What would be the point of all this modelling without its ability to promote accurate, relevant action - pulling causal levers whose structures we partially represented in the world? — fdrake
If you have a goal of opening a door, your hand position needs to adapt to where the handle is and how it works; there's an accuracy constraint involved with the door's location, functionality and so on; irrelevant of how it's split up into perceptual features. — fdrake
Focus for a moment on the γ, if I've read things right these are "hidden causal states" which are later associated with environmental parameters θ rather than available sufficient statistics x, again if I've read it right. They are hidden, but inferred upon by the whole active-modelling process under some representation ("recognition dynamics"?). — fdrake
Our ability to act well in an environment depends upon having a good model of it; to update our model through some error minimising in response to our current goals and current environment; the model doesn't just take input from previous modelling steps, it takes input from external states with their own dynamics under some processual representation. It would be unable to guide action if it did not have a satisfactory (sufficiently accurate) representation* of the external states as they are relevant to our goals and bodily constraints. — fdrake
I think you're emphasising that the starred representation* is another flavour of model; which it is; but it's also observation process of relevant structures for us in the environment. What would be the point of all this modelling without its ability to promote accurate, relevant action - pulling causal levers whose structures we partially represented in the world? — fdrake
Assumption that there is ‘a point’. Pointless question as far as I can tell. What does i mean to ‘have a point’ or ‘be pointless’? We can ask what the ‘theoretic’ attitude is doing, how it is structured and how theories change. — I like sushi
1. I don't see anything in the maths (and this, I think is what you've been looking at, but I'm not convinced) that requires there to be distinguishable 'structures' in the environment. Only for there to be heterogeneity in the environment (otherwise it would be impossible to model, plus with no randomness, there'd be no probability gradient to work against). All I'm arguing here is that all 'structures' are models of some sort. — Isaac
Only for there to be heterogeneity in the environment (otherwise it would be impossible to model, plus with no randomness, there'd be no probability gradient to work against). All I'm arguing here is that all 'structures' are models of some sort. — Isaac
Well, it's because certain properties of experience are perceiver-dependent and not in the objects themselves. The air feels cold, but that doesn't mean it is cold in an objective sense (the feeling of cold varies between individuals and time). It just feels cold to you now. — Marchesk
All of this needn’t be led under the assumption of some abstract ‘input’/‘output’ system. That is merely an expression of the ‘theoretic’ attitude - a necessary means for distinction among the ‘white noise’. For further more ‘substantial’ evidence for this neural priming is an expression of this in the ‘natural sciences’. — I like sushi
This gets mopped up by the error terms, no? — fdrake
we might be able to representatively sample its dynamics using only our f and g models. — fdrake
We might, agreed. But could we then feedback errors? — Isaac
Did you not read what I wrote, or not understand it, or not agree with it. If you're not going to actually respond in any way to what I write there's little point in continuing is there? — Isaac
We have before us now, a listing of categorical errors...Which ones will be used to render judgment upon whether or not a premiss of our choosing qualifies as being guilty of categorical error as compared/contrasted to other kinds of errors? — creativesoul
, you haven’t really learned what you set out to discover, insofar as you’ve got the “how” but not necessarily the “how come”, because your subject himself may not even know.
— Mww
I don't think the 'how come' is a measurable thing by any metric, so it's not a relevant investigation. Pick your reason. — Isaac
So, we must surely abandon Kantian language here. For anything that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices qualifies for that which exists in and of itself(Noumena). — creativesoul
Furthermore, we must have knowledge of both our premisses and that which exists in it's entirety prior to our premisses in order to perform a comparative assessment between the two. That comparison is required in order to know that one has indeed committed the error called "categorical". — creativesoul
We have before us now, a listing of categorical errors...Which ones will be used to render judgment upon whether or not a premiss of our choosing qualifies as being guilty of categorical error as compared/contrasted to other kinds of errors?
— creativesoul
Categorical errors can only be demonstrated by showing the falsity of the proposition from which they were originally given. I suppose one could list them, but recognizing them would seem to be sufficient. — Mww
I understood it. I didn't so much disagree with you. Rather, I found that it was rather incomplete, in that you offered choices for me to agree with, but not one that was close enough to what I hold. You're the one asking me for clarification... I gave it. — creativesoul
I understand that, but I gave you what seemed to me to be the only options (perhaps I should have made that more clear), so any response which simply re-iterates your original position without explaining how you circumvent the issues I raised seems to contribute nothing to our mutual understanding of the issue. — Isaac
As already mentioned, c.e. is a mistake in logical form.. — Mww
Not all senses of "categorical error" are commensurate. — creativesoul
what counts as a category is completely and utterly determined by us — creativesoul
I seek to discover that which exists in it's entirety prior to our discovery process, therefore prior to the naming and descriptive practices commonly called common language use... — creativesoul
For anything that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices qualifies for that which exists in and of itself(Noumena). — creativesoul
Noumena is untenable. I've already offered adequate argument for that conclusion. It's been left sorely neglected. — creativesoul
Logical forms are existentially dependent upon common language use. — creativesoul
What exactly does one mean by subjective experience. — TheMadFool
I’m sorry if I’m taking your point out of context but I target it because it reminds me of the Hoffman argument, outlined in his TED talk. I don’t understand how the model can completely be unrelated to reality at all. Of course it is made for organism-relevant features, but surely you’d agree wavelengths picked up by the retina are coming from reality, and surely, at least the structural regularities in experience, are ‘real’, even if they’re not fundamental or reference frame independent. There’s a broader question of whether we are epistemically restricted to the point that we can’t intuit fundamental features of reality. I am still unsure if we can but I think there’s is evidence maybe we can. The fact, for example there is experimentally robust evidence for indeterminacy at smallest scales. indeterminacy implies no underlying mechanism or principle that results in the phenomenon. It would be hard to imagine or define what something more fundamental could be once you’ve reached a level where there are no deterministic principles. So maybe we have enough access to identify fundamental features or principles of the parts of reality we can interact with. What are your thoughts?No, I don't think I would, but I get what you're saying. I don't think proximity to reality measures the usefulness of the model. As such, I think it's theoretically possible that a model might be useful without relating to anything at all, but I haven't thought about that much, so my intuition may well be wrong. Interesting question. — Isaac
the only (categorical)error worth a damn in philosophical discourse is grounded in pure reason. — Mww
There are several things to the definition. One is any experience which varies between individuals. The room feels hot to you, cold to me, and fine for a third person. The experience of temperature is subjective. If we wanted to measure the room's temperature, we use a thermometer which gives us an objective value which does not vary.
Another is private. I have a dream, and although I can tell you about my dream, you cannot experience the dream yourself. The experience is private to me. So although dreams can be studied objectively, the experience itself is only available to the individual who has that dream.
A third is perceiver-dependence. This is based on the kind of perceiver, and their sensory capabilities. So humans experience the world through five senses of an upright walking ape, with differences among individuals due to color blindness, being able to taste a certain chemical, incapacity, etc.
The perceiver-dependent qualities of human subjective expereince would be those sensations we have good reason to believe are generated by our nervous system, instead of being properties of the world around us. So shape, size and location are objective properties of things in the world, while color, sound, taste are properties we experience because of the kind of creatures we are. Going back to the room temperature, our experience of heat or cold is a perceiver-dependant quality. The temperature is objectively the kinetic motion of particles moving about, and not a feeling of coldness or heat.
Nagel makes the argument that science creates a view from nowhere that has no perceiver-dependent, private, perceptually-relative sensations. There is nothing it's like to be a wavefunction or a supernova or evolution. It doesn't feel like anything, it doesn't look like any color, it doesn't sound like anything. The particles moving about in a room don't feel cold or hot. Ultimately, it's mathematized models of some reality divorced from our experience of it. — Marchesk
...our experience of heat or cold is a perceiver-dependant quality... — Marchesk
Experience is a quality?
Consisting entirely of Quale? — creativesoul
Experience is a quality?
Consisting entirely of Quale?
— creativesoul
I don't know, but it's something perceivers generate in the act of perception, memory, imagination, dreams, hallucinations, etc. — Marchesk
I would agree if we changed that slightly to "help generate"...
What's a "perceiver"? — creativesoul
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