What experiment would you set up to show that humans had this feature? — Isaac


I've been watching, reading, and listening to quite a bit.

Which feature? — creativesoul

You said "I found it rather odd that they chose some experiments/games which are not even capable of showing in humans what they are wanting the same experiment to show in non humans?", yet you seemed to be saying, in the rest of your posts (maybe I've got this wrong), that humans were unlike non-human primates in their abilities in this regard. So I thought you would have an experiment in mind which showed as much to your satisfaction, but maybe I've misinterpreted what you're saying.

But the model of the table isn't more real in the artist's mind nor are these alternative models in the same field, one is how to negotiate the object in our spatiotemporal environment, the other is how to make marks on a page to best invoke such a table. Two different models with two different variance-minimising results. — Isaac

An artist must learn to process the information both (or perhaps a variety of different) ways, and to apply the ‘model’ or value structure according to the task at hand. — Possibility

I wasn’t disagreeing with you as much as you seem to think I was. They are two different value structures applied to the same reality, and can still both be used to make marks on the page and invoke a table. When you’re talking about two drawings on a page, they ARE alternative models employed in the same field. One is more real on the page than the other - it conveys more relevant information about the table in the same field than the rectangle does. That they are better suited to different fields, I agree with - hence my comment that the artist must learn to process the information both ways.

Ah, I see what you mean now. You mean "the artist must....in order to produce art" . I read it as "the artist must..." in the same sense as the non-artist simply trying to make inferences about the the object in general. My mistake.

Not on my view...

I would argue experience necessarily must be subjective experience, and subjective experience I think implies the subject which is "self", i.e. self-awareness. So for example, to make computer consciouss and experience emotions or smells, all we have to do is give it self-awareness and appropriate sensors.

However, Kant denies direct perception of reality. — creativesoul

No, he does not. Direct perception is given; direct knowledge is denied.
———————-

Thus, Kant did not and could not draw and maintain a distinction between non linguistic thought and linguistic thought. — creativesoul

He didn’t want to because he didn’t have to. There is no such thing as linguistic thought, if thought be understood as the human rational system in action. No language is used whatsoever, until or unless that action is to be expressed, either subjectively in which case a subject immediately expresses to himself, or objectively in which case the subject mediately expresses beyond himself. When I ask or tell myself what I’m thinking, I must have already thought it, in order to have something to ask or tell myself about. The split second before I reach down to tie my shoe, is not filled with the words “hey, dumbass....your shoe’s untied”. And I certainly don’t go through the maze of linguistic representations telling me all that possibly happens because of it.

Why do you think the phrases like “it all happens behind the curtain”, or “sub-consciously”, or any of a myriad of expressions typifying the speculation that our system of thinking is all accomplished without our thinking about it. When someone says, “I just don’t have the words for it” all they are meaning is their understanding of such experience does not abide with the language to relate it, even thought the experience itself is fully resident in the subject. Which makes explicit the experience, which is nothing but the rational system in action, cannot be predicated on its expression. This reflects to my assertion the other day, in that all words are invented, which means language is invented, which makes explicit thought is always antecedent to the language it invents. The case is equally well served by the fact that different words used by different thinking subjects express the same thought in each subject respectively.

Thought takes time. Why would Nature require the time necessitated by the manifestations of natural law in our brains, to be heaped upon the time require to transpose each constituent of thought, re: manifestations of natural law, whatever they are theorized to be, into a linguistic representation? When someone says, “it flashed before my eyes!!”, do you think they meant some words flashed, or was it an event that flashed? It was some experience that flashed, without a single linguistic representation attached to it. In that instantaneous, infinitesimal split second before I bend down to tie my shoe......well, you know what really happens, I trust.

QED!!!!!! Dammit!!!!

Is it any wonder philosophy never really solved anything? If it did, what would we have so much fun with?

Red Herrings.

You said "I found it rather odd that they chose some experiments/games which are not even capable of showing in humans what they are wanting the same experiment to show in non humans?", yet you seemed to be saying, in the rest of your posts (maybe I've got this wrong), that humans were unlike non-human primates in their abilities in this regard. So I thought you would have an experiment in mind which showed as much to your satisfaction, but maybe I've misinterpreted what you're saying. — Isaac

It seems that you're asking me which experiment I would prefer, without ever setting out what it is that we're looking to prove. I'm strongly objecting to anthropomorphism; a.k.a. the personification of something other than a person; a.k.a the misattribution of uniquely human attributes to that which is non human.

Bayesian Reasoning is one. A sense of fairness is another. You've recently expressed ambivalence regarding the act of misattributing thought and belief that is unique to complex common language users to creatures without; that's what attributing some human thought and belief to non human primates amounts to. That's the conversation backdrop.

What does the dot experiment prove with regard to whether or not some non human animal can possibly use Bayesian reasoning, or have some sense of fairness/justice?

Are you walking back the earlier claim? You've recently denied offering the experimental results of the grape/cucumber trials as support for also saying that the participants were working from some sense of unfairness/fairness and/or justice/injustice. That denial is false. It contradicts what happened. You did propose such.

In order to have a sense of fairness/unfairness or justice/injustice, the candidate under consideration must have already experienced reality not matching up to expectations. Unexpected results are part of what a sense of fairness requires for it's own emergence. The results are thought to be unfair/unjust solely as a result of not following an earlier agreement. In order to develop a sense of justice/fairness, the candidate must perform a comparative assessment between what they expected to happen and what did happen. To do this requires naming and descriptive practices. That how one begins to become aware that they have a worldview.

What's the difference between a non human primate's clear behavioural signs of discontent because they did not receive what they expected, and discontent as a result of having a sense of justice/fairness?

A clearly understood agreement being broken.

It has been said that the primate felt cheated as if he did the same work as her(his partner) but did not receive the same reward. It is clear that his expectations were left unmet. Clearly, his behaviour put his discontent on display for all to see. There is nothing to further suggest that those unmet expectations were also further thought - by him - to be unfair.

When I ask or tell myself what I’m thinking, I must have already thought it, in order to have something to ask or tell myself about. — Mww

The above is thinking about one's own thought and belief. That is linguistic belief because it is existentially dependent upon language use.

No language is used whatsoever... — Mww

That would be non linguistic thought and belief.

Here there is a distinction to be made between unspoken thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon prior language use, and thought and belief that can be formed and/or held by a language-less creature.

I can sit on a chair and think about triangles without using language. I cannot if I've never used language. Thus, such thoughts are themselves existentially dependent upon language even if our having them in the chair is done in silence.

the misattribution of uniquely human attributes to that which is non human. — creativesoul

Yes, that is what I'm asking you about. If my null hypothesis were that attributes such as a sense of fairness were not unique to humans, what kind of experimental result would force me to think otherwise. Or are you suggesting that something other than empirical evidence should force me to hold a different null hypothesis?

What does the dot experiment prove with regard to whether or not some non human animal can possibly use Bayesian reasoning, or have some sense of fairness/justice? — creativesoul

The dot experiment has nothing to do with non-humann primate abilities. You asked me about how they measured gaze directions with regards to conscious harvesting of inference-related data, it's a standard scientific technique, nothing controversial.

Are you walking back the earlier claim? You've recently denied offering the experimental results of the grape/cucumber trials as support for also saying that the participants were working from some sense of unfairness/fairness and/or justice/injustice. That denial is false. It contradicts what happened. You did propose such. — creativesoul

The results of those experiments are pretty vague. They rule out a few extreme theories at either end of the spectrum, but they could reasonably support a number of quite different theories. That's why there's still no consensus on the matter.

In order to develop a sense of justice/fairness, the candidate must perform a comparative assessment between what they expected to happen and what did happen. To do this requires naming and descriptive practices. That how one begins to become aware that they have a worldview. — creativesoul

And you know this how?

What's the difference between a non human primate's clear behavioural signs of discontent because they did not receive what they expected, and discontent as a result of having a sense of justice/fairness? — creativesoul

Nothing, you just said, discontent related to a sense of fairness would also be a form of response to not receiving what one expected.

I'm not really interested in this "prove it" attitude. Hundreds of intelligent and dedicated people have spent decades trying to iron out these exact differences by creating more subtle and controlled experiments. If you want to just come in without any technical background whatsoever and dismiss the whole enterprise on the basis of having skimmed through one or two papers on a subject you don't even fully understand, you're welcome to. I'm not going to be involved.

the misattribution of uniquely human attributes to that which is non human.
— creativesoul

Yes, that is what I'm asking you about. If my null hypothesis were that attributes such as a sense of fairness were not unique to humans, what kind of experimental result would force me to think otherwise. Or are you suggesting that something other than empirical evidence should force me to hold a different null hypothesis? — Isaac

Those are not the only options. I'm saying let's look and see if a sense of fairness/justice is unique to humans.

Is a sense of fairness/justice unique to humans?

That is the question here. In order to know that we must first know what our sense of fairness/justice consists of. What does our sense of fairness/justice require in order for it to begin working? I've been setting this out.

We have to know what it is that we're looking for.

The results of those experiments are pretty vague. They rule out a few extreme theories at either end of the spectrum, but they could reasonably support a number of quite different theories. That's why there's still no consensus on the matter. — Isaac

So, those particular experiments produced results that provide equal support for different reports/accounts of those experiments, particularly reports/accounts regarding the content of non human thought and belief.

In order to develop a sense of justice/fairness, the candidate must perform a comparative assessment between what they expected to happen and what did happen. To do this requires naming and descriptive practices. That how one begins to become aware that they have a worldview.
— creativesoul

And you know this how? — Isaac

Decades of careful study and accounting practices largely informed by methodological naturalism, use of logical reasoning, and knowing what all thought and belief consist of. The studies you've presented here included a number of assertions from prior studies that were being challenged. I'm guessing I'm more in agreement with the previous conclusions from the previous studies and/or experimental results.

The scientific work that went into the very beginning of that abstract seems to agree with me. One of the necessary prerequisites for humans when testing for a sense of fairness/justice was agreement between parties.

The modified tests could not include the agreement because non human primates cannot make an agreement with you to do certain things and receive certain rewards. They can draw correlations between their own behaviour and receiving the same reward afterwards. They can develop expectations. Those expectations can lead to intense discontent. They can be angry and violent. They can be despondent and no responsive, etc. They cannot be said to be feelings and/or thoughts of unfairness/injustice because there is no prior agreement in the mind of the candidate from which they feel like they've been cheated.

I would definitely say that all those same experimental results could be used in show a sense of trust developing between the subject and the humans actively involved, if rewards were always hand delivered.

What's the difference between a non human primate's clear behavioural signs of discontent because they did not receive what they expected, and discontent as a result of having a sense of justice/fairness?
— creativesoul

Nothing... — Isaac

:worry:

I can sit on a chair and think about triangles without using language. I cannot if I've never used language. Thus, such thoughts are themselves existentially dependent upon language even if our having them in the chair is done in silence. — creativesoul

Evidence?

Are you suggesting a human without language cannot think? If so you must be using the terms ‘language’ and ‘think’ in a particular way. Explain yourself.

Ah, I see what you mean now. You mean "the artist must....in order to produce art" . I read it as "the artist must..." in the same sense as the non-artist simply trying to make inferences about the the object in general. My mistake. — Isaac

It’s more than that, though. The capacity for creative thought and alternative modelling serves us well beyond art, too. Many of our conceptual models are inaccurate or limited, leading to conflict and error in how we interact with the world. The flexibility to present and apply alternative or adjusted conceptual models enables critical thinking that leads to more accurate concepts and more effective and efficient interaction with reality.

In order to know that we must first know what our sense of fairness/justice consists of. — creativesoul

Our sense of fairness/justice consists of anything we want it to consist of. It's not a term that pre-exists humans making it up.

So, those particular experiments produced results that provide equal support for different reports/accounts of those experiments, particularly reports/accounts regarding the content of non human thought and belief. — creativesoul

I'm pretty sure none of the experiments made any judgement about the "content of non- human thought/belief. I don't think thought/belief is even the sort of thing that can have content, so don't even know what evidence for such would look like.

Decades of careful study and accounting practices largely informed by methodological naturalism, use of logical reasoning, and knowing what all thought and belief consist of. — creativesoul

Check out the argument from epistemic peers.

non human primates cannot make an agreement with you to do certain things and receive certain rewards. — creativesoul

Again, you know this how? From your decades of primate research perhaps?

Many of our conceptual models are inaccurate or limited, leading to conflict and error in how we interact with the world. — Possibility

And how would we know that?

So, behind all these weird and irrelevant replies coming from you is the simple confession...

I'm assuming that non linguistic animals(non human primates) are capable of having a sense of fairness/justice, and you need to convince me otherwise.

Is that about right?

I'm pretty sure none of the experiments made any judgement about the "content of non- human thought/belief. I don't think thought/belief is even the sort of thing that can have content, so don't even know what evidence for such would look like. — Isaac

What is thought and belief then, if it is not the sort of thing that has content? How do you discern between thinking of trees and thinking of dots if there is no difference in the content?

This difference regarding thought and belief, and particularly what it consists of, may be the primary wedge between our viewpoints.

In order to know that we must first know what our sense of fairness/justice consists of.
— creativesoul

Our sense of fairness/justice consists of anything we want it to consist of. It's not a term that pre-exists humans making it up. — Isaac

Well, this is certainly at the heart of the matter...

Is our sense of fairness a term?

I would think that if you sincerely believe that non human primates have some sense of fairness/justice, then it would have to be the case that that sense of fairness/justice predates humans and thus does not require terms at all.

Which means that our sense of fairness/justice - if it predates our language use - does not consist of anything we want it to.

:brow:

I'm assuming that non linguistic animals(non human primates) are capable of having a sense of fairness/justice, and you need to convince me otherwise.

Is that about right? — creativesoul

No - why would I need to convince you otherwise? If I thought your views might cause harm to me or others, then maybe I'd have a crack at convincing you otherwise, but outside of that scenario I can't think of a single reason why I would want to do that.

What is thought and belief then, if it is not the sort of thing that has content? — creativesoul

I think a belief is a disposition to act a certain way, its an inference manifest in the action it sets in motion. I think all living things, and some non-living things, have beliefs.

Thoughts, for me, are any neural activity, only creatures with brains can therefore have thoughts. The two are not the same.

our sense of fairness/justice - if it predates our language use - does not consist of anything we want it to. — creativesoul

We don't have a sense of fairness. I have one, and you have one but there's no reason at all why they should be any more similar than is required to have the most basic conversation on the matter. It never ceases to amaze me the power of this nonsensical conviction that we can somehow 'drill down' into words which never had a detailed meaning in the first place and somehow find some inherent truth that no one ever put there.

Of course the notion fairness did not predate our language use. Creatures had certain beliefs prior to language use. I've no doubt those beliefs varied. Which collection were going to come under the umbrella of 'fairness' was determined by the language community using the word, and at no point in time did they ever sit down to thrash out exactly what it, or any other word really means.

I'm assuming that non linguistic animals(non human primates) are capable of having a sense of fairness/justice, and you need to convince me otherwise.

Is that about right?
— creativesoul

No - why would I need to convince you otherwise? If I thought your views might cause harm to me or others, then maybe I'd have a crack at convincing you otherwise, but outside of that scenario I can't think of a single reason why I would want to do that. — Isaac

You've misunderstood. I was asking if that assumption was the one you're holding...

What is thought and belief then, if it is not the sort of thing that has content?
— creativesoul

I think a belief is a disposition to act a certain way, its an inference manifest in the action it sets in motion. I think all living things, and some non-living things, have beliefs.

Thoughts, for me, are any neural activity, only creatures with brains can therefore have thoughts. The two are not the same. — Isaac

That notion of belief grants inference and disposition to act to inanimate objects.

Of course thoughts and belief can be different.

our sense of fairness/justice - if it predates our language use - does not consist of anything we want it to.
— creativesoul

We don't have a sense of fairness. I have one, and you have one but there's no reason at all why they should be any more similar than is required to have the most basic conversation on the matter. — Isaac

What's the point of all this irrelevant bickering? I have one. You have one. We have one. It doesn't have to be the exact same. We have one.

Does it make any justified sense at all to say that the non human primate has one?

I'm asking you for exactly what counts as a sense of fairness? What is the criterion which - when met by any and all candidates - counts as a case of that candidate having a sense of fairness? You and I meet the criterion.

What is it such that the non human primate meets it too?

Of course the notion fairness did not predate our language use. Creatures had certain beliefs prior to language use. I've no doubt those beliefs varied. Which collection were going to come under the umbrella of 'fairness' was determined by the language community using the word, and at no point in time did they ever sit down to thrash out exactly what it, or any other word really means. — Isaac

Why do you keep going off on these tangents and arguing about stuff that I've never claimed? I'm not asking about what a word really means. I'm asking you to set out a minimum criterion for having a sense of fairness.

There is some agreement between us here. Perhaps it can be put to good use. We both agree that some language less creatures are capable of having belief. You're also claiming that what counts as a sense of fairness is determined by the community using the word. I do not disagree.

What I'm getting at is that if a sense of fairness exists within language less creatures, then it does not consist of language; it is not existentially dependent upon language. Rather, it exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it. The same holds good of thought and belief.

In other words...

We can get them wrong.

I was asking if that assumption was the one you're holding.. — creativesoul

Yes, I understood that, and the answer was, no, that's not the full assumption I'm holding because it does not contain the assumption that I need to convince you otherwise. To clarify, I think non-linguistic primates have a sense of fairness, I'm working on the presumption that you don't (because you stated that fairness requires a pre-existing agreement and that such agreements are impossible without language), I'm arguing in defence of my position, I've no desire to get you to change yours (at this time). Does that clear things up?

That notion of belief grants inference and disposition to act to inanimate objects. — creativesoul

I have no problem with beliefs being attributed to non-living things, but if you do, then the notion could be limited to such states when expressed in the architecture of a brain. It makes no difference to my defence. The main point is that I don't believe they can be sensibly talked about as having 'content' in the same way a book has 'content', they are not necessarily 'about' other concepts (though they can be).

I'm asking you for exactly what counts as a sense of fairness? What is the criterion which - when met by any and all candidates - counts as a case of that candidate having a sense of fairness? You and I meet the criterion.

What is it such that the non human primate meets it too? — creativesoul

A sense of fairness, for me, is a belief that some restorative action should be initiated if certain resources in certain scenarios are not distributed either equally (by default) or according to some rule which has been previously established between individuals in a group.

Non-human primates can be said to have met that criteria if the take restorative action (complain, show negative emotion etc) in such scenarios. the evidence is stronger where alternative explanations for those restorative behaviours have been ruled out by careful experiment design such as the use of ultimatum games, tokens, eliminating social hierarchies etc. instead of simple resource distribution.

I am not of the opinion that such alternative explanations for apparent restorative behaviour needs to be entirely ruled out before we accept the hypothesis because I think that would imply an unwarranted principle of anthropocentrism. We know we evolved from primates, we should presume, as a default, that they share all of our traits until we demonstrate one to be unique, not presume all of our traits are unique until we prove that they're not.

To clarify, I think non-linguistic primates have a sense of fairness, — Isaac

You mean that you have a model where there are non-linguistic primates and they have a sense of fairness, but it's strictly something you've constructed. Objectively, you don't believe there are things with properties that make them primates or make them have a sense of fairness or anything like that. You should always be clear that you're simply talking about models that you've constructed, and this reply is part of your model that you've constructed in your view, too.

There are plenty of studies that show ‘reciprocity’ among primates. Fairness is a human extension of this. I wouldn’t suggest that other primates are aware of the concept of ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’ though. That is like saying a dog can understand who wins a football match just because it is present to experience a football match.

I'm getting at the fact that Isaac believes that things like primates and qualities they have are a mental model of his own devising. If he's going to claim to believe that, he can't start talking about primates like he believes there really such things and he can observe them.

You mean that you have a model where there are non-linguistic primates and they have a sense of fairness, but it's strictly something you've constructed. Objectively, you don't believe there are things with properties that make them primates or make them have a sense of fairness or anything like that. You should always be clear that you're simply talking about models that you've constructed, and this reply is part of your model that you've constructed in your view, too. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's right. Luckily most of my models are shared with my interlocutors with sufficient congruity for us to dispense with the declarations to that effect. But any time you feel the need to clarify the matter, feel free to do so.

Luckily most of my models are shared with my interlocutors — Isaac

Your "interlocutors" are part of your model, no?