Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated. — Theorem

What is the DNA code a statement about?

I wouldn't classify DNA as a statement.

What is the difference between the information encoded in DNA and the information encoded in a statement?

We should really deny this assumption of "the world", until it is justified, and produced as a logical conclusion, rather than taken as an assumed premise. This means that we should go through all the evidence from all the various fields of science, and other forms of knowledge such as theological knowledge, then we can start to make conclusions about mind-independence. If this evidence produces a conclusion that there is a "world", then the assumption is justified. if not, then we move on to a new conception.

To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt. You admit that we don't have complete knowledge of the world as it is, which is my point. We make a claim that the world is, but we have no, & logically cannot have, any direct unmediated knowledge of what the world is as it is, only what appears. The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is.

What is the difference between the information encoded in DNA and the information encoded in a statement? — tom

Statements (as signs) are essentially conceptual/inferential in nature, whereas DNA (even if it be a sign in some sense) is not.

Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there was a mind there. It means that there had to have been a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said.

I have no issue with this problem of tense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good. Then I expect not to see you make the same mistake. But, based on what you say next, I'm not sure whether you actually understand the problem.

I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can do, but I don't see how that would resolve the problem. I'm not sure how I can be any clearer, but I'll give it go.

The problem with the following sentence is the part that I've bolded:

"The meaning is what is intended by the author".

That differs importantly from the statement:

"The meaning is what was intended by the author"

The former has the logical consequence that if no meaning is intended by the author, then there is no meaning. No meaning would be intended, so there would be no meaning.

The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning.

See the difference and how important it is in terms of logical consequence?

We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. So what? I think you're missing the point.

Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that doesn't follow from what I argued. Show me. It might follow if you fuck up what I said by altering the meaning by replacing terms and such. But then that wouldn't be addressing my argument or anything that I've said. It would be addressing your own creation.

That's fine, and not at all absurd as you would claim here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't and I didn't. That isn't what I claimed is absurd. Don't twist my words, please.

As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But in the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two.

Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Without that fact the symbols would be meaningless. And I haven't claimed that that would be absurd. Stop attacking a straw man and come at me bro.

As I said, I'll adhere to proper tense use, replacing "meaning" with "what was meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

For Christ's sake...

The point I'm trying to make though, is that there is nothing real, which exists as "what was meant", other than a pattern of symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

There would be a fact. It would be a fact that the author meant such and such. Do you disagree? And if so, why?

But this pattern of symbols does not constitute meaning for a reader. — Metaphysician Undercover

There wouldn't be a reader, and even if there was, it wouldn't have to mean anything to them. None of that has any bearing on what the author meant.

The reader must assume that there is a "what was meant" beyond the pattern of symbols, what the symbols represent. — Metaphysician Undercover

There wouldn't be a reader, and even if there was, they needn't assume anything. That would have no bearing on what the author meant.

So the symbols have no meaning without a reader to assume that there is a "what was meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

False.

It is you who is making the tense errors. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not.

There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary.

I'm not sure what you mean. That the author meant something with the symbols is a present fact about the past. It is now the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and it would remain to be the case in the hypothetical future scenario. Nothing could stop that from being the case, with the exception of time travel.

You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you have a better suggestion for what we call the meaning of the symbols than what the author meant with them? If so, do share.

The author meant something with the symbols. That is a fact which continues to be factual over time. This shouldn't be difficult to grasp or accept.

If, in the hypothetical scenario, it is the case that the author meant something with the symbols, and if this is what we mean when we talk about their meaning, then the symbols would have meaning.

"What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't help but be a little amused at your confusion. "What was meant" is about the past. It is (presently) the case that something was meant.

Yes, meaning is in the present. That is true. The present meaning in the future scenario would be the same as that which was meant. Why would it have changed?

Are you following all of this? I hope so.

The difference between these two, past and present, justifies my claim that the symbols have no meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn't.

What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, no I don't. If nothing was meant, and that is what we mean by "meaning", then they wouldn't mean anything, and there would be no disagreement between us. To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible.

Secondly, anyone who has even a basic grasp of the nature of facts and time will know that what I've said is true. It's possible that you lack this understanding. My question to you would be: why the heck would it stop being a fact that something was meant?

Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that doesn't follow from anything I've said. What principles are you even referring to? If you think that it follows from something I've said, then show me by constructing a valid argument (assuming you're capable of doing so). Then the argument can be checked to see whether 1) it represents what I said (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities to represent what I say), and 2) whether the argument is valid (and I don't have much confidence in your abilities in that regard, either, truth be told).

Following from what I actually said, and not what you've imagined I said, the symbols would have no meaning unless there was a mind which meant something with the symbols. But there was, so they have.

If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

What you imagine to be my conditions don't seem to be my conditions. So be careful what you call my conditions.

You should indeed allow that something was meant by the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario.

And, like I said, this wouldn't be a wild and unrealistic assumption, like "Let's assume that an evil demon took control of humanity!". It's quite possible that the author did indeed mean something. This shit happens all the time, every day. It's happening now! I am the author of these meaningful statements. I meant something with the symbols that constitute them. And that will be a fact tomorrow, and the next day, and the next, and the one after that, and the one after that, and so on, and so forth. Why on earth would it not be? Sometimes it's like you're from another world. Is that why you're undercover?

This post is so long, and has taken up so much of my time, that I think I'm just going to leave it here - for now at least. Sorry for missing the last part out. Maybe I'll come back to it and continue where I left off.

I have to say I have little faith in any notions of "re-programming". I see the tendency to objectification as merely a bad habit we have picked up. Once we learn not to take as read the ideas that support it we can come to see beyond it. Until then, we cannot enjoy genuine faith. By faith I just mean openness to our own experience. That is the first real step. Self-cultivation prior to that is just that, I think; a cult of the self. I've been through that and seen so much of that for so many years!

To deny the fact that there is a world that is the cause of what appears, which exist separate from us is not logical. You cannot treat the lion charging you as an assumed premise, it's real and it is about to kick your butt. — Cavacava

The appearance of a thing charging me is the appearance of a thing charging me. It could kill me. This thing affects me, how does that produce the logical conclusion that there is a world separate from us?

The truths we derive from what appears are our best effort to say what could possibly be the case to allow for such appearances, but there is no guarantee that what we derive on this basis is what actually is. — Cavacava

Yes, this is exactly the problem I am pointing to. The so-called "truths" are derived from what appears, and we have no way of confirming that this is "what actually is". How do we know that there is such a thing as "what actually is". And the basis of the assumption of "a world" relies on this assumption.

Statements (as signs) are essentially conceptual/inferential in nature, whereas DNA (even if it be a sign in some sense) is not. — Theorem

What justification do you have to claim that the DNA encoding does not refer to anything?

So, what's the problem then? That in itself needn't be a problem. None of that necessitates a mind being there. It necessities that there was a mind there. It means that there had to have been a mind there doing that - which I haven't denied, and need not deny. The dependence relation isn't about the past, as I've already said. — Sapientia

You seem to have missed a key point Sapientia: "we assume that there is something which was meant". Minds are the things which make assumptions, so "we assume" implies minds. This is not concerning the past, this is right now, when we look at the symbols, we assume that there was something meant. If there are no minds, there is no assuming that there was something meant.

The latter entails that so long as there was a meaning intended by the author, then there is a meaning. The meaning would have been intended, so there would be a meaning. — Sapientia

See, you're mixing up the tenses, like you accused me of doing. That there was a meaning intended by the author indicates that something was meant by the author, at that time, in the past. You have provided no premise whereby you can say that because there was something meant, at that time in the past, this, "what was meant", persists today as meaning. You seem to have an undeclared premise, that once something was intended at a particular time, this persists indefinitely in time, as meaning

It is an assumption for argument's sake, for the sake of the hypothetical scenario that we've discussed. But in the hypothetical scenario, no, it isn't an assumption. The author meant something with those symbols. That is a given if you're going to properly engage in this thought experiment. It also need not be an assumption outside of the context of our discussion, since, obviously, there really are - and have been - authors who meant something with a bunch of symbols. I am one of them, as are you, and as is everyone else in this discussion, so, that obviously isn't an assumption. It's a fact. And there's a big difference between the two. — Sapientia

I have no problem with saying that the author meant something. The assumption which I disagree with is your assumption that what the author meant, at that particular moment in time, persists indefinitely through time, as meaning. You assume that there is a real "what is meant" by the words, right now, as "meaning", and you support this with the claim that there is a real "what was meant" by the author. What I want to know is how you establish a temporal continuity between the two. Unless you can do that, then "what was meant" by the author at that time, and "what is meant" by the words now, are completely distinct, unconnected. If they are distinct, then you cannot use what was meant by the author, to justify the claim that the words have meaning now. So we must turn to a mind which interprets, to give meaning to the words now.

Why do you keep using scare quotes like that?! It isn't necessary. — Sapientia

I use quotes when the words I use refer to a thing which is conceptual only. So, above I refer to "what was meant", and "what is meant". "what is meant" is the supposed meaning which the words have. These are two distinct concepts, and unless you can show how the two are connected, we do not have a relationship between them. So far, your claim is that the author meant something at a particular moment in time, and this persists infinitely, or eternally through time, as 'the meaning". how do you justify this claim?

To make it interesting, let's make it a given in the thought experiment that the author meant something, which is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and quite possible. — Sapientia

Right, let's assume as a given, that the author meant something. This is what occurred at that particular moment, in the past when the author wrote the words. At that time, there was meaning, because at that time, the author meant something. The question for you, is how does this necessitate that there is meaning now, or at some future time?

You should indeed allow that something was meant be the author. Otherwise you'd miss the point. The controversy only arises once we've assumed for argument's sake that something was meant. The thought experiment is about what would happen next in a particular scenario. — Sapientia

Again, I'll reiterate, I have no problem accepting that the author meant something. This was an occurrence in the past. What I have a problem with is your claim that this occurrence in the past, continues to exist today as meaning. How do you support this claim?

It doesn't matter. Then you can just define the relation with an argument for context, and have truth of a sentence relative to a context. This isn't important to the point.

Propositions aren't sentence-dependent, no. It can be true that p even if there's no sentence acting as a vehicle to express p.

Then you can just define the relation with an argument for context, and have truth of a sentence relative to a context. This isn't important to the point. — The Great Whatever

I still don't know why you're using the word "relation." But yes, we can persist in trying to have sentences act as primary truth-bearers and pin them to context of utterance. If that's your cup-a-tea, great.

Propositions aren't sentence-dependent, no. It can be true that p even if there's no sentence acting as a vehicle to express p. — The Great Whatever

So what exactly is the ontology of a proposition such that there can be such a thing even if there isn't a
sentence to express it? Is the proposition that the cup is red the same thing as the red cup? If so then to say that the proposition that the cup is red is true is to say that the red cup is true, and this seems grammatically incorrect. But if not then as well as the proposed mind-independence of physical things like red cups there's also a proposed mind-independence of non-physical things (unless the proposition that the cup is red is a physical thing but just something other than the red cup). Is this Platonism?

The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true", so I understand your claim that it can be true that p even if there isn't a sentence as the claim that 'p' can be true even if there isn't a sentence. But there can't be a true sentence if there isn't a sentence.

I think this is a case of being bewitched by language. That we can talk about a thing being true without having to mention a sentence isn't that truth doesn't depend on there being a sentence.

Classically, a proposition is a mapping from world-states to truth values. You can model this as a function from a set of objects to {0, 1}.

I still don't know why you're using the word "relation." — Mongrel

A relation contains tuples of objects or maps tuples of objects to truth values. So 'true' could be defined as a relation between sentences and contexts.

I never claimed sentences have to be primary truth-bearers, and it's irrelevant to the discussion anyway.

The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true" — Michael

You're still wrong about this, though, they're not equivalent, for reasons I've explained to you at length in the past.

You should stop talking about language bewitchment until you figure out the use-mention distinction.

Okay, I've had a little break. So, back to the grind. Here is part II: continuing from where I left off.

How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant? — Metaphysician Undercover

With regards to the last part, I simply ask: why would there need to be a mind to assume that something was meant? Either it would or would not be the case that something was meant. It would be the case that something was meant if something was meant. As a thought experiment, we can assume either one possibility or the other as an actuality, and explore what the consequences would be. The consequences of assuming that nothing was meant are uncontroversial, so we can set that aside. That would leave only one possibility worth exploring via the thought experiment, as that is where the controversy lies. That is where there is disagreement between realist and idealist relating to the mind-dependence/independence of truth - which is what this discussion is about.

Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that doesn't matter. That fact is in the present. It meant something then, and unless that meaning has somehow changed, it would mean the same thing now. A meaning doesn't cease to exist just because the author of that meaning has stopped doing what he did at the time. The author can even cease to exist whilst the meaning stays the same.

You really need to actually answer my previous questions to you about this, regarding what I actually claimed is absurd:

The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd. — Sapientia

It is absurd because it is demonstrably false. Do you think that statements made by authors who are now dead are meaningless? Do you think that whether the authors meant something is just a questionable assumption? Well, let me tell you, if you think that, or if you think something which has that as a logical consequence, then you're simply and obviously wrong. Countless statements made by authors who are now dead do have a meaning, which can be exactly what they meant at the time. And this need not be an assumption. It can be known. If you reject that, then you'd have a problem with plausibly explaining how a whole load of stuff makes sense.

How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what is meant by having a meaning. I think it makes sense to say that it has a meaning, and that this is what the author meant. Otherwise it wouldn't have a meaning. But there is good reason to go with the former, since that is what we currently do when we talk about meaning. We say that something has a meaning when the author meant something with that something. And that's how we talk and think about meaning, even when the author has died.

I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meanings and intentions are real, not conceptual. But they do originate in the the mind, and require a mind to bring them about. Once they are expressed, they become independent. The author himself can confirm his meaning, and we can acknowledge it as the meaning. The author can then go away and do something else, without having to worry that if he is not around to constantly mean what he meant, his statement will become meaningless. He can die without his meaning dying with him, and everyone else being left clueless as to what he meant, and having to resort to guesswork. Once expressed in the form of the sort of statement that can be true or false, these expressions can of course be true or false.

And none of that needs a mind being there doing anything. Ergo realism.

There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was. But then it was expressed, and became public and known. And the fact that something was meant continues to be factual. And if we normally talk about the meaning of this expression in terms of what the author meant, then why should that be any different in the thought experiment? Why should we change that? Just so you can posit mind-dependence and reach an idealist conclusion? I don't think so, sonny Jim.

There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there often is. But that needn't be relevant. It wouldn't be so if we talk about meaning in terms of what the author meant, as it makes sense to do. And, of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be any mind or reader to interpret or misinterpret any meaning. And there needn't be. Hence realism.

You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is generally such a thing, and I do make the assumption for the sake of the thought experiment that something was meant. But it isn't an assumption in the thought experiment. In the thought experiment, it's a fact. That's where we begin, and we then think about what that would entail.

Actually, your claim is what is nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense!

Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

That reply is fallacious in more than one way (ignoratio elenchi and non sequitur). I said that there doesn't need to be an interpreter, not that there doesn't need to be an interpretation. But there doesn't need to be an interpretation, either. It just needs to be such that there would be a correct way for it to be interpreted - which implies that it would need a meaning. Interpretation is about what people do afterwards. There would already be a meaning and a correct way to interpret it if it were to be interpreted - which it needn't be. So it doesn't follow that it'd just be meaningless symbols.

Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

It already has a meaning. It is predetermined. It doesn't need to be interpreted. The teacher doesn't need to figure out whether the rules have or have not been broken for the rules to have been broken. The teacher needs to figure it out for other reasons, as part of his or her job, but that isn't relevant to the analogy.

If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken? — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises doesn't matter unless it follows from that that the kid spoke. Did the kid speak? Does that count as speaking? What does the rulebook say? That is what matters, not what you or I think. If the kid spoke, then the rule was broken. It doesn't matter what the criteria are. If those criteria have been broken, then the rule has been broken.

What justification do you have to claim that the DNA encoding does not refer to anything? — tom

Well, I didn't make that claim, so none.

I don't deny that DNA can act as a sign-vehicle of sorts, analogous to how markings on a page can act as sign-vehicles for statements. But whereas a statement is what it is in virtue of expressing a propositional content which, in turn, is what it is in virtue of being inferentially related to other such contents, DNA is not. So while DNA sequences and statement-tokens are alike in acting as sign-vehicles, they are yet essentially different respecting the types of sign-systems they participate in.

This is a bit tangential to the topic, but isn't the idea of DNA as language somewhat analogical - DNA is language-like, rather than language per se. It's more that the manner in which cells are replicated are better understood through the analogy of language, than through the analogy of mechanism.

Classically, a proposition is a mapping from world-states to truth values. You can model this as a function from a set of objects to {0, 1}. — The Great Whatever

A mapping from world states to truth values? Isn't that just saying that a world-state is either true or false?

So 'true' could be defined as a relation between sentences and contexts. — The Great Whatever

Truth is unanalyzable.

You're still wrong about this, though, they're not equivalent, for reasons I've explained to you at length in the past.

You should stop talking about language bewitchment until you figure out the use-mention distinction. — The Great Whatever

I understand the use-mention distinction. That's why I don't say that we eat "cake" or that cake has four letters.

And I don't think I'm wrong. The following all have the same truth conditions.

1. It is true that p.
2. p. The previous sentence is true.
3. "p" is true.

So iff it is true that p then "p" is true.

I haven't been following the whole discussion, but I think that @Michael is a logical chap, so it will be interesting to see whether he is on my side - assuming he has shown his cards.

Nope.

Consider the following situation: it's 4 million years ago, so there aren't any sentences. Yet at that time, the Earth existed, so was true that the Earth existed (that proposition was true). But the sentence "the Earth exists" wasn't. So they don't mean the same thing. One predicates truth of a linguistic object, the other maintains that a state of affairs holds. These claims being materially equivalent depends on a linguistic system in which the sentence in question expresses that proposition, but since this need not be, they're not counterfactually coextensive, and their truth conditions can come apart. Since one can be true while the other is false, they can't be synonymous.

Says who?

A mapping from world states to truth values? Isn't that just saying that a world-state is either true or false? — Michael

No, it's a mapping from world-states to truth values. A world-state isn't the sort of thing that's true or false. A proposition is something that has truth conditions: that is, the proposition is what's true or false, relative to a world-state (or perhaps absolutely, if you think the actual world is privileged, and alternate possibilities are defined in terms of it). So if you like the proposition 'looks at' what the world is like, and spits out true or false accordingly, and the cases in which it says 'true' are its truth conditions, which are roughly what the sentence expressing such a proposition means. Truth isn't predicated of the state of affairs.

1. It is true that p.
2. p. The previous sentence is true.
3. "p" is true. — Michael

Just to drive this home, let p = "the Earth existed" and move 'is' to the past tense.

1. It was true that the Earth existed.
2. The Earth existed. The previous sentence was true.
3. "The Earth existed" was true.

Notice that the second sentence of 2) is now false, and so 3) doesn't follow.

Says who? — The Great Whatever

Frege.. in a brick shithouse of an argument.

I think we're talking past each other. To say truth is a relation between sentences and contexts is no more to go against Frege or any notion of the 'unanalyzability of truth' than to say it's a property of propositions or of anything else, which we must say because it is (some things are true, whether statements, sentences, propositions or whatever). So there's a misunderstanding here about what claiming it's such a relation amounts to.

Second, defining truth in this way is, as I've already said, not relevant to the point of what I was saying to begin with.

Second, defining truth in this way is, as I've already said, not relevant to the point of what I was saying to begin with. — The Great Whatever

I would be interested if you'd want to explain it again. You were saying that there's an aspect of truth that is mind-dependent and an aspect that isn't?