:lol: :lol: :lol:You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — Bartricks
Consider this premise: if I say something is true, it is not necessarily true.
Does that need justifying, in your view? No, it doesn't. It is obviously true - that is, its truth is manifest to reason. — Bartricks
imagine someone saying "ah, but what about a subset of things I say"
Okay - what subset? (And you can't invoke truth, of course, for that would be circular).
Identify the subset and let's test it.
Things you say on Saturday? Are things you say on Saturday 'necessarily' true just by dint of you saying them on Saturday? Nope.
And on and on. — Bartricks
Justifications have to come to an end, otherwise nothing will be justified. What is the appropriate stopping point? When you have found that your view is manifest to reason.
It is manifest to reason that this argument form is valid:
1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. therefore not P.
Now, that does not mean it is valid. But it does mean that in terms of justifying our belief in its validity, its self-evidence suffices.
If someone held that that argument form is invalid, then they would have the burden of proof. They may be able to discharge it. But note, in discharging it they too would have to appeal to some self-evident truths of reason, including the self-evident truth of reason that contradictions cannot be true.
So the currency of arguments is self-evident truths of reason.
Premise 2 is self-evidently true.
You want to deny it. Be my guest. But provide an argument. That is, show me that the self-evident truth of 2 conflicts with some even more abundantly self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks
would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? — Happenstance
Your example of perceptual bias causing you to 'wrongly' extrapolate my capital letter usage, would for an intelligent reader , signally illustrate those dynamic set membership issues I have suggested above, which take place in communicative exchanges. But the phrase 'intelligent reader' is of course problematic in your case — fresco
:lol: :lol: :lol:You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?!
— Bartricks
One can also just use language. — creativesoul
Being acquainted with one's own rationality is a situation that requires different things — creativesoul
What must be valued? (...) What do all people value, regardless of their individual particular circumstances? — creativesoul
On my view, moral values consist entirely in/of thought/belief. — creativesoul
All thought/belief consists of both objective and subjective things. So, moral values are neither. — creativesoul
premise 2 enjoys powerful support from our rational intuitions. So it appears to be a refutation. — Bartricks
It was quite obvious all along that my statement entailed the negation of your #1, and therefore the negation of your conclusion--i.e., the unsoundness of your argument, even though it was valid--but apparently you were unable to see it until I presented it as a formal deductive syllogism.You needed to make an argument - not just state something time and time again - and show how that statement, in conjunction with another, entails the negation of my conclusion. — Bartricks
In my experience, there are very few (if any) "self-evident truths of reason" other than the laws of identity and non-contradiction. There are certainly no "self-evident truths of reason" that pertain to moral values, which is why there is still so much disagreement about them after millennia of debates. Seriously believing that one can settle them in favor of subjectivism with a simple deductive argument reflects either hubris or delusion (or both).Premises need to be supported by reason - that is, they either need to be self-evident truths of reason or they need to be entailed by self-evident truths of reason. — Bartricks
Of course we must "entertain the possibility" that a premiss is true in order to evaluate it fairly, but "how well it comports with our rational intuitions" is a contentious and highly fallible basis for doing so, since different people have different "rational intuitions." For example, my rational intuition finds my #2 vastly more plausible than your #1, while your rational intuition apparently indicates exactly the opposite.And therefore do you accept that one must entertain the possibility that it is true - not false, but true - and then see, on that assumption, how well it comports with our rational intuitions? — Bartricks
This is not equivalent to my #2. In order to refute your #1, it is sufficient to argue that some things are morally valuable even if no subject values it--a particular proposition, not a universal proposition. Even just one such thing is enough. In other words, the objectivist does not claim that all moral values are objective, only that some moral values are objective.2. That which is morally valuable is morally valuable even if no subject values it. — Bartricks
but apparently you were unable to see it until I presented it as a formal deductive syllogism. — aletheist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.