Yes he did. — frank

Yes he did what?

There are two uses of the word in play. One is about what we take to be true. The other is akin to absolute truth. — frank

I think there is indeed some overuse of the term, which prompts me to blabber for a while here, to put my current thoughts on record if anything. Feel free to skip any or all of the following.

I think that you cannot say that a statement is true if it doesn't involve some interpretation. Also, many statements are not accounts of particular place at particular time, but principles. What makes them different is that they will be subject to interpretation contexts, some valid, some distorted. Meaning that an idea may be subject to the wrong interpretation. The interpretation has to be fixed first, to even talk about truth. Truth is not about the statement, but the belief in the fact matter of the statement, or the validity of the statement after "interpretation". (Note that in formal logic, the correctness of the interpretation is implied, but this is a foundational assumption that mathematics needs to make.)

If two people mean two different things by the same statement, those are not two different perspectives on the fact matter, those are two different vocabulary uses or mixed-up notions. We can achieve consensus about the proper (or "correct") interpretation of some notion or assertion, but this is not essential to the quality of truthfulness, but to the quality of communication. If on the other hand, two people actually mean the same thing by their statements, and they convey contrary statements (whose interpretations are directly contrasted), I believe that one of them is more true to the matter of fact.

To elaborate on the last point - what does it mean, and how does it become apparent, whether some view is true to the matter of fact. In my opinion, being true indicates that the subject has mentally captured some amorphous representation of its hosting reality, which affords it the benefit of making projected value judgements of its plans and actions. At least in the sense of the final utility of the interpretation of two opposed statements, one will carry more benefit then the other. Note that for interpretation that has no practical utility (such as a non-realizable belief), then its negation may have no direct application as well, but would be less costly, reducing the distortion of value and attention expenditure.

How does the utility of an idea become apparent - through adversity, failure, or demise. Or through expiration. If the utility of a non-factual idea works for one individual as a happenstance, or for groups of individuals as a transitory effect, it will probably become too costly for the majority eventually, as they contend between the resistance to change and their practical needs. The obsolete idea becomes expelled through exclusion.

Also, it is relevant that most statements are self referential. A statement about a statement requires interpretation whose subject matter are the interpretations of statements. For example, "this statement is true" can be seen as a statement, or as self-assertion. This nuance applies when we communicate - sometimes statements imply their truthfulness and are implicitly self-referential, and sometimes we elaborate them and don't comment on their truthfulness. But usually the outermost statements are implicitly self-asserting. Truth as a concept arises from this self-reference, by making statements about the interpretation of other statements.

If you mean cross-cultural truths - things that are true for more than one culture - then why not say that, instead of using the ambiguous term absolute. — Banno

What I am trying to get at is that what is true can be relative or absolute; i.e. relative to some context or true independent of any and all contexts. And what is true can also be relative or absolute relative to any particular context. So in the context of humanity as a whole there will be some things which are true always and everywhere and other which will be true only relative to certain cultures.

Redundancy means that truth is an aspect of the act of assertion. — frank

You can say that truth is an assertion of actuality, which is what Tarski's formulation amounts to. The way I look at it is that truth just is actuality.

You can say that truth is an assertion of actuality, which is what Tarski's formulation amounts to. The way I look at it is that truth just is actuality. — Janus

The t-sentence doesn't reference actuality.

It says "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white. Snow being white (if it is white) is an actuality.

says "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white. Snow being white (if it is white) is an actuality. — Janus

No, the part that follows IFF is a statement or sentence.

Yes he did what? — Terrapin Station

Its called the identity theory of truth. A proposition is identical to a fact. The late Russell tried to drop propositions in favor of beliefs, but it's generally accepted that that doesnt work.

Thanks guys! I'll respond later.

Well, of course it is a statement, a statement that, unlike the first statement which refers to a statement, refers to an actuality; namely snow being white.

Well, of course it is a statement, a statement that, unlike the first statement which refers to a statement, refers to an actuality; namely snow being white. — Janus

No.

So, you are saying that snow being white is not an actuality?

=incomplete information. — Anthony

Are you saying that truth is something we reach for (as if beyond us in time and space)?

Its called the identity theory of truth. A proposition is identical to a fact. The late Russell tried to drop propositions in favor of beliefs, but it's generally accepted that that doesnt work. — frank

I don't understand. Are you denying that in the Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell forwarded a view that "fact" and "truth" are different and that that was and continues to be hugely influential on analytic philosophy?

And what does this have to do with me trying to clarify the senses of terms we're using, which you keep not really addressing?

, you are saying that snow being white is not an actuality? — Janus

Not in the t-sentence. Read about it. It's semi-fascinating. Tarski never finished his obscure project, but he inspired others.

So, now we have an interesting situation. The quote in your OP says that everything is a matter of interpretation. I interpret Tarski to be referring to an actuality in his t-sentence. Maybe Tarski thinks he is not. Is there a privileged interpretation of the T-sentence? What would determine the truth in this case?

Also, note that I am not claiming that the T-sentence must refer to any particular actuality but to the idea of actuality in general. So if you it wrote instead as: "X is F" is true iff X is F, I would say that X being F is the general or abstract idea of an actuality, of something that obtains.

interpret Tarski to be referring to an actuality in his t-sentence. Maybe Tarski thinks he is not. Is there a privileged interpretation of the T-sentence? What would determine the truth in this case? — Janus

Tarski was a logician, not a poet. He explained very explicitly what the parts of his t-sentence mean.

So what does "snow is white" refer to, according to your understanding of English and of Tarski? Could Tarski be using the phrase to refer to something other than what the phrase normally refers to?

I said it as a hypothetical truth. Sometimes there is no greater power that is calling a power to account for their immorality. It still does not negate the opportunity for a power to do so, because ultimately, morality is a judgement of the rightness or wrongness of a power.

If we say that law is an expression of the society's moral values (which, sometimes are immoral laws), and the Police are the power, then the courts are responsible for interpreting law according to it's moral intention, in order to instruct whether Police should seize and enforce a penalty. If there ever is a disagreement about the intention of a law, it is the moral interpretation of law that prevails.

Moreso than that, morality is used as the frame by which each side makes it's case that the law should serve their interests. Nobody tries to persuade a judge that the immoral application of law should prevail if the judge is aware that he would be judging in favour of immorality. A judge is constrained firstly by law, and secondly by (his, or society's conscience toward) morality, to deliver a verdict that is in the interests of justice.

I have an old Oxford dictionary somewhere that defines justice as "the exercise of power for the maintenance of right". This dictionary says a similar thing:

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/justice
"the maintenance or administration of what is just by law, as by judicial or other proceedings:"

Could Tarski be using the phrase to refer to something other than what the phrase normally refers to? — Janus

Yes. Tarski's t-sentence is a rule for the use of the truth predicate in formal languages.

There's more to T-sentences than redundancy. I'm thinking more of Davidson.

Structuring an assertion requires belief, and truth is a predicate of assertions, hence truth requires belief.

That's not something special about redundancy theories.

Sometimes there is no greater power that is calling a power to account for their immorality. It still does not negate the opportunity for a power to do so, because ultimately, morality is a judgement of the rightness or wrongness of a power. — Serving Zion

Judgment, in order to be of any significance has to have the power of enforcement. The greatest power on the scene has that power. Any lesser wielders of power are themselves subject to this greatest power.

Unless the government is divided against itself. Aha!

There's more to T-sentences than redundancy. I'm thinking more of Davidson.

Structuring an assertion requires belief, and truth is a predicate of assertions, hence truth requires belief.

That's not something special about redundancy theories. — Banno

Cool.

A belief might be said to have power 'to the extent that it's convincing or otherwise compelling'; not a truth - that is, to consider 'the extent that it's convincing or otherwise compelling' is to consider an assertion as a belief, not as a truth. A truth has power, in a manor of speaking, in so far as in things being thus, the are not otherwise.

What I am trying to get at is that what is true can be relative or absolute; i.e. relative to some context or true independent of any and all contexts. And what is true can also be relative or absolute relative to any particular context. So in the context of humanity as a whole there will be some things which are true always and everywhere and other which will be true only relative to certain cultures. — Janus

What to do here.

"...what is true can be relative or absolute..."

Are you claiming that any truth can be either relative or absolute?

"...relative to some context or true independent of any and all contexts"

Any truth is embedded in a context - any assertion is part of a language. Nothing is independent of all contexts.

" ...in the context of humanity as a whole there will be some things which are true always and everywhere and other which will be true only relative to certain cultures."

Yeah. Nuh.

A little side not on the Special Theory of Relativity. Some folk think is shows that a certain observation will be true for one frame of reference, false for another. That's not quite right. What it does is provide a set of rules for translating that description of an observation so that what it says, if true in one frame of reference, will be true in any frame of reference.

So if it is true for you that the ball is moving at 20m/s, then for me it will be true that for you the ball is moving at 20m/s.

The supposed distinction between true-for-me and true-for-you vaporises right there.

Here's a thought as an objection to Nietzsche:

Morality was never placed in the mouths of divinities by powerful kings. We projected ourselves onto the heavens millennia after millennia like a giant piano in the sky. A king just plays a particular song on that instrument.

If it appears that contradictions arise, so that a giant man carrying around a lion is the icon of virtue in one era, and a crucified man is the icon in another, it's because we ourselves are contradictory.

So losing faith in the divine doesn't actually do anything to truth or morality. Thoughts?

We are the source of morality. That much is I hope obvious, after so much existential writing.

To my eye talk of carrying lions or of being crucified serves to hide this basic existential fact: the choice is down to you.

But perhaps such myths are about the tension between the choice one makes and the choices others make. They provide social pressure to make such and such a choice.

They provide social pressure to make such and such a choice. — Banno

The man carrying the lion is Gilgamesh. He encourages people to go off and steal somebody's cedar trees. There are multiple ancient cultures in which theft by raiding was central to their economies. One of the few remnants of celtic culture we have is a story about a big cattle raiding trip.

In my culture, this way of life is anathema.

And this is the flaw in Davidson's attitude to conceptual schemes, isn't it? It's just a flat-out contradiction.

How to you picture both kinds of morality coming from the same species?

You seem to like keeping things half-said. What's the contradiction? That some folk think you should steal cedar trees, while other folk don't?

How's that a contradiction?

For the Celts, steeling cattle was right. Are you disagreeing with that?