The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others.

If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's muddled. If they are foundational then they are true. Are you claiming that all propositions can be either true or false? but that's wrong, too.

But this is the same stuff we have been over many times before.

What's yours on religion? — tim wood

A system of beliefs grounded in faith, which in turn is uncritical belief, belief not to be questioned.

Further, Theists, many, absolutely believe, and as seems best to them profess that belief. With them I at least have no issue. I have my beliefs too, and I think believing is an important aspect of moral thinking. But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. Kant's denial of knowledge to make room for faith is also significant here. But to those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us! Or — tim wood

To believe something is to think that it is true. Christians generally think that God exists, in an objective way, independent of humans thinking that he exists; that he existed before there were any humans to think that he existed. They may not claim to know with certainty or be able to demonstrate that to other people, but they still think that God exists independent of human opinion, and would disagree vehemently (see this thread) that he's "just an idea".

More on the topic of the OP, I thought what you were looking for was consensus on what the idea of God is of, regardless of whether or not that exists. Like, we can probably come to a consensus agreement on what "unicorn" means, and then debate whether or not there are any such things. I thought that's what you were looking for.

God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, even if we're talking about my paragraph above, just agreeing on what it is we're to debate the existence of. The creator of what, and does absolutely anything count as that, whatever it should turn out to have created whatever you mean? E.g. if the creator of the Earth, then does the Sun's protoplanetary disc count as "God"? Or maybe whatever old dead star whose remains that protoplanetary disc (and the Sun itself) coalesced out of? If the creator of the universe, would "quantum fluctuations in eternally expanding space-time" count as God? If "whatever created..." something is all you mean by God, then you're going to end up concluding that there necessarily is a God, because nothing comes from nothing, and even atheists won't disagree that that thing (that whatever came from) exists, they'll just disagree that it deserved the label "God".

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The point here being that believing in something and claiming it to independently exist are two different things. Confusion on this point abounds, and people who are confused can be in this respect toxic. — tim wood

This seems to be a confused use of the word "believes". I believe that the sun exists, and that its existence is independent of anything anyone thinks about it. My understanding of most Christians, and most theists generally, is that they have the same opinion about God as I (and probably they too) have about the sun, in that respect.

There might be a difference in their opinion between God and the sun in the respect that they can easily demonstrate the existence of the sun to other people and demonstrating the existence of God might not be that easy. But there are plenty of other mundane things that it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of (faraway celestial objects, tiny subatomic particles) that nevertheless can be shown to exist with indirect evidence and reasoning from that evidence, and plenty of theists seem to think that the existence of God can be indirectly demonstrated in the same way (just look at all the many arguments for why God must exist).

As an atheist I of course think all of those attempts to demonstrate the existence of God fail, but theists obviously disagree.

God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that. — MU
Ok. Anyone second this? — tim wood

I already raised problems with that in my previous post.

Beyond that, what reality can you give [God], that is not an idea or any material form? — tim wood

That God is transcendent and beyond material form is not an idea of my devising.

Even without any explicit faith commitment, who or what the name ‘God’ refers to is necessarily a very slippery matter. But I will quote some passages from Comparative Religion scholar Karen Armstrong, from an essay of hers on the question Should we believe in belief? which I think it highly germane to the topic.

She leads with:

The extraordinary and eccentric emphasis on "belief" in Christianity today is an accident of history that has distorted our understanding of religious truth. We call religious people "believers", as though acceptance of a set of doctrines was their principal activity, and before undertaking the religious life many feel obliged to satisfy themselves about the metaphysical claims of the church, which cannot be proven rationally since they lie beyond the reach of empirical sense data.

Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach?

Well, she says:

Most other traditions [i.e. other than Christian] prize practice above creedal orthodoxy: Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, Jews and Muslims would say religion is something you do, and that you cannot understand the truths of faith unless you are committed to a transformative way of life that takes you beyond the prism of selfishness. All good religious teaching – including such Christian doctrines as the Trinity or the Incarnation – is basically a summons to action [or a way of being]. Yet instead of being taught to act creatively upon them, many modern Christians feel it is more important to "believe" them. Why?

In most pre-modern cultures, there were two recognised ways of attaining truth. The Greeks called them mythos and logos. Both were crucial and each had its particular sphere of competence. Logos [corresponding with the modern conception of “science"] was the pragmatic mode of thought that enabled us to control our environment and function in the world. It had, therefore, to correspond accurately to external realities. But logos could not assuage human grief or give people intimations that their lives had meaning. For that they turned to mythos, an early form of psychology, which dealt with the more elusive aspects of human experience.

Stories of heroes descending to the underworld were not regarded as primarily factual but taught people how to negotiate the obscure regions of the psyche [what we now call ‘the unconscious’]. In the same way, the purpose of a creation myth was therapeutic; before the modern period no sensible person ever thought it gave an accurate account of the origins of life [i.e. that it was literally true]. A cosmology was recited at times of crisis or sickness, when people needed a symbolic influx of the creative energy that had brought something out of nothing. Thus the Genesis myth, a polemic against Babylonian religion, was balm to the bruised spirits of the Israelites who had been defeated and deported by the armies of Nebuchadnezzar during the sixth century BCE. Nobody was required to "believe" it; like most peoples, the Israelites had a number of other mutually-exclusive creation stories and as late as the 16th century, Jews thought nothing of making up a new creation myth that bore no relation to Genesis but spoke more directly to their tragic circumstances at that time. [And actually there’s more than one creation myth in Genesis.]

Above all, myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. [Scholar Mercia Eliade said it was a way of symbolically entering the ‘eternal domain’.]. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play [like a deaf alien watching the performance of a symphony orchestra and wonder what all those beings were doing ]

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.

Some comments inserted by me.

Setting aside God as a nonliteral, metaphorical, mythical character as Wayfarer describes above, and focusing instead on the logos interpretation, I was thinking this could be a useful way of helping frame the "what is God" question:

Picture the world you think atheists believe exists.
Now picture the world you think theists believe exists.
Now describe the difference between those two pictures.
That difference is what you think "God" means.

For me, I think that difference is generally the existence of a person of some sort -- some being with a mind and will -- that excels to perfection at all the things that are virtues of a person, having complete knowledge of everything in the universe (omniscience), perfect function of mind and will within itself (including omnibenevolence), and complete power over everything in the universe (omnipotence).

And I don't think such a thing exists.

Other nominal theists seem to think that "God" means either something that atheists wouldn't dispute the existence of, just the labeling of (so there is no difference in the two pictures above), or something poetic, literary, or metaphorical, like "love" or other theologically noncognitivist referents. But for theists who do posit a difference in the world they think exists and the world that atheists think exists, it seems to be something like the above.

Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others. — Banno

Your example, "I like vanilla" is not beyond doubt. Perhaps it's beyond doubt to you, but it's not beyond doubt to me. So when you use that in your attempt to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes, it may be questioned by me, doubted. Therefore you have not provided an acceptable example.

By Christians not claiming God as independently existing, I mean that the founders of Christianity, and the thinkers on it, have (near as i can tell) believed and never questioned, and, never questioning, never bothered to spread their claim to nature or natural science. In short, God is simply a presupposition of their thinking. — tim wood

This is the way you look at Christian theological thinking, as presuppositions, but it is not the way that the founders of Christianity looked at God. If you read some of the material you'll see that it's mostly all questions, with some proposed answers. St. Augustine for instance questions everything from the earth to the heavens, and especially the presupposition that God is omniscient, in relation to Augustine's own experience of "free will". Take a look at the table of contents of St Thomas' Summa Theologica for example, the entire book is a series of questions, discussion of the questions, objections, and replies. Your claim that these thinkers presupposed God, and never questioned the presuppositions, is the exact opposite of the truth. That is exactly what they did, question the presuppositions. And that is why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's ontological proof as unsound.

OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. — Wayfarer

This is the key point which tim wood doesn't get. Certain individuals will make a serious quest toward whether there really is a God. These individuals will question (doubt) all the fundamental presuppositions, which Banno is claiming are beyond doubt, in regard to the reliability and truth of such presuppositions, which others insist are beyond doubt. Some of these thinkers, like St Thomas for example, became the most profound theologians for that very reason, that they got beyond the prior presuppositions, to establish new principles of a deeper an higher understanding.

Tim wood portrays the theologian as believing in God only because God is a presupposition. It is implied that if one doubts or questions God that person looses the presupposition and will necessarily become atheist by the very fact that the presupposition of God is cast aside. So tim does not accept the profound reality which you and I have experienced first hand, that if one makes a serious quest, the reality of God becomes evident. And, it does not require the presupposition that God is real, as tim believes, it just requires a human being with an inquisitive (doubtful) nature. Some of these human beings who seriously doubt the existence of God end up as the most profound theologians.

That's why I said, "I think...". From your survey of the posts, what did you come up with? — tim wood

You seem to have missed my post, way back earlier in the thread. I said that to think that there is such a thing as "the definition" would be a mistaken thought. So you will not get my consent on any proposed definition. And, it is evident in this thread that my position is correct, because there has been no consensus.

And I think you ned to renew your credential either/both as a Christian or someone who claims to know what Christianity is. The fundamental tenet is belief. — tim wood

I've read a considerable amount of Christian theology and never have I seen it stated "the fundamental tenet is belief". You really are just making this stuff up. Faith is very important, but faith, as that which supports or propagates belief, is not the same thing as belief. And faith itself is propagated, cultured, not indoctrinated, so faith is not even the type of thing which could be a tenet. That's a category mistake. This category mistake is very similar to the reason why Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological argument. We cannot make God real simply by believing or having faith that God is real, we must actually understand that God is real. So Aquinas points to the human disposition which is required in order for a human being to understand that God is real.

Aquinas succinctly states that the existence of God, and other things which can be known about God by natural reason, are not articles of faith. However, to those who cannot understand the reasoning by which the existence of God is known, this can be accepted by faith.

Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach? — Wayfarer

As stated above, Aquinas assures us that the existence of God, as well as some things about God, can be known by natural reason. He explains this by describing how we can know a cause through its effect by reason. We can observe the effect, create principles based on that observance, and deduce that there was a cause, and some things about the cause.

What appears to be missing for your quoted passages is the Aristotelian distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge, made in his Nichomachean Ethics. In modern epistemology it is know-how and know-that. In post-Socratic times, the distinction between logos and mythos was mostly supplanted by the Aristotelian system.

It appears like this came about because Socrates was highly critical of ambiguity in the use of "techne". Through rhetoric and sophistry logos and mythos got all mixed together, conflated such that the combined two became techne or episteme, and there were no hard principles to separate knowldege which was based in theory from knowledge which was based in practise. And theory is not necessarily supported by sound premises. A significant portion of Aristotle's work is actually aimed toward sorting this out, starting with his fundamental logical Categories, and the designation of "substance" as what grounds logic (theory).

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Picture the world you think atheists believe exists. — Pfhorrest

Nature minus mystery. :chin: :clap:

Now picture the world you think theists believe exists. — Pfhorrest

Nature plus mystery. :scream: :pray:

Now describe the difference between those two pictures. — Pfhorrest

• plus Mystery. Begs all questions, answers none (e.g. "Mystery did it ..." "Mystery said it ..." "It's the Mystery's Will ...") Mystery-of-the-gaps. A(nother) just-so story. Magical thinking.

• minus Mystery. Explicable answers at least in principle - criterion for filtering out pseudo-questions (e.g. "What happens to me after I die?"). Complexity (perplexity) exorcises mystery (anxiety). Defeasible thinking.

That difference is what you think "God" means. — Pfhorrest

Ersatz, ad hockery, stop-gap, placeholder (+0), fetish, anti-anxiety placebo ... :sparkle: :monkey:

• plus Mystery.. — 180 Proof

You forgot the second mystery.

?

Stupid joke. The difference between Nature + mystery and Nature - mystery is 2 mystery.

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:smirk:

But would you also agree that material existence is criteriological? To exist, the materially existing thing must meet some criteria? If you agree, then demonstrate. If you do not agree, then for you, anything and everything exists. — tim wood

No - and this is the crux of the issue for philosophy of religion. Western culture has lost the ability to understand or envisage different modes of being. There's a very interesting article on IEP about 17th Century Theories of Substance. It notes that:

For 17th century philosophers, the term 'substance' is reserved for the ultimate constituents of reality on which everything else depends. This article discusses the most important theories of substance from the 17th century: those of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Although these philosophers were highly original thinkers, they shared a basic conception of substance inherited from the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition from which philosophical thinking was emerging. ...

Degrees of Reality

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.

I'm arguing that the possibility of 'degrees of reality' (and the corresponding sense of 'ontological proximity' to the absolute) has generally been lost in the transition to modern thought - and that, therefore, we believe that the term 'existence' is univocal - something either exists or it doesn't. Birds, bats, and the number 7 exist; unicorns, phlogiston and the square root of 7 do not. And that I believe is what we have in mind when we ask whether 'god' is 'materially existent'. Then the answer is 'no'. And that's the only answer available, in the flattened-out worldview that we nowadays inhabit, because we've lost a dimension or a mode of cognition.

So, in answer to your question as to whether I accept that simply 'anything and everything exists' - the answer is no, but empiricism is not the appropriate method to deal with the question. I do accept there are levels of being that are outside the purview of the scientific worldview, and that they are real. But this is the question of metaphysics, par excellence, and empiricism reduces any consideration of what is real, to what can be seen, felt, and touched, or theories arrived at by way of mathematical inference based on what is measurable, and it conditions our entire outlook and way of being in the world on that basis. So it tends to foreclose the possibility of there being a metaphysics (although I should add, I think that metaphysics is only ever provisional in nature, that it's a "pointing out device", not a final truth.)

With its strict division between selves and the world, subjects and objects, or mind and nature, this picture sets us against the world, in effect treating it as alien to us. And it is a bad picture, since in reality, Heidegger argues, we and the world cannot, even notionally, exist without one another: “self and world” are not “two beings”, but mutually dependent. The Cartesian picture results from viewing us in an over-intellectual way – as, essentially, “thinking things” who observe objects and mentally represent them. Phenomenological attention, undistorted by theory, to “things themselves” yields a very different picture of how we relate to the world, however. We do so, not as “spectators” or “thinkers”, but “primordially” as agents... ¹

Commentary on Heidegger.

but it's not beyond doubt to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's work with that. I say I prefer vanilla, You ask if I am sure - it was chocolate yesterday, Banana (yuck!) the day before...

Or you notice that there is only one serve of chocolate remains, and you know that I know you prefer chocolate, and hence suspect that I am putting up with the vanilla so that you can have the chocolate.

IS this what you have in mind?

But it's material existence we're stuck on, and you don't seem to get that the claim of material existence must be heretical and destructive of the essential nature of the God you appear to want. — tim wood

Why are you stuck on material existence? No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. But this does not mean that Christians believe that God's existence depends on the human mind, like other immaterial things seem to. On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.

I don't insist on dictionary meanings, though they're a good place to start. Do you care to expand on these, or do you accept them as is. — tim wood

Sure, I'll accept those definitions of "faith". Now did you read what I said Aquinas stated very succinctly, that the existence of God, and some things about God are not articles of faith, because they are known by natural reason. But they may be accepted on faith by those who do not understand the reasoning.

This is barely worth comment. I note the "can." The sense of it is that sometimes we may know the cause via effects and thinking, not that we will (nor how we might know that we do, or don't). And to be sure, he was all about plugging in just what he needed.

Again, this is all reasonable if you grant the founding argument of the existence of God. Without that, not-so-reasonable. — tim wood

The founding premise is that each and every material object has a cause of its existence. Notice that there is no presupposition of "God" here. But when we notice that the first material object must necessarily have a cause which is immaterial, we give that immaterial cause a name, "God".

Of course, if you do not understand the argument, you might accept "God" on faith, as Aquinas said, but I see no reason to reject the argument. And I've seen many who have attempted to give reason to reject the argument, but all those attempts have proven to be unreasonable. So in reality it appears to be unreasonable not to accept the founding argument for the existence of God.

IS this what you have in mind? — Banno

Yes, you might be lying. You purchased vanilla. You claimed to be able to justify your purchase with "I like vanilla". This assertion does not justify your purchase because I am not convinced that you actually do like vanilla, and I think you were buying the vanilla milkshakes for someone else. Either justify your claim or I'll continue to believe that you were buying the milkshakes for someone else.

The point being that any claim which is purported to be "beyond doubt", must be substantiated, in order to actually be beyond doubt. And to substantiate a claim is to justify it. So your claim "I like vanilla" can only act to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes if it has itself been substantiated, or justified.

The regress in justification does not end in the way that you think it does. It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. So if I trusted you for example, when you said "I like vanilla", that might put an end to the need for justification. In general, we commonly appeal to authority to put an end to the regress in justification, citing a scientific principle, or some such thing, which will not be doubted by people who trust science.

It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see this as different from what I have suggested.

It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover


I don't see this as different from what I have suggested. — Banno

I may be misunderstanding here, but here's my reaction to a possible distinction between the two. There is a difference between what I need to have no reason to doubt and what is beyond doubt. If I have experiences X, this could lead to a rational belief A that I have which I cannot demonstrate to others, but which I have no reason to doubt. This could be mundane - I see a pumas of different sizes and ages - in a state where they are not supposed to exist, I see them engaged eating a recent killing stalking prey raising young. And over a period of the last decade. I decide pumas are in this state. (like New Hampshire, say). Others have good grounds to not accept my belief. They don't know me, how good my observational skills are, if I have an agenda, what I saw, if I can tell the difference between a lynx (or bobcat, whichever one it is that's in that region) and a puma, if I am nuts, was high and so on. So they have very good grounds to go with whatever the official state and scientist position is on the demographics of pumas and ignore my belief. I on the other hand have no reason to doubt my own belief - unless I was high, or had an agenda, or am subject to visual hallucinations and so on. But I can have good grounds for ruling these out.

I think often in discussions it is as if two rational people with different experiences must reach the same conclusions. I don't think this is the case.

Now I realize this mundane example is still dealing with something scientists, in general, would say has some, extremely tiny chance of being possible. They don't dispute the existence of pumas, in fact they believe they exist, just not there - though often in practice they will speak in terms of impossibilitiy and rule out rather than remaining agnostic - the history of rogue waves is a good example of this where people were told their estimates of the waves were wrong and that such things were impossible and so on. Only later did technology shift and it was found out the scientists were ruling out something that was real and correctly interpreted and described by the people on ships at sea.

There does come a point where the side that rules out is not really accepting the problem of other minds. Their assertions come very close to: if I experienced whatever you did, I would not believe it and interpret it as you do.

I don't see this as different from what I have suggested. — Banno

So I'll explain to you the difference.

You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them. This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."

On the other hand, I say that these are things which we simply choose not to doubt. This does not assign to them any sort of certainty or indubitableness, nor does it categorize them as somehow outside the theatre of justification, or inherently beyond doubt. In fact, the majority of these things which we choose not to doubt, have actually been doubted, and justified many years ago. Then they appear to us as "common knowledge" past down from generation to generation by parents, teachers, and other authority figures. As common knowledge they might appear to be beyond doubt when they really are not.

The point being that I believe it is a mistake to categorize these things as "beyond doubt". When human knowledge (as a whole) grows and evolves, the principles which were once used to justify these things which we accept from the authorities, without doubting them, may become outdated and inconsistent with modern principles. This means that within human knowledge s a whole, there are inconsistencies. Over time, as the inconsistencies within our knowledge continue to glare at us with an increasingly blinding light, it becomes more and more irrational not to doubt these things which might appear to be "beyond doubt". The irrationality is compounded by philosophers who insist that such things actually are beyond doubt.

So we can place "God" in this category of foundational things, as you suggest, and I agree with you on that point. But I believe it is a mistake to portray these foundational things as beyond doubt. We must categorize them in the exact opposite way, as extremely dubious because they are ancient conclusions. We must therefore doubt them all, revisit the principles whereby they were originally justified, and establish consistency with the principles believed today. To have a human "body of knowledge" which contains inconsistencies is incoherent and contradictory. Such inconsistencies exist as a result of us choosing not to doubt fundamental principles.


You'll see that I prefer to categorize these things which Banno says are "beyond doubt" as things which we choose not to doubt. This places "doubting" as the natural human condition. We do not choose to doubt, it comes naturally when the conditions which produce certainty are not created, and we choose not to doubt with a judgement of certainty. We must choose not to doubt, suppress the urge to doubt, in order to accept and believe things without first doubting them.

This is consistent with Socrates' portrayal of the root of philosophy being "wonder". The philosopher has a desire to know, and this presents itself in its primitive form as wonder. Doubt is a type of wonder. It is only by doubting things, seeking justification for things, that we produce higher levels of certainty. Therefore I would replace Aristotle's classification, 'man is a rational being' with 'human beings are philosophical beings'. This emphasizes the role of wonder, doubt, and uncertainty, in relation to the desire, want, and lack of certainty.

So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. Most likely you have already doubted, which would be your natural inclination, so you researched material to verify what you actually saw. Now your judgement is beyond doubt to you. Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.

To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. A debate is based in doubt, it is not based on the two opposing sides both being certain. So abstaining from, and ignoring the debate, is contrary to the natural desire for certainty, which manifests as doubt.

And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.

You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them.This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts." — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put.

So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less.

And that's Wittgenstein's antidote to Socrates' senseless wondering.

One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se.

So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess.

How could we have a coherent omnipotent, omnipresent omniscient being? Wouldn't such a being be so overwhelmingly present as to be beyond doubt?

And I suspect that there are theists who think like this; they suppose atheism to be incomprehensible.

It should be beyond doubt, the contention is God is found everywhere. Metaphorically (since such a God, being everywhere, cannot have a specfic empircal manifestation to watch), would see such a God wherever we looked.

But if we understand that, there is no question of faith. We know God is present for sure. We no longer have an uncertainty or nihilism for belief to make safe.

But if we understand that, there is no question of faith. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yep. Doubt would be unconscionable.

Yet, plainly, there is doubt...

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How could we have a coherent omnipotent, omnipresent omniscient being? Wouldn't such a being be so overwhelmingly present as to be beyond doubt? — Banno

from the p-o-v of the mystics, God is indeed the only reality. Us hoi polloi are completely bamboozled by appearances and are clinging to the unreal.