But inasmuch as God is supposed to be a supernatural thing, I think it can't help but fail in that undertaking, because supernatural things by their very nature have no effect on the world that we experience (if they did, they would be natural), so we cannot tell anything about whether or not they are real, and so can only appeal to faith for claims about them. — Pfhorrest
Every progress in evolution is dearly paid for; miscarried attempts, merciless struggle everywhere. The more detailed our knowledge of nature becomes, the more we see, together with the element of generosity and progression which radiates from being, the law of degradation, the powers of destruction and death, the implacable voracity which are also inherent in the world of matter. And when it comes to man, surrounded and invaded as he is by a host of warping forces, psychology and anthropology are but an account of the fact that, while being essentially superior to all of them, he is the most unfortunate of animals. So it is that when its vision of the world is enlightened by science, the intellect which religious faith perfects realises still better that nature, however good in its own order, does not suffice, and that if the deepest hopes of mankind are not destined to turn to mockery, it is because a God-given energy better than nature is at work in us. — Jacques Maritain
The Subjects of Reality
What is the nature of the mind, inasmuch as that means the capacity for believing and making such judgements about what to believe? — Pfhorrest
[The questioner asks] "You have only told me, this is your inner Self in the same way as people would say, 'this is a cow, this is a horse', etc. That is not a real definition. Merely saying, 'this is that' is not a definition. I want an actual description of what this internal Self is. Please give that description and do not simply say, 'this is that'.
Yājñavalkya replies: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman."
Do X and people will like you and help you. Do Y and people will dislike you and hinder you. We want to be liked and helped. Our dependence is extreme, and therefore hard for us to confess. — Eee
I'm not sure I understand you, and that makes me wonder if perhaps you misunderstood me. I was trying to say that wisdom is basically being able to evaluate both descriptive and prescriptive claims: where descriptive claims are those about what is or isn't, what's true or false, what's real or unreal; and prescriptive claims are those about what ought or oughtn't be, what's good or bad, what's moral or immoral. It sounds like you're saying that figuring out what's false, bad, unreal, or immoral is just as important as figuring out what's true, good, real, and moral; and I meant that to be implied by what I said before. Wisdom is the ability to discern one from the other (in both dimensions), or at least to place ideas somewhere in relation to each other on each of those scales. For the purposes (as will be elaborated later) of telling both where we are and where to go, figuratively speaking, and thus how to get there from here. — Pfhorrest
It does seem to me that most prescriptive claims manifest the best part of our nature. Good laws and traditions aren't bondage but rather the highest expression of our freedom even (another stolen though[t].)....[W]ith time it became clear [to me] that many prohibitions are simply successful self-sculpture. We live above such things. Humans take profound pleasure in denying themselves things, and this is great. — Eee
Bonus question: What do aesthetic claims, about beauty and comedy and tragedy and such, mean, and how do they relate to prescriptive claims about morality?
The Objects of Morality
What are the criteria by which to judge prescriptive claims, or what makes something moral? — Pfhorrest
The Importance of Justice
Why does is matter what is moral or not, good or bad, in the first place? — Pfhorrest
Bonus question:
What is the meaning of life? — Pfhorrest
I don’t think I’ve misunderstood you - I’m talking about how we then relate to what is false or immoral or what we claim ‘oughtn’t be’. Wisdom is more than just evaluating claims - it includes determining and initiating action in relation to those claims. I think that wisdom breaks down, for instance, when we isolate, exclude or attack what is but oughtn’t be. — Possibility
4.4 "What's my philosophy?" Don't be a fool (or an asshole) is the whole of philosophy; the rest, like the Rabbi says, is commentary. — 180 Proof
The Institutes of Philosophy
Who is to do philosophy and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest
The Importance of Philosophy
Why do philosophy in the first place, what does it matter? — Pfhorrest
Cynical I get. My only point is that you didn't answer the question. 'Ethics' is an urgent need because we are so species-defective. — 180 Proof
Wittgenstein showed that philosophy, yes in it's entirety, consists in language on being on holiday. And that's it really. It supposedly ends in quietism. — Wallows
The Meaning of Reality
What do descriptive claims, that attempt to say what is real, even mean? — Pfhorrest
The Meaning of Philosophy
What defines philosophy and demarcates it from other fields? — Pfhorrest
The Objects of Philosophy
What is philosophy aiming for, by what criteria would we judge success or at least progress in philosophical endeavors? — Pfhorrest
The Method of Philosophy
How is philosophy to be done? — Pfhorrest
All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.
— creativesoul
I don't understand what you're trying to say. — Pfhorrest
The Subjects of Philosophy
What are the faculties that enable someone to do philosophy, to be a philosopher? — Pfhorrest
The Institutes of Philosophy
Who is to do philosophy and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest
The Importance of Philosophy
Why do philosophy in the first place, what does it matter? — Pfhorrest
I think the distinction you're making is quite artificial. After all, what is supernatural and what is not, are usually defined almost solely in terms of previous religious doctrines — Wayfarer
reason itself does not have a natural explanation — Wayfarer
You'll have to tell me if I understand you right. That sounds to me like you're saying all meaning is of the type meant by expressions like "clouds mean rain" and "smoke means fire": one thing signifies another thing, because of the correlation between those things. Is that what you mean by that claim? If so, what do you take statements that purport to describe reality to signify, or correlate with -- what do they mean? Or if you somehow object to asking that question, can you explain why?All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.
— creativesoul
I don't understand what you're trying to say. — Pfhorrest
Did you understand the first claim? — creativesoul
Oh boy, this is a fun one.Bonus question:
What do mathematical claims, about numbers and geometric shapes and such, mean, and how do they relate to descriptive claims about reality? — Pfhorrest
The Meaning of Reality
What do descriptive claims, that attempt to say what is real, even mean? — Pfhorrest
The Objects of Reality
What are the criteria by which to judge descriptive claims, or what is it that makes something real? — Pfhorrest
The Methods of Knowledge
How are we to apply those criteria and decide on what to believe, what descriptive claims to agree with? — Pfhorrest
All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.
— creativesoul
I don't understand what you're trying to say. — Pfhorrest
Did you understand the first claim?
— creativesoul
You'll have to tell me if I understand you right. That sounds to me like you're saying all meaning is of the type meant by expressions like "clouds mean rain" and "smoke means fire": one thing signifies another thing, because of the correlation between those things. Is that what you mean by that claim? If so, what do you take statements that purport to describe reality to signify, or correlate with -- what do they mean? Or if you somehow object to asking that question, can you explain why? — Pfhorrest
...one thing signifies another thing, because of the correlation between those things...
If so, what do you take statements that purport to describe reality to signify, or correlate with -- what do they mean? Or if you somehow object to asking that question, can you explain why?
What exactly about reason is in need of an explanation? — Pfhorrest
If some ghost hunters manage to actually capture incontrovertible evidence for ghosts, for example, I'm not going to say "that's supernatural so it doesn't count", I'm going to look forward to the amazing scientific discoveries that are sure to follow from this newly-confirmed unexplained phenomenon. — Pfhorrest
Many people in modern ages therefore place their notion of God as something entirely beyond that kind of experiential import, which then puts it into the category of supernatural as I mean it, about which we can only believe one way or another on faith. (Look at all the agnostics and theists on this very forum who insist that atheism also be taken on faith, because God as they mean it is beyond the proof or disproof.) — Pfhorrest
reason itself does not have a natural explanation
— Wayfarer
I'm not sure what you mean here. What exactly about reason is in need of an explanation? "How did humans come to be able to use reason?"? That is, as you say, not a philosophical question, but a biological one, and evolutionary explanations work just fine there. — Pfhorrest
if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs - for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — Rene Descartes
There is a paper by the French philosopher of science, Michel Bitbol, It is never known but is the knower: consciousness and the blind spot of science which elaborates this point from a contemporary perspective. — Wayfarer
I think you’re reading too much of your impression of a materialist into my philosophy when those elements aren’t there — Pfhorrest
I agree that the physical sciences have a limited domain, but that domain is only limited to the description of reality. Other kinds of activities, like prescribing morality, are outside the dominant of physical science. — Pfhorrest
I don’t think mystical experiences like you describe really count as evidence for any kind of descriptive claim about reality — Pfhorrest
A much better way of explaining what I’ve alluded to in my response to the ‘Objects of Reality’ question — Possibility
You'll note that I don't say anything at all about whether God exists until the very last chapter of my book. It's an open question, and most of the book is about how to go about answering questions. My philosophy isn't built around an absence of God; rather, the conclusion that nothing that would count as God is likely to exist is a consequence that falls out of more general questions.'m criticizing, the spirit of the age - what happens when you take God out of the picture — Wayfarer
Limited only to the description of physical reality, with the tacit assumption that reality is physical — Wayfarer
because the reality science assumes is devoid of meaning, then meaning is provided by the individual - hence subjectivism and relativism [...] Hume's 'is/ought' problem in a nutshell — Wayfarer
Me too.The mystics I'm thinking of, are the Christian, Hindu and Buddhist mystics. — Wayfarer
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