You don't see an ethical issue with removing any protection children would have against psychological abuse from their parents?

You don't see an ethical issue with removing any protection children would have against psychological abuse from their parents? — Benkei

Correct.

Correct. — Terrapin Station

Why not?

Also that was an example of a non-normative use of the word "correct".

For one, I don't consider any psychological states to be forced by environmental factors such as speech, and I only have an ethical problem with nonconsensual force. (And only a subset of nonconsensual force at that, but there's no need to get into the details of that in this context.)

For one, I don't consider any psychological states to be forced by environmental factors such as speech, and I only have an ethical problem with nonconsensual force. — Terrapin Station

Uhm. Why must it be forced (whatever that means) and why not "caused"? I mean, if I shoot someone I don't force him to die. It's just really likely that he will, so it's considered a conditio sine que non. If parents don't yell at their kids and continually tell them they're crap, stupid and not worth a dime, the kids wouldn't have a behavioural problem either as a result. So the presence of their yelling and name-calling is a conditio sine que non for the behavioural problem.

Second, a kid is in a dependent relationship with their parents. It's not as if they can escape to somewhere else to avoid this behaviour, especially at very young ages.

EDIT: come to think of it. It's pure nonsense. All thought is caused by speech that we learned from others. We don't come in this world ready with words. In that sense, every psychological state is caused by speech except the most base emotions but even that is routed through the neo-cortex.

Psychological abuse is a real problem and it's not just limited to child abuse but that's an example where the State can (and will) step in by separating the children from abusive parents. — Benkei

Yes. And in the context of an ethical discussion about what's right or wrong, or what is or isn't a problem, the resolution to the issue of someone speaking up to say that it's okay, or that it isn't a problem, is simply to disregard what they say. Or, especially if there's a risk that they might cause harm by influencing others with their views, then the best thing to do would be to get them to see sense, if possible. But we certainly shouldn't treat what they say as in any way credible, acceptable, reasonable, or justified.

Uhm. Why must it be forced (whatever that means) and why not "caused"? — Benkei

I'd say it must be "caused," but contiguous, etc. physical force is how I'm using the term "cause" there. So I'm substituting "force" for that to make that clear. (There was an issue with that earlier.)

It must be forced because dispositionally/in terms of intuitive feeling, etc. that's the only thing I find morally objectionable. (And again, just a subset of that.)

If you shoot someone, you were applying physical forces to them, for which we can detail the causal (forced) chain. They might not die, of course, but when they do, there's a causal (forced) chain we can trace. (And of course there are causal chains we can trace when they don't die but the shooting causes other sorts of physical damage, too.)

All thought is caused by speech that we learned from others. — Benkei

Not a claim that I agree with in the slightest.

For one, I don't agree that all thought is linguistic, and I don't think that meaning is linguistic, either.

Found it.

To directly support my comment.

Work across various academic disciplines has converged on the view that morality arises from the integration of both innate abilities which are shaped by natural selection and deliberative processes that interact with social environments and cultural exposure

Right... so numerous neuroscientists and psychologists have established the link between abusive language and behavioural issues with children. You are just pretending it doesn't exist by claiming only a specific type of causality exists. Offering up such a persuasive definition is just semantics and ignores the work in the field of psychology. Basically, you're denying the existence of causality between parental speech that is abusive and the consequences to children subject to such speech. Those consequences have been documented and scientifically proved. Your disagreement with facts is noted but can be ignored as inconsequential.

Not a claim that I agree with in the slightest.

For one, I don't agree that all thought is linguistic, and I don't think that meaning is linguistic, either. — Terrapin Station

Of course you don't. And all those people working in advertisement and speech writers are really not influencing anything. Oh wait...

By the way, I don't know if you saw me mention this, but for some weird reason, I often do not receive notifications for posts you respond to. It happens occasionally with other posters, too, but it seems like more often than not your responses don't show up in my "Mentions 'feed.'" So if sometimes I don't respond to you, that might be why.

At any rate . . . so among other things, we'd have to examine (a) just how they're defining some of those terms, (b) just how they're reaching the empirical conclusions that they're reaching.

It's not clear just from that text that they're claiming something akin to "Moral stances of type x (that is, of a certain complexity and/or specificity) must be based on moral stances of type y (of less complexity/specificity), even if moral stances of type y are unconscious," which is what you were claiming.

Part of examining just how they're defining terms would be looking at whether they'd "define away" someone intuiting moral stance M, where it's not consciously based on any other moral stance, despite being of type x (a certain complexity and/or specificity), as "not being morality" because it's not meeting some requirement or other--such as not being what they'd consider deliberative processes that interact with social environments and cultural exposure. I have no idea if that would be the case without looking at how they're defining "deliberative processes" as well as "deliberative processes that interact with social environments and cultural exposure.

Alternately, if they're claiming that M is based on unconscious moral stances of type y, we'd need to examine just how they're supposedly gaining empirical evidence of there being an unconscious moral stance of type y.

Right... so numerous neuroscientists and psychologists have established the link between abusive language and behavioural issues with children. — Benkei

So one, I have issues with the methodology of lots of those sorts of claims. We could get into that, but it would be a big, detailed diversion to get into. I think it would be a good diversion to get into, because we'd be digging into some epistemological issues we normally avoid on this board, and that's presumably the sort of thing we'd be doing on a philosophy board, but no one ever wants to bother, and there's a weird tendency here to want to defer to people that one considers experts in various fields. (Meanwhile, we have people here who have the qualifications necessary for "expertise" in philosophy, where that includes concentrations such as philosophy of science and epistemology, but there's no similar deference to them. It turns out to be deference to "experts saying things I agree with/experts saying things I want them to say.")

You are just pretending it doesn't exist by claiming only a specific type of causality exists. — Benkei

So putting aside the epistemological issues for a moment, what I said, and I shouldn't have to repeat this, is that I brought up force because per my dispositions, my intuitive moral feelings, that's the only thing that I find morally objectionable. So if we're not claiming force in those situations, I don't find it morally objectionable, whatever other things, exactly, we're claiming.

It's not as if any particular moral stance follows from any particular set of facts. That's definitely NOT the case. That would be an example of an ought following from an is, but oughts don't follow from "ises."

Offering up such a persuasive definition is just semantics and ignores the work in the field of psychology. — Benkei

I'm not trying to persuade anyone of anything. I'm telling you what my disposition is. You asked me my opinion. That's my opinion. It doesn't have to be your opinion, and I'm not attempting to make it your opinion by persuading you of anything. I'm just reporting to you what I'm like.

Those consequences have been documented and scientifically proved. — Benkei

Science methodology 101: we don't prove empirical claims.

You could be using "prove" in a loose sense--giving what we consider to be evidence for something, but the whole nut behind falsification re a demarcation criterion for science is that any positive claim whatsoever could be wrong, and is thus open to revision in principle.

Your disagreement with facts is noted but can be ignored as inconsequential. — Benkei

Definitely you are not required to care about, be interested in, my opinion. The smart thing to do in that case would be to just not respond to me.

And all those people working in advertisement and speech writers are really not influencing anything. — Benkei

If only that had something to do with whether all thought is linguistic, whether meaning is linguistic, etc.

So putting aside the epistemological issues for a moment, what I said, and I shouldn't have to repeat this, is that I brought up force because per my dispositions, my intuitive moral feelings, that's the only thing that I find morally objectionable. So if we're not claiming force in those situations, I don't find it morally objectionable, whatever other things, exactly, we're claiming. — Terrapin Station

Yes, as I said, your dispositions are irrelevant. That YOU think certain things ought not be punished isn't relevant to the fact most people believe they ought. So your free speech absolutism cannot work because it assumes conditions that don't exist. As I said, everybody should be rich. That's as informative as your position is. E.g., not relevant in any way.

So your free speech absolutism cannot work because it assumes conditions that don't exist. — Benkei

That's not the case. We're not disagreeing on any facts. We're disagreeing on whether those facts are acceptable.

In other words, I'm fine saying for the sake of argument, "Speech causes psychological harm."

I think that psychological harm is acceptable. You do not.

We are disagreeing on facts but you refuse to accept that what you think is irrelevant in a society where 99% disagrees with your definition of causality or ethical dispositions.

We are disagreeing on facts — Benkei

What fact would you say we're disagreeing on?

Re relevance, everything is relevant to some things and not relevant to others, depending on the interpretational framing one is doing. That's why I didn't address that part.

Read again, it's in the same sentence.

Here's a thought experiment:

99 persons say punching someone in the face should be allowed.
1 Terrapin Station says it shouldn't.

TS is welcome to his opinion but is punched in the face nevertheless.

Here's a thought experiment:

99 persons say punching someone in the face should be allowed.
1 Terrapin Station says it shouldn't.

TS is welcome to his opinion but is punched in the face nevertheless. — Benkei

What is that thought experiment supposed to be showing?

Yes, whatever should that be showing? Maybe think about it before replying.

Yes, whatever should that be showing? Maybe think about it before replying. — Benkei

Well, or just be straightforward and say what you think it's supposed to be showing.

No, my speech doesn't affect your psychological state any ways so it doesn't make you wonder or think in any case.

No, my speech doesn't affect your psychological state any ways so it doesn't make you wonder or think in any case. — Benkei

Your speech doesn't force my psychological states.

At any rate, if you don't want to be straightforward about what you think the thought experiment shows, that's fine with me. It would just have the practical implication that it must not be very important to you to talk about it with me in any depth. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

I often do not receive notifications for posts you respond to. — Terrapin Station

Happens to me too, I'll try and '@' you if ever I think you're missing out on my edifying pronouncements.

It's not clear just from that text that they're claiming something akin to "Moral stances of type x (that is, of a certain complexity and/or specificity) must be based on moral stances of type y (of less complexity/specificity), even if moral stances of type y are unconscious," which is what you were claiming. — Terrapin Station

So, the main thing you'd need to explain to counter this theory, is what the prefrontal cortex is doing when making complex moral choices, if they are just intuited. That's the main sticking point with your theory. Both functional imaging and brain damage studies show this activity. They also show different areas of the brain functioning with simple desire satisfaction, stimuli avoidance, even phobic responses. Basically, everything we associate with 'intuition' happens in areas of the brain outside of the key area engaged in complex moral decision making, which just happens to be an area also involved in prediction, calculation and weighing choices. Are you suggesting we put that down to coincidence?

You could conclude from this that no moral decisions are intuitive (though other studies would counter that), but what does not match that evidence is your theory that all moral decisions are intuitive feelings.

Part of examining just how they're defining terms would be looking at whether they'd "define away" someone intuiting moral stance M, where it's not consciously based on any other moral stance, despite being of type x (a certain complexity and/or specificity), as "not being morality" because it's not meeting some requirement or other — Terrapin Station

You'd have to look into the experiments themselves for that. I know a very large proportion of the older ones were done using the trolley problem, then that was updated (it was considered a bit 'sterile') to a variety of 'aid' dilemmas (what you would risk to help a person) and unfair judgement responses (deliberately treating third parties unfairly).

So, the main thing you'd need to explain to counter this theory, is what the prefrontal cortex is doing when making complex moral choices, if they are just intuited. — Isaac

The problem is rather that:

(a) if S is making what's being classified as a "complex moral choice,"
and
(b) S reports that he's making the choice simply intuitively, with no other (moral) stances behind it
and
(c) the prefrontal cortex shows activity A via imaging during this process

then

What grounds do we have for saying that something additional is going on mentally with respect to (moral) stances, despite S's report?

That would be a classic example of disregarding recalcitrant data in the guise of theory-worshipping.

In other words, the only way to link third-person observational stuff like brain imaging to mental phenomena is via first-person reports from the subjects in question.

Well, if we do that and we develop a theory linking certain observables with certain mental phenomena, but then we come across a subject who shows the observables in question but who does NOT report the same mental phenomena, that doesn't suggest that the subject is wrong and really has the mental phenomena in question (but just isn't aware of it or some nonsense like that).

It rather suggests that something is off with the mapping or with the theory. What we thought were observables for the mental phenomena in question weren't really--maybe they're correlated in some way, usually, at least, but they're not the same thing as the mental phenomena in question, and there's not always a correlation.

Imagine that we had a bunch of lights that can flash, and then we have (to invoke Wittgenstein a bit) a black box that we can open and check whether there's a beetle inside. We don't know beforehand just how the lights, the box and the beetle are connected. We notice that whenever the lights go off in certain pattern, there's a beetle in the box after we check. But then on one occasion, the lights go off in that pattern and there's no beetle in the box. We can't insist that "there really was a beetle in the box that time, too--it must have just been invisible" or something like that. We have to consider that the lights in that pattern aren't actually a guarantee that there's a beetle in the box. There might be some connection, but it at least wouldn't be the same thing, and there's not necessarily a connection. We'd have to do a lot more research to figure out what's going on.

The problem with the mental version of this is that we can't actually third-person check for the beetle in the box. We have to rely on someone else telling us whether there is. Which not only means that they can tell us that there isn't a beetle in the box when there is (if they're not being honest, for example), but the opposite, too--they can tell us that there's a beetle in the box when there isn't, and that can be exacerbated by priming or pumping them, maybe in ways that aren't obvious.

We can't insist that "there really was a beetle in the box that time, too--it must have just been invisible" — Terrapin Station

By the way, this is unfortunately what we more or less literally have done when it comes to positing something like dark matter. We realize that our equations aren't working for what we're observing, so rather than thinking, "Crap--maybe we've got this theory, these equations wrong for at least some circumstances," we say, "there must be far more matter there, it's just effectively invisible."

That would be a classic example of disregarding recalcitrant data in the guise of theory-worshipping. — Terrapin Station

OK, so how do we go about holding any theory at all by that standard? We have a theory that the earth is round but Bill says he measured it and it came out flat. Do we have to re-think our theory, or just dismiss Bill's results as probably an error?

You're basically begging the question of your 'no unconscious mental events' theory. We can never disprove it because any brain activity we link to unconscious thought, doesn't count without the correct first-person account. If you want to hold self-immunised theories, that's fine, but there's no point in discussing them.

As I've said before. Quite a lot of careful work over tens of thousands of man-hours has gone into considering issues like this. I can't give a degree course in psychology over the Internet to convince you these matters have been considered already. If you have a specific experiment you want to question the methodology of, I don't mind going through that, but spending time convincing you that the whole of psychology is not a castle in the air is not something I'm interested in doing I'm afraid.

OK, so how do we go about holding any theory at all by that standard? We have a theory that the earth is round but Bill says he measured it and it came out flat. Do we have to re-think our theory, or just dismiss Bill's results as probably an error? — Isaac

"The earth is round" isn't about individual's subjective experiences. It's about the objective shape of the Earth.

"S has mental content M" is about subjective experiences. There's no way for anyone to observe the subjective experience per se aside from the subject reporting it to someone else.

Recalcitrant data for the Earth being round is a different objective measurement. Not someone's subjective report.

There can be recalcitrant objective data. I just mentioned this above re why we posit "dark matter."

Recalcitrant data for the Earth being round is a different objective measurement. Not someone's subjective report. — Terrapin Station

How is "I measured the earth and found it to be flat" not a subjective report?

How is "I measured the earth and found it to be flat" not a subjective report? — Isaac

That might be, but we don't go by subjective reports for this. We make objective measurements.

We can't do that when what we're studying is subjective phenomena. Again, this is the whole point of noting that the only way to link third-person observational stuff like brain imaging to mental phenomena is via first-person reports from the subjects in question.