Those are just statements - in each csae it is just you blankly stating something that contradicts the conclujsion - the conclusion - of my argument. This premise: "if Aletheist says something, it is so" is false.

You needed to make an argument - not just state something time and time again - and show how that statement, in conjunction with another, entails the negation of my conclusion. Furthermore, you needed to make clear that there is evidence in support of that claim - that is, that reason represents it to be true. Otherwise all you're doing is saying things. That's incredibly important. Premises need to be supported by reason - that is, they either need to be self-evident truths of reason or they need to be entailed by self-evident truths of reason. Otherwise, it is once more just you saying things. Anyone can say things, arguing is different.

Anyway, premise 2 is false and I can show why without begging the question. But I am not going to waste time explaining why unless you play by the rules. I think you are already completely convinced that anyone who rejects any premise of any argument you make has, regardless of the strength of their case, 'begged the question' .

So, do you accept that one begs the question if one assumes that the thesis under consideration is false for the purposes of refuting it? And therefore do you accept that one must entertain the possibility that it is true - not false, but true - and then see, on that assumption, how well it comports with our rational intuitions?

You don't know a valid argument from an invalid one. Demonstrably. You have asked painfully pompous and disingenuous questions You are not remotely open minded. You are not a 'kumbaya' person, as you described yourself earlier. In my experience most people who describe themselves are the opposite of the description they offer - the description is an aspiration, that's all. And you confirm that. YOu are completely - 100% - convinced that my argument is invalid and absolutely nothing is going to convince you otherwise. That's your position, and you're dug in.

I am not going to explain why my argument is valid again. I am happy to leave you in your illogical little fox hole. So - lovely as it has been to take lessons from someone who doesn't know what they are talking about - this is now over and you can either take issue with a premise or go away.

Bartricks: Janet was either killed by someone or she died of natural causes

Hugh: No, Janet also could have been killed by Mark.

Bartricks: That would be someone. Mark is a someone.

Hugh: So say you. But you've lost us a useful distinction. The distinction between someone, Mark, and natural causes.

Bartricks. Er, okay. That really doesn't seem useful to me at all. And anyway, what we're discussing here is whether Janet was killed by someone or she died of natural causes.

Hugh. No, not 'someone' or 'natural causes' but 'someone', 'Mark' or 'natural causes'. And Jim.

Bartricks: okay, thanks, but you're actually not a detective anymore are you - you were demoted for being just absolutely mind-numbingly bad. So, you know, finish the hoovering and then leave please.

MESSAGE FROM 'THE CONTINENT'

I happen to have been teaching 'truth tables' last week to class of 12 year olds on an ITC course. (I'll send you the notes if you like).I use arbitrary premises, like yours to demonstrate the difference between 'truth' and 'validity', which highlights the difference between humans and machines.
The adage 'garbage in gives garbage out' is underlined in their notes..

In an adult group I belong to which includes university philosophers, we recently discussed the limits of classical logic in dealing with semantic drift in discussions.
Non binary logic, and adaptive state transition models were suggested as alternative frameworks

We continentals have moved on from games to game theory.

the 12 year olds must have been very frightened. How long before security evicted you from the premises? Thank you for the offer, but in my mind you have just written 'truth' in capital letters on some tables that you are pushing around in a supermarket trolley. Thanks though Conty!

Alas no... the 12 year olds had great fun with premises like 'all US presidents have red hair'.
I use 'truth' in the pragmatist's sense of 'what works in terms of social agreement as to what is the case'.
BTW Your example of perceptual bias causing you to 'wrongly' extrapolate my capital letter usage, would for an intelligent reader , signally illustrate those dynamic set membership issues I have suggested above, which take place in communicative exchanges. But the phrase 'intelligent reader' is of course problematic in your case.

You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?! — Bartricks

:lol: :lol: :lol:

I'm laughing at myself as well because I should've realised by now that I don't have the medical or clinical training to deal with you (nor the pedagogical training for that matter).

Let's just say that I find no moral value in aiding your delusions :wink:

Consider this premise: if I say something is true, it is not necessarily true.

Does that need justifying, in your view? No, it doesn't. It is obviously true - that is, its truth is manifest to reason. — Bartricks

Depends on your definition of truth, which is a contested term. But in ordinary language use, it's usually true.

imagine someone saying "ah, but what about a subset of things I say"

Okay - what subset? (And you can't invoke truth, of course, for that would be circular).

Identify the subset and let's test it.

Things you say on Saturday? Are things you say on Saturday 'necessarily' true just by dint of you saying them on Saturday? Nope.

And on and on. — Bartricks

Some statements that are true for the whole are not true for subsets. This can be easily shown:
"Not all animals have a placenta" is trivially true.
"Not all mammals have a placenta" is trivially false.

Justifications have to come to an end, otherwise nothing will be justified. What is the appropriate stopping point? When you have found that your view is manifest to reason.

It is manifest to reason that this argument form is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. therefore not P.

Now, that does not mean it is valid. But it does mean that in terms of justifying our belief in its validity, its self-evidence suffices.

If someone held that that argument form is invalid, then they would have the burden of proof. They may be able to discharge it. But note, in discharging it they too would have to appeal to some self-evident truths of reason, including the self-evident truth of reason that contradictions cannot be true.

So the currency of arguments is self-evident truths of reason.

Premise 2 is self-evidently true.

You want to deny it. Be my guest. But provide an argument. That is, show me that the self-evident truth of 2 conflicts with some even more abundantly self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks

So, is it a self-evident truth that the currency of arguments is self-evident truths? I certainly don't think it is.

There is an epistemic difference between the form or arguments - in this case predicate logic - and their content. The form of arguments is given by pure reason and is, in this sense, self-evident. But the content of the premises can be anything, from a-priori truths to empirical statements. These are not self-evident, they need to be at least reasoned.

If you refuse to Reason the premises of your argument, your argument fails.

In this case, an argument can be made against the modified premise 2 as follows:

The only evidence we have of moral values in practice are the moral values of human persons. So, prima facie, Moral values are identical with the personal moral values of individuals. Therefore, it's not self-evident that personal moral valuings are not necessarily moral values.

would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? — Happenstance

Well that made me laugh, I must admit. You don't say!!

Are you actually going to address anything - anything - I have argued?

There is no way on earth that any responsible educational establishment would let you near impressionable young minds. In a country in which the national currency is the chicken you might be able to persuade the local drug lord/mayor let you have a rant at some local kids, but then only because you've agreed to take a few extra suitcases back with you.

Your example of perceptual bias causing you to 'wrongly' extrapolate my capital letter usage, would for an intelligent reader , signally illustrate those dynamic set membership issues I have suggested above, which take place in communicative exchanges. But the phrase 'intelligent reader' is of course problematic in your case — fresco

You'll need to do a lot better than that if you're going to make it as a continental philosopher. If you've got nothing to say, at least say it well.

covariant quantum fields.

I don't get it! :chin:

I'm happy you got a laugh because you read like an uptight serious angry gobshite!

Sorry .Typing problems. No message

That I do get! I do it all the time myself! :up:

Aw, is you serious angry? Nice to meet the real you. You're exactly as anticipated.

You almost have my sympathies being attacked from all sides !
Maybe you should have a lie down !

Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Pee Wee Herman of argumentation.

Haha, my tongue was in my cheek just an itsy witsy bit.

Nah, You saying ' I dun don't know any greek symbols' and shitting your pants was funnier.

'I thought I was done and dusted! Game over man! Game over!!'

Anyway, lovely as all this is, how about we go back to the actual argument and this apparent refutation of the position it entails:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then that which is morally valuable is morally valuable if and only if the subject values it.
2. That which is morally valuable is morally valuable even if no subject values it.
3. therefore moral values are not the values of a subject

Premise 1 surely can't be denied, and premise 2 enjoys powerful support from our rational intuitions. So it appears to be a refutation.

Haha, my tongue was in my cheek just an itsy witsy bit. — Bartricks

Replied to the wrong insult.

Nothing like having your tongue stuck up your own arse, eh!

You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?!
— Bartricks

:lol: :lol: :lol:

You know I like you much more now you've dropped the wise old logician act and become just another vulgar little insulter like all the rest.

Anyway, would the new you like to address the argument?

Nah you're okay fella, I've got to go now but I'll be back with more vulgar insults seeing as you like me more now! :up:

One can also just use language. — creativesoul

.....when thinking about thought/belief, yes. The proverbial voice in my head, the private monologue, the alleged “dreams of spirit seekers”; its name is legion.
———————

Being acquainted with one's own rationality is a situation that requires different things — creativesoul

You mean other than physical existence, intelligence, functional physiology, those conditions presupposed in order that acquaintance to be possible in the first place? Such as......?
———————

What must be valued? (...) What do all people value, regardless of their individual particular circumstances? — creativesoul

Yeah, in effect. What is something, or, is it possible for there to be something, all people value in response to any individual particular circumstance. If there is, then a foundation for all or any morality can be derived from it, and can theoretically serve as a logical proof for the primary domain for morality itself. Which, of course, absolutely requires us to think about our thought/belief.

Funny how that works, innit?
———————

On my view, moral values consist entirely in/of thought/belief. — creativesoul

Oh. Well, there ya go.
———————

All thought/belief consists of both objective and subjective things. So, moral values are neither. — creativesoul

Wait....whaaa????

Moral values = thought/belief;
Thought/belief = O and S things;
Moral values can be neither O nor S things of thought/belief;
Moral values /= thought/belief.

Hmmmmm.........

Til tomorrow, then.

premise 2 enjoys powerful support from our rational intuitions. So it appears to be a refutation. — Bartricks

You may have been over this, but what standing do rational intuitions have compared to rational knowledge?

We could argue that humans have a rational intuition that there are metaphysical forces shaping the physical world, that these forces have personalities, and that the world/time have start and end points.

All of these intuitions have been questioned by philosophers though. Is your rational intuition in the same category?

You needed to make an argument - not just state something time and time again - and show how that statement, in conjunction with another, entails the negation of my conclusion. — Bartricks

It was quite obvious all along that my statement entailed the negation of your #1, and therefore the negation of your conclusion--i.e., the unsoundness of your argument, even though it was valid--but apparently you were unable to see it until I presented it as a formal deductive syllogism.

Premises need to be supported by reason - that is, they either need to be self-evident truths of reason or they need to be entailed by self-evident truths of reason. — Bartricks

In my experience, there are very few (if any) "self-evident truths of reason" other than the laws of identity and non-contradiction. There are certainly no "self-evident truths of reason" that pertain to moral values, which is why there is still so much disagreement about them after millennia of debates. Seriously believing that one can settle them in favor of subjectivism with a simple deductive argument reflects either hubris or delusion (or both).

And therefore do you accept that one must entertain the possibility that it is true - not false, but true - and then see, on that assumption, how well it comports with our rational intuitions? — Bartricks

Of course we must "entertain the possibility" that a premiss is true in order to evaluate it fairly, but "how well it comports with our rational intuitions" is a contentious and highly fallible basis for doing so, since different people have different "rational intuitions." For example, my rational intuition finds my #2 vastly more plausible than your #1, while your rational intuition apparently indicates exactly the opposite.

2. That which is morally valuable is morally valuable even if no subject values it. — Bartricks

This is not equivalent to my #2. In order to refute your #1, it is sufficient to argue that some things are morally valuable even if no subject values it--a particular proposition, not a universal proposition. Even just one such thing is enough. In other words, the objectivist does not claim that all moral values are objective, only that some moral values are objective.

but apparently you were unable to see it until I presented it as a formal deductive syllogism. — aletheist

Which is ridiculous to need to do, but Bartricks seems to have some sort of fetish for it.

Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses?