Anyway tell us again how a definition of non-ampliative implies question begging. — Happenstance
You really should get this tattoo to remind you. Maybe on your abnormal forhead wrote backwards so you can see it in a mirrorI'm confusing Happenstance for someone who gives a shit about my crappy argument!
↪aletheist
Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses
— aletheist
Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong. — Bartricks
No, I am not defining 'God' as I didn't mention God. And Reason is the subject whose values are moral values and whose prescriptions are the prescriptions of Reason, a subset of which are moral prescriptions. That's what the argument establishes. — Bartricks
For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks
I didn’t say anything about moral value being required for cognitive apparatus; I said incorporated into: just as the wet ingredients of a pastry are incorporated into the dry to construct a finish-able product, so too are moral values incorporated into pure practical reason, aka cognitive apparatus... — Mww
1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something it will necessarily be morally valuable
2. if I value something it is not necessarily be morally valuable
3. therefore moral values are not my values.
Yet it is valid. Obviously. — Bartricks
An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial. — Bartricks
So, what you are now admitting is that the argument establishes - proves - that moral values are not the values of any one of us. — Bartricks
Yes, moral intuitions - a subset of our rational intuitions - are 'about' morality, but they are not morality itself. Just as I cannot make an act right - not of necessity, anyway - by just ordering myself to do it, or make it valuable - not of necessity anyway - by valuing it, likewise I cannot make an act right or good by simply having the rational intuition that it is. — Bartricks
This simply does not follow. If you allow - and you must on pain of being unable to argue for anything at all - that rational intuitions have probative force, then we do - absolutely do - have a way to test rational intuition. Rational intuitions! — Bartricks
Others may dislike the conclusion, but disliking something is not evidence it is false. Those who wish rationally to reject its conclusion must find something else reason seems to say that contradicts what this argument entails.
And that is precisely what I have done - there do indeed seem to be some other things that reason seems to say that, in combination with other things she seems to say, contradict the conclusion of the above argument. — Bartricks
So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all. — joshua
People are bringing up God because many of us have been exposed to quite a few "philosopher's gods" over the years — joshua
The 'philosopher' is the Reason-whisperer — joshua
But looking only at the argument above, the moral values belong to something like the community. — joshua
It looks to me that history is largely about the modification of our conceptually mediated moral intuitions. The 'divine commander' looks organic, like a kind of mist thrown up by our doings. We remake the world, and the changed world forces us to remake ourselves. Repeat until we run out of world — joshua
The problem is that you seen impervious to criticism of either the form of your arguments or the content of their premises. You are unwilling to subject your arguments to the reasoning of other people, claiming instead that their premises are given by unchallengeable rational intuition. That's not convincing, and the way this thread has devolved should be ample evidence of that. — Echarmion
How can something test itself? I allow there are basic principles, logic itself, which can not themselves be subjected to reasoning. — Echarmion
No, completely false. Your criticisms have been poor. You have gone to great lengths to try and show that my argument is invalid. You failed. The argument is valid. — Bartricks
If you want to know if an argument is valid, you consult your reason and the reason of others, yes? And what is an argument apart from a prescription of reason? So, that is an example of us using our reason to confirm what our reason says. — Bartricks
An earlier assertion of yours stands in direct contradiction with thought/belief existing on a rudimentary level prior to definition.....
(Maybe. Depends. I’d love nothing more than to be shown a self-contradiction that isn’t merely a misunderstanding)
......Some(non-linguistic, rudimentary, basic) thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to language....
(Certainly. Wouldn’t disagree at all. I am familiar with how it may be called)
......Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief.....
(Ehhhh.....starting to lose me here)
.......Thought/belief are more than sufficient for cognition, just not meta-cognition.....
(Denied!!! I think.)
.......Pure Practical Reasoning is metacognition.
(Yes, in a way, but still only one of two kinds of metacognition)
Kant can't take account of this. — creativesoul
Unfortunately, you are the only one here who thinks so. — Echarmion
I concede that reason self-checks when we are crafting an argument in our minds. But, crucially, this process is open to the reason of other people, who can run it in their minds and tell us their conclusions. That's what differentiates an argument from intuition. I can transmit the argument to someone else, but not the intuition. — Echarmion
As far as I’m concerned, a conversation doesn’t have to be eventually productive as it has to first be interesting. And what interests me about your apparent personal speculative philosophy, is that if I badger you long enough, in the form of proper Socratic dialectical procedure, you’ll get around to telling me exactly how such personal philosophy works, rather than merely laying a bunch of self-invented terminology on me, and leave me hanging like Grandma’s laundry. You can’t just inform me the rational framework of my choosing doesn’t work without giving me something to compare it to, and thus allowing me to judge for myself. — Mww
Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief.....
(Ehhhh.....starting to lose me here) — creativesoul
So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all. — joshua
I have no idea what you're talking about. Are you drunk? — Bartricks
An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial. — Bartricks
Aw diddums. Philosophy isn't therapy and the truth sometimes hurts. The argument establishes the being of a god, regardless of how that may or may not impact your psychology or anyone else's. — Bartricks
1. Subjects and only subjects can value things
2. I am valued
3. therefore I am valued by a subject.
So, if I follow reason I now get to the conclusion that my being morally valuable consists in me being valued by a subject - a subject of experience, a mind.
I am one of those myself and there are billions of others. But upon reflection it is simply not plausible that I am the subject in question:
1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings. — Bartricks
My point is that your theory and your sense of its importance is self-flattering. You seem to be casting yourself as the 'favorite son' of the Goddess Reason. — joshua
I counter that a sane person who thinks an argument establishes the truth of divine command theory would instead look for the mistake in that proof (find out its sophistry.) — joshua
You're an internet-tough-guy theologian — joshua
But that's because this is where the essence of your position is manifest.
It's the ancient game of projecting yourself as daddy. And you are playing a retro version, where you (little daddy) are 'proving ' the existence of big daddy classic, no doubt created in your image — joshua
You can't have your cake and eat it too. — joshua
Much of our sense of right and wrong is inherited from the community. There are things that 'one' does not do. But in highly complex and pluralistic cultures like ours, one of the things we do is ...question the things that one does. — joshua
On another stage, I shall assume you’re aware a sound deductive syllogism predicated solely on rational premises cannot be falsified. It’s impossible, actually, for no purely rational dictum whatsoever lends itself to verifiable negation outside itself. — Mww
My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad. — Bartricks
Ah, I see. Well, that's false - but whatever. Just focus on the argument and stop trying to analyse me or I'll tell my mum — Bartricks
My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad. — Bartricks
Okay, fine. But what would it take for that belief to be true? That is, what would it take for anything actually to be morally good?
That's the question I am answering. You don't answer it by looking into the history of the belief, but rather by looking at what the belief is 'about'. — Bartricks
I've noticed that you, like others, are getting hung up on God and keep mentioning him - I have not, except to point out to people like you that I have not mentioned him. God is not mentioned in any premise in my argument or in the conclusion. — Bartricks
So? Philosophy isn't diplomacy and the truth isn't democratic. — Bartricks
1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings.
That argument works for you too and, I suspect, all other human subjects. And once more, Reason says not jus that the argument is valid, but that it is sound - that its premises are true. — Bartricks
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