The difficulty is finding something which is truly good - like a 'true north' for the moral compass. That requires that there be a 'summum bonum'. Sounds too much like religion for most people’s liking. It has to be ultimately subjective in some sense - a matter of choice.

Most atheists consider themselves to be part of some system of physical, biological, psychological, social...etc system of laws which they refer to to make rational decisions. — Isaac

But what laws are there apart from physical necessity? I had the idea that in the atheist’s world the only principles resembling laws were physical laws i.e. laws of motion, thermodynamics, and so on. Social and civil laws would have no direct grounding in such laws, rather are grounded in social convention. And ultimately they’re underwritten, it’s assumed, by successful adaptation, are they not?

But what laws are there apart from physical necessity? I had the idea that in the atheist’s world the only principles resembling laws were physical laws i.e. laws of motion, thermodynamics, and so on. — Wayfarer

No, I think most atheists subscribe to some social, psychological and even economic models which they reference in rational thinking. "X will likely lead to Y because..." does not always have to reduce to physical laws.

Religious systems may well provide "do not do X because..." type of answers, but so can a favoured economic model. Of course you have to have - a) faith in the model, and b) an initial feeling about the objective you want the model to help you achieve. But I don't see religion getting anyone out of those problems. One must have faith in the system and one must always decide that following the system (or sometimes the rewards within it, like heaven) is an objective one wants to achieve.

One major difference between religious systems and non-religious ones is that faith in non-religious systems is more easily justified by their utility at helping to provide useful strategies, but this is far from universal (many people stick with favoured non-religious systems despite abject failures to produce anything useful, and conversely some religious systems produce useful interrim results people find useful).

:roll: :roll: :roll:

“No, I think most atheists subscribe to some social, psychological and even economic models which they reference in rational thinking. "X will likely lead to Y because..." does not always have to reduce to physical laws.”

In my experience, most atheists in regards to Ethics are either Relativists or Pragmatists. You should check out Pragmatic ethics, I think you’d really like that. Moral ecology and Piercean Realism are also subjects you should research.

Relativists or Pragmatists — Mark Dennis

Are you considering things like (but not limited to) evolutionary ethics, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, or rights based ethics to fall under those two categories broadly?

Well technically for Descriptive relativism yes. Only in saying that the rational relativist sees no moral absolute, but would say these things exist on the relative moral spectrum as beliefs within our population.

Pragmatists are probably more utilitarian when it comes to ethics but not metaethics. In that they apply a utilitarian principle toward ethics, looking at every moral view for utility to find pragmatic truth.

Pragmatic truth is probably best defined as that definition of good which is closest to objective by the empirical facts we have on hand. So at the individual level this can lead to different flavours of pragmatism.

Fundamentally the pragmatist believes in objective good, they just don’t believe it is possible to truly identify without us knowing all the facts of the universe. This also leads to a second feature of pragmatism (which I am oft prone to forgetting in my practice of it) is that it is not the individual that is being judged as moral or immoral, but the society individuals collectively create. Simply because one individual cannot have access to our entire collective knowledge as it is, let alone if we legitimately knew everything there was to know about the universe already.

Now we arrive at moral ecology which is the view that we have to manage our collective moral views as we would an ecosystem. There is some disagreement on moral ecology though, some think all views need to be represented and maintained while others (myself included) feel certain maladaptive and destructive moral views will always contribute to a negative moral judgement on humanity as a whole and don’t contribute to our survival, stability, security or moral progress.

The only valid criticism of Pragmatism I’ve come across really is that at times it conflates the distinction between normative and descriptive ethics, but no more than science conflates the distinction between empirical facts about the universe and the opinions on those facts. If anyone has other criticisms of pragmatism though I’d be willing to hear.

The one I’ve noticed myself reading this back; is that if the individual cannot know everything there is to know, then how would the pragmatist ever know if the society they are in is moral or not even if collectively we knew everything?

To put it simply though, pragmatism for the individual requires building ones own ethica pragmatica; A working theory of what good is, an obligation to hold true to that good with a moderate grip, so that one has the integrity to fight for it and yet isn’t so rigid that concrete evidence against their theory of good isn’t ignored.

Then you have adaptive pragmatism as a philosophy as opposed to pragmatic ethics (it is quite possible to be a philosophical pragmatist but not a moral one and vice versa) it’s only real difference between Pragmatism is that it requires a philosophy of science to be quantum accommodated, meaning a philosophy of science is incomplete without an attempt(A horrible, long and confusing attempt because of how probabilistic it is) at interpreting philosophy of quantum mechanics.

In conclusion, the answer to your question is Relativism is broad but pragmatism can be as broad or narrow as the individual pragmatist feels is justified.

Moral Ecology expanded: Take my heated debates with @Bartricks

After thinking on it last night, I realised I’m not angry at him for being an Antinatalist and I’m not even angry at Antinatalism. I’m angry at my inner conflict over its place in our moral ecology.

On the one hand, Antinatalists at their current numbers in my perspective are useful in that they slow the human growth rate making a small contribution to resource management.

On the other hand it is one of the views that if it gains too much popularity could lead to a logical progression from Antinatalism is okay, to Genocide is okay. That’s not to say that’s what they currently think and I’m happy to take back that accusation I threw at Bartricks yesterday.

However now that he has a bit more insight into my own views (if he reads my response to @Artemis)and I’m agreeing to walk back my anger from our previous debates in the pursuit of seeing each other as persons and not means to our ends; maybe he can make the case to me that Antinatalism belongs in our moral ecology without me having to fear them hounding for mine, my descendants or everyone else’s death at some point down the line?

Is that fair Bartrick? I do apologise, but I think you can at least empathise with the fact that your views are controversial and emotive to most.

I'm not sure I understand how you can have an "ethics" of any sort without some principles you fall back on?

Like, you previously stated something along the lines of judging each situation individually, but on what basis do you make a judgement? — Artemis

The basis upon which anyone makes any moral judgment is their dispositions or intuited feelings about interpersonal behavior. That's how people wind up forwarding or buying into moral principles as well.

My ethics is my set of preferences/judgments about interpersonal behavior (more significant than etiquette)

My ethics is my set of preferences/judgments about interpersonal behavior (more significant than etiquette)

What do you use to make these judgements? Your opinions and preferences on empirical data?

What do you use to make these judgements? Your opinions and preferences on empirical data? — Mark Dennis

Not just me, but everyone uses their dispositions/intuitive feelings. It can both be in response to empirical observations and in response to imagining scenarios.

Wouldn't any positive statement imply a negative one? — Artemis

Only if you’re looking for one - ie. if you’re motivated by fear.

Any statement of ethical principle is inaccurate, whether it’s positive or negative.

Could imagines scenarios not fall under the category of social, psychological and linguistic etc empirical data? For example when the imagined scenario is written down and becomes a literary work of fiction or when the imagined scenario is explained to the psychologist and the sociologist is looking for trends and patterns in accounts of people’s imaginings?

Could imagines scenarios not fall under the category of social, psychological and linguistic etc empirical data? For example when the imagined scenario is written down and becomes a literary work of fiction or when the imagined scenario is explained to the psychologist and the sociologist is looking for trends and patterns in accounts of people’s imaginings? — Mark Dennis

That's fine, but you could imagine something and keep it to yourself, too.

Oh true, that stuff is completely lost to the ether.

It all is eventually.

Hopefully later rather than sooner unless Bartrick has his way though haha

dispositions or intuited feelings about interpersonal behavior. — Terrapin Station

How do you differentiate that from essentially a moral code? Seems to me at least any intuition could be formally stated as a type of premise?

How do you differentiate that from essentially a moral code? — Artemis

I wouldn't say there's any conventional difference between the two (and I don't use the terms differently . . . well, not that I even use the phrase "moral code").

Seems to me at least any intuition could be formally stated as a type of premise? — Artemis

Sure, it could.

Only if you’re looking for one - ie. if you’re motivated by fear.

Any statement of ethical principle is inaccurate, whether it’s positive or negative. — Possibility

I don't really understand why something like "don't drown kittens in a burlap sack" would be either inaccurate or motivated by fear.

And an ethics where all maxims/codes/whatever you want to call them are inaccurate is not really an ethics per se. I'm not saying it's an indefensible position on that basis, just that it doesn't count as an ethics. Like atheism is not a form of theism.

and I don't use the terms differently . . . well, not that I even use the phrase "moral code") — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure yet either what word I'd use for my personal ethical.... Um, guidelines? But you get my drift.

Sure, it could. — Terrapin Station

Okay, so then you must have some underlying principles you fall back on? And why wouldn't avoiding unnecessary suffering be one of them? (And let's not get sidetracked in semantics. A scenario where you recognize that suffering is unnecessary. And suffering as understood to be something non-masochistic-actually-causing-pleasure-loophole.)

Okay, so then you must have some underlying principles you fall back on? — Artemis

No. Because I think that seeing any moral principle as a trump card (so you're falling back on it) always results in ridiculous policies.

Re "unncessary suffering," first, I think that both parts of that--especially the "suffering" part, are very vague with respect to how people use those terms. A lot of things that I see people call "suffering" are not something that I consider morally problematic at all. Some things that almost everyone considers "suffering" I think are either neutral or positive and/or indicative of a problem (like a mental problem) on the sufferer's part.

Re necessity, in this sort of context, I consider necessity/needs to hinge on wants/desires.

So an example is saying something that offends someone else. I not only see that as not morally problematic, I see it as desirable to offend the offendable, and I see it as indicative of a problem on the offendees part that they were offended. Which is a reason that I think this is a good thing--knowing that you're offendable should be a cue to work on yourself and fix those issues.

No. Because I think that seeing any moral principle as a trump card (so you're falling back on it) always results in ridiculous policies. — Terrapin Station

Seems to me you yourself still fall back on them, even if you're just doing it "intuitively."

And I think you have to distinguish between a naive Kantian maxims doctrine versus more nuanced ethical approaches that take context and situationally conflicting morals into account.

Re your re's, you're totally disregarding my suggestion to leave semantics aside for a moment. When I'm talking about your personal moral maxim, it doesn't matter what other people consider these terms to mean. And your example about offense simply implies that sometimes you think offense is a necessary thing.

Would you beat up a small child in an alleyway if you knew you could get away with it and suffer absolutely zero social or financial or other external consequences? Why or why not?

Seems to me you yourself still fall back on them, even if you're just doing it "intuitively." — Artemis

I don't though. I intentionally try to intuit how I feel about a particular situation, simply as that particular situation. I particularly have a distaste for what I consider overreactions, and those tend to follow from people relying on a principle-oriented approach.

When I'm talking about your personal moral maxim, it doesn't matter what other people consider these terms to mean. — Artemis

The problem is that I don't frame anything in terms of "suffering." (Or any sort of unqualified "harm" even.) "Suffering" is not a term that I normally use in any context, unless someone else is using the term.

And your example about offense simply implies that sometimes you think offense is a necessary thing. — Artemis

Again, in my view, that would have to hinge on wants/desires. But understanding that, sure.

Would you beat up a small child in an alleyway if you knew you could get away with it and suffer absolutely zero social or financial or other external consequences? — Artemis

I wouldn't beat up anyone "out of the blue," where it's not in response to something. That's not my personality.

I intentionally try to intuit how I feel about a particular situation, simply as that particular situation. — Terrapin Station

Seems to me you're contradicting yourself now.

Your intuition must be based on something, or else it's just random and random actions won't do anyone any good whatsoever.

Your intuition must be based on something, — Artemis

Yeah, on my body. How I feel about the situation at hand/what my natural disposition is.

Again, this is ultimately what everyone does.

More or less. There is not a clear distinction on my account of prescriptive claims that are moral versus ones that are not moral, but sometimes in writing about it I get the feeling that using the word "moral" in place of just "prescriptive" might confuse some part of the audience, so I'm not certain that for all speakers they are synonymous.

The sense I get from those who might make such a distinction is between other-directed action and self-directed action, though on my account there is no need to make that distinction for the claims to be broadly speaking "moral": I'd say one ought not, for example, literally beat oneself up (like punch oneself in the face) over one's failures, and that "ought" is prescriptive, and therefore on my account the same kind of claim as a claim that one ought not beat up overs over their failures, but I get the sense that others would say that only the latter claim about interpersonal action is "moral" and the first is... something else, I guess? I would make a distinction between self-directed and other-directed action when it comes to procedural justice, saying that someone has the right to beat themselves up but not the right to beat someone else up, but that's only a subset of moral concerns, and in the broader sense I'd say that the first is moral too. — Pfhorrest

How does the direction of fit play a part(apply) in "One ought not literally beat oneself up over their failures"?

Yeah, on my body. How I feel about the situation at hand/what my natural disposition is.

Again, this is ultimately what everyone does. — Terrapin Station

So, if you're just having a particularly bad "body day" you might actually beat up the kid in the alley?

Again, this is ultimately what everyone does. — Terrapin Station

Nope.

So, if you're just having a particularly bad "body day" you might actually beat up the kid in the alley? — Artemis

Is it a possibility? Sure. There's no way to rule out that being a possibility for anyone.

Nope. — Artemis

It is, because nothing else is available. I'm not saying that it's what others necessarily believe that they're doing. But it's what they're doing nonetheless.

It is, because nothing else is available — Terrapin Station

There has to be. Or else everyone would respond to all situations like a toddler.

I'm not saying intuition doesn't play a role. But there are other elements to decision making.