Not because I know any better but because perfectly intelligent people possessed of all the same facts nonetheless disagree. — Isaac
And here it seems that the intent of the speaker matters. — Marchesk
My own personal disagreement is laid out way back on page 5, but I still don't know if it's flawed, or misunderstands Davidson completely because, as I said, I'm no expert myself. — Isaac
Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm
My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the absence of a conceptual scheme - haven't been addressed either. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Davidson didn't reestablish anything. He just pointed out a flaw in the idea of conceptual schemes — frank
My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the absence of a conceptual scheme - haven't been addressed either. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Everyone seems to be conflating commensurability with translatability as if the two were equal.
'Sun setting' talk may well be translatable to 'earth rotation' talk, and 'prevailing wind talk' may well be translatable to 'coriolis force' talk, but in one conceptual scheme the two are linked. How do you translate that link without simply changing beliefs? — Isaac
The claim that there are no conceptual schemes would have to come from a transcendent vantage point. — frank
Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Suppose we have two conceptual schemes, such that some things are accounted true in one, but not in the other - the idea being that what is to count as true depends on what scheme one is using. — Banno
And yet already we have translation - because we have talked about the very same thing being true in one, but not in the other... — Banno
What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be true in one, but not in the other? What sort of things are true, if not statements? — Banno
What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be said in one, but not in the other? — Banno
As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno
As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno
As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno
he's opened the doors of his time machine and invited us to return to the way things were before Descartes speculated that nerves are like strings that the world plucks (which is an amazingly good guess, actually).
To travel this distance, we have to get super deflationary about truth, meaning, reference, concepts, etc. And then yes, we find ourselves back where it all began — frank
I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Banno stated in this thread he's convinced philosophy is bunk, so the goal would be to deflate/dissolve philosophical discourse. — Marchesk
I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm
It takes a lot of philosophical discourse to dissolve philosophical discourse. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Yeah, I don't know. An interesting question that comes to mind is to ask whether it's true that philosophy is bunk, and how we would know that to be case. — Marchesk
I don't expect big answers from philosophy. (I — ZzzoneiroCosm
An interesting question that comes to mind is to ask whether it's true that philosophy is bunk, and how we would know that to be case. — Marchesk
Using philosophy to prove philosophy is bunk proves philosophy isn't bunk. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Just to be precise: What Banno said to me was: Philosophy amounts to nothing. — ZzzoneiroCosm
: nothing, it may be said, could
count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence
that that form of activity was not speech behavior.
...talk about the truth of beliefs (as opposed to the truth of statements) cannot be encompassed in prosentential theories, which is why I don't think Davidson does away with conceptual schemes simply by declaring them necessarily translatable...but that argument seems to be falling on deaf ears, so I suspect perhaps I'm wasting my time... — Isaac
We get a new out of an old scheme when the speakers of a language come to accept as true an important range of sentences they previously took to be false (and, of course, vice versa) . . . A change has come over the meaning of the sentence because it now belongs to a new language.
So what sounded at first like a thrilling discovery - that
truth is relative to a conceptual scheme - has not so far been
shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and familiar fact
that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the
language to which it belongs. Instead of living in different worlds,
Kuhn's scientists may, like those who need Webster's dictionary,
be only words apart.
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