There's no such thing as a fallacious biconditional. — The Great Whatever
Your reply doesn't make sense to me.
The property only obtains as a judgment. — Terrapin Station
The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular. — Cavacava
But "the world" is a construct... — Metaphysician Undercover
...and the idea that what happens in the world happens regardless of our presence is a construct as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's really not useful to take this type of realist position because it lacks in what we would call "truth". — Metaphysician Undercover
And once you dismiss this position as ill-founded, something which is commonly believed but not true, you no longer will see yourself as part of the world, but the world as part of yourself. — Metaphysician Undercover
The true territory is not external. — Metaphysician Undercover
Just to split hairs, but objective idealism allows for things to happen regardless of our presence. — Michael
Can you remind me what that is, and how it allows that? Is "objective idealism" the most appropriate term for such a position? In the context of this discussion, idealism posits the mind-dependence of truth, so idealism can't allow for things to be independent of the presence of mind if that would entail corresponding truths which are likewise independent. But it need not entail that, I suppose. — Sapientia
The world itself is one big mental thing (à la panpsychism or pantheism, I guess), so even though things are dependent on the presence of mind, they're not dependent on the presence of human minds (or the minds any other intelligent life). — Michael
If I judge a factually incorrect statement as true, then it's true? — Sapientia
Sure, "the world" is a construct, but the world isn't. The world is not "the world". The world is the world. — Sapientia
But you are part of the world, regardless of how you see yourself. — Sapientia
If you say so... :-d — Sapientia
OK, I see you at least understand what I'm saying. You're doing better at understanding what I am saying than I am doing at understanding what you are saying. Now tell me where I can find this thing called the world. I want to see if it's really there, to see if you know what you're talking about.Well, of course the idea is a construct.
Is it that time again? Irrelevant idealist truism time? — Sapientia
But whether a certain sentence expresses a proposition, and so whether a certain sentence is true, is probably mind-dependent, in the sense that whether something counts as a sentence, and what a sentence expresses, is dependent on a linguistic practices in turn dependent on minds in some way. — The Great Whatever
To deny this would be to say that for any arrangement of things in the world that logically or conceivably could be interpreted, according to some imaginary linguistic system, in a certain way, in fact already is — The Great Whatever
...and so you'd be forced to say that basically everything is a sentence, and everything expresses every conceivable proposition, always (since there will always be a logically conceivable linguistic convention that could be so arranged). — The Great Whatever
...whether a sentence is true is mind-dependent, because what it means is mind-dependent, even though the truth it expresses isn't. — The Great Whatever
What a sentence means is not mind-dependent. — Sapientia
By that I mean a proposed biconditional which is actually false, e.g. it is raining iff I am a man. — Michael
Which part? My claim that the following are not equivalent:
1. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists" is true in this situation
2. the Earth exists in this situation iff "the Earth exists in this situation" is true — Michael
According to you, there's a difference between asserting that the cup is red and asserting that "the cup is red" is true — Michael
So if you assert 1 and if I agree with you, do I have to assert 1 or do I have to assert 2? Does it make sense for me to assert 1 but to deny 2? — Michael
Why do you think that whether a proposition is true or false is a matter of judgement? — Sapientia
How can it be otherwise? — Wayfarer
Propositionsdon't float around in the ether, they are not natural forms, butonly exist in the minds of rational beings who are capable of making statements, which may be true or false. — Wayfarer
So you and I will judge something to be true or false - apart from that, there is nothinginherentlytrue or falsein nature, is there? — Wayfarer
'Things are neither good nor bad, but thinking makes it so', said the bard. — Wayfarer
What a sentence means is not mind-dependent. — Sapientia
This is what I'm disputing. Sentence meaning depends on linguistic practice, which in turn, at least as far as we're familiar with it, depends on minds. — The Great Whatever
I agree – that was my entire point. The point is that 1) is false, where 'this situation' refers to the situation I presented to you. This is therefore a counterexample situation to your strict biconditional, and therefore it's false. — The Great Whatever
In cases where the sentence "the cup is red" does not mean that the cup is red, but something else, their truth conditions clearly come apart. — The Great Whatever
For instance, if "red" meant what "blue" does now, then in such a situation "the cup is red" would be true just in case the cup was blue, in that situation.
My claim is that the following assertions are equivalent:
1. It is true that the Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices
2. The above is true
3. "The Earth existed in a situation where there were no linguistic practices" is true — Michael
It is implicit in the T-schema that the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is the same as the meaning of the sentence used on the right hand side. — Michael
Yet it is still the case that for any assertion "it is true that p" there is an equivalent assertion "'q' is true". That's the point I'm making. It doesn't matter if the actual letters (or sounds) used in the sentence are the same or not. — Michael
The world doesn't exist separately from us, it just exists independently of us. We live in the world, and it is all around us. We are part of it, as you say. But we can't be both separate from it and part of it.
Much of what happens in the world does indeed happen regardless of our presence, and it would continue to do so without our presence. That's why idealism is wrong.
Not sure what you mean when you say that our viewpoint must be circular.
No, it isn't. — The Great Whatever
Then you should not phrase your claims in terms of the sort of biconditional you have been all along, nor make arguments based on this, if it is now what you mean.
The way I see it is that the sentence "it is true that p" is equivalent to the sentence "'p' is true" — Michael
Besides, what you say here is still false. It's not true that these assertions are (ever) equivalent, as I've already shown, since their truth conditions are different.
Since these two mean different things; one says a cup is a certain color, the other says a certain sentence is true. In the current situation, they are materially equivalent in virtue of what the sentence happens to mean, but counterfactually one might be true and the other false. So their truth conditions are distinct.
The truth conditions of the following are the same:
1. It is true that the cup is red.
2. The above sentence is true. — Michael
So to say that the T-schema fails because in some counterfactual situation the string of symbols "the cup is red" might mean that the cup is blue is a non sequitur. — Michael
You might as well say that 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2 because in some counterfactual situation I might be doing binary mathematics in which case 1 + 1 equals 10. The fact that I can use the same symbols in different ways is irrelevant. When I'm using them in this way, 1 + 1 equals 2, and the cup is red iff "the cup is red" is true. — Michael
No, they are not. For the truth conditions of two sentences to be the same, it must be that the proposition they express has the same truth value evaluated relative to all possible situations.
But this isn't so, since evaluated relative to situations in which "the cup is red" means the cup is blue, the proposition expressed by 1) can be true, while that expressed by 2) will be false. — The Great Whatever
It is not a non sequitur in any way. The whole point of stating a strict biconditional is that it holds in counterfactual situations.
Not at all. 1 + 1 will still equal 2, even if say, you use the symbol '5' to refer to 1. In such a situation, the equation (read: 'sentence') '1 + 1 = 10' would be true, but nonetheless it would still be true that 1 + 1 = 2.
What you can say is that for any assertion "p" in a situation there is an assertion materially equivalent to it in that situation of " 'p' is true," but this is not what the biconditional you're stating means, and none of the heavy metaphysical theses you typically martial as a result of it follow from this.
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