religion-in-general goes deeper than that, into the essence of human nature. It's not just intellectual assent to a list of specific "truths", "facts" or commandments. Instead, it's an emotional bond to a family or tribe or social group. The details differ from tribe to tribe, but the feeling of belonging is the same for all people of all places and all times. It's the same emotional connection that unites a family or football team, or military unit. And it may even be motivated by the same neurotransmitters (e.g. oxytocin) that bond a mother and her baby. — Gnomon

Yes, and it's manifest in actions. The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary. We bookish philosophers inherit the fantasy of justified systems of beliefs. What we don't like is our radical immersion in material circumstance and tacit knowledge that not only cannot be justified but also cannot even be made explicit. (This immersion itself can be and has been made fairly explicit by various famous 'anti-philosophers' who tended to have more sophisticated notions of religion like yours above.)

As this is a philosophy of religion thread, I would like to contribute something on the reality of soul.

I believe there is a way into understanding 'the nature of the soul' as connected with 'what grasps meaning'. Being able to grasp meaning is something fundamental to all living organisms in the sense that even so-called instinctive behaviours are responses to environmental stimuli and can be understood in terms of signal and response (which is basic to the emerging science of biosemiotics ¹.)

But what I want to concentrate on here is the sense in which the mind draws together and synthesises the meaning-world which underlies all acts of judgement. This is the faculty of 'transcendental apperception' in Kant, which provides the basis of experience - without it, we would not be able to interpret or understand anything, all of our sensory perceptions would be a mere chaos. It is analogous to what might be described as 'the ground of being'.

I'm inclined to see this conception as the philosophical descendant of Aristotle's 'rational soul', subject of the famous and controversial passage in De Anima of the 'active intellect'. Of course anything of this kind is nowadays dismissed as archaic but I suggest that there is a conceptual space for the possibility of the 'rational soul', and that it plausibly corresponds with what Kant and later Husserl called the 'transcendental ego'.

Transcendental ego, the self that is necessary in order for there to be a unified empirical self-consciousness. For Immanuel Kant, it synthesizes sensations according to the categories of the understanding. Nothing can be known of this self, because it is a condition, not an object, of knowledge. For Edmund Husserl, pure consciousness, for which everything that exists is an object, is the ground for the foundation and constitution of all meaning.

Bolds added.

You might object 'where can this 'transcendental ego' be found? And I think there's a clue in the examination of the so-called 'neural binding problem', in particular the problem of the 'subjective unity of experience'. This refers to the capacity of the brain to synthesise all manner of perceptual stimuli into a coherent unity - the 'subjective unity of experience' - which is, at least, strongly suggestive of the 'transcendental ego'.

In his paper on this issue, Jerome S. Feldman says that:

There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).

...There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.

Source

So does this mean that the rational soul/transcendental ego exists? I would say not, because, as noted above, 'nothing can be known of it', and by its nature, it can never plausibly be an object of cognition (hence, 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense.) Yet without this faculty, we would not function as conscious beings. I am suggesting that this is a plausible account, even if only by way of analogy, of the reality of 'soul' - not as the ethereal 'res cogitans' of Descartes but the native faculty which grasps meaning.

------------------

1. Interestingly, 'semiotics' as a distinct discipline originated with St Bonaventura who wrote that 'sensible things are understood to be signs that ultimately can direct humans to the divine art or wisdom through which all things have been made. ... In addition, Bonaventure posits two higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are ”images“ (imago) pointing to the First Principle through its properly rational powers which have their source and highest object in God and ”likenesses“ (similitudo) of God to the extent that they are recipients of divine grace and conform themselves to the divine will. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.1

Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition. — tim wood

This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. They start out with a preconceived notion (a sort of definition) of what "knowledge" is. Then in all the proposed examples of how this supposed "knowledge" might actually exist, they find that the examples are lacking, and cannot assure them of what they are looking for within their defined essence of "knowledge", i.e. truth. At the end of the dialogue they realize that they were misguided by their own preconceived definition, knowledge as it exists cannot fulfil the criteria of their definition. The definition mislead them

This is why the method of Platonic dialectics is to not accept, as "the definition", any possible definition, but to respect them all, as exactly that, possible definitions. Then by analyzing possible definitions we proceed to get a firm idea of how the word is actually used. From here we can develop an idea of "the thing" which is referred to by the word.

The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary. We bookish philosophers inherit the fantasy of justified systems of beliefs. What we don't like is our radical immersion in material circumstance and tacit knowledge that not only cannot be justified but also cannot even be made explicit. — jellyfish

So, (e.g. JCI) religions aren't in the  theological & liturgical/pastoral businesses of trying to "justify" their "beliefs" in order to "authorize" the applications of said "beliefs" in practice? Damn those "bookish" Theologians & Preachers!

I like Socrates, but he's only different from other gurus on the level of quality. He's not playing a different game altogether or refusing to play the game. [ ... ]

If knowledge of our own ignorance is the most important kind of knowledge, then somehow this wonderful humility ends up back on top. What a surprise... — jellyfish

:chin:

:up:

So, (e.g. JCI) religions aren't in the  theological & liturgical/pastoral businesses of trying to "justify" their "beliefs" in order to "authorize" the applications of said "beliefs" in practice? — 180 Proof

Often enough, yes. But I maintain that religion is misunderstood when it's examined as a mere set of silly concepts. The concepts can afford to be silly, because the concepts aren't really it.

My comments on humility aren't anti-Socrates. I'm just pointing out a tension. We orient ourselves. We want to experience ourselves as dignified, noble, decent, valuable, etc. We abase ourselves only to be exalted. Personally I love the notion of learned ignorance. And non serviam. I will not serve. I assert my learned ignorance as (more importantly) the ignorance of those who would dominate me with their tales of this and that. The questioning mind is a weapon, and its target is whatever humiliates or diminishes the questioner (who sits so sly). The fiction of God the monster actually gets something right, as an image of our impossible project. Once out of nature [and its vulnerabilities and indignities], I shall never take my bodily form from any natural thing....

:cool:

Abilities? Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, faster than a speeding bullet. Those abilities? Or do you mean that at the maximum of ability, nothing beyond that can exist? — tim wood

Mainly the latter. Of course this implies the former, but it is less important. Also I assume we are excluding dead religions like the ancient greek religions.

By "scientific (rational) study of truth," do you mean putting the question to what you suppose is the truth to see if it is - or can be - truth? — tim wood

Not sure I understand your question haha. To give my definition in other words, it is finding what conclusions can be inferred from divine revelations, which serve as the premises.

Religion: a set of behaviours. Based on? Entirely? Or does religion add to theology? — tim wood

Upon reflection, I now think the term has two meanings. (1) is the subject matter itself, and (2) is the practice based on the theology, as per my first definition. E.g. Christianity is a religion, but also a christian is religious strictly if he practices the acts described in the theology.

Let me know if any objections.

This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Starting with a definition might also assume some questionable project of making the 'ground' explicit. A big system of words is supposed to be its own foundation.

Swan Quoting me(?) out of context always scratches the wrong itch ... now I'm on the wet spot. :kiss: the latest profile pic, btw. — 180 Proof

Going through my personal belongings again... :kiss: :hearts:

I get it.

(Atheism, irreligious, 'discussions' etc.. are just meta).

Earlier in the thread there was talk about religion being largely sub-conceptual. It's what we do, perhaps, more than it is what we say about what we do. The 'religious' person who gets and spends and obeys like the 'non-religious' person is not that interesting. It's make-up for Facebook, a little flag. But IMV this also applies to 'non-religious' and maybe even 'anti-religious' politics.

My point isn't that anti-religion is good or bad. And I do see the usefulness of the word 'religion.' But I also see the usefulness in understanding 'religion' metaphorically. The quote below does not express my own position in general, but it's a good description of 'culture' as 'religion.'

The spiritual individual, the people, insofar as it is organized in itself, an organic whole, is what we call the State. This designation is ambiguous in that by “state” and “constitutional law” one usually means the simple political aspect, as distinct from religion, science, and art. But when we speak of the manifestation of the spiritual we understand the term “state” in a more comprehensive sense, similar to the term Reich (empire, realm). For us, then, a people is primarily a .spiritual individual. We do not emphasize the external aspects but concentrate on what has been called the spirit of a people. We mean its consciousness of itself, of its own truth, its own essence, the spiritual powers which live and rule in it. The universal which manifests itself in the State and is known in it – the form under which everything that is, is subsumed – is that which constitutes the culture of a nation. The definite content which receives this universal form and is contained in the concrete actuality of the state is the spirit of the people. The actual state is animated by this spirit in all its particular affairs, wars, institutions, etc.

This spiritual content is something definite, firm, solid, completely exempt from caprice, the particularities, the whims of individuality, of chance. That which is subject to the latter is not the nature of the people: it is like the dust playing over a city or a field, which does not essentially transform it. This spiritual content then constitutes the essence of the individual as well as that of the people. It is the holy bond that ties the men, the spirits together. It is one life in all, a grand object, a great purpose and content on which depend all individual happiness and all private decisions. The state does not exist for the citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the end and they are its means. But the means-end relation is not fitting here. For the state is not the abstract confronting the citizens; they are parts of it, like members of an organic body, where no member is end and none is means. It is the realization of Freedom, of the absolute, final purpose, and exists for its own sake. All the value man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state. For his spiritual reality is the knowing presence to him of his own essence, of rationality, of its objective, immediate actuality present in and for him. Only thus is he truly a consciousness, only thus does he partake in morality, in the legal and moral life of the state. For the True is the unity of the universal and particular will. And the universal in the state is in its laws, its universal and rational provisions. The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. — Hegel

What is the separation of church and state but the implementation of a state 'religion' ? I'm not objecting to this apparent privatization of spirituality. I'm just pointing out that it's something like individualism or freedom as the state religion. In fact it's more like oligarchy, but with lots of great TV.

The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious degradation of being into having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the economy leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which all actual “having” must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate function. — Debord

Don’t have time to go over this just now. The link looks very good though! Right up my alley :)

It the initial quote from the same source? I couldn’t see it.

Thanks

All the links work for me. When you do have time, have a read, I'd be interested in any feedback as I think I'm making a novel and valid point.

I meant it isn’t at all clear where the first quote (not link) is sourced from. The quote, “Transcendental ego, ...”

There is no link directly beneath that quote.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/transcendental-ego

That’s surprising! That site is usually pretty careful with its wording. The quote fails to highlight the sense in which Husserl uses the term ‘object’ in regards to phenomenology. To the causal reader they may not pick this up unless they look further.

well, sure. I was just looking for a snippet to illustrate my point which I believe still stands.

in fact, I'd hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia. Apparently, you, tim, are not interested in - capable of(?) - a more freethought (i.e. atheological) approach. — 180 Proof

Actually, much closer to the ground, in that for certain words I wonder if any agreement, even provisional, on meaning is possible. On "God" for example, unless I've missed it, no one has pinned anything down. Yours is the empty name, mine the idea, some Anselm, and X. That's it for God. One more: The fiction of God the monster actually gets something right, as an image of our impossible project.

Religion. There somewhat more so far on this. Religion is:
a human creation,
ritualized daily living,
behaviour based on the findings of the theology,

"Religion is any system of beliefs about reality or morality grounded ultimately in faith thus defined,
a religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions
of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such
an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." Geertz,

practice,
the tacit acceptance of the truth of matters believed in and accepted on faith, and the establishment and maintenance of practices and beliefs that follow from the basic beliefs,
an authoritative creed... [also] an emotional bond to a family or tribe or social group,

Religion is a set of beliefs that consists of two parts. 1)The transcendental part are rituals, prayers, festivities, and similar behaviours. 2) The religous-law part is a set of rules that forbid particular behaviour types and from which the believer can derive the moral status of the behaviour he intends to engage in,

gnosis, or 'higher knowledge'. It is universally assumed by the participants here that religion is invariably a matter of belief, and by most people, belief in non-existent mythological figures,

standard definitions (a la those found in major dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc.), unless one specifies otherwise,

manifest in actions. The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary,

And,

The reason why we can't agree on a definition of God/Religion/Theology is because they are no mere acts of taxonomy, the meaning of the words is their use and their use is intimately tied to people's lifestyles, identity etc. You can no more easily get someone to give an inch on a definition than you can persuade them to act this way or that, best to simply present alternatives.

Added to this the suggestion that we ban use of the words "god," "religion," and "theology" along with a minority view that we jump in without defining, because, apparently, definitions mislead.

Aporia? Is this really an impossible topic, and no consensus, even provisional, possible?

Faith and belief also figure in this thread so far. But the evidence here of these leads me to a thought new for me:

That "God" is a placeholder for whatever is called for in particular when needed. But who, or what, calls? It would seem that what calls - or what we hear and react to now - is the long drawn out note

. "we too have heard, Far off -- Ah, que ce cor a longue haleine --"

of need -> belief -> faith -> religion. And religion the institutionalization of the insubstantial reified.

That is, that god, religion (theology), are all results of a more fundamental push. As results of pushes at different times and places for different reasons, all different and differing, it is therefore (on this idea) a mistake to look in these things for a sameness and consistency that isn't there. Instead, it would seem that understanding must go back behind to consider the primitive - or at least original, because imo the whole thing is recapitulated in the development of the individual - the bonfire, and the jaws that hover indistinctly in the shadows at the dark edges of it.

Actually, much closer to the ground, in that for certain words I wonder if any agreement, even provisional, on meaning is possible. On "God" for example, unless I've missed it, no one has pinned anything down. Yours is the empty name, mine the idea, some Anselm, and X. That's it for God. — tim wood

Perhaps a different approach to the generic name "God" would be helpful. For Atheists, "god" refers to an empty set. But for Theists, "God" refers to a meaningful, but abstract concept, with associated feelings. For example, "United States" is not a concrete thing, but an abstraction that invokes positive feelings for some, and negative feelings for others.

In order to avoid the conflicting theological baggage attached to the "God" designation that means different things to different people, I spell it "G*D", and provide a definition that fits my personal worldview*1. But I cannot give a concrete description, or claim that "G*D" is real and empirical. Instead, my "G*D" is a gap-filler in the same sense that scientists use "Dark Matter" and "Multiverse". They don't know what Dark Matter is, only what it does. Likewise, Multiverse is an explanatory hypothesis, with no possibility for empirical confirmation. It has to be taken on Faith. I don't know what G*D is, only what it has done : enform this non-self-existent universe. And since generic Information is the fundamental substance of the material universe, I must assume that G*D is an Enformer. *2

These knowledge-gap-filler terms are useful in that they convey a meaning that can be communicated, even though the referent is not accessible to objective confirmation. For me, "G*D" refers to the logical "First Cause" and "Logos" hypotheses of Aristotle. Objectively, we can all agree that the world exists. But how it came to be is debatable. So. those with Materialist assumptions imagine an eternal mechanical Multiverse, while those with Spiritualist assumptions imagine an eternal king-like magician (Jehovah), or an infinite abstract power with no human characteristics (Allah). None of us has any direct knowledge of the object referred-to by our gap-filler names. But we can use the agreed-upon definitions of those terms for philosophical discussions. We may not accept that those definitions are factual, but at least we can know what we are talking about.


*1 G*D : " I refer to the logically necessary and philosophically essential First & Final Cause as G*D, rather than merely "X" the Unknown, . . . ."
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html

*2 EnFormAction : http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page29.html

"God is an empty name"? is that the best you can do, 180?

 Whatever "God" may be, it cannot be an empty name ... — tim wood

Well instead, woody, consider God is the ur-Placebo. :smirk:

God is the percocet of the people...

Don't you think it's significant that placebos actually work? I have always thought of them as an argument against physicalism. Physicalism would expect that aspirin has physical efficacy i.e. causes the cells to behave differently by chemically altering them - call that 'bottom-up' causation. But the placebo effect doesn't rely on anything physical, instead, the subject's belief in the efficacy of the sugar-pill causes physical change - call that 'top-down' causation. And top-down undermines physicalism, which by definition is always bottom-up. And if the placebo principle effect works in respect of human physiology then there's no reason it may not be an instance of a broader type of non-physical causation.

That is, that god, religion (theology), are all results of a more fundamental push. As results of pushes at different times and places for different reasons, all different and differing, it is therefore (on this idea) a mistake to look in these things for a sameness and consistency that isn't there. Instead, it would seem that understanding must go back behind to consider the primitive - or at least original, because imo the whole thing is recapitulated in the development of the individual - the bonfire, and the jaws that hover indistinctly in the shadows at the dark edges of it. — tim wood

Pushed from or by whom or by what? John Hick is relevant here, and as he was a philosopher of religion, as distinct from a theologian, perhaps his Who or What is God might be worth a glance.

From the Wiki article

The concept [of god-of-the-gaps], although not the exact wording, goes back to Henry Drummond, a 19th-century evangelist lecturer, from his Lowell Lectures on The Ascent of Man. He chastises those Christians who point to the things that science can not yet explain—"gaps which they will fill up with God"—and urges them to embrace all nature as God's, as the work of "an immanent God, which is the God of Evolution, is infinitely grander than the occasional wonder-worker, who is the God of an old theology.

Overall a good article. :up:

:up:

Placebos work roughly a third(?) of the time and never treat (or cure!) underlying ailments just the symptoms. And they definitely count as evidence for a physicalist interpretation, or model, of the human brain-CNS (which is a survival - environmental perception-behaviour coordination - engine and only tangentally (if ever) a "truth engine") in my book. :wink:

Placebos work roughly a third(?) of the time and never treat underlying ailments just the symptoms. — 180 Proof

They don't always work, but they lead to genuine cures, and they work sometimes. They plainly undermine the physicalist model, and they're routinely described as 'not scientific' because no objective or measurable reason can be found for them to work at all. However

the placebo effect seems to be becoming stronger as time goes on. A 2015 study published in the journal Pain analyzed 84 clinical trials of pain medication conducted between 1990 and 2013 and found that in some cases the efficacy of placebo had grown sharply, narrowing the gap with the drugs’ effect from 27 percent on average to just 9 percent.

So simply asserting that they 'count as evidence for physicalism' does not constitute an argument.

I see merit in all the perspectives offered in this thread. I don't know if it helps to make this observation but it is interesting to me how trying to say that religion is one sort of thing is bound up with separating it from what it is not. I am drawn to the language of Zhuangzi as a way to approach the problem of referring to experiences while trying to have them. The way that mysticism and reason are engaged with each other as countervailing forces requires a lot of assumptions before the scrum can commence.

It is difficult to approach the matter from that direction.

But the OP asked for more than muttering into my beard. So, I will assert that the intersection of the cultural and personal frames of experience, the distance between past expressions and the needs of the present moment, involve a desire to embrace a disproportion between explanation and action. The flickering messages of what must be done and the call to make your own way are not the consequences of this or that set of beliefs but reflects the problem of our existence.

So simply asserting that they 'count as evidence for physicalism' does not constitute an argument. — Wayfarer

"... count as evidence ... in my book" I wrote: not an "argument" at all, merely an as far as I know aside. My use of 'placebo' is analogical not literal or scientific, which works fine - gets my point across - in the prevailing context of this thread. Let's agree to disagree on this point here and now, Wayf; maybe fodder for a later discussion / debate on some other thread. :victory:

I concede that since this discussion is about religions in general and not only about catholicism, then we may include "blind faith" as part of "faith". So "faith" could be defined in this context as: the beliefs regarding claims about the gods and related topics, which are not known with certainty to be true.

that just means that faith is any belief about religious topics, which would then make religion defined in reference to faith circularly defined. — Pfhorrest

I have removed the term "religion" from the above definition of "faith" to avoid any circularity.

The thing that distinguishes faithful belief from other belief is its independence of good reasons. Thomists may claim that you should strive also to have good reasons in addition to your faith, but that is just saying not to go on faith alone, as faith alone (without reason) is blind. Faith per se is thus exactly what they would call “blind faith”, and it is only in fortifying a belief with something besides faith that it becomes not blind. — Pfhorrest

But if faith is always blind faith, and you should not go on faith alone and should also use reason, then why use faith at all and not just always use reason instead? The Thomists are not that bad at logic.

For Atheists, "god" refers to an empty set. But for Theists, "God" refers to a meaningful, but abstract concept, with associated feelings. For example, "United States" is not a concrete thing, but an abstraction that invokes positive feelings for some, and negative feelings for others. — Gnomon

Hi. Perhaps you are oversimplifying atheism here. I'm an 'atheist,' but I also think God is a concept of central importance. I'd say that an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept. A theist might instead separate their concept of God from God itself.

But I cannot give a concrete description, or claim that "G*D" is real and empirical. Instead, my "G*D" is a gap-filler in the same sense that scientists use "Dark Matter" and "Multiverse". — Gnomon

Fair enough, but this looks like a philosopher's 'God.' It's a piece of sculpture. It scratches an itch that most people don't have.

In the philosophical context, it ignores some of the modern ideas about just how entangled we are in the world --so entangled that most of our knowledge cannot be made explicit. And the knowledge that can be made explicit has a dark foundation. Whatever castles we build (however sharp their towers) rise from the mist.

'I think therefore I am.' But what is it to even be able to say this? What is it to know a language?

Pushed from or by whom or by what? — Wayfarer

Fear, and a lack of control over environment.