There are two of them? — Banno

Propositions -- world

There's two.

If truth is irreducible, like actuality, then we are committing a category error in demanding an account of it. — Janus

I think we should be clear about one thing: truth is a concept, maybe a multi-faceted one. It is too fundamental to be analyzed. There is rigorous proof of that.

Two what? Propositions are not part of the world?

But then, correspondence isn't wrong here.
— Banno

It's dualistic, though. — frank

Is it?

It's only dualistic if one holds that all statements are true or false(bivalence). I'm a strong advocate for correspondence, but do not think that all statements are truth-bearers. Predictions are neither true nor false.

The question of "how" may be an old objection, but it's toothless unless one thinks that it is a legitimate and/or valid objection. I do not. Correspondence is truth. Truth is what makes true statements what they are( that is not amenable to the conventional correspondence theory).

Truth-bearers can correspond to fact/reality(or not) solely as a result of saying something meaningful about it(or not).

That's how.

"2+2=4" is meaningful because we say so. "The cat is on the mat" is meaningful because we say so. "I love vanilla ice cream" is meaningful because we say so.

The arithmetic claim is true because it corresponds to fact/reality. In this case, our rigid standards(names for quantities). The claim about the cat and the mat is true because it corresponds to fact/reality. In this case the cat is on the mat. The claim about the ice cream is true because it corresponds to fact/reality. In this case one's personal tastes/preferences.

It's not that hard to understand. Philosophy proper has made a mess out of it though.

I think we should be clear about one thing: truth is a concept, maybe a multi-faceted one. It is too fundamental to be analyzed. There is rigorous proof of that. — frank

I kind of agree with that. I think truth is more of a general notion than a clear concept with clear facets. And I think the inherent logic(s) in the notion of truth can be analyzed. If that logic (in at least one of its incarnations) consists in correspondence with actuality I think we have arrived at notional "ground zero" because we will become tangled in aporias if we try to unravel how sounds or marks could correspond to other actualities.

I'm not convinced there is, or could be, any "rigorous proof" of any of that though. :wink:

Truth is what makes true statements what they are(↪Janus
that is not amenable to the conventional correspondence theory). — creativesoul

I would say that actuality is what makes statements true or false, and I'm still not seeing how that is out of sync with the "conventional" understanding of correspondence. As I said above I also think that truth just is actuality in the final analysis; statements speak truth when they speak actuality, so we are perhaps not disagreeing.

There are remarkable differences between truth and actuality. If one equate the two, one is essentially defining "truth" as the way things are.

Statements correspond to truth... ???

You see the problem?

Correspondence to fact/reality is not a concept. "Truth" is a concept.



I'd love to debate that in the proper forum.

:wink:

We're not that far apart.

It's just a broader notion of truth, akin to Heidegger's "truth as unconcealement" or "alethia".

Of course if you think narrowly that truth is only a property of statements then of course the idea that statements correspond to their own property seems nonsensical.

Correspondence to fact/reality is not a concept. "Truth" is a concept. — creativesoul

Truth is a concept.

You seem to be conflating different senses of the term.

Ok. Let's see where this leads...

Concepts are existentially dependent upon language use. Do you agree?

statements are true iff they correspond to actuality. — Janus

But here you have not relied on truth functionality to define correspondence. It still waves in the wind.

So, so what?

You are still so far as I can see saying that truth is correspondence without telling us anything about correspondence, or else saying that the sort of correspondence changes with each sentence - in which case it's of no use as a definition.

Two what? Propositions are not part of the world? — Banno

If there aren't two things, then how is the word "correspondence" being used?

...you have not relied on truth functionality to define correspondence... — Banno

If truth is correspondence and this question aims at that then "truth functionality" needs to be re-worded. Otherwise, the substitution of "truth" with "correspondence" results in a nonsensical question.

You seem to be conflating different senses of the term. — creativesoul

What do you mean? I thought we are here to discuss all senses of the term, not merely the notion of propositional truth. The OP is concerned with the idea of the "power of truth" and truth has power only as actuality, as "unconcealment", as revelation, not as proposiition, as far as I can see.

There being two things doesn't imply dualism...

Dualism is a severing of the world into two things that are irreducible, one to the other. So are you going to say that word corresponds to, but is irreducible to, world?

Or what?

I do not understand what you are doing.

Gimme a minute. No worries. I'll set it out for you.

A discussion of all senses requires a very careful progression, and can lead to quite a bit of confusion. They are not compatible.

I do not understand what you are doing. — Banno

I thought he was referring to bivalence...

I do not understand what you are doing. — Banno

Just trying to understand, as always.

So correspondence is saying that one aspect of the world corresponds to another aspect of the world?

And by virtue of that correspondence, one part of the world is true?

WTF?

But here you have not relied on truth functionality to define correspondence. It still waves in the wind. — Banno

What more does the T-sentence tell or show us in your opinion? As I've said repeatedly I'm not claiming we can do any more than unravel the logic inherent in our idea(s) of truth. We all know what correspondence is, just as we all know what time is. Sometimes we just have to be satisfied with our ignorance, instead of making unreasonable demands for impossible definitions or explanations.

I see no need for confusion. It's not that difficult. They are simply different ways of thinking about truth; and they don't need to be "compatible"; to demand that they should be would be to commit a category error.

Think of Wittgenstein here: there does not need to, cannot, be one essence, one strict definition, of truth; if you ask for that you are trying to drill down to ore that isn't there, it is more a matter of family resemblance.

Using more than one sense of the same term constitutes a formal fallacy. Equivocation. It also inevitably leads to self-contradiction.

So, all terms have only one sense for you? What a strangely limited viewpoint!

If there aren't two things, then how is the word "correspondence" being used? — frank

Yep; that's what I am saying.

Yep; that's what I am saying. — Banno

Ok.

Well, isn't that what correspondence theory says? And also a good reason to question correspondence theory?

We're currently talking about truth as correspondence to fact/reality. To change the referent from correspondence to fact/reality to fact/reality(actuality) is a big problem. That's an entirely different conversation.

So, all terms have only one sense for you? What a strangely limited viewpoint! — Janus

Don't devolve Janus.