I do think and would strongly argue that language is necessary. — creativesoul
they are further thought of as being unfair. — creativesoul
This implies some sort of agreement — creativesoul
it requires some measure of morality(what ought happen) — creativesoul
When we're claiming that some non human creature has a sense of fairness/justice, we're saying something about that creature's mental ongoings(thought and belief). Thus, it behooves us to know what all thought and belief consist of, lest we have no way to know whether or not some creature or another is capable of forming/holding those kinds of thought and belief. — creativesoul
I'm having trouble with the equivalence being drawn between clear discontent due to false belief about what's going to happen(accompanied by and exemplified after unexpected events/results), with complaining and taking restorative action. There's no issue with discontent being characterized as showing negative emotion. However, not all discontent and negative emotion are equivalent to complaining and/or taking restorative actions. — creativesoul
Which experiments show conclusively that those animals are acting out of a sense of what ought be done as compared to what was? — creativesoul
What's the difference between behavioural discontent as a result of the cognitive dissonance that takes place when expectations are dashed by what happens and having behavioural discontent as a result of thinking, believing, and/or 'feeling' like what happened is unfair/unjust, or ought be somehow corrected? — creativesoul
To avoid a semantic debate over the word seeing, we can distinguish a red perceptual experience from an internally generated one. This demonstrates that red experiences come from us and not into the eyes riding on light waves, as if the red somehow jumps onto electrons and enters the visual cortex. — Marchesk
...we don’t experience an apple or a chair, we experience our intentionality constituted through intersubjective perception. — I like sushi
Talk about eyes, occipital lobes and retinas is not an experiential investigation. — I like sushi
It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. — creativesoul
What on earth are 'red experiences'? I've certainly never had one. — Isaac
No it doesn't. It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. It also demonstrates that the internal/external and objective/subjective dichotomies are inadequate for taking proper account of experience. — creativesoul
I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. — creativesoul
I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. — creativesoul
No. — creativesoul
Simple. Take a sensation, call it 'red'. Job done. 'Red' isn't out there waiting for us to find it, we experience things and give some of them names, the names have to be related to some external behaviour otherwise naming fails (no one else knows what we're talking about). So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name. — Isaac
For example think about what you can imagine and can’t imagine about some ‘object’ of experience (be it a sound, shape, colour etc.,.). — I like sushi
...with pain we have something clearly subjective. — Marchesk
What good is that notion of subjective? — creativesoul
No, we don't, otherwise the word wouldn't mean anything. If any subjective experience counted as pain without any objective measures, then how would we ever learn what the word meant? — Isaac
Turn that around and you have the same problem. If there were no subjective experiences of pain how would we ever learn the word? We wouldn't, because it wouldn't be an experience for us. — Marchesk
Yes, but why does it have to be a subjective experience for this to be the case? 'Pain' we all learn, is the word we use to indicate whatever it is that motivates us to those particular sorts of actions. — Isaac
I could be a robot and still learn to label the tweaking of my diodes which causes me to writhe about and cry 'pain'. — Isaac
I said ‘object’, as in intentionality, ‘conscious of’, not some noumena fancy. ‘Object’ in the sense of this discussion isn’t an existent object, ‘existence’ is an ‘object’ of intentional experience. — I like sushi
Phenomenology (Husserlian) is precisely a field of philosophical thought that came into being to deal with these questions. — I like sushi
Instead a see the same old repetition where people get bogged down in arguments about dualism, reality, and naive realism. — I like sushi
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