you seem not to know what that means. You sometimes say things that indicate you do, but in practice you don't.

I mean, your argument - if we're generous enough to call it that - is "intrinsic moral value is objective moral value. Therefore moral value is objective.

That's question begging. Unquestionably question begging.

Contrary to what you assert (with that characteristic combination of ignorance and confidence that defines most people here), when it comes to assessing argument is it not all about the presmises. You first assess whether the argument is valid, then you assess the premises.

If you want to deny a premise, do so - but say which one you are denying and then provide a deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion.

You haven't done that. You've just asserted false things about intrinsic value - you've just confidently confused it with objective value, as already explained.

But just go on asserting things. You know, you can't be wrong, can you?

aletheist

If you want to deny a premise, do so - but say which one you are denying and then provide a deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion. — Bartricks

How many times do I have to repeat that I deny your #1 because I reject the definitions of terms that it presupposes? Here is my deductively valid argument, since you seem to think that providing one makes a difference.

1. If being morally valuable entails being valued, then no things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued.
2. Some things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued.
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not entail being valued.

This is perfectly valid, but you will likely reject my #2 as question-begging, just as I reject your #1 as question-begging. The bottom line is that we disagree about the definition of "morally valuable," and no deductive argument is going to change either of our minds.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

Ah, well done for changing what you're saying and then thinking I won't notice!

That argument makes no mention of objective value in its premises (hence it is not question begging). Rather, it appeals to the intuition I mentioned in brackets in my previous reply. It is not question begging, and it is not question begging precisely because you've now stopped insisting that intrinsic value and objective value mean the same and have instead appealed to something reason says about moral values.

So let's stick to that argument, because I admit that THAT argument is a good one.

I will reject premise 2 but I am not going to do so on question begging grounds. I know you're convinced - convinced - it will be. But it won't be.

You agree, I take it, that it is question begging to assume a theory is false for the purposes of refuting it?

And if you agree to that, do you agree that, to avoid begging the question against a view, we must start out by being open minded about its truth - that is, we should grant the possibility that it may be true, even if after investigation we may conclude that it is not? That is, we don't stay open minded - we can close our mind at the end - but not at the outset.

I mean, if you don't do that, then you're begging the question - you're assuming the view is false at the outset and then dismissing any potential evidence to the contrary in advance.

So, for instance, if there are only two people who could have done the crime - Jane and Jill - we should not start out assuming Jane did it. What we can do - indeed, should do - is entertain the thesis that Jane did it, and see if it fits the crime scene data, and entertain the thesis that Jill did it and see how well that fits the crime scene data. Yes?

There are only two possibilities where moral value is concerned: it is subjective or objective.

So, we should entertain the possibility that it is subjective and see how well it fits the crime scene data - in this case, how well it comports with what our rational intuitions say? Yes?

I mean, I am admitting that premise 2 of that argument is very - very - powerfully supported by both my rational intuitions and, I suspect, most other people's.

So, I admit that. But do you agree that to non-question beggingly assess a thesis, we should entertain the possibility that the theory is true and see how it fits the data?

After all, there does seem to be quite a significant miss-match in the case of my theory - so I can hardly be accused of loading the deck in my favour.

Janus

The bad faith coming from Bartricks is producing a monumental stench.

Bartricks

↪Janus

It's not bad faith - I am going to reject that premise, and I am going to do so on non-question begging grounds. You're the one who's convinced I'm not. But I'm in a better position to know, given that I'm me and you - thank goodness - are not.

Janus

It is bad faith Bartricks, and judging from their responses that fact seems to be obvious to everyone but yourself. It consists in your unwillingness to consider alternative views, and to acknowledge that both your views and alternative views are based on assumptions, not on evidence.

So, for example, this:

There are only two possibilities where moral value is concerned: it is subjective or objective. — Bartricks

is a limited view for a start. Moral value may be inter-subjective. But you simply insist on your stipulation that it must be subjective, and then groundlessly repeat the claim that it is not assuming what it purports to prove.

If you understood logic adequately you would know that deductive arguments never prove anything about what is the case in the world.

Bartricks

↪Janus

I am using subjective in a way that covers intwrsubjectivist views. Stop being tedious.

Bartricks

↪Janus

another possibility is that moral values are nonsense. But stop being tedious. Stop it. Stop. It.

Janus

↪Bartricks

Well, then you are losing a helpful distinction. Maybe that explains why you are blind to the tendentiousness of your claim for a god: Reason. If a moral value is valued cross-culturally by the vast majority of people then that objective fact alone is sufficient to justify its status as a moral value. No need for gods then.

Janus

another possibility is that moral values are nonsense. — Bartricks

No, that is not a possibility since the vast majority of people make sense of moral values (even if they don't always adhere to them or agree with them).

aletheist

Ah, well done for changing what you're saying and then thinking I won't notice! — Bartricks

On the contrary, my #2 is not substantively different from what I have been repeatedly saying all along:

being morally valuable is a quality that is external to any subject ... regardless of whether anyone properly recognizes it. — aletheist

there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

"being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

some things are morally valuable ... regardless of whether they are actually being valued by anyone. — aletheist

Some things are morally valuable even if no one actually values them; i.e., even if no one ascribes the property of value to them. — aletheist

some moral values are objective--i.e., do not require anything/anyone to affirm them--because they are moral facts that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them ... being valuable does not entail being valued by something/someone. — aletheist

In other words ...

2. Some things are morally valuable regardless of whether they are being valued. — aletheist

EricH

Now, in plain English, once more, is the argument I made valid? You have said that it is. — Bartricks

Sigh. I never once said that your argument was valid. But you're engaging in many cross discussions, so perhaps you mixed me up with someone else.

Here is what I said:

You appear to be making some basic errors in logic, What you are calling P & Q contain hidden variables and operators. BUT I keep an open mind - it is possible that I am mistaken. However, if you want to convince me that your logic is sound, we will need to unpack your logic — EricH

Anyway . . . besides myself, multiple people have demonstrated to you from different angles that - while your formula may have the superficial appearance of being correct - when you get into the details it falls apart. It is neither logical nor valid. You can shout it from the rooftops, you can buy a billboard and plaster it across Times Square or Piccadilly Circus (which ever is closer to you), you can repeat the same thing over and over again and insult everyone who disagrees with you, but that is not going to change anything.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Now please take what I am about to say as constructive criticism. It is clear from your writing that you're reasonably intelligent and articulate. However, by your own admission:

I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. — Bartricks

I don't know what a truth table is — Bartricks

you have made it clear that not only are deeply ignorant of basic Predicate and First Order Logic but that you have no desire to educate yourself. That's a shame.

This is a highly technical philosophy forum, and the ability to understand Predicate & First Order Logic along with rudimentary set theory are basic skills needed to engage in any philosophical discussion. These are things that a philosophy major would take in their first year of study. If you don't understand these basic building blocks of modern philosophy, then no one here is going to take anything you say seriously.

If you want to engage with other people on this forum, I recommend that you take some time and learn these skills - there are numerous online resources. If you get that far, you can stop at Modal Logic - that stuff is really hairy. :razz: If you are having trouble understanding some particular concept (e.g. negating an inference), then this forum is an excellent resource; there are many folks out here who will be glad to help.

And now I give you the last reply (or insult) in this conversation . . .

creativesoul

if I am already entirely familiar with the content of my rationality by my inescapable acquaintance with it, why in the hell do I have to think about it in terms of their respective definitions, which you explicate as “thinking about one’s own thought/belief”? Only in the telling, methinks, never in the doing. — Mww

Thinking about definitions is one way to think about one's own thought/belief. It's not the only way. One can also just use language. That's just to clarify a nuance of my position to you, it's not that germane to this particular exchange. However, we've had many, and I suspect that that will continue.

To address the rest...

It's the content and/or complexity of the rationality(thought/belief) that matters here. Being acquainted with one's own rationality is a situation that requires different things, depending upon the content and/or complexity of the thought/belief(rationality) itself.

Follow me?

A different tack on the question...

What must be valued? That seems to be what your asking. What do all people value, regardless of their individual particular circumstances?

Is that an acceptable re-wording?

creativesoul

So.....tell me all about the subjectivity of moral values. In 30 words or less. — Mww

On my view, moral values consist entirely in/of thought/belief. All thought/belief consists of both objective and subjective things. So, moral values are neither.

The Subjectivity of Moral Values

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