The question then arises, how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or concepts arise by degree from a simpliciter, or, divide into simpliciters from a whole, from one mechanism? — Mww
By comparison. — creativesoul
It’s a fine line between comparison and relation. It suffices to say comparison, when the rational chronology is from knowledge backwards to perception, insofar as knowledge may or may not compare one-to-one apodectically with the object. In the case of that chronology from perception forward to knowledge, which is the major concern of reason anyway, wherein all procedural methodology is strictly a priori, the much more general relational operative is better suited for deducing precisely what the object is, out of the manifold of possible objects it might be. — Mww
So, we're talking about methodological approach here, aren't we? — creativesoul
If the question is how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or by degree from a simpliciter, or divide into simpliciters from a whole, aren't we asking two questions about our candidate? — creativesoul
If the question is how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or by degree from a simpliciter, or divide into simpliciters from a whole, aren't we asking two questions about our candidate? 1.) What does it consist of? And 2.) What is it existentially dependent upon? — creativesoul
All that to say this: you’re on record as saying we are too far apart in our thinking, so.....enough is enough, right? — Mww
2.) That which a concept is existentially dependent upon, is the entirety of the argument... — Mww
I'm more than willing to continue this one. Are you? — creativesoul
How can we know what a concept is existentially dependent upon if we do not know what a concept consists of? — creativesoul
What do you think is the constituency of concepts? — Mww
I agree we do correlate things. And such correlation develops out of thoughts. I hesitate to call such correlation the development of concepts. — Mww
there is no difference between one's concept of a dog and one's thought and belief about dogs. — creativesoul
The SEP begins with this...
Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts.
Of course, I strongly disagree! — creativesoul
What do you think is the constituency of concepts?
— Mww
Thought and belief — creativesoul
It's not just a matter of which came first. — creativesoul
The evolution part is important to keep in mind. — creativesoul
I would also propose that some of our concepts are capable of describing and/or pointing towards that which existed in it's entirety prior to our reports. — creativesoul
This article gives an overview. — Isaac
This can be seen by expressing the free-energy as surprise
plus a [Kullback Leibler] divergence between the recognition and conditional densities. Because this divergence is always positive, minimising free-energy makes the recognition density an approximation to the true posterior probability. This means the system implicitly infers or represents the causes of its sensory samples in a Bayesoptimal fashion. At the same time, the free-energy becomes a tight bound on surprise, which is minimised through action. — from the article
It seems like you're asking about things having properties sans experience, which is fine, but presumably you're not just saying there's no experience period, are you? (In other words, you'd just be saying that there is no consciousness/no conscious beings, etc.) — Terrapin Station
I also wanted to portray the relevance of embodied cognition to conception; so using concept in both places seemed appropriate. Conception still leverages body stuff that we usually take as conceptually unrelated to it. — fdrake
Why is it unhelpful to have an understanding of conceptual architecture which does not distinguish us as well from animals? Or conversely, what is it about distinguishing us from other animals that is so helpful it must be maintained in any understanding of neural systems? — Isaac
It's not just a matter of which came first.
— creativesoul
It certainly is if there’s no way to tell which one of two or more somethings came first. How are we supposed to keep in mind evolution is important if it isn’t just a matter of which came first. How can there be said to even be any evolution if the matter of a first, and thereby a succession in time, isn’t resolved?
This I think is only important if we think concepts consist of something other than just other concepts. Actually, I guess it could get real muddy, depending on the scope of reductionism being played with. — Mww
There is an inductively quantitative evolution, as major name concepts multiply in complexity by a compendium of minor names inhering in the same phenomenal object, which always comes first. — Mww
There is deductively qualitative evolution, as the procedural method itself reduces from the compendium of possible named identities for a phenomenal object to a particular named identity judged as belonging to it, which always comes last. — Mww
I would also propose that some of our concepts are capable of describing and/or pointing towards that which existed in it's entirety prior to our reports.
— creativesoul
Of course, no argument here. Their names are in the literature, if one knows where to look. Do you have names for them of your own, or from some other literature? — Mww
I call our reports cognitions. Will you agree reports are at the end of the cognitive chain? Or for you, where are reports located? Where....when.....does a report manifest? — Mww
I think it is more helpful to maintain distinctions between linguistically and culturally elaborated conceptualizing capacities, and the primordial somatically-based embodied cognition we share with animals. — Janus
The SEP begins with this...
Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts.
Of course, I strongly disagree!
— creativesoul
Because you hold the reverse, that thoughts (and beliefs) are the building blocks of concepts? — Mww
Try this: concepts do not begin with naming, but end with it. This way, the presupposition of names is eliminated, as well as their constituency, because the concepts are the names. — Mww
it makes sense that the relation between our embodied minds and their environment would be an entropy minimising process in a non-incidental manner, as that's an efficient solution to acting in accord with environmental and bodily regularities - utilising both to act. — fdrake
The specific model of form M3 which is formed at this stage is an approximate minimizer over all models of type M3 with respect to criterion C1. — fdrake
something interesting here is that precisely what counts as a "time step" is just... one part of the process feeding into another, the paper doesn't write it out like that, it does it in terms of dependency arrows. — fdrake
The proposal I gave would have there being more than one functional form in the M3 class; and the functional forms would interact. Less parsimonious, messier. — fdrake
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