I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put. — Banno
So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less. — Banno
One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se. — Banno
So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess. — Banno
If by "immaterial cause" you mean, "I - we - don't know," and further that "God" is just a shorthand expression for the "I-don't-know", and, the "I-don't-know" itself is meant to imply that we think that there is something to be known, then no further comment from me. — tim wood
I find I'm obliged to suppose that those heavy thinkers understood this entirely well but felt for reasons sufficient to them that the idea of God had to be made both real and flesh for most people to find it both acceptable and accessible, as well as to make fate a little easier to reconcile to. . — tim wood
No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. — Metaphysician Undercover
it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real. — Metaphysician Undercover
Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) Thus unicorns and the wicked witch of the West both exist. Included in this species are verbal constructs, like square circles, that can be named, but for which there is no corresponding idea. — tim wood
So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think this is often the case. Not just because humans have a tendency to doubt, but because if the experiences are different, then the conclusions will tend to be. Add in paradigmatic biases or model based biases and what is required as evidence can become enormous.Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case.To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to be seeing agnosticism as a permanent state. I don't take it that way. All I am suggesting is that people realize that there are, now, and here and for them personally, epistemological obstacles. These may or may not change.And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) — tim wood
don't buy this argument. But I note that in it you make the material/immaterial distinction. If you then deny that God is an idea, your work is cut out for you. — tim wood
No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. — Coben
But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible. — Coben
agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case. — Coben
I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.
I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all. — Coben
Oh, probably I would. I was talking about after the events I listed. After I had sufficient evidence, for myself, that I no longer needed to doubt. I was not saying that in the first moment I see what looks like a puma I instantly believe.But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? — Metaphysician Undercover
I haven't read all of Banno, so I don't know if you are framing this as he would, but I agree with you. Doubt can return.These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't disagree, though I consider this a different issue from the one I was addressing. Clearly related, but different. And, yes, I do take other people's words for things. There are various factors that weigh in when I do this. I could go into that topic, but I won't yet.At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt". — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think either skepticism or agnosticism really fits. But I think you get what I mean. The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely.Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I don't think it has to be a universal, timeless and/or absolute position. I don't want to call it skepticism, since this to me implies a relation only to other people's beliefs. IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. It may seem like they lack a belief, but actually they are taking a rather strong epistemological stand. I can't no anything about God and no one else can. That is a belief founded on a lot of supportint beliefs.OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think you will answer this better than I if you give thought to what you're referring to. Given a 3-4-5 triangle, what there is a 3-4-5 triangle. No theorem at all. You've got the rest of this, yes?What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it? — Wayfarer
Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be.As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. — Metaphysician Undercover
What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?
— Wayfarer
I think you will answer this better than I if you give thought to what you're referring to. Given a 3-4-5 triangle, what there is a 3-4-5 triangle. No theorem at all. You've got the rest of this, yes? — tim wood
That doesn’t address the point, however, which is kind of reality that such principles as the Pythagorean theorem possess. They’re ‘intelligible objects’ i.e. objects of reason only, but which are real in that they’re the same for anyone who can grasp them. — Wayfarer
Real as constructs of mind. Indeed intelligible to any who can grasp them. Underlying this is nothing - but the ability of the mind to notice what happens when it combines in its considerations things that otherwise have nothing to do with each other. No mind, no theorem. No mind, no combining, no recognition of relationships. No mind, no relationships. And so on. — tim wood
I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency. — Valentinus
(SEP entry on Kant)reflecting judgment enables us to discover empirical laws of nature by leading us to regard nature as if it were the product of intelligent design ....Since this principle only regulates our cognition but is not constitutive of nature itself, this does not amount to assuming that nature really is the product of intelligent design, which according to Kant we are not justified in believing on theoretical grounds. Rather, it amounts only to approaching nature in the practice of science as if it were designed to be understood by us. We are justified in doing this because it enables us to discover empirical laws of nature. But it is only a regulative principle of reflecting judgment, not genuine theoretical knowledge, that nature is purposive in this way.
The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time. — Valentinus
The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely. — Coben
IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. — Coben
Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be. — tim wood
It is akin, then, to an argument as to whether superman could beat aquaman under water. Maybe great fun, or even at one time considered substantive and therefore serious. But not today. As substantive, it's from the chest of toys in the attic and nothing for a grown man to waste time on beyond an appropriately few moments of remembered pleasure. — tim wood
Why claim reality? — tim wood
And neither you nor others seem to grasp that what you have as idea is endless possibility. — tim wood
Make your case, then make it real. That would convert me. — tim wood
WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.
Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess. — Banno
Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting. — Banno
There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading. — Banno
Yes, but if you think you have a parasite but get sent to a psychiatrist for having chemical imbalances leading to hypochondriacal symptoms, it ends up being the same thing. The doctor is ruling out that you have a traditional physical illness caused by some organism or cancer, etc.I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. — Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed.This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism. — Metaphysician Undercover
IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion. — Coben
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover
But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have enountered this argument made by atheists. That current scientific knowledge precludes the possibility of a deity. I suppose we could try to figure out if 'Many' in the assertion he made is fair or not, but otherwise it certainly seems true that some atheists believe this is the case.This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
Strawman (1). — 180 Proof
On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as? — 180 Proof
Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. — 180 Proof
I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions. — 180 Proof
And to MU Metaphysician Undercover, please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to. I have said that for cause you would not. Show me at least in this mistaken (or point me back to where it is so that I may look at it). — tim wood
On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
— Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Question: what is the standing or kind of your argument/conclusion? Is it a piece of physics? Religious apologetics? An exercise in drawing conclusions as a matter of logic? Maybe another way: if you had to give a billboard statement of it as if it were an ad for a motion picture, what would you say? — tim wood
He calls them logical arguments. How about you, what do you call them? — tim wood
If I may, the underlying argument looks like this:
1) There are things, i.e., material things.
2) These things are caused; i.e., have efficient causes.
3) If things are caused by things, then there cannot be a first thing as cause, because it itself would need a thing to cause it.
4) Therefore the first thing is caused by an immaterial cause, that we call God.
Please accept this formulation as an agreed starting point, or edit or provide your own for me to agree with. — tim wood
In passing, Aquinas acknowledged that God is unknowable, but that we can have indirect knowledge through "negative" theology - what I call above a neither/nor argument. — tim wood
Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. — tim wood
As apologetics, I have no issue with Aquinas. And as well for us who are not Thomas, it becomes an exercise in what we want to believe, the presuppositions that stand as axiomatic to those beliefs, and what emerges from that mix and for what purpose. Inevitably this involves some close and careful definitions, themselves to be demonstrated if they're not granted. All trending towards a medieval-style argument of granting major and minor premises, agreeing to forms, and so forth. — tim wood
That, or we can jump right away to an evaluation of the argument in modern scientific terms. — tim wood
Why modern scientific terms and standards? Because ultimately that's what you're insisting on (as I understand the argument of you and others). That is, you insist on the efficacy of yours or Aquinas's arguments in absolute terms beyond their original scope. If you want to be medievalist in your thinking and exhibit examples of that thinking as examples of what you believe, have at it and I stand aside. But as in any sense scientific is simply an absurdity - and a curiosity. And it might be argued that one should just let it pass in silence, but we live in a world that for too long lets too much pass in silence that is harmful. As someone apparently versed in the details of these quaint pursuits, you ought to know better! Do not even think of asking what harm! — tim wood
First things first. You clearly have not thought through the meaning of the words "material" and "things." On using those term uncritically, your argument fails. Now lets move on. ("Material" and "things" are abstract terms applied to abstractions.) Think. e.g., about what a chair is.(material things have a cause of existence) — Metaphysician Undercover
And this presupposes a first material thing without defining "first." And I'll note right now that my objections would be absurd and ridiculous in most arguments, but are substantial here.there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing — Metaphysician Undercover
an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. — Metaphysician Undercover
As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. — tim wood
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