We have to be able to say, "No, that is a thought we ought not have about others." — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, we have to be able to say that is an action we should not take against others. Thoughts are private to the individual and nobody else's business. We all have uncharitable and rude thoughts about this or that person for whatever reason. But it's what we do or say that matters.

He also defended slavery!

Wittgenstein was a Nazi!

1. You didn't answer.
2. I suppose you were trying to poison the well so that what he said about social justice is prima facie wrong. That's a fallacy.

I take it then that you haven't read his Nichomechean Ethics?

You said he was the first advocate of social justice, as if that meant something. I merely replied that he also defended slavery.

You said he was the first advocate of social justice, as if that meant something. I merely replied that he also defended slavery. — NOS4A2

Have you read aristotle? He is the first advocate of social justice. — Benkei

Uhuh. Learn to read buddy.

Uhuh. Learn to read buddy.

You appealed to authority and then didn’t like it when I point out that authority also defends slavery.

Still didn't answer the question. Yes or no?

Edit: also superfluous I might add, I didn't appeal to authority. I referenced a philosopher who discussed (using different words) social justice. We haven't gotten into why "social justice is injustice" is wrong yet and that requires me to first understand what you know and don't know, philosophically speaking.

It’s been a while but yes I have.

Thank you. Great. So do you remember his three types of justice: distributive, rectificatory and reciprocal justice?

I do not recall rectificatory, but the other two I do.

OK. So I'm going to outline what I think he means with these types of justice and you'll see that there's a philosophically viable idea of social justice which shouldn't be confused with activism.

His distributive justice is about people getting their fair share; e.g. unequal shares for equal people and equal shares for unequal people are unjust. In other words, it's justice as equality.

But it extends into the political as well. From his Politics: justice to Aristotole is proportional and communally relative to the political status/merit of individuals along the lines of the predominant culture and its institutions. Injustice violates this proportionality. Aristotle likens this form of justice to the manner of redistribution of the common funds found in an economic partnership.

The second form of justice, rectificatory/corrective justice concerns itself with equality as well, including redistribution resulting from injustice.

The third form of justice, reciprocal justice is about the natural fairness within economic exchange. This is where it gets interesting as in his view both grace and friendship ought to be the ethical norms that ought to institutionalise economic exchange. Exchange is not to be based on market prices, profit, supply and demand, desires or utility. No, economics is simply a means to maintain the all-important solidarity for its common objective in its pursuit of happiness/flourishing.

So each type of justice has something to say about the distribution of wealth.

OK. So I'm going to outline what I think he means with these types of justice and you'll see that there's a philosophically viable idea of social justice which shouldn't be confused with activism.

His distributive justice is about people getting their fair share; e.g. unequal shares for equal people and equal shares for unequal people are unjust. In other words, it's justice as equality.

But it extends into the political as well. From his Politics: justice to Aristotole is proportional and communally relative to the political status/merit of individuals along the lines of the predominant culture and its institutions. Injustice violates this proportionality. Aristotle likens this form of justice to the manner of redistribution of the common funds found in an economic partnership.

The second form of justice, rectificatory/corrective justice concerns itself with equality as well, including redistribution resulting from injustice.

The third form of justice, reciprocal justice is about the natural fairness within economic exchange. This is where it gets interesting as in his view both grace and friendship ought to be the ethical norms that ought to institutionalise economic exchange. Exchange is not to be based on market prices, profit, supply and demand, desires or utility. No, economics is simply a means to maintain the all-important solidarity for its common objective in its pursuit of happiness/flourishing.

So each type of justice has something to say about the distribution of wealth.

Thanks for the explanation.

But wasn’t distributive Justice determined on the basis of merit? that it is determined on the basis of the contributions one has made? It seems to me the whole notion of “proportion” in his reciprocity conflicts with modern notions of “social justice”. Excuse me if I’m mistaken about this.