I think it is more helpful to maintain distinctions between linguistically and culturally elaborated conceptualizing capacities, and the primordial somatically-based embodied cognition we share with animals. — Janus
When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness? — Isaac
Or perhaps they just wanted a grape... — creativesoul
Well on an ecological level, we simply wouldn't behave as efficiently as a creature which had a clear answer, on an epistemic level, how would we experience that with some means of modelling it... — Isaac
Yes. The great thing about the free-energy approach is that it gives both a mechanism and an evolutionary story to the Bayesian modelling system which we already have a good idea the brain uses. — Isaac
I'm struggling to think of an example where we, as humans, might verbalise a concept which is completely absent in its entirety in other social animals. — Isaac
Explaining the unity of consciousness in terms of our body's self modelling processes as realising a single action-sensation-internal state from a space of possible ones is pretty neat. We must act in some specified way, and that specification coincides with a collapse (through sampling) into a unique state. — fdrake
our brains seem to model and estimate at the same time. — fdrake
I'm just suspicious that something of fundamental importance is being missed. — fdrake
I don't want to drown you in reading material, but the idea is explained in this paper. It may answer some of your concerns. — Isaac
The forward/backward propagation steps in Box 3 in the Frisk paper are probably worth me reading more closely too (with the neural implementation of gradient descent through message passing in mind). — fdrake
Try this: concepts do not begin with naming, but end with it. This way, the presupposition of names is eliminated, as well as their constituency, because the concepts are the names.
— Mww
This approach puts all concepts on equal footing as being the names. It would only follow that there are no concepts prior to naming. I could agree actually, but something tells me that you may not? My agreement to that would lead to a denial that that which exists prior to it's namesake is a concept. — creativesoul
What I meant by "it's not just a matter of which came first", was that that is an gross oversimplification of the methodological approach needed in order to even be able to acquire the knowledge we're seeking to obtain here. I think you'll agree with this? — creativesoul
Knowing which came first requires knowing what all thought, all belief, and all concepts consist of. For when we know what each consists of, it offers us solid ground to be able to deduce which came first, by knowing what each is existentially dependent upon. — creativesoul
What I'm left wondering still, is not only what exactly is it that you're claiming "always comes first", but "first" - as in prior to what else? I want to say that the primary namesake comes first, but I'm hesitant for you may be saying that the phenomenal object comes first. If it's the latter, then I would agree that some conceptions are of phenomenal objects and in those cases the object 'comes first'. — creativesoul
There is deductively qualitative evolution, as the procedural method itself reduces from the compendium of possible named identities for a phenomenal object to a particular named identity judged as belonging to it, which always comes last.
— Mww
This bit I cannot understand. Could you set it out with an example? — creativesoul
I thought we would agree there. — creativesoul
I don't see how they can be distinguished. When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness? — Isaac
When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness? — Isaac
I would also propose that some of our concepts are capable of describing and/or pointing towards that which existed in it's entirety prior to our reports.
— creativesoul
Of course, no argument here. Their names are in the literature, if one knows where to look. Do you have names for them of your own, or from some other literature?
— Mww
Do I have names for those concepts of my own? (...) To directly answer your question, or at least what I think you're asking me for...
Thought, belief, meaning, and truth all exist in their entirety(on the most basic level/degree of complexity) prior to our conceptualizations/names of/for them... that is... prior to common language use. — creativesoul
, if all A's consist of B, then no A exists prior to B. If all A's consist of B, then each and every A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else. These are the sorts of reasoning that come into play here. — creativesoul
There's no difference between our conception of games and games. — creativesoul
Correlations drawn between different things are the building blocks of everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. — creativesoul
When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness?
— Isaac
This seems to be all in the interpretation: alternatively, it could be down to a feeling of envy or a preference for grape over cucumber. — Janus
...rather than knowing what all thoughts, beliefs and concepts consist of, it is better suited for the method, to know what they do. If they do what they do without contradiction or inconsistency, their constituency may not matter. That being said, there are those things the constituency of which is quite relevant, but it remains to be seen whether the constituency is a population given to them by their use. In other words, a faculty certainly has a population of a priori objects of reason for its constituency, but each a priori object of reason that is a constituent, may not consist of anything. We must nip inevitable infinite regress at the root somehow. — Mww
...there are those things the constituency of which is quite relevant, but it remains to be seen whether the constituency is a population given to them by their use. — Mww
I just don’t really see where this discussion is going? There appears to be a lot of emphasis on ‘concepts’ and ‘naming concepts’ ... why? — I like sushi
So it is a phenomenological approach then? — I like sushi
I believe that Mww is arguing from such a position. I do not. It denies direct perception the actual role it plays in rudimentary level thought, belief, and experience. — creativesoul
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