What do statements about the world and/or ourselves mean???

That's a strange question. I mean, strange that one would not know this already, at a very early age without knowing that they do. That such a question is even given credence attests to the gross misunderstanding of human thought and belief at work in the background...

The meaning of any and all things meaningful consists entirely of the correlations being drawn. The meaning of any description depends upon the naming and subsequent descriptive practices. It depends upon what's being focused upon in addition to what's being said about that focal point. There is no one size fits all answer. It's not as if they all have the same meaning. They cannot unless they all draw correlations between the same things.

Does this satisfy your curiosity?

That sound like an answer to my question about the meaning of descriptive statement, yes.

Hey Wallows, just curious. You have almost 8000 posts. I read a few of them, and to be brief I quite liked them. Have you written something in print as well? Like a book or essays or stuff?

Apart from my shit you see here, not really.

If your looking for structural tendencies on my part have a look at the reading group threads to the left on the categories section. I quite enjoyed the Tractatus reading group I helped organize. Towards the end it was a delicacy following that thread.

Thanks, I'll remember to. Also would like chip in a friendly suggestion that you write something for print. See you around :)

Appreciated! :ok:

The Subjects of Reality
What is the nature of the mind, inasmuch as that means the capacity for believing and making such judgements about what to believe? — Pfhorrest

The mind is the structure of our conceptual systems, that enable us to make predictions about our interactions with the world. In my view, it is here that we have the capacity to interact with the world beyond time, whether we do so consciously or not.

What we believe is what information we can integrate into these conceptual systems - what enables us to reduce prediction error in how we interact with the world.

The Institutes of Knowledge
What is the proper educational system, or who should be making those descriptive judgements and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest

The way I see it, there is no authority of knowledge among human beings, no elite group of knowledgeable. Our sources of knowledge, understanding and wisdom are and should be as diverse as possible. I think we can learn as much in this broad sense from a year spent listening to those in prison as from a year spent listening to those in lecture halls at university - when we value all information regardless of moral claims and can employ critical and creative thinking without judgement (ie. without dismissing information that contains falsehoods or immorality, for instance).

But not everyone is as open to knowledge, understanding and wisdom as we can be - and those who are certainly aren’t valued for that capacity.

Everyone should be pursuing not just knowledge, but understanding and wisdom - as much as they can. Not everyone will. Knowledge is an individual pursuit, but understanding requires one to recognise that we cannot know enough on our own - that expanding our capacity to know beyond the physical constraints of the brain involves connecting or developing ongoing relationships with others and, not so much trusting their knowledge, but being able to include it somehow.

Further expanding our capacity to know and understand the world requires us to develop still more relationships with others who not only possess knowledge but also understanding that we cannot grasp ourselves due to our personal limitations (including an unwillingness to engage in immoral behaviour or interact with an imaginary perspective of the world). Nurturing these relationships and understanding when and how we can draw on this knowledge, as well as when and how we should be sharing what we know and understand with others, IS wisdom.

It isn’t about authority or power in knowledge, but about relationships and meaning. Humility enables us to recognise our physical limitations in pursuing knowledge, and courage inspires us to transcend those limitations in how we relate to the world by developing complex networks of knowledge beyond our own minds.

Bonus question: How do we get people to care about education and knowledge and reality to begin with? — Pfhorrest

As adults, the simplest life is one in which we operate almost entirely from our conceptual systems, with little to no interaction with new information. But we still don’t know enough about reality yet - we still suffer from prediction error. There is an element of our social system that encourages us to strive towards attaining this error-free position: without the pain, loss, lack or humiliation that comes from having to interact with a reality that isn’t what we expect it to be.

Ideally, the more accurate our conceptual systems, the less suffering from prediction error as we interact with the world. But we often construe this as striving only to reduce suffering from prediction error (ie. less pain, lack, humiliation, etc) - which can be achieved by simply neglecting to evaluate or test predictions - rather than striving to improve our conceptual systems.

We then reduce this ‘ideal’ to certain evidence: education, wealth, popularity, intelligence, influence, authority, etc. - as if attaining these are what reduce prediction error.

We need to counteract the social system that idealises this external ‘evidence’ of success and favours reduced prediction error over increased interaction. We can do this by more diversely illustrating the difference between ignorance and knowledge, fantasy and reality, protection and education, fear and courage - and by valuing the latter in every instance, without avoiding interaction with the former as a source of information.

The Importance of Knowledge
Why does it matter what is real or not, true or false, in the first place? — Pfhorrest

Prediction error is a key source of suffering in the world. When our conceptual systems are inaccurate, we encounter more prediction error in our interactions, which can lead to anxiety or depression, as well as anger, hatred, violence, oppression, despair, etc. As a result, we tend to withdraw from or avoid interactions that may result in prediction error.

But the only effective way to reduce prediction error in our interactions is to be prepared to continually restructure our conceptual systems to integrate new information, and accept that we cannot know everything there is to know. It requires us to come to terms with experiencing a pervasive uncertainty in relation to what is real, and to improve our perception of reality through increased interaction and interdependence.

That sound like an answer to my question about the meaning of descriptive statement, — Pfhorrest

Ok. Good. Would you now answer my question?

What does all human thought and belief consist of, on your view?

Sure.

Beliefs are a kind of thoughts, thoughts with descriptive content, thoughts about how the world is, in contrast to intentions which are thoughts with prescriptive content, about how the world ought to be.

Thoughts more generally are reflexive feelings, where feelings likewise have descriptive and prescriptive versions, perceptions and desires. A thought is a perception of a feeling coupled with a desire for that feeling to remain, or else whatever feeling is desired in its stead: basically, a thought is what you feel you ought to feel, the mental states you judge to be the correct ones.

A feeling in turn is an interpretation of an experience, where experiences also have descriptive and prescriptive versions, namely sensations and appetites. Experiences are the uninterpreted raw input from an interaction between one’s mind and the rest of the world.

A mind is just a function of a physical system — namely, this kind of function I’ve been describing. There is also a qualitative, what-it’s-like phenomenal experience of being a mind, but that’s not a special thing of minds: everything has such a first-person experience, but what that experience is like varies with the function of the thing just like its behavior does — the function is a map from experience to behavior — and it is only minds proper, with functionality like I’ve been describing, that have a first person experience similar to the kind that we human minds have.

A thing with similar enough functionality does not technically have to be human: other animals, aliens, AIs, etc, can all in principle have similar enough functionality too.

...And what do all those examples of thought and belief have in common such that having it is what makes them thoughts and beliefs instead of something else?

Do language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought and belief? It seems to me that you cannot admit that without incoherence and/or special pleading. The notion of thought you've advocated for does not allow it, despite your suggestion at the end.

I think I’ve already answered that question so if there is something to my answer I’ve left out you’ll need to specify.

And yes language-less creatures can have thoughts, including beliefs. Nothing I’ve said is to the contrary.

You've offered different descriptions regarding kinds of thought and belief. You've not offerd a universal criterion for what counts as thought and belief such that when we're assessing whether or not a candidate of our choosing counts as being a case of thought and belief it counts as such by virtue of satisfying that criterion.

Are you saying that language less creatures can form, have, and/or hold thought about how the world is and/or ought to be?

Yes, I am saying that.

And I gave criteria for a thought to be a belief, and for a mental state to be a thought, and for what makes a state mental, so I’m not sure what further criteria you want.

A thought is a perception of a feeling coupled with a desire for that feeling to remain... — Pfhorrest

All thoughts?

A thought is a perception of a feeling coupled with a desire for that feeling to remain, or else whatever feeling is desired in its stead: basically, a thought is what you feel you ought to feel, the mental states you judge to be the correct ones. — Pfhorrest

Desiring for a feeling to remain is to know that they do not always. Knowing that feelings are fleeting requires being able to think about one's own thought. That requires naming and descriptive practices for one's own mental ongoings.

Language less creatures have none.

How do you reconcile this problem?

Why do you claim reflexive mental activity requires naming or other linguistic capability?

More to the point, where are you going with all this? I don’t mind so much explaining what my philosophy is like ahead of schedule but this all started with you objecting to the questions in the OP, and now you’re more or less asking me those same questions, so I don’t see your point in doing so.

The Objects of Reality
What are the criteria by which to judge descriptive claims, or what is it that makes something real? — Pfhorrest

Commonality to all empirical experiences, or instrumentality toward explaining such. This means an empirical realism, or a physicalist phenomenalism, a kind of neutral monism, where all that exists are physical things, and physical things consist entirely of their phenomenal, experiential, empirical properties, which are in turn just the way that they interact with observers (who are in turn just other physical systems).

This means that the most concretely real of things are only the presently occurring "occasions of experience" (as Whitehead calls them), such as the "pixels" (so to speak) of whatever you're seeing at the moment. Concepts of quantity and quality ("universals" like shape and color) are abstractions useful for explaining patterns in those experiences, so things like shapes in your field of vision are abstractions away from those "pixels of vision", and real inasmuch as they're instrumental in explaining that. Things like rocks and trees existing in three-dimensional space even when you're not looking at them are further abstractions and real inasmuch as they're instrumental in explaining that.

In a sense "here" is more concretely real than "there" (we only infer the existence of "there" from things going on here; even if you can see "there" right now, it's via photons that are here now that you do so), but "there" is still real. Likewise time: the present is more concretely real than the past or the future (we only have records of the past and predictions of the future, all existing in the present), but the past and the future are still real. Likewise other possible worlds: the actual world is more concretely real than other possible worlds, but other possible worlds are still real. I actually hold that time is definable in terms of possible worlds, and space is definable in terms of time, so possible worlds are a more primitive abstraction than time or space.

Purely abstract objects like discussed in math are the least concrete things of all, finally leaving all concreteness behind, but are still real inasmuch as they're useful in explaining the concrete world, as merely one of those infinitely many abstract objects, the one of which we are a part.

You can disregard everything I write if you want. I'm very very critical. I'm of the well-considered opinion that you've followed philosophy proper down a mistaken path. I'm focusing upon that.

You've gotten human thought and belief wrong, and you're not alone. Like I said, you may ignore me if you like, or if you'd rather not get into it, then I'm good with that too.

Think about this either way...

If you are indeed mistaken about human thought and belief, then you are also mistaken - in some way or other - about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. The scope of rightful application could not be broader.

Why do you claim reflexive mental activity requires naming or other linguistic capability? — Pfhorrest

I did not claim that, nor did you offer that as a criterion for thought and belief.

I did argue against the criterion you did offer for thought and belief by first granting it and then explaining exactly how it fails to account for language less thought and belief.

I described thought as reflexive mental activity. If that wasn’t clear then I think you’re not understanding anything I’ve said. I think I would rather just discontinue our conversation, it seems pretty fruitless and proceeding sound frustrating unproductive. If you want to say what you think I’m wrong about and what’s right instead though, go right ahead, cause I'm lost on what you think the problem is.

I described thought as reflexive mental activity. If that wasn’t clear then I think you’re not understanding anything I’ve said. — Pfhorrest

I'm understanding just fine. You've described thought in all sorts of ways. You've named different kinds. You've made all sorts of comments. You've neglected a valid objection to something you have written, in lieu of talking about something I've not objecting to.

What you have yet to have done is offer a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought and belief. Such a standard/criterion is the device we use to determine whether or not some situation counts as a case of thought and belief.

The above sums it up thus far for me. I would be happy to end it here, if you still want to do so after reading my last two posts.

What you have yet to have done is offer a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought and belief. Such a standard/criterion is the device we use to determine whether or not some situation counts as a case of thought and belief. — creativesoul

But do we really use some device to understand 'thought' or 'belief' in ordinary language? What if an investigation of thought leads to the conclusion that no device constructed by this or that philosopher can ever get it just right?

After all, any investigation of the notions of thought or belief must already use these words and their naive meanings. We use the supposedly broken thing in order to fix it, proving that it wasn't so broken.

But do we really use some device to understand 'thought' or 'belief' in ordinary language? — Eee

Language is a device. Why quote the terms? I'm not talking about the language use. I'm using those two terms as a namesake for the same referent. That referent is prior to language. That referent is an integral element within all thought and belief, those existentially dependent upon language use notwithstanding.

What if an investigation of thought leads to the conclusion that no device constructed by this or that philosopher can ever get it just right? — Eee

Then we ask...

What counts as "just right"?

...and we comment...

My criterion for "just right" includes a basis borne of universal criteria.

After all, any investigation of the notions of thought or belief must already use these words and their naive meanings. We use the supposedly broken thing in order to fix it, proving that it wasn't so broken.

I guess. Who says it's broken? All sensible use of the terms must be accounted for, and this includes ordinary language. It seems to me that there is no way to avoid placing existential value upon ordinary use. If we are to develop an acceptable working theory of human thought and belief, it must be amenable to evolutionary progression. Human thought and belief must begin simply and accrue in it's complexity. History shows this nicely. There are arguments about the source of novelty, but that's not in question, nor does it matter. "God did it" doesn't work any more than "Aliens did it" any more than "The Flying Spaghetti Monster" did it...

What we need is knowledge of what all thought and belief consists of. Then, and only then, can we determine what the particular thought belief is about. This is too much a bit too fast, but hopefully you'll get a gist for the position I'm arguing for/from.

Yeah I've told you what I think belief consists of, and what I think thought consists of, and you haven't told me what you think either of them consist of, or what's wrong with my answers, or what any of this has to do with the OP, which was a series of questions and not any statements about anything, so at this point this subthread really just seems like a disruptive derailment to me and I'd rather not continue it.

Yeah... ...you haven't told me what you think either of them consist of... — Pfhorrest

First time for everything I guess...

:razz:

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. The only difference between thought and belief regarding the ordinary everyday use of the terms is immediately discernable during a.)suspending agreement, assent, and/or judgment, and/or b.) deliberate misrepresentation of one's own thought and belief. Those thoughts are more complex beliefs, and as such the two cannot be interchanged in such circumstances without losing meaning. So, there is a distinction between thought and belief, but not at the pre-reflective level.

Why quote the terms? — creativesoul

I quote the words that we already know how to use.

I'm using those two terms as a namesake for the same referent. That referent is prior to language. That referent is an integral element within all thought and belief, those existentially dependent upon language use notwithstanding. — creativesoul

OK. So the referent of 'thought' and 'belief' is prior to language, to words? That's plausible, but it depends on how one further specifies the nature of thought and belief. For obvious reasons it's difficult to talk about non-linguistic thought and belief. We can interpret actions as manifestations of belief.
But I'd be slow to drag 'thought' or 'belief' far from their ordinary usage.

"God did it" doesn't work any more than "Aliens did it" any more than "The Flying Spaghetti Monster" did it... — creativesoul

I think you are arguing against one of your own pet demons here. This has nothing to do with anything I've said.

What we need is knowledge of what all thought and belief consists of. — creativesoul

We already have it. We already are it. But I support the project of articulating our tacit know-how.

Then, and only then, can we determine what the particular thought belief is about. — creativesoul

I don't think this is obvious. Instead, I think it's more like the hermeneutic circle.

"One's understanding of the text as a whole is established by reference to the individual parts and one's understanding of each individual part by reference to the whole. "

And how can we generalize thought and belief without seeing what particular thoughts and beliefs ar about? We are already in life, in the world, successfully transplanting hands, planning trips to Mars, curing HIV. Philosophy is late on the scene, merely increase self-consciousness, allowing us to make clear to ourselves what we are already doing and already know. Or that's one approach.

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

The idea of the purely mental, however, is itself a product of language. It's a distinction within language. The notion of the mental depends on the useful fiction of the isolated ego. This supposedly isolated ego can speak to itself that 'I think therefore I am,' ignoring that its language is not its own.

To be clear, I understand what people mean by the mental and by meaning that can be translated. These concepts are useful but shouldn't perhaps be used as unquestioned foundations.

My criterion for "just right" includes a basis borne of universal criteria. — creativesoul

This is a theme I like. Universal criteria. And that's why the philosopher isn't exactly or simply the solitary ego. Whim or mere opinion is no interest, correct? Correct thinking isn't 'just me' thinking. It let's the thoughts evolve as they 'must.' I don't mean anything mystical. I'm just trying to analyze what we vaguely mean by universal criteria or being reasonable.

We already know how to be reasonable, so it's just a matter of bringing what we mean to a greater vividness, focusing.

I quote the words that we already know how to use. — Eee

Not a good start. I'll overlook it for now.

I like the avatar picture. Reminds me of an old forum long ago.

To be continued...