No. Respect people.

Freedom of speech as an ideal can only be sound if it does not contradict itself. There are some expressions of freedom of speech that have consequences that will prevent further freedom of speech. Such as voicing the opinion - aka playing politics (defined as the relation between people) - that certain groups should not or do not deserve to be heard. This is a form of freedom of speech that in many cases encompasses what we would call hate speech.

In this manner we can consider that such expression of speech is not really freedom of speech, as it is self-limiting. Hate speech - if u agree that it’s aim is to prevent the equitable speech of another group or member of humanity - in its use prevents freedom of speech.

So hate speech cannot hide under the umbrella of freedom of speech - at least not with conversations of people who can actually think logically. It is by its very nature an attack on freedom of speech. It is a self contradiction and ergo false.

So the answer must be no. Hate speech is not a form of freedom of speech.... it is a form of the denial of freedom of speech. It cannot be though of as otherwise. But please reply if you think otherwise, it would be interesting to be proven wrong!

I'm not asking about naming and thinking about. — Terrapin Station

The stuff the measure is made of is objectively there — Isaac

Now are you just going to repeatedly ask the same question, or are you going to address the glaring hypocrisy in dismissing my position because it universalises some theory about the way human minds work, whilst doing exactly the same thing in support of your own position?

We're still working on you understanding how measurements are objective. You keep bringing up thinking about measurements --concepts, applying particular terms and all sorts of things, but we're trying to reach understanding that the claim isn't about concepts etc.

A measurement is a concept. It doesn't exist outside of someone's mind, the only thing I concede probably exists outside of someone's mind is the heterogeneous sea of stuff reality is made of. It doesn't contain measurements, which are a human concept attached to human-determined objects. I don't know how much more clear about this I can be.

Something exists/happens in 'reality'. We decide in our minds what to think about that in terms of naming, significance, prediction, beliefs, associations, modelling etc.

A measurement is a concept. — Isaac

No. That's not even a sophormoric conflation. It's a freshman-level conflation. Or a high school kid getting high and thinking that he might be interested in philosophy-level conflation.

There is a concept of measurement. But measurements themselves are not concepts.

You can't conflate concepts and what they're concepts of. That's one of the most naive philosophical mistakes.

Now, you can make a sort of "guesstimation measurement" in your head at times, but that's not what we're talking about.

Oh lord, here we go. With arguments like these we’re one step closer to censorship.

Free Speech Is Killing Us

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-media-violence.html

No. That's not even a sophormoric conflation. It's a freshman-level conflation. Or a high school kid getting high and thinking that he might be interested in philosophy-level conflation. — Terrapin Station

So, ad populum arguments are fair use when they suit you? No need to present a case for why I'm wrong, simply refer to the fact that educated people think I'm wrong, therefore I must be.

So where does that leave your outlandish views on how the mind works, which everyone above high-school level psychology would disagree with?

You can't conflate concepts and what they're concepts of. That's one of the most naive philosophical mistakes. — Terrapin Station

You're presuming that there is a thing that the measurement is a concept of. Absent that presumption there are no two things to conflate. What is my concept off flying space monkeys a concept of?

Now, you can make a sort of "guesstimation measurement" in your head at times, but that's not what we're talking about. — Terrapin Station

So, I look at an object and guess it is six inches. I look at the same object together with a ruler (where I see the number 6) and you're telling me the latter observation is a philosophically distinct thing?

So, ad populum arguments are fair use when they suit you? — Isaac

Can you explain this question?

Can you explain this question? — Terrapin Station

You have frequently rejected arguments against positions you hold which consist of nothing but reference to how many people disagree with you. Your argument above contained no substantive support, simply a claim that everyone above high-school level philosophy would disagree with me (not make the 'mistake' I'm making).

Simply saying that better educated people would not agree with me is not an argument unless there is a body of empirical fact that those people are learnt in, and that is a fact which you yourself have used previously against interlocutors.

Simply saying that better educated people would not agree with me — Isaac

??

Not what I said. It's more that you wouldn't agree with you at a stage of development in your thought about this stuff that didn't resemble a high school kid who "thinks he might be interested in philosophy" and who just smoked a joint.

It's like if you were to say, "I'm going to only eat bubblegum!" I might point out that you seem like you're four years old. That has nothing to do with what other people say. It has to do with the fact that that's the stage of development where people typically think something like "I'm going to only eat bubblegum!"

Well, the stage of development where people have a lot of problems separating concepts from what concepts are about is around the time of either "stoned high school student with some interest in (at least what he thinks is) philosophy" or the "freshman taking a Phil 101 course for the first time."

That's nothing to do with agreeing with other people.

[Admittedly, I did not read through much of the initial content of this thread, much less the entire thing. Consequently, I run the risk of rehashing the already hashed hash.]

Can speech-censoring as a means to mitigate/overcome unnecessary suffering (of those who would take psycho-affective (?) damage from such speech), ultimately achieve such?

Does the censoring of hate speech solve the problem, or does it merely palliate(?)/treat the symptoms of a hateful condition?

If it does (promise to OR actually) solve the problem, does the enforcement of this kind of censoring only need to increase further?

If it only mops up after the symptoms (which certainly has its value, seeing as it can serve to decrease the flow-rates of verbal vitriol, at least in theory), does any deeper treatment necessarily involve the allowance of such expression regarded as "hate speech"?

If any deeper treatment does involve such allowance, what, then, would be the plan? Would attempts need to be made to appeal to the sensibility enshrouded in what we may call the clouds of hate? Can such appeals be made?

If such appeals can be made, at what cost? How far does the offended have to cater to the offender in this scenario ("offended"/"offender" used as provisional terms, seeing as the concreting of such labels only serves to crystalize an opposition that does not seem, to me, to be absolute and irreconcilable)?

If you think such appeals cannot be made, do you also think that the defenses of the offender are impenetrable?

If you think such appeals should not be made, what do you think should be done? Should the offended, or the defender of the offended, continue to correct/censor the offender? Can such be done, effectively, with sensitivity? Or should the offended/defender sacrifice sensitivity in the interest of assertiveness? Does sensitivity need to be sacrificed in this situation?

How much psychic energy does the offended have to spare? How draining is it to have been under such a barrage for the bulk of one's life?

What of the hermeneutics (?) of hates speech? Does the speaker need to be consciously driven by hate for it to constitute hate speech? Or can ignorance/unawareness (unconsciously driven by hate or not) qualify speech as hateful? If the ignorant/unaware speaker speaks and is accused of hate speech, is their ignorance/unawareness reified, in their mind, as hate? If so, how can this problematic equation be remedied? Does this bring us back to appealing to the offender?

Is hate merely repressed if its expression is censored? Does this depend on the (situational and socio-systematic) power dynamics (?) of the censoring interaction?

Are we framing hate as the absence of love? Is it a matter of substantiating a void?

Or are we framing hate as negative, love as positive, and neutrality as zero?

Which aspects of these dichotomies are fixed, and which are fluid?

Can speech-censoring as a means to mitigate/overcome unnecessary suffering (of those who would take psycho-affective (?) damage from such speech), ultimately achieve such? — Blurrosier

If one is worried about unnecessary suffering, in a situation where we're censoring some speech, what about the unnecessary suffering of people who now can't say what they want to say?

This seems, to me, to be the crux of the matter.

From what little I gather, by means of both personal speculation and testament of others, about the experience of some marginalized person, one who has not been taken into account as a subject by whatever mainstream/"master" narrative that defines their social environment; from what I gather about the condition of such ongoing experience, I am willing to equate such marginalization (intentional or not) to suppression.

This suppression, in turn, can, perhaps, be framed as a being-held-underwater, in which case the gradual demarginalization (by means of political correctness?) can be framed as a coming-to-the-surface, the fresh air of which has been reserved, historically, for those who are/have been taken into account as subjects by the local mainstream/"master" social narrative.

In this analogy (and perhaps I am clutching onto it too dearly, at the expense of optimal expression), is the movement upward, toward the surface, represented by the inversion of suppression? Would the marginalized being, by ceasing their censorship of the kind of expression they deem offensive/suppressive; by ceasing this censorship, would they necessarily be curbing their movement upward? Is this a fixed inverse relationship? Does ground gained by the historical non-subject (the so-called "other?") necessarily equate to ground lost by the historical subject? If the historical subject (the oppressor, in certain terminology; capital M "Man," etc.) is the arbitrator of who is deserving of the title of subject, how can this power be shared? Is that possible?

Back to your point, Terrapin: I, perhaps, can address this from firsthand experience, unlike the matters aforementioned. There are aspects of this kind of censorship that, in as far as I identify with the censored subject, carry with them connotations of total invalidation. That is, if I am as privileged as everyone says I am, is there anything worthwhile (i.e. is any of my "success" the fruit of my work at all? Or is it entirely derived from my genetic and socio-economic circumstances?) about my being qua what-part-of-my-being-is-up-to-me?

Additionally, the accusations of insensitive speech can sting (In as far as you pride yourself on being a good person, I suppose), but I can only assume that such speech stings more on the other side. But, if I understand what you are saying, what of the sting felt by the censored? Is it necessary? Does it amount to anything positive/remedial(?) for both sides? Does it only sting until one gets accustomed to it? Again, is the inversion of suppression promising as a solution, or does it merely smolder the emotions accused of being hateful, and cause them to fester and, perhaps, explode, automatically, through a barrel into a crowded area?

Now, that last question, admittedly, reads quite pointedly - but I do see some serious import in it, as hyperbolic as it may seem.

The best answer I have, of now, is to embrace the sting (the post-oppressor as martyr??), and hopefully it will lesson the suffering on both ends - one of which, I feel compelled to point out, has been suffering (in various ways, not necessarily in every way) far longer.

But ^this^ kind of "A (but really B (but also A (but really B)))" oscillation can, in my eyes, persist into oblivion.

If one starts to introduce all of those additional qualifications, they'd need to be supported, and we could just suggest that one state the full policy, with all of the qualifications, right off the bat, instead of modifying it every time we point out a problem with it.

Well perhaps it was a bit too complicated an answer, but this does seem to be a complicated issue.

My intentions are merely to lay out what contingencies seem to arise from such choices. It would be ideal if such a policy could be prescribed off the bat, and then, the policy itself being deemed sufficient, it would only be a matter of adhering to it. But does that not amount to our supposing that the relation being addressed by the policy is fixed in its nature? I'm inclined to believe that, at most, the essence of such a relation (oppressor/oppressed?) may be fixed in its nature, but the circumstantially-dictated attributes are surely liable to change, are they not?

Then, if a policy is to be asserted and remain fixed, it must account for this essence (which also assumes that the essence is, in fact, fixed), withstanding whatever circumstantial changes may be experienced (?).

I don't necessarily believe that all of these qualifications can be completely supported, but I am inclined to believe that, by introducing more factors to be suspended in criticism, alternative pathways may open. Pretty vague, but I do believe it.

Or maybe I am totally off-base and am considering your points in ways you did not intend.

I'm inclined to believe that, at most, the essence of such a relation (oppressor/oppressed?) may be fixed in its nature, but the circumstantially-dictated attributes are surely liable to change, are they not? — Blurrosier

The idea is that, for example, "needless suffering" and "oppressor/oppressed" are different ideas. If we state that our concern is for one, but then we switch to the other when we're analyzing a policy we've stated, it suggests that we're simply ad hoc arguing for our preference and not actually basing it on any sort of principle after all.

Maybe I'm still not understanding your point, because "ad hoc" seems, to me, to be a wonderful modality (?) to adopt.

If the absence of fundamental principles - which apply, unflinchingly, throughout any and all scenarios - is what you hold as the negative aspect of such ad hoc operation, perhaps I even agree with such an arrangement, but I merely think of such an absence as a positive (my understanding of "positive" and of "negative," as they are both commonly used, is especially unstable).

Maybe my reasoning here comes down to this: when the adhering to fundamental principles obstructs/prevents the realization of the intentions behind the principles, should one take liberties to stray from such adherence? In this case, if the (fundamental) pretext for such considerations is a concern for the one (oppressed), when does switching our concern to the other (oppressor) actually work in favor (overcoming unnecessary suffering) of our concern for the one?

Maybe I'm still not understanding your point, because "ad hoc" seems, to me, to be a wonderful modality (?) to adopt. — Blurrosier

The idea of "ad hoc" is that one is just making any shit up, as needed as a discussion continues, in order to "support a point"/be right.

Okay, I think I understand I bit more now. If there isn't any kind of guiding principle at all, then any and all points drawn are that much more arbitrary, dictated by one's whim.

But can ad hoc movement be effectively subordinated to a more constant (yet fluid?) underlying principle? If we take "incremental overcoming of unnecessary suffering" (Anyone know, by the way, where that originated? I heard it from Mckenzie Wark, and various other iterations in other places.) - if we take "incremental overcoming of unnecessary suffering" as the guiding principle, one that is constant in essence but flexible in expression (?), and express it with ad hoc technique (oppressor/oppressed sympathy dialectics), could that not be effective? Ad hoc as a means/micro to achieve "overcoming of unnecessary suffering" as an end/macro? At this point, would "ad hoc" merely semantically not be the best term?

uler manufacturers aren't even aware of the official standard that an inch is 127/500 of the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299 792 458 of a second. They probably just use some sort of template they have on hand. — Terrapin Station

Official Bollocks.

What counts as an inch was established long before we even knew the speed of light.

Sure, but what I quoted is the official standard now.

Certainly. That's why it's humorous. I'll check my rule against it for accuracy.

Certainly. That's why it's humorous. I'll check my rule against it for accuracy. — creativesoul

Haha--right. So it probably ended up not being that great of an example for "assuming a standard," since in practice, that one's actually a bit of a mess (which is why that was dropped when I brought up the data re variances in rulers).