Yet I can argue and you can't.

Let's remember that you were sure - quite sure - this argument was invalid:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something it will necessarily be morally valuable
2. if I value something it is not necessarily be morally valuable
3. therefore moral values are not my values.

Yet it is valid. Obviously.

Your worms and squares - whose behaviour you understand so well - did not help you to see this. Far from it.

Then you conceded that it was indeed valid - something that would have been obvious to anyone who just thought about it - and instead insisted that it established something trivial.

That's wrong too. Not remotely trivial. An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial.

Anyway tell us again how a definition of non-ampliative implies question begging. — Happenstance

I would never say such a thing, given I haven't the foggiest what 'non-ampliative' means. I don't use words I don't understand. No doubt you'll try and tell me, but please don't bother as I'm running out of room on my buttocks.

I'm confusing Happenstance for someone who gives a shit about my crappy argument!

You really should get this tattoo to remind you. Maybe on your abnormal forhead wrote backwards so you can see it in a mirror

↪aletheist
Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses
— aletheist

Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong. — Bartricks

Is there a symbol for 'crappy' in your pigeon logic language? It just strikes me as odd that someone who clearly fancies themselves as a logician - and managed to dupe others into taking that possibility seriously, for they mooed back at you in kind - deems my argument 'crappy', when it seems to be a sound argument with an astonishing conclusion. It's just a very odd use of the word 'crappy' that's all.

:rofl:

Er, yes, I did not use the word 'non-ampliative' there, did I? I don't know what it means. Is a non-ampliative argument a very quiet one? But my point stands: I think Aletheist thinks that all valid arguments (those are the kind I make) are question begging. That's why I predict you'll both get on well together.

In Aletheist's quote that you yourself quoted, s/he is saying that deductive arguments are non-ampliative, that is: there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premises, to which you thought that s/he was implying question begging. If you knew that deductive arguments are non-ampliative then you wouldn't have said that Aletheist was implying deductive arguments are question begging. But because of your incessant need for trying to play one-up-manship, you replied with your usual standard of bollocks. If you ditch your shitty attitude of, 'I know arguments better than you', maybe I would still be engaging with you at the level you seem to want. But everything you write just further belies any knowledge of logic that you may have and your shitty arrogant attitude doesn't warrant any thoughtful replies, hence me changing tact.

And as for your so-called valid argument, you don't even know how the fuck one is constructed to be valid. You can't just come on a board with the attitude of you being the only one who knows logic when it is obvious, if you do a bit of reading, that there a great number of people here who are far more intelligent than you or I. It is a silly, self-conscious, stupid attitude that just gets you laughed at.

But please do continue with your dance of the dodgers because it is entertaining.

Anyway got to go now fella, but please don't ever change! :grin:

LOL. Good one.

Are you finding our conversation productive?

No, I am not defining 'God' as I didn't mention God. And Reason is the subject whose values are moral values and whose prescriptions are the prescriptions of Reason, a subset of which are moral prescriptions. That's what the argument establishes. — Bartricks

So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all.

People are bringing up God because many of us have been exposed to quite a few "philosopher's gods" over the years. A subject who determines what's right and wrong for all of us....that's largely why people want gods in the first place. And often enough this divine 'subject' will endorse the preferences of his or her discover. The 'philosopher' is the Reason-whisperer. For better are worse, all of your opponents in this thread are also servants of that particular goddess. Reason dictates that you and your argument have to march through misunderstanding and criticism.

Do you still not see that the primary premiss is false? Some values are not moral values. "moral values" is not equivalent to "values". With that in mind...

For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks

Some values are not moral values. All values are valued. When non moral values are being valued they do not become moral values, but things are still being valued.

So...

The primary premiss is false. It contradicts the way things are. As it stands we have more than just moral values. As a result we can be valuing something and it not be morally valuable.

Being morally valuable takes more than being valued.

I didn’t say anything about moral value being required for cognitive apparatus; I said incorporated into: just as the wet ingredients of a pastry are incorporated into the dry to construct a finish-able product, so too are moral values incorporated into pure practical reason, aka cognitive apparatus... — Mww

Incorporating one thing into another requires both things.

You may not have said it, but the coherency of your position depends upon it.

An earlier assertion of yours stands in direct contradiction with thought/belief existing on a rudimentary level prior to definition. Some(non-linguistic, rudimentary, basic) thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to language. Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief. Thought/belief are more than sufficient for cognition, just not meta-cognition. Pure Practical Reasoning is metacognition.

Kant can't take account of this.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something it will necessarily be morally valuable
2. if I value something it is not necessarily be morally valuable
3. therefore moral values are not my values.

Yet it is valid. Obviously. — Bartricks

Yes.

An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial. — Bartricks

I agree.

But looking only at the argument above, the moral values belong to something like the community. If we didn't always already agree on all kinds of behavior being good or bad, we wouldn't have made it this far. We're social animals. So the word 'moral' seems already charged with some impersonal subject, a kind of 'we' that does and does not do certain things.

On the 'God' issue again: if the commanding divinity offends our moral intuitions, then he or she had better have the power to back it up. Even then conformity would only be prudence. 'Our' moral intuitions are already the commanding divinity. Tribes have their 'gods,' which cannot be questioned. To really be in the tribe is to see/feel why such questioning is impious or irrational.

It looks to me that history is largely about the modification of our conceptually mediated moral intuitions. The 'divine commander' looks organic, like a kind of mist thrown up by our doings. We remake the world, and the changed world forces us to remake ourselves. Repeat until we run out of world.

So, what you are now admitting is that the argument establishes - proves - that moral values are not the values of any one of us. — Bartricks

I didn't actually admit that. I only admitted that moral values are not identical to the entire set of values of any one of us. Because, obviously, the entire set of values contains things like "I like cats more than dogs", which don't have anything to do with morality.

Yes, moral intuitions - a subset of our rational intuitions - are 'about' morality, but they are not morality itself. Just as I cannot make an act right - not of necessity, anyway - by just ordering myself to do it, or make it valuable - not of necessity anyway - by valuing it, likewise I cannot make an act right or good by simply having the rational intuition that it is. — Bartricks

How do we know that? My rational intuition tells me that logic is itself a rational intuition. The rational intuition doesn't tell us something about some logic "object", these rational intuitions are logic itself.

So the same could be true for moral intuitions.

This simply does not follow. If you allow - and you must on pain of being unable to argue for anything at all - that rational intuitions have probative force, then we do - absolutely do - have a way to test rational intuition. Rational intuitions! — Bartricks

How can something test itself? I allow there are basic principles, logic itself, which can not themselves be subjected to reasoning. Because, essentially, they are reasoning itself. Anything beyond that doesn't enjoy the same necessity though, so I don't see why I must accept all manner of so-called intuitions.

Others may dislike the conclusion, but disliking something is not evidence it is false. Those who wish rationally to reject its conclusion must find something else reason seems to say that contradicts what this argument entails.

And that is precisely what I have done - there do indeed seem to be some other things that reason seems to say that, in combination with other things she seems to say, contradict the conclusion of the above argument. — Bartricks

The problem is that you seen impervious to criticism of either the form of your arguments or the content of their premises. You are unwilling to subject your arguments to the reasoning of other people, claiming instead that their premises are given by unchallengeable rational intuition. That's not convincing, and the way this thread has devolved should be ample evidence of that.

So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all. — joshua

I have no idea what you're talking about. Are you drunk?

People are bringing up God because many of us have been exposed to quite a few "philosopher's gods" over the years — joshua

Aw diddums. Philosophy isn't therapy and the truth sometimes hurts. The argument establishes the being of a god, regardless of how that may or may not impact your psychology or anyone else's.

The 'philosopher' is the Reason-whisperer — joshua

The what now?

But looking only at the argument above, the moral values belong to something like the community. — joshua

No, that view is the least plausible of all. For a community is not a subject and so it cannot value anything. Second, this argument adds another head-shot to an already dead head:

1. If moral values are the values of my community, then if my community values something necessarily it is morally valuable.
2. If my community values something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of my community.

It looks to me that history is largely about the modification of our conceptually mediated moral intuitions. The 'divine commander' looks organic, like a kind of mist thrown up by our doings. We remake the world, and the changed world forces us to remake ourselves. Repeat until we run out of world — joshua

Well, that's just false as my argument demonstrates. You need to follow reason, not your pet theories.

The problem is that you seen impervious to criticism of either the form of your arguments or the content of their premises. You are unwilling to subject your arguments to the reasoning of other people, claiming instead that their premises are given by unchallengeable rational intuition. That's not convincing, and the way this thread has devolved should be ample evidence of that. — Echarmion

No, completely false. Your criticisms have been poor. You have gone to great lengths to try and show that my argument is invalid. You failed. The argument is valid.

Now, that doesn't mean I am impervious to criticism. It means your case against me failed. Simple.

You are impervious to criticism because you're never going to accept that you're wrong. You've already decided I'm wrong and no matter how good my arguments are, that's your position and you're sticking to it.

The fact is you haven't raised a reasonable doubt about anything I have argued.

How can something test itself? I allow there are basic principles, logic itself, which can not themselves be subjected to reasoning. — Echarmion

If you want to know if an argument is valid, you consult your reason and the reason of others, yes? And what is an argument apart from a prescription of reason? So, that is an example of us using our reason to confirm what our reason says.

if you want to know about me, who's the best person to ask? Me. For you that's some kind of contradiction - how can I be the best source of information about me?!? Well, I can and am, obviously. I mean, the real question is why would anything think otherwise?

Likewise, if you want to know what Reason says, who's the best person to consult? Reason. And how do we gain insight into what Reason says? By means of our reason. And how do we know that? By our reason.

There's nothing problematic about that. But anyway, if the only way you can raise a doubt about my argument is by attempting to dismiss the whole project of consulting reason, then my argument must be incredibly strong. Which it is!

No, completely false. Your criticisms have been poor. You have gone to great lengths to try and show that my argument is invalid. You failed. The argument is valid. — Bartricks

Unfortunately, you are the only one here who thinks so.

If you want to know if an argument is valid, you consult your reason and the reason of others, yes? And what is an argument apart from a prescription of reason? So, that is an example of us using our reason to confirm what our reason says. — Bartricks

Good point. I concede that reason self-checks when we are crafting an argument in our minds. But, crucially, this process is open to the reason of other people, who can run it in their minds and tell us their conclusions. That's what differentiates an argument from intuition. I can transmit the argument to someone else, but not the intuition.

Since your position is that our faculties of reason merely access a metaphysical entity that embodies reason itself, it's all merely a self-check. But I think there are alternatives that don't require us to establish reason as a separate subject.

As far as I’m concerned, a conversation doesn’t have to be eventually productive as it has to first be interesting. And what interests me about your apparent personal speculative philosophy, is that if I badger you long enough, in the form of proper Socratic dialectical procedure, you’ll get around to telling me exactly how such personal philosophy works, rather than merely laying a bunch of self-invented terminology on me, and leave me hanging like Grandma’s laundry. You can’t just inform me the rational framework of my choosing doesn’t work without giving me something to compare it to, and thus allowing me to judge for myself.

Case in point....

An earlier assertion of yours stands in direct contradiction with thought/belief existing on a rudimentary level prior to definition.....
(Maybe. Depends. I’d love nothing more than to be shown a self-contradiction that isn’t merely a misunderstanding)

......Some(non-linguistic, rudimentary, basic) thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to language....
(Certainly. Wouldn’t disagree at all. I am familiar with how it may be called)

......Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief.....
(Ehhhh.....starting to lose me here)

.......Thought/belief are more than sufficient for cognition, just not meta-cognition.....
(Denied!!! I think.)

.......Pure Practical Reasoning is metacognition.
(Yes, in a way, but still only one of two kinds of metacognition)

Kant can't take account of this. — creativesoul

And how would I know that, if you don’t show what this is, how it works hence why the Kantian account doesn’t, which presupposes you know Kant at least as well as I do.
———————

On another stage, I shall assume you’re aware a sound deductive syllogism predicated solely on rational premises cannot be falsified. It’s impossible, actually, for no purely rational dictum whatsoever lends itself to verifiable negation outside itself.

“....any attempt to employ it (general logic) as an instrument in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy....”

The best that can be done, if one feels he must do something, is to present different, better, more logically exact premises entailing an equally sound deduction, which only shows the former deductive conclusion to be relatively useless in comparison to it, that is to say, the latter demonstrates a stronger logical inference. The whole being nothing but a.....currently.....38-page exercise in metaphysical circle jerking.

Unfortunately, you are the only one here who thinks so. — Echarmion

So? Philosophy isn't diplomacy and the truth isn't democratic. None of the criticisms offered thus far work. Not my fault, they just don't. Demonstrably don't. If you took a vote on it, I wouldn't win. But that's because most of the voters have made the poor criticisms in question. You have to show a criticism to be good, not just show that a lot of people whose powers of rational discernment have in common that they all seem poor, think that it is good.

I concede that reason self-checks when we are crafting an argument in our minds. But, crucially, this process is open to the reason of other people, who can run it in their minds and tell us their conclusions. That's what differentiates an argument from intuition. I can transmit the argument to someone else, but not the intuition. — Echarmion

I fail to see the distinction you are drawing. Certain chains of thought are valid, and their validity consists in them being chains of thought that Reason approves of. Reason approves of thinking that if P entails Q, and P obtains, then thinking that Q must obtain. She approves of that - tells us to draw that conclusion - and her telling us to do so is what its validity consists in.
How do we know which chains of thought are the ones Reason wants us to engage in and which she does not? We consult our reason and the reason of others. And in consulting our reason we are doing no more than seeing what rational intuitions it generates about the matter. If our rational intuitions are corroborated by the rational intuitions of others who have sincerely engaged in the same process, and we have no independent reason to think our faculties of reason have been corrupted on this particular matter, then that's good evidence that the rational intuitions are accurate. That is, that Reason herself really does approve of it. And how do we know that? Because it is what our faculties of reason say is the case.

Anyway, if you consult your reason and resist any squiggling and squoggling urges, it will be evident that this argument is valid:

1. If I am morally valuable, then I am featuring as the object of a valuing relation (if P, then Q)
2. I am morally valuable (P)
3. Therefore I am featuring as the object of a valuing relation (therefore Q)

And both of those premises also seem supported by reason. It is by reason that we are aware of our moral value and the moral value of others. And anyone who thinks that being morally valuable involves something other than being the object of a valuing relation, they have the burden of proof.

This too is valid:

1. Subjects and only subjects can value things
2. I am valued
3. therefore I am valued by a subject.

So, if I follow reason I now get to the conclusion that my being morally valuable consists in me being valued by a subject - a subject of experience, a mind.

I am one of those myself and there are billions of others. But upon reflection it is simply not plausible that I am the subject in question:

1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings.

That argument works for you too and, I suspect, all other human subjects. And once more, Reason says not jus that the argument is valid, but that it is sound - that its premises are true.

Moral values, then, are the values of a subject, but the subject is not you or I, but someone else. Who? Well the question presupposes that we have to locate her among other subjects - that's absurd. We don't. She is who she is. And who is she? She's the one whose values constitute moral values and whose prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions. She's Reason herself. For moral prescriptions are - as Kant held - simply a subset of the prescriptions of Reason. Well, if moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, and if moral prescriptions are a subset of the prescriptions of Reason, then Reason is the subject in question.

There. That's the argument again. It is valid all the way through and each leg consists of arguments whose premises seem themselves to be manifest to reason.

The only challenge that this case faces, comes from this argument, one that no-one has yet pressed;

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

That too is valid, and that too has premises that are manifest to Reason. Yet it seems to contradict my case.

As far as I’m concerned, a conversation doesn’t have to be eventually productive as it has to first be interesting. And what interests me about your apparent personal speculative philosophy, is that if I badger you long enough, in the form of proper Socratic dialectical procedure, you’ll get around to telling me exactly how such personal philosophy works, rather than merely laying a bunch of self-invented terminology on me, and leave me hanging like Grandma’s laundry. You can’t just inform me the rational framework of my choosing doesn’t work without giving me something to compare it to, and thus allowing me to judge for myself. — Mww

Fair enough.

There's no need for you to beat around the bush though. If you want to know how it all works, as best as I've figured it out anyway, just come straight out and ask me that. I'm always willing to show my work. The charge against Kant does not require understanding my view though, to be clear. Kant does not and cannot draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. He is not alone. In fact, he has all the company in the world. As far as I'm aware, there is no philosopher from any school of thought that has... even to this day.

Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief.....
(Ehhhh.....starting to lose me here) — creativesoul

The above needs to be understood, in order to grasp the totality of what I'm saying. That seems a good place to go from here.

All thought, belief, and statements thereof consist entirely of correlations between different things. On the rudimentary level(regarding a language less creature) those correlations are always drawn between directly perceptible things. Language is not always one of them.

Imagine a language-less creature that has just touched fire for the first time. This creature learns that fire hurts when touched despite not being able to say that. It can recognize and/or attribute causality, and does, as is demonstrated by it's subsequently avoiding fire. The creature thinks/believes that touching fire caused the pain that immediately followed.

There is no place and no need for language here. Definition and conception are both existentially dependent upon language. Learning that fire hurts when touched is not. Neither definition nor conception is required for such rudimentary level thought/belief. All that is needed is a creature capable of drawing correlations between their own behaviour(the touching) and the pain that immediately ensued.

Our understanding of all this is another mater altogether. Definition, conception, and language are all required for our knowledge/understanding regarding this matter. What we're reporting upon(the thought/belief of a language-less creature) is not existentially dependent upon language. Our report most certainly is.

It's all a matter of existential dependency. Being verifiable/falsifiable helps too. :wink:

I said to you:

So 'Reason' establishes her own divinity through her favorite son. But we already knew she was divine. The fact that you chose to establish her via an argument says it all. — joshua

I have no idea what you're talking about. Are you drunk? — Bartricks

My point is that your theory and your sense of its importance is self-flattering. You seem to be casting yourself as the 'favorite son' of the Goddess Reason.

An argument that seems to establish the truth of a divine command theory of value cannot - by any sane person's estimation - be considered trivial. — Bartricks

I counter that a sane person who thinks an argument establishes the truth of divine command theory would instead look for the mistake in that proof (find out its sophistry.)

Aw diddums. Philosophy isn't therapy and the truth sometimes hurts. The argument establishes the being of a god, regardless of how that may or may not impact your psychology or anyone else's. — Bartricks

You're fun, bro. At least we've finally squeezed it out you: You're an internet-tough-guy theologian. I've seen the atheist version, but the theist version is new to me. It;s like church lady clothes becoming hip again. Instead of appealing to 'science,' you appeal to 'logic.' In either case some magic word is invoked in order to generate a new magic word. Your 'logic' 'establishes' the 'being of a god.' No small accomplishment. I'd be proud of myself too.

But you'll have to add your 'proof' that there is a God to a list of other 'proofs' that few take seriously.

Now I do agree with you that 'philosophy isn't therapy and the truth sometimes hurts.' The real 'god' at work is a personal investment in exactly this principle (which is also the macho fantasy of the intellectually identified .) We pay for truth by sacrificing the parts of our personality that don't want to see it. Our cherished fantasies of who we are must be thrown into the flames, a living sacrifice. We must be washed in the blood of the lamb fires of logic.

It's an investment, though, because we expect in return the narcissistic pleasure of belonging to the exclusive club of those who know the spiritual/metaphysical truth.

Note how often you use the 'diddums' condescension gimmick. I laughed at some of your insults. They're your best work so far. But that's because this is where the essence of your position is manifest.
It's the ancient game of projecting yourself as daddy. And you are playing a retro version, where you (little daddy) are 'proving ' the existence of big daddy classic, no doubt created in your image.

1. Subjects and only subjects can value things
2. I am valued
3. therefore I am valued by a subject.

So, if I follow reason I now get to the conclusion that my being morally valuable consists in me being valued by a subject - a subject of experience, a mind.

I am one of those myself and there are billions of others. But upon reflection it is simply not plausible that I am the subject in question:

1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings. — Bartricks

Your hidden assumption seems to be that there is only one subject bestowing value. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Much of our sense of right and wrong is inherited from the community. There are things that 'one' does not do. But in highly complex and pluralistic cultures like ours, one of the things we do is ...question the things that one does. We obey by disobeying. But that's another issue.

It's easier to just think in terms of tension between the community and the individual. With certain basic norms, the individual is impossible. But most of us these days think of the community as being justified in terms of what it offers the individual (at the price of a certain conformity.) In a democracy with laws that can be changed, it's even almost the duty of a citizen to think how the laws themselves can be improved. And of course there's moral progress to be chased, like setting a good example. A person could try to make vegetarianism cool. Or make transphobia look bad. [Simply labeling things 'phobias' was the PR move.]So individuals can use persuasive speech (and so on) to edit the current norms --but they will usually reason from uncontroversial norms toward the establishment of new norms.

This is why you appeal to logic in order to prove the existence of God to us decadent, heathen philosophers. And it's why certain evangelical atheists will use the 'it's science, bitch' approach. What matters is no whether the logic or science is good but rather the assumed investment of the target market in the magic word. (Of course there is good science and good logic, but perhaps you see what I mean.)

My point is that your theory and your sense of its importance is self-flattering. You seem to be casting yourself as the 'favorite son' of the Goddess Reason. — joshua

Ah, I see. Well, that's false - but whatever. Just focus on the argument and stop trying to analyse me or I'll tell my mum.

I counter that a sane person who thinks an argument establishes the truth of divine command theory would instead look for the mistake in that proof (find out its sophistry.) — joshua

That's exactly what I'm bloomin' well doing! Literally. Here. Now. I'm presenting the argument in the cold light of day on a philosophy forum to see how it fares. Answer: hasn't even been dented.

You're an internet-tough-guy theologian — joshua

Yes, I'm the pope. I have to be nice to losers all day long so I unwind by being really nasty to some on the internet in the evenings.

But that's because this is where the essence of your position is manifest.
It's the ancient game of projecting yourself as daddy. And you are playing a retro version, where you (little daddy) are 'proving ' the existence of big daddy classic, no doubt created in your image — joshua

Hmm, thanks Freud. And yes, I do find my mum sexy - what of it?

You can't have your cake and eat it too. — joshua

You can. Buy a cake. Eat it. Who's telling you these things?

Much of our sense of right and wrong is inherited from the community. There are things that 'one' does not do. But in highly complex and pluralistic cultures like ours, one of the things we do is ...question the things that one does. — joshua

I think that's false, but even if it was true it wouldn't challenge anything in my argument. My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad.

So, take the belief that there is a god. Now, perhaps the full explanation of why some people have that belief is that having a disposition to form it meant their ancestors had more babies than those who lacked this disposition. Okay, fine. But what would it take for that belief to be true? Well, there would need to be a god, wouldn't there?

Now take the belief that some things are morally good. Once more, perhaps the full explanation of why so many of us have this belief is that a disposition to form it meant our ancestors had more babies than those humans who lacked such a disposition. Okay, fine. But what would it take for that belief to be true? That is, what would it take for anything actually to be morally good?

That's the question I am answering. You don't answer it by looking into the history of the belief, but rather by looking at what the belief is 'about'.

I've noticed that you, like others, are getting hung up on God and keep mentioning him - I have not, except to point out to people like you that I have not mentioned him. God is not mentioned in any premise in my argument or in the conclusion.

Again, I am like a detective who says that "someone has killed Janet" and you - and lots of others - are hearing "Mr Someone killed Janet". No, not "Mr Someone" - although if Mr Someone exists, let's not rule him out - but 'someone'.

On another stage, I shall assume you’re aware a sound deductive syllogism predicated solely on rational premises cannot be falsified. It’s impossible, actually, for no purely rational dictum whatsoever lends itself to verifiable negation outside itself. — Mww

First, the agreement...

A sound deductive syllogism has both true premisses and a valid conclusion and/or argumentative form. A true statement/proposition cannot be falsified simply because it's true. True statements are not false. Being falsified is being shown to be false. Only false statements are falsifiable.

There are no false statements in a sound syllogism. It is impossible to falsify a true statement. A sound deductive syllogism cannot be falsified.


Now, the disagreement...

Validity does not equal truth. A false conclusion can result from a valid inference if being valid is following the rules of correct inference and/or having valid argumentative form.

Some valid syllogisms provide verifiable/falsifiable conclusions. Verifiability/falsifiability has nothing to do with a valid syllogism being predicated solely on rational premisses. Those premisses cannot be verified. Logical possibility alone(argument by definitional fiat) is inadequate ground for belief. Some valid syllogisms predicated solely on rational premisses can most certainly be falsified.

The verification of something to the contrary, a mutually exclusive set of statements/propositions provides us with true statements about fact/reality that offer more than adequate ground to reject any and all claims to the contrary as false. That is more than adequate to falsify a valid deductive syllogism with unverifiable premisses... those consisting solely of rational premisses notwithstanding.

See my critique of the OP's first premiss...

My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad. — Bartricks

The right answer would consist of two remarkably different standards/criterion. Right and wrong are a matter of being true/false. Good and bad are a matter of what counts as acceptable/unacceptable, praiseworthy/blameworthy, glorified and celebrated/vilified and shunned, good/evil, helpful/harmful, etc.

I suspect you know this already.

Ah, I see. Well, that's false - but whatever. Just focus on the argument and stop trying to analyse me or I'll tell my mum — Bartricks

Pretty good answer. Threatening to tell your mum is a nice pivot. Change the mask. I really was pleasantly surprised. I tried to push your buttons and you kept your cool. I respect that.

My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad. — Bartricks

OK, that helps. Are you saying that without something like a god there can be no 'true' right or wrong? That in the absence of a god we just have 'monkey' opinion and feelings about right and wrong?

Okay, fine. But what would it take for that belief to be true? That is, what would it take for anything actually to be morally good?

That's the question I am answering. You don't answer it by looking into the history of the belief, but rather by looking at what the belief is 'about'. — Bartricks

This helps too. If you are looking into the ground (or its absence) of some kind of timeless, pure morality, then that is a different issue. I was just taking it for granted that there is no such ground --that we are animals who ended up (for various reasons) calling and feeling certain actions and attitudes 'right' and 'wrong.' I was concerned with morality as it exists and evolves historically.

This applies to the god issue in general. People have vague notions of the real nature of god(s), but religion (in my view) is mostly manifest in how people actually act. This even applies to math. For the most part the metaphysical status of numbers and so on is unimportant enough to remain endlessly undecided.

Specialists in god, pure math, and philosophy can endlessly refine their attempt to formulate the absolute versions of their concepts, but mostly the world never cared. It makes due with coarser and more embodied versions in each case. It performs comforting rituals, acts on standard calculations, and gets its philosophy from politics and other forms of pop culture. Just as look at which books are bestsellers, etc. People are more likely to be annoyed than impressed by a quotation from Plato or Marx.

I've noticed that you, like others, are getting hung up on God and keep mentioning him - I have not, except to point out to people like you that I have not mentioned him. God is not mentioned in any premise in my argument or in the conclusion. — Bartricks

Well I did misunderstand where you were coming from --with your help. If you can answer some of my questions above, I might figure out your motivations. For instance, do you believe in something like the biblical god? Or is your divine subject secondary to your point?

So? Philosophy isn't diplomacy and the truth isn't democratic. — Bartricks

But since there are a number of fairly intelligent and well read members on this forum, their opinions should have weight to you. Especially since you agree that one should consult others to test whether one's reason is "corrupted".

1. if I am the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore I am not the subject whose valuings constitute moral valuings.

That argument works for you too and, I suspect, all other human subjects. And once more, Reason says not jus that the argument is valid, but that it is sound - that its premises are true. — Bartricks

As has been pointed out multiple times, this argument isn't valid, and premise 1 is obviously false.