So, re the example I gave of Chinese and Western medicine; of course they can both be expressed in Chinese or English or presumably many other (but not all?) languages. What then does it mean to say that one conceptual scheme must be translatable into the terms of another or else one (or both?) of the conceptual schemes cannot be "true and meaningful"? — Janus
But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm
But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm
Davidson doesn't make this claim though...
He clearly talks about his skin being warm... — creativesoul
But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm
Davidson doesn't make this claim though...
He clearly talks about his skin being warm... — creativesoul
Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes
in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has come down, then,
to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual
scheme or theory if it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in
order to allow sharers of a scheme to differ on details. And the
criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now be-
comes: largely true but not translatable. The question whether
this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we under-
stand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent of
the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not
understand it independently at all...
Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these things make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm
Rather, I think he's argues that it's all that's needed here as a means to assess the translatability of one scheme into the other. — creativesoul
Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm
My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so. — creativesoul
It's pretty clearly not correspondence theory. It's just sentences spoken in two different formal languages. — frank
it's familiar formulation 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.."'Snow is white'" refers to the sentence or proposition 'snow is white' and "snow is white" refers to the actuality or state of affairs of snow being white. So, it says the truth of the proposition depends on the actuality: if and only if snow is white then the sentence "snow is white" is true. — Janus
There's also A coherence theory of truth and knowledge, an article which I have not studied in any detail.
Must get a round tuit. — Banno
I couldn't see it either. I have it in a collection; it's more recent, and has a few replies to critics stuck on the end. — Banno
Do you agree that Banno's interpretation of Davidson is more deflationary than your own? — ZzzoneiroCosm
My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so.
— creativesoul
By "so" do you mean "true"? — ZzzoneiroCosm
There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it. — frank
Bullshit is bullshit. — Banno
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