noticed that this is not Davidson view; but Davidson’s Account of his antagonists view? — Banno

Thanks. Working on a paragraph-by-paragraph exegesis beginning with the notion of "fitting." I think I understand the essay up to that point.

@Banno Alright, I'm finishing up now

Do we understand truth independently of translation?

Davidson answers no.

In short he does this because convention T embodies our best intuitions about how the concept of truth is used. And convention T allows us to get at the meaning of a sentence by taking truth as fundamental, or more specifically, taking "...is true" as fundamental and, through that, can translate German into English (or other languages too). Without truth -- without this convention T -- what could translation amount to?

Much thanks for your help on that one .

I think I have more to say on that later, but for now I'm just focusing on getting the argument right.


But basically this ends the argument against total untranslatability -- since there is no criteria we might list which allows us to make sense of a scheme which is both true and untranslatable, including all the myriad ways that various authors have tried to do, we must let go of this notion of conceptual schemes. And so we move onto partial untranslatability.

Here we return to what seemed to me a side-point at the beginning -- the closeness between meaning and belief. And we get a little more explanation, that this interdependence (a relation spelled out?) comes from the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sentences. And he argues for this by asking we grant that a man's speech cannot be interpreted (correctly?) without knowing a good deal about what he believes.

But, then, to know a good deal (as he puts it "fine distinctions between beliefs") about what he believes we must understand his speech.

On the face this is plausible to me. Sarcasm and irony can use the exact same sentences, but wouldn't be understandable as such -- the meaning of the sentences wouldn't be understood -- without knowing our speaker's beliefs (construed broadly). These aren't the only modes of speech that change the meaning of sentences with the exact same words in them, but I think it demonstrates the point.

If we are to intelligibly attribute beliefs or interpret speech we must, then, have a theory which simultaneously accounts for these, without begging the question.

For this paper Davidson proposes the attitude of "accepting as true", while noting that there's more to the story for an entire theory that answers the question -- but that this is enough to make his point about conceptual schemes.

I'm not sure I understand the abstract argument he proposes to allow this, but I'm also fine with, at this point at least, just granting the point about "accepting as true". The example that explains the general argument makes enough sense to me. Yes, we do reinterpret how our conversation partner's use words all the time. I fully grant that. In fact the further point he makes later is something I've stated a few times before -- that (meaningful) disagreement takes place on a background of agreement.

Now I have to admit though that I don't know what Davidson means by charity is a condition of a workable theory. Meaningful disagreement, and the desire to be understood? All these make sense to me. But I don't know what he means by "a workable theory" here -- a theory of translation or interpretation or of the original problem introduced which he answers with "accepting as true"?

But the point, going back to partial untranslatability, has more to do with how charity is not an option, but is forced upon us.

And so, having it forced upon us, if we translate an alien sentence -- one rejected by the aliens but the translation is beloved by ourselves, as a community -- we may be tempted to call this a difference in schemes. But we must make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we make an effort to optimize for agreement (i.e., interpret charitably). And so conceptual relativism is really nothing more than a difference of belief or opinion. And there is no way to say that the difference is really in our concepts or our beliefs, no indication that this is a conceptual scheme.

In a very short summation: because we must accept charity, on pain of not being understood at all (in which case, what are we talking for), it follows that partial untranslatability falls apart or basically reduces to nothing more than a difference in belief.



Davidson closes with a somewhat elliptical, to my mind, conclusion. It seems to me that the paper is done at this point, but the last two paragraphs serve as what he believes he's demonstrated, at least. One, just as we cannot say that schemes are different, so we cannot say they are the same. But I think I might side with saying that by this Davidson means that such talk is unintelligible, so should be set aside -- at least, it is unintelligible the moment we make it clear.

Then Davidson wants to remind his readers that giving up this distinction does not land us in a land without truth at all. Even without "objective truth" as he puts it. Davidson wants to clarify, though maybe it is difficult to see for some dependent upon the third dogma of empiricism, that this dogma obscures objective truth -- and by putting it to the wayside we still have true sentences. Sentences which, being sentences, are relative to an actually existing language. But true all the same.

The elliptical part, for me anyways, is perhaps just a bit of poetic stretching on Davidson's part. But it speaks better for itself:

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do
not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the
familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions
true or false.

Seem to betray some of the previous points, but you gotta have a nice conclusion, yes? :)


Probably call it there for a night. Long day. But I'll pick up the conversation again tomorrow.

our improved understanding of the article might be better facilitated by your attempting to answer these questions yourself. — Banno

Paragraph by paragraph, beginning with page 15 and the question of “fitting.”

Engaging the question of fitting we turn to complete sentences. It is sentences that can be “compared or confronted with the evidence.”

Dismissal of extreme and reductionist views as “implausible versions of the general position.” (Is this dismissal justified by something specific - apart from the analytic zeitgeist?)

The "general position" re “fitting”: “sensory experience provides all the evidence for the acceptance of sentences.” (Translated: Sentences must fit sensory evidence. What is problematic about this expression?)

But that implies (“what is in view here is”) “the totality of possible sensory evidence, past, present and future.” (Okay, that's a problem. But is that actually "what is in view"? It has the ring of an extreme or strawman position.)

The posits/sensory-evidence dyad mirrors the scheme/content dyad.

Fitting adds nothing to the concept of being true. (Fitting wasn't there to add something: Fitting is just what we do with sentences and sensory evidence when we make true sentences by looking at sensory evidence. I don't see the problem with the "fitting" notion.)

Re (and dismissive of) fitting: “something is an acceptable conceptual scheme if it is [largely] true.” ("Acceptable conceptual scheme" is already deflated by Davidson's rejection of extreme and reductive schemes. Again, zeitgeist?)

A conceptual scheme different from our own must be described as: largely true but untranslatable.

Is this a “useful criterion”? Only if we can understand the notion of “truth” independent of the notion of “translation.” Can we?

Tarski and T-sentences. Description of T-sentences.

s (of L) is true if and only if p -----------> “s” is true if and only if s

Convention T "suggests...an important feature common to all concepts of truth." Makes “essential use of the notion of translation into a language we know.”

Truth and translation (specifically, from a foreign language to (in my case) English) must be inextricably linked. (Note: this is a specific case of translation from a foreign langauge (something foreign (un-understood) but known to be a sense-making language) into a known language. Will the specific terms of this specific kind of translation be recognizable as the concept is situated in the logic of the argument?)

There is no “neutral ground” (earlier, “coordinate system”) for comparison of conceptual schemes. If by “ground” we mean “something conceived as common to incommensurable schemes” - there is no use in continuing the search. It's useless to look for something commensurable in something incommensurable.

So much for “fitting” and “a total failure of translation.”

I read it as Davidson pointing out again that it is statements that are true or false; and since statements are part of language, their truth is relative to that language. So "il pleut" is not true in English, even if it is raining. — Banno

Take the phrase:

"il pleut" is not true in English

Is translation from one language to another a strong enough basis for or analogue to the kinds of translation that must take place between radically (but not wholly: Davidson's case of partial failure of translation) different conceptual schemes?

Looking at the case study: materialism v. immaterialism...

(defined here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7109/davidson-trivial-and-nontrivial-conceptual-schemes-a-case-study-in-translation/latest/comment)

And supposing distinct conceptual schemes to be analogous to distinct languages:

The immaterialist says: "the universe consists entirely of mind."

The statement is false in the language of the materialist.

How does the materialist translate the immaterialist's statement?

(Or is immaterialism (conveniently) categorized by Davidson as "extreme" or "reductive?" Is strict materialism less extreme and less reductive? In what sense?)

Secondary sources:

https://www.unl.edu/henderson/Papers/SCHEMES.pdf
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01332.x
https://jeelooliu.net/470%20folder/470%20(22)-%20Davidson,%20Conceptual.pdf

And so conceptual relativism is really nothing more than a difference of belief or opinion. — Moliere

Conceptual schemes, as we encounter them in philosophical exchange, are generally centered on disconnective differences in belief. What is the significance, then, of reducing conceptual relativism to a difference in belief?

The immaterialist (as defined here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7109/davidson-trivial-and-nontrivial-conceptual-schemes-a-case-study-in-translation/latest/comment) has a conceptual scheme: immaterialism. He believes the world consists entirely of mind.

The materialist has a conceptual scheme: materialism. He believes the world consists entirely of matter.

Reduce these conceptual schemes to beliefs and you have the same disconnect and very possibly the same relativism.

Drop the neuroscience for a bit. — Banno

:point:

The sin Davidson is castigating is that of thinking we can not talk about dollars, but only about economic models of dollars. — Banno

:up:

That's very similar to the point I'm making. Theory ladened perceptual features are still about their content; they are a relation between a body and an environment. Economic models of dollars are about dollars; they are relation between a mathematical abstraction and dollars.

Yay secondary sources. So for Davidson, the meaning of a statement is its truth conditions.

If we can't translate the statements of a certain language, we cant identify truth conditions for them.

Since Davidson sees truth and meaning as inextricable, he sees an untranslatable conceptual scheme as incoherent because it's pulling meaning and truth apart. By definition we know it's true, but we cant access the meaning.

So his argument depends on our accepting that: that it's impossible to separate truth and meaning.

I'm going to try to re-frame the problem and I hope respond to some of the points you've both made in doing so. Apologies if this totally misses the mark.

Taking the inference model, there are states of the world which can be represented by some set R{a,b,c} where a,b,c are atomic facts. Our phenomenal representation of those states is E{d,e,f} and is the result of some function f(R). Our model of those states is M{g,h,i} which we take to be our best guess at R. The complication is that M acts as a filter/modifier for E no matter what R actually is. So it's not a one way system. This is just a rephrasing of what fdrake has already said, but I can't do the mathjax thing.

Translating to Davidson, I think the issue is whether M acts more as a filter or more as a modifier to E. This is where @fdrake and I have our argument. If we believe that the more significant feedback is that of error reduction by updating E, then, as Fdrake points out, the fact that those errors come from R (actual unmodified R) means that our M must be approaching R. Or, without my paraphrasing,...

Theory ladened perceptual features are still about their content; they are a relation between a body and an environment. — fdrake

If, rather as I do, we think that M's effect on E is more confirmatory, only shaken when overwhelmingly contradicted, then, most of the time M is running the show and the effect of R is constraining rather than forming. It limits M, it doesn't directly shape it. Now, of course M is still about R, but this affects what we can say about M in terms of truth and translatability.

But I need to first say why I think this is important with regards to Davidson, and it has to do with the difference between Tarski and Ramsey on truth, so a little diversion into @Banno's post above...

Ramsey and Tarski do seem to have very similar accounts of truth, both making use of meta-languages, but Ramsey said that he would be quite happy to have his labelled as a correspondence theory - why? I think it's because of Ramsey's view on belief and certainty which (when it comes down to it) is what the meta language (both his and Tarski's) is in terms of. It is our shared certainty that the cat is on the mat (no quotation marks) that makes the truth of "the cat is on the mat". It is only this way that anyone can use Tarski to say anything about the real world outside of Formal Languages.

Ramsey is a pragmatist about truth (in his later work). The Ramsey-Prior theory states that

T) a is true if and only if for some p, a is a . . . that p and p.

The dots have to be filled by some mental states that could be bearers of truth. so mental states or mental acts are bearers of truth, particularly - beliefs.

Hence Ramsey's assertions that there are two types of truth, those of tautology and those of functioning beliefs - induction.

The mind works by general laws ; therefore if it infers q from p, this will generally be because q is an instance of a function φx and p the corresponding instance of a function ψx such that the mind would always infer φx from ψx.

The pictures we make to ourselves are not pictures of facts

Anyway, rather than me bang on about Ramsey for another few paragraphs, I'm going to assume you get the difference and perhaps add more if there's any queries.

So, getting to...

The sin Davidson is castigating is that of thinking we can not talk about dollars, but only about economic models of dollars. — Banno

Here 'dollars' are the 'pictures of facts' about which an economic theory is made, and I think Davidson is absolutely right to castigate the idea that two economic models about dollars could ever be incommensurable. But some models alter the pictures of facts. An economic model about dollars doesn't have any impact on what a dollar is, a dollar is not a different thing in each of two models. If ever it was, even then, we might simply be able to say "how different?", define those differences in terms of some more atomic picture of fact and translate the schemes.

But our models of reality create the very pictures of facts they are about, by induction, It is not possible, then, to use theories of truth to dismiss the uncertainty about R where those theories appeal to meta-languages about atomic facts (pictures of facts). We can only use Davidson one level up from that process - which means he's out of bounds in both cognitive neuroscience, child development, and model-dependant realism (which is where I'm not sure he defeats Kuhn).

Is M a conceptual scheme of they type Davidson wants to do away with, or is M more properly thought of as the contents of such a scheme? I think there are arguments for both, and , since Davidson raises some very important points about the problems of relativism, personally I'd prefer to rescue what he has to say by assuming M are (or rather, would be, pre-Davidson) the contents of conceptual schemes and so Davidson is right, but with the caveat that this does not lead to naive (or even modulated) realism about R.

Economic models of dollars are about dollars; they are relation between a mathematical abstraction and dollars. — fdrake

A dollar is an abstraction, though. So an economic model of dollars is about a relation between a mathematical abstraction and an abstraction?

A dollar is an abstraction, though — frank

As are laws, countries, economies, cultures, people, love, justice...

Yes. But he also does make an argument for this, too -- not just to accept it by fiat. And it's important to note, I believe, that this is in the section against total untranslatability. So even if meaning has more to it than the truth of convention-T -- we're talking about two languages which share nothing in common, no meaning whatsoever.

So German and English, for instance, can both express some similar meanings even if the meanings are not exactly the same.

Conceptual schemes, as we encounter them in philosophical exchange, are generally centered on disconnective differences in belief. What is the significance, then, of reducing conceptual relativism to a difference in belief? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If we're talking about competing beliefs in talking about different conceptual schemes then we're not talking about two sets of beliefs that can both be true and mean different things, but simply two sets of beliefs; if the two beliefs contradict one another then, insofar that we accept the law of non-contradiction at least, at least one belief must be false (of course both could also be false, too, I would think -- given that real competing beliefs are not of the strict form, P or ~P, of the LNC).

The immaterialist (as defined here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7109/davidson-trivial-and-nontrivial-conceptual-schemes-a-case-study-in-translation/latest/comment) has a conceptual scheme: immaterialism. He believes the world consists entirely of mind.

The materialist has a conceptual scheme: materialism. He believes the world consists entirely of matter.

Reduce these conceptual schemes to beliefs and you have the same disconnect and very possibly the same relativism.

Would you say this sort of untranslatability is a total failure, or a partial failure?

Just wanna give credit where credit is due, you've made excellent posts this thread.

:) Thanks. I feel the warm fuzzies of flattery.

Would you say this sort of untranslatability is a total failure, or a partial failure? — Moliere

Partial failure inasmuch as the immaterialist and materialist behave in a similar way, suggesting a common core of practical beliefs. I can't really imagine an example of total failure apart from a case of severe psychosis.

Yes. But he also does make an argument for this, too -- not just to accept it by fiat. And it's important to note, I believe, that this is in the section against total untranslatability. So even if meaning has more to it than the truth of convention-T -- we're talking about two languages which share nothing in common, no meaning whatsoever.

So German and English, for instance, can both express some similar meanings even if the meanings are not exactly the same. — Moliere

:up:

Partial failure in as much as the immaterialist and materialist behave in a similar way, suggesting a common core of practical beliefs. I can't really imagine a case of total failure apart from examples of severe psychosis. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Cool.

So let's take a trip into partial untranslatability.

But first I feel it important to note that these are stock characters -- the materialist and the immaterialist. At least they are stock characters unless you happen to have some specific philosophers you have in mind. I mean I can imagine referencing Berkeley vs. Epicurus, as some sort of arch- versions of both, but they didn't speak to one another and I'm just conjuring them up as arch-examples.

I feel that's important to note because I'm kinda super into history-of-whatever. That's my jam. So stock characters stand as paradigmatic (to us) examples of thought, not as real examples. And the reason I like the historical approach so much is that it often dispels these phantoms of thought and imagination when we look closely.



So partial untranslatability. I will admit that the Ketch and Yawl example seems *extremely* close. And kinda. . .. uhhh... let's just say poor people have to google to understand it. All the same -- I think it makes sense to say that we do, in fact, reinterpret our conversation partners words to mean something else. They don't have to mean what we think they mean. And the closeness of the example is actually strong because it shows one case where we are very close but, rather than attributing a belief to another person, we accept the belief and reinterpret the words.

That's big.

And I think one good thing Davidson notes is that we do this on pain of not being understood.


So we have our stock characters. I think the more popular example of stock characters are the atheist materialist and the Christian spiritualist. In that situation -- might the people involved wish to be misunderstood? Maybe not consciously. That's a psychological matter. But maybe they just want to assert their belief and have others believe it.

I don't want this to be read universally. But, at least ,as an explanation for some -- maybe the examples we are all thinking of, I hope -- of our experiences with conceptual schemes?

Tell me what you think.

That's an excellent summation. You've grasped the argument.

Now I have to admit though that I don't know what Davidson means by charity is a condition of a workable theory. — Moliere

I take him to be talking about a workable theory of the meaing of another language - and hence, that in order to understand an alien language we must assume that overwhelmingly they believe much the same sort of thing as we do.

The only sticking point I have found here is with folk - @Metaphysician Undercover, for one - who cannot see that Davidson is talking about our beliefs as a whole, and so focus on the very small number of beliefs about which we disagree. OF course, these are the ones we find most interesting and hence that we spend the most time on.

As for the last paragraph... I think it has to do with his attitude towards belief. See how Isaac can read the article but still adhere to something like this:

Ramsey is a pragmatist about truth (in his later work). The Ramsey-Prior theory states that

T) a is true if and only if for some p, a is a (belief) that p and p. — Isaac

(I'm going to use belief to stand in for a whloe bunch of propositional attitudes...)

It seems the need to link truth and belief is for some overwhelming - and it's clear why; we want our beliefs to be true, after all.

But I think one of the cogent ideas in Davidson is the divide between belief and truth.

It's obvious that we can believe things that are true, and that we can believe things that are false. What is less obvious perhaps is that this implies a chasm between belief and truth. They are different sorts of things - or better, they do quite different things in our language.

So the proposal is the modified T-sentence

s is true IFF p, and p is believed

There are several errors in this formulation. To its credit, it does stop one issue - it allows us to be mistaken, in that we can have a false belief, in which case s will not be true. But notice that this is also the case with the original T-sentence, so that's not a gain. A bigger issue is that it stops there from being things that are true but not believed. So it prevents the sort of mistake in which something is true and yet not believed.

Suppose I leave the phone at work, but I believe that it is lost. Is it true that the phone is at work? We get:

The phone is at work IFF (the phone is at work and it is believed that the phone is at work).

But it isn't believed that the phone is at work; hence it is not, by this grammar, true that the phone is at work.

The other big issue with the modified T-sentence is its failure to tell us who is holding the belief. Beliefs, being propositional attitudes, are not single-place predications, but relations between an actor and a statement. John believes... We Believe...

Can we modify the already modified T-sentence to accommodate this? The obvious modification is telling...

s is true for A IFF (p and p is believed by A)

...truth is relative to the believer, and we are back to relativism

So we should reject this modified T-sentence.

So, @Moliere, this attempt to reacquaint truth and belief fails.

Why is it important to philosophers to find links between belief and truth? They want their beliefs to be true; and erroneously think that the answer is to find what it is that links belief and truth. THat is, they want to understand what counts as good reasons for a belief.

But the world does not work that way. The world does what it will, regardless of what we believe.

And it's this segregation of belief and truth that is behind those last few paragraphs.

I don't quite grasp how Davidson overcomes linguistic relativity. Has this been demonstrated yet?

I explained above why we ought reject this reformulated T-sentence.

The Queen never farts.

If, and of course this never happens, but if the queen were to fart, those around her would not notice, and the event would never be mentioned, nor even remembered, and certainly never believed.

But of course, the Queen never farts.

What's

linguistic relativity — Wallows

In a nutshell, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which I've been bragging about hereabouts, somewhat earlier.

@Isaac I think the problem you see with neuroscience comes from the introduction of a bit of recursion.

Davidson rejects the notion of paradigms - changing the language a bit - but does not reject scientific theories. He rejects the notion that Newtonian and relativistic physics are utterly different languages. He does not reject Newtonian and relativistic physics.

He rejects the notion of conceptual schemes, but not the beliefs claimed to be within those conceptual schemes.

The recursion mentioned above comes about because the theories that interest you are about how those beliefs are formed.

SO I like especially your example of a child not having a theory of mind - I deal with such folk. It's tempting to say that they do not have the concept that others have a mind distinct from their own. I think that's a mischaracterisation; I think we get closer to the truth when we talk about their not having a belief in the minds of others.

Damn. I don't have time to finish this thought. Roughly, I suggest we dispose of the notion of concepts and just talk in terms of belief. I suspect your problem will dissipate should we do so.

That's what this thread is about.

That's what this thread is about. — Banno

And, thus, I have demonstrated that, in at least an epistemological sense, that linguistic relativity is true?

So the proposal is the modified T-sentence

s is true IFF p, and p is believed

There are several errors in this formulation. To its credit, it does stop one issue - it allows us to be mistaken, in that we can have a false belief, in which case s will not be true. But notice that this is also the case with the original T-sentence, so that's not a gain. A bigger issue is that it stops there from being things that are true but not believed. So it prevents the sort of mistake in which something is true and yet not believed.

Suppose I leave the phone at work, but I believe that it is lost. Is it true that the phone is at work? We get:

The phone is at work IFF (the phone is at work and it is believed that the phone is at work).

But it isn't believed that the phone is at work; hence it is not, by this grammar, true that the phone is at work. — Banno

If it is only propositions which are true or false, then If no one believes anything about something then there are no propositions about that something, and it follows that there can be nothing true about that something. The actuality of something means that there are potentially true statements about that something, but there cannot be anything true about it, if truth is merely the property of statements or propositions, and no statements about it have been made, or no propositions about it have been formed.

The other alternative would be to equate truth with actuality, and to say that a true statement expresses, presents or describes actuality. This just is the correspondence account, Aristotle's account and, I remain convinced, the essential logic of the T-sentence.

As to your "phone" example, you believe something about it, which is contradictory to what is the case; your belief about it is false, therefore it can be true that it is at work.

So, your formulation above could be modified to:

s is true IFF p, and p is believed OR
s is true IFF p, and not-p is believed

ah! That's... very nice and good. Thank you.

Gotta think.

Also, whilst I have fielded a few retorts today... well, you know -- family, life, and all that. Be back in a bit.

He rejects the notion of conceptual schemes, but not the beliefs claimed to be within those conceptual schemes. — Banno

If the essence of a conceptual scheme can be located in a far-ranging belief, are we back to square one? Back to an essentially (although a belief- rather than a concept-based) relativistic picture?

What is the significance of the rejection of conceptual schemes if our beliefs continue to paint a picture of fundamentally different ontologies (and sister -ologies)?

So let's take a trip into partial untranslatability. — Moliere

Thanks for the response. I'm busy with the human stuff today. Will respond to this soon. Like you: the earth calls us out of the clouds.