Analysis of what the word 'mountain' represents.

Analysis of how the word mountain is used? — Marchesk

Analysis of how use naming and descriptive practices as a means for talking about mountains would serve us better.

Well, it's a problem with how we're talking about the world and/or ourselves. Typically, I fix such problems by changing how I talk. — creativesoul

One way would be to stop using the word mountain. But that process might result in a radical revision of language.

Analysis of what it takes for "mountain" to represent serves us better.

Whoops, I apologize. That was meant for @Wayfarer.

You realise this is special pleading: the objects matter, rocks, snow and dirt are equally things we have named. If there is a problem with the things we call mountains existing before we name them, the same would be true of matter, rocks, snow and dirt.

Well, it's a problem with how we're talking about the world and/or ourselves. Typically, I fix such problems by changing how I talk.
— creativesoul

One way would be to stop using the word mountain. — Marchesk

Stop using it to do things we cannot do with it.

You realise this is special pleading: the objects matter, rocks, snow and dirt are equally things we have named. If there is a problem with the things we call mountains existing before we name them, the same would be true of matter, rocks, snow and dirt. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but I was focusing on mountains. We could just say only the fundamental physics stuff exists and the interesting patterns it makes. A chair is just a bunch of particles arranged chair-wise would be one way of saying that.

Stop using it to do things we cannot do with it. — creativesoul

You mean don't use mountains when doing philosophy?

Whoops, I apologize. That was meant for Wayfarer — PessimisticIdealism

Gotcha. Notta problem. So, you are arguing against the historical archaic version of realism. Have fun, but just so ya know, there have been much better versions arise.

:wink:

Nope, that's also special pleading: fundamental particles and patterns are just as much things we name as mountains.

Nope, that's also special pleading: fundamental particles and patterns are just as much things we name as mountains. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm a scientific realist, so I'm going to have to draw the line there. We don't understand electrons in terms of something more fundamental, unless string theory turns out to be true. That's not the case with ordinary objects.

The problem with ordinary objects isn't that we name them, it's that they don't map neatly onto our scientific understanding of the world.

It's an issue of whether nature is the way we conceptualize it to be. — Marchesk

Yes. Do we form, have, and/or hold true belief about nature? Are our beliefs about nature true?

"Nature" here - for me at least - refers to the universe and/or ourselves.

The problem with real mountains as objects is where to draw the line on what constitutes a mountain versus a hill or some other formation. — Marchesk

What counts as a mountain is wholly determined by us. The same is true of a hill. The problem above is the bit about "real mountains as objects"....

What are those again?

I don't care where you draw the line or not. Any fundamental particle is named just as much as a mountain. If we cannot speak of mountains before we name them, we cannot speak of fundamental particles before we name them.

Ordinary objects and fundamental particles are on the same level, each is a thing we may describe. Fundamental particles are really just another ordinary object. They never "explained " other objects themsleves-- to speak of atoms is not to speak of a house, for example.

Stop using it to do things we cannot do with it.
— creativesoul

You mean don't use mountains when doing philosophy? — Marchesk

No.

I mean stop using the subjective/objective dichotomy as a means to take account of experience. It cannot take proper account of our own thought and belief. All of our experience consists - in very large part - of our thought and belief throughout the duration thereof.

Ordinary objects and fundamental particles are on the same level, each is a thing we may describe. Fundamental particles are really just another ordinary object. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That doesn't follow unless everything we may describe counts too.

Correct. More than one substance is incoherent. :clap:

Correct. More than one substance is incoherent. :clap: — TheWillowOfDarkness

Not following this...

What counts as "substance" will determine whether or not there can a plurality. This seems irrelevant to the topic at hand.

Help?

My Spinozisic intentions must not have been clear enough...

Pluarity is impossible because we are dealing with explanation. One cannot have two forms of explanation. If something is explained, true, etc., it is so in the same sense: the thing in question has been accounted for.

One cannot have two forms of explanation. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Are you familiar with the Leibnizian notion of dual explanations, the realm of power (mechanism, e.g. "I see because I have eyes") and the realm of wisdom (teleology, e.g. "I have eyes so I can see")? These are two distinct, mutually-existing explanations, and both are useful in accounting for phenomena.

My Spinozisic intentions must not have been clear enough...

Pluarity is impossible because we are dealing with explanation. One cannot have two forms of explanation. If something is explained, true, etc., it is so in the same sense: the thing in question has been accounted for. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ah.

I separate from certainty when it comes to the origen of everything. I also do not require omniscience for knowledge of X.

That said... Spinoza on "love"... brilliant and certain of it! Spinoza on monism... the same holds good.

Covered by what I said, both of those are, in the same sense, an explanation. (or in Leibnizian terms, both are true by PSR).

The problem has never been having multiple instances of explanation, just supposing there is a difference in what it means for something to be explained. (i.e. dualism, transcendent things, supernatural realms, etc.).

I'm not sure why anyone would need omniscience to simply know X. It seems strange to think they would need it to be certain about X either. In either case, one has knowledge of one particular thing. One does not need omniscience to know one thing.

I think what could be agreed upon is that the world we see is an appearance, an image of something more fundamental than the image, and that this image depends on us.

Because if the world wasn't an appearance then we would always see things as they are, yet different people see things differently, believe differently, and so we cannot all be seeing things as they are. And there has to be something more fundamental because otherwise everything would be illusion and that's not possible, there has to be something real in order for there to be an illusion.

Yes, basically that's it, although the visual metaphor bothers me a little, because one might argue we're being fooled by thinking only in terms of vision, where illusions can occur. With these sorts of questions, it's important to keep in mind our entire experience of the world, less we be mislead by a metaphor.

But I agree the world is a kind of appearance to us, different from what it is, to some extent, at least.

Pluarity is impossible because we are dealing with explanation. One cannot have two forms of explanation. If something is explained, true, etc., it is so in the same sense: the thing in question has been accounted for. — TheWillowOfDarkness

True explanations are often incomplete. Incomplete explanations are not complete accounts. If we make a true statement about a tree, the tree has not been accounted for - by any robust accounting practice.

Do we agree here?

I think what could be agreed upon is that the world we see is an appearance, an image of something more fundamental than the image, and that this image depends on us. — leo

And the world...

:brow:

...an image of something more fundamental than the image... — leo

The world, perhaps?

:meh:

And the world... — creativesoul

It's obviously somewhat different than the appearance, or naive realism would have gone unquestioned. The "appearance" also includes our conceptualizations of the world.