Do you prefer the Magic Bang answer? Is that satisfying to you? Apparently, it's not for many astronomers, who postulate a hypothetical Multiverse as a "turtles all the way down" alternative to the mathematical creation event. How is that better than a One Big Turtle solution? Does an infinity of invisible universes satisfy your curiosity about an origin theory that most scientists at first rejected as a religious explanation?. My thesis does not try to explain G*D, but merely takes the First Cause hypothesis as a reasonable axiom. After that assumption, it's all a process of Enformation (applied mathematics). My reason for pursuing that hypothesis is because all materialistic explanations ignore Qualia, which is of more significance to living humans than dead Matter and aimless Energy.God did it! What a satisfying answer, let us pretend that explains everything about us and our world, so we are only left to explain it all over again for the gods and their worlds. Why make the problem worse for no reason at all? — Zelebg
I'm familiar with Laszlo , but not with that abstruse theory. However, the term sounds like Cartesian Dualism to me. His solution was "neat", in that it got the church off his back, by arbitrarily defining Non-Overlapping Magisteria. And materialistic Science has flourished for centuries since cutting itself off from Philosophy and Metaphysics. But since the Quantum revolution in Science, the overlap between Mind & Matter has become ever harder to ignore. Anyway, I'll check it out, because the notion of Complementarity is essential to my own abstruse thesis. :smile:It absolutely does address the hard problem of consciousness. The solution is called "biperspectivism". It as quite neat. — Pantagruel
my reason for pursuing that hypothesis is because all materialistic explanations ignore Qualia, which is of more significance to living humans than dead Matter and aimless Energy. — Gnomon
That's the spooky magic (@180 Proof) that emergentism about phenomenal consciousness claims happens. — Pfhorrest
My thesis does not try to explain G*D, but merely takes the First Cause hypothesis as a reasonable axiom
Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is.
Everything we know in science dealing with the natural phenomena, every law, discovery, explanation... everything is about some kind of motion, — Zelebg
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
There is a distinction between distraction and daydreaming, yes?
More to the point, it's about something which is objective.
Functional properties can emerge from complex arrangements of other things with simpler functional properties, but if some wholly new irreducible thing is supposed to emerge, you’re talking magic.
Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete explaination
From your description in that other thread, that is exactly the same thing that I am talking about under the more traditional name of panpsychism. It says nothing at all about the "emergence" of things with "cognitive descriptions [...] appropriate for the internal/introspective perspective" (phenomenal consciousness) from things without one, which is the meaning of "emergence" used in philosophy of mind, in the sense that distinguishes it from panpsychism. — Pfhorrest
To that end, you would still be left with the metaphysical mystery of causation (or Will), right? — 3017amen
No. Simply another emergent phenomenon within a nested-hierarchical system of complex-adaptive systems (CAS). Explicable with respect to the properties of top-level system. — Pantagruel
Is there not a possible reality where that statement is actually the answer, and what exactly would be missing from that description to make it fully satisfying? — Zelebg
Neither is perceptible to touch.Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. — Pantagruel
Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. Yet it is also just as mysterious as the underlying laws governing universal forces.
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