That’s how I understand it as well, in Platonism. Enlightenment philosophy subsequently dropped objects of mind down a peg or two, making them equal in degree of reality with objects of sense, calling them both representations, but arising from different faculties, thus having different rules of use — Mww

The key point being that this enabled philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter - as everything became. (Glad at least someone else gets it, although in this matter it’s oddly reassuring to be thought wrong by almost everyone.)

"They're objects of mind." If they're objects of mind, does not that place them in the mind in the sense that matters here? — tim wood

The point I want to make is that such objects would be found by any mind in any possible world. They're not dependent on the human mind for their reality, but are independent of any and all minds. However they can only be grasped by a mind. That is the sense in which they're 'objects of mind'.

What evolutionary naturalism says is that ideas are the product of the evolutionary process, which can then be understood through the prism of genetics and neurobiology, which therefore grounds knowledge in the exigencies of biology and in the phenomenal domain. That is, nowadays, the single largest factor underlying empiricist and naturalist philosophy, and what vitiates it (as spelled out in Thomas Nagel's 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False.)

Without denying the facts of evolutionary biology, I am arguing that at the point of the development of language and reason, h. sapiens is no longer understandable solely through the evolutionary perspective, but is capable of insights into the nature of being which are beyond anything available through a purely biological perspective. In other words, to understand that which transcends the biological and the phenomenal. Platonism, generally, is one of the products of that capacity, and many of those criticising it fail to even understand what it is they’re wanting to negate.

The key point being that this enabled philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter - as everything became. — Wayfarer

I‘ll be the first to say I guess I don’t get it after all. You said logical principles were higher reality objects of the mind. I said later philosophy put sense objects and objects of the mind at more or less equal reality, all as objects of the mind. Then you said this allowed philosophers, presumably in Plato’s time, to regard ideas properties of matter.

I can’t make the connection from universals, which apply to logic as I understand it and to real objects in general, re: universal forms (?) but where do whatever allowed philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter make the scene? Even if I don’t grant logical principles as universals having a higher reality but see how it can be said to be that way, how do I get from that to properties of matter?

My favored.......and long-ingrained......epistemological framework is getting in the way.

I can’t make the connection from universals, which apply to logic as I understand it and to real objects in general, re: universal forms (?) but where do whatever allowed philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter make the scene? Even if I don’t grant logical principles as universals having a higher reality but see how it can be said to be that way, how do I get from that to properties of matter? — Mww

Because there's a connection between 'ideas' and 'forms'. The platonic 'ideas' are in some sense like archetypes or essences, the forms that give a particular its identity as a type.

The reason they were judged to be 'higher' is because their forms or types are universal, i.e. socrates is an examplar of the universal 'man'. This is what informed 'hylo-moprhic' i.e. matter-form dualism. The matter was basically dumb stuff out of which particular things are fashioned. (Actually Aristotle adopted a word for 'timber', hyle, as generic 'stuff'.)

So from there it's not too great a leap to suppose that the 'maker' of individual particulars is Plato's demiurgos, who later becomes identified as 'God' by Greek-speaking Christian philosophers.'

Also consider how this intuition went on to become the basis of scientific taxonomy, as originated by Aristotle, and later refined by Linnaeus.

Have a look at this passage.

One thing to note about universals expressed within the Plato writings; There are many different views about what participating in the expression of a form is like. The interest in the matter was not just about validating a set of presuppositions but an investigation of what what was going on.

Substitute any empirical unity. All trees are the unity of trees, but the unity of trees doesn’t explain why some are hardwoods and some are soft, some broadleaf, some needle leaf. There’s something more needed than just being trees, to facilitate trees being hardwoods. — Mww

Ah, yes, that's clear. So we have something like subsets. I like the idea that concepts exist in a system or a web. To make sense of one is to rely on others close by in the network.

I won’t fight over that. Intersubjective still leaves concepts as purely subjective constructs with possibly real objects which conform to them, which we call experience. — Mww

Right, and I agree with that. All that I personally add is that this subject is not quite absolute, in the sense that subject is one more concept/object in the (ideally or largely) impersonal and interpersonal concept scheme. In short, I think there's some truth in 'language speaks the subject.' To be sure, common sense almost demands that we focus on consciousnesses in individual brain being linked by language and action.

Might interest you to know that Popper co-authored a book with neuroscientist Sir John Eccles on dualist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

Dualism gets something right. In practice, we seem to live and talk as dualists. We all agree pre-theoretically that there are dreams and chairs. I'll look into Eccles.

One person understands something about the world and teaches - communicates with - others so that they understand; the knowledge then, because that is what it is, becoming a general community property (of those educated and able to understand). And where is this general community property kept? Nowhere else but in the minds of individuals, there being enough of them to obscure the nature of the keeping place(s). — tim wood

I agree with this framing of the situation. The issue seems to be about the interpretations of minds, communities, and languages, all of which are obviously intimately related. We can talk about 'understandings of being' or 'impersonal conceptual schemes' or 'non-material realms.' We call also imagine signifieds somehow disconnected from their signifiers, (pure) meaning apart from and above all the sounds and marks that we nevertheless need to store and transmit it.

Ideal, universal truth seems to assume a ideal, universal human nature. All rational minds can repeat the 'meaning act' and join in the single truth. Does some organ in us gaze into a realm that is not material? I think this is metaphorically true. What do we mean if we say more? But what is the material world that the tough minded offer for contrast? Another metaphorical separation of a lived unity?

I am arguing that at the point of the development of language and reason, h. sapiens is no longer understandable solely through the evolutionary perspective, but is capable of insights into the nature of being which are beyond anything available through a purely biological perspective. — Wayfarer

I think this is true. We are symbolic, historical, metaphorical beings. We are profoundly social, able to talk across oceans with our sharing in English.

He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. — A

However we position platonic ideas or concepts, we are beasts without them --not fully human. So we are not fully human without our fundamental tool, which we might call meaning or intellect. And this tool is intrinsically social. Does the debate boil down to deciding what to call this stuff that a community swims in? The stuff that makes private theorizing and disagreement possible in the first place?

Can be boil down the question to this? Can the platonic ideas or concepts survive the death of the species?

Interesting passage. I can see the development of subsequent philosophies from it. But still, how closely did Thomist epistemology follow Platonic? We were talking Plato, yet you used Aquinas for reference, so shall I assume the latter built on the former without much advancement?

From the link:
“...Now possible intellect is supplied with an adequate stimulus to which it responds by producing a concept.”
........possible intellect assumes the name understanding, the adequate stimulus assumes the name phenomenon.

“...Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect. The product of abstraction is a species of an intelligible order...”.
........active intellect assumes the name pure reason; species of intelligible order assumes, or already had assumed, from Aristotle, the name categories.

Not too hard to see that, with physical science in general and astronomy in particular, well underway by or in the Enlightenment, this version of species-common epistemology became untenable. Thus the thesis that the matter of objects of sense are given their properties by the understanding by means of concepts, rather than “....divesting the form of every character that marks and indentifies it as a particular something...”.

Ever onward, right?

I like the idea that concepts exist in a system or a web. To make sense of one is to rely on others close by in the network. — Eee

Concepts exist in a system, yes. But the system is (mostly) used to make sense of the world, so to say relying on one member of the system to make sense of another, isn’t quite right. It would be nearer the case, that one is used in conjunction with another.....

“....Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind....”
“....understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think...”

......in order for the system to work in making sense of the world.
————————

subject is one more concept/object in the (ideally or largely) impersonal and interpersonal concept scheme. — Eee

Agreed. But the vast chronology of our individual existence is spent alone in our own heads, exempt from the interpersonal concept scheme, wherein the absolute subject rules in speechless dictatorial fashion.

Dualism gets something right. In practice, we seem to live and talk as dualists. We all agree pre-theoretically that there are dreams and chairs. — Eee

Is this to suggest dualism got something right as the exception to the rule that is usually doesn’t?

philosophies proceed... for intellectual and moral agency development - the latter being the elitist version(?) of the more populist former [religion]... I suppose, then, the inverse formulation follows: philosophy is religion for the ... elites. :yikes: — 180 Proof

Resolving the "buzzing, blooming confusion" makes of you at the least not less than an animal with a brain. More than an animal? Imho, I think you shall have to yield that both religion and philosophy, instead of being intrinsically bad, or bad-in-themselves as what-they-ares, has each its respective what-it's-for, which is to say that each can point to something both beyond and other than itself. And the only thing I can think of at the other end of that pointing is the pointer. All, if I may be brief, in service of making a person of the animal.

It may be that we can and should ask what we can do for our country, but it's useless to ask what we can do for God in any Western sense of the word. (Dunno about the East.) One can instead only ask what God can do for me, us. Which in my system of belief, let's call it primitive-Kantian, means asking oneself - or others whose views might be worth considering.

Yours, then, a clever joke, or a confusion about which end of the stick is which. I, myself, think of that end as the gooey end and try to avoid it. Sounds like you might be running 50-50, in itself a sign you might benefit from a closer look. If you manage without taking hold of the stick at any point, then you have knowledge worth the price of admission.

They're not dependent on the human mind for their reality, but are independent of any and all minds. — Wayfarer

Imo, substitute for "reality" "possibility." The realization of the possibility being the reality.

Whatever, man. I like your stream of [ ... ], maybe better once I divine it's gooey middle. :yum:

But still, how closely did Thomist epistemology follow Platonic? We were talking Plato, yet you used Aquinas for reference, so shall I assume the latter built on the former without much advancement? — Mww

They were a long way apart in many important ways, but they are still more alike than they are like anything in post-Cartesian philosophy. It is said that Aristotle rejected Plato's 'theory of ideas' but in so doing, he still preserved the theory of forms, but was said to have 'immanatised' it - rejected the idea that they are real independently outside the material forms in which they are instantiated. But Aristotle was still a student of Plato, and even where he disagreed with him, he still carried his ideas forward and Aristotle was central to later philosophy, including Aquinas (although of course Aquinas modified Aristotelian ideas to conform with Christian principles.)

But the striking thing about that particular passage I quoted is the way it lays out the principle of Aristotelian dualism with brilliant clarity - it makes profound sense to me, in a way that Cartesian dualism never did.

Can be boil down the question to this? Can the platonic ideas or concepts survive the death of the species? — Eee

As I said, were there another Earth-like planet we would have reason to assume that that culture would discover similar principles.

They're not dependent on the human mind for their reality, but are independent of any and all minds.
— Wayfarer

Imo, substitute for "reality" "possibility." The realization of the possibility being the reality. — tim wood

But, there are "real possibilities" - that is, possibilities that actually exist, and others that are mere fantasies.

What is the Schrodinger wave equation, if not a distribution of possibilities? Before an object is observed, it doesn't exist in any place, all you have is a literal potentiality, described by that equation.

three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ...At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extra -spatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility." 1.

Two points:
1) What does quantum anything have to do with Platonic ideals?
2) It is time for you to provide a rigorous definition of "reality."

When you slice and dice things this fine, you surrender the benefit of crude and gross. The equation - qua - is a set of arbitrary marks with meaning assigned to them. The marks are real, e.g., of ink and paper. Their meaning real, as an idea. This is exactly the difference between numeral and number.

Now as to the QM part: far as I know, there's nothing indeterminate about the particle. What is indeterminate is certain aspects of knowledge about the particle, the indeterminacy apparently unavoidable.

Probability real? You don't need QM for that. I toss a coin in the air - it will come own, but how? Probability is just a way of measuring ignorance - everything in the world conceals itself in some way from us behind its own curtain that keeps us out. Do you mean to say that every possible probability about everything possible everything is something real? I think that gets you into some real trouble with the physics of available space.

He compared it to the uroboros, the mythical self-eating snake, saying, 'the hardest part is the last bite'. — Wayfarer

That's a pretty sentence.

It seems to me worth adding that Plato also was much concerned with the abuses of rhetoric called sophistry, his notions of ideals coming into play as a defense against lies. That is, if you can say what something is in some sense, then you can say what it isn't. And if you can't the former, then the latter becomes difficult, contentious, ultimately a matter resolved by force. — tim wood

Yes, makes sense. Ideals as a shield against extreme relativity. It is interesting.. I wonder if a certain form of perfectionism has pervaded Western culture as a result of the notion of Ideals. If there is a perfect X, how am I not living up to that perfect X? However, in a roundabout way some evolutionary psychology purports that indeed, there may be ideal templates humans look for in things like mates (though I believe this to be too simplistic, reductionistic, and "just so" to be considered absolutely true), and just in nature in general. However, the downsides are believing things have to be "perfect" and general displeasure to anyone that doesn't live up to this standard. That's just some offhand armchair sociological implications I can see perhaps coming from the notion of Ideals.

Also, there seems to be the notion of The Good in Plato. Clearly then, perfection (seeing, understanding, experiencing, following, being the Ideal) is equated with The Good. This of course filters into late Roman and Medieval religious philosophies of understanding The Good and equating it with God (the one from Christianity). This of course, ignores particularities for generality, as the "garb" of the shadow-cave illusions of everyday life are but distortions on the pure Ideals that are not only perfect but Good.

I think again, Schopenhauer has the most interesting take on it. The reason for our aesthetic experiences of beauty in nature and art is because of the non-temporal aspect of the experience. Looking at something without "wanting" or "desiring" brings about some sort of ecstatic feeling that is not normally had in the everyday experiencing of always needing or wanting this or that particular object or experience. During the aesthetic experience one is seeing the Platonic Ideal of that object, and not the everyday distorted aspect that is in time. Again, I don't know if I agree with his theory, but it is certainly a cool twist.

Hi, just saw the thread, and I have something of interest to add as it pertains to Platonic Ideals, so please forgive the necro.

I would like to mention that a very good fiction book by Neal Stephenson called Anathem (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anathem) has platonic ideals as an integral part of reality, or at least, the argument between nominalism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism) and platonic realism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic_realism) in an interesting story narrative format.

Another major theme is the recurring philosophical debate between characters espousing mathematical Platonic realism (called "Halikaarnians" in the novel and associated with Incanters) and characters espousing nominalism (called "Procians" in the novel and who are the Rhetors).

It was the first time I was personally exposed to these ideas in such a clear and intriguing way (as opposed to introductory high school or college philosophy) that it captivated me and even now, ten years after the fact I still think about these ideas. I must admit that idea of "Ideal forms" existing independent of perceptible reality, or perhaps as emergent features of underlying reality, is an interesting topic of debate. Does the idea of "1" or "2" exist whether we can think of it? I would say that yes - just like trees falling with no-one around creates noise regardless of the availability of witnesses as a consequence of understood and generally accepted laws of physics.

The philosophical topic was so good that I would highly recommend a reading to get a different frame of reference when thinking about this topic:

As an appendix to the novel, Stephenson includes three "Calca", discussions among the avout of purely philosophical or mathematical content. ... The third discusses a "complex" Platonic realism, in which several realms of Platonic ideal forms (called the "Hylaean Theoric Worlds" in the novel) exist independently of the physical world (called the "Arbran Causal Domain" in the novel)

Now, the following is speculation, but consider:
Is it possible that "triangles" and other geometric shapes, as well as numbers and other exact concepts can exist in some sort of higher dimension beyond what is readily perceivable by our senses as base reality? Is is possible that our minds act as conscious antennas that can "receive" these ideas in thought and then apply them to the real world as shaped objects and written/spoken formulas or ideas?

I have heard from non-idiots that it is possible that a higher realm of ideas that contains all that is possible and knowable exists and we access it every time we have an insight.

It may seem like nonsensical woo, but it feels true.

Does anyone have any related material that would be worth diving into?

Thanks,
Diagonal Diogenes.

Cool, my Christmas cookies would be safe from him...

This is great. You see, I came to this forum for this discussion, that is Plato's Forms. I wrote something about them and I was wondering what others might think of the idea.

First may I ask though, in my readings of philosophy I think I have picked up from some sources that they felt that Plato's concept of Forms is considered by some to have been a major mistake that messed up philosophy for a long time after. Apparently his thinking on them was eventually rejected by Hegel based on the Atomic Theory (that was actually older than science) that objectively described all material objects, suggesting that everyone must be experiencing the same reality and basically the same way. This is the first question and what I came here to ask - Are Plato's Forms considered a problem in philosophy?

Now I am basically following that opinion but for a different reason. I'm just a simple biologist. I work on the idea that humans left the tribal ecology we were most adapted to when we created the farms and cities of civilization and now we need to adapt genetically and strategically to a new ecology that I refer to as civilization. I covered how we needed to adapt genetically and am working on how we can adapt strategically. I saw a problem and I think it relates to how we think ... going back to Plato's Forms. You see, he was looking for perfection. An engineer would know better and warn to" never let perfect be the enemy of good enough". This seems valid based on how evolution works. It never "tries" to achieve perfection. It operates on what works. So I see a problem when looking for how humans can survive into the future if their strategy is to contaminated by a quest for perfection. That is not necessarily the best way to survive. For some people it is like asking a computer to multiply by infinity. I wrote an essay on this that I feel is too long for this forum. You might find it interesting though so I'll put a link to it - What About God . It basically is about this topic but in the context of Gods such that it says that Gods before the current Christian concept of God were never like that because Plato's Philosophical ideas of Perfection were never applied to the. Most God's never had that standard applied and the result was ... weird when it was applied.

Anyway, here is the preface to that essay if you are interested.

I'm afraid that this essay cannot easily be understood without explanation, but it is extremely important. An engineer might say "do not let perfect be the enemy of good enough". Biology and evolution has operated that way as well. "Perfect" is an odd word and concept. There are basically two ways that the human mind can interpret "perfect". It can be real like a flawless work of art. It can also be imaginary like Plato's concept of Perfect Forms. The trouble is that for a human to think of anything like Plato's concept of "perfect" is very like a computer multiplying by infinity. It doesn't work. Some computers can pull out of it, some cannot let go of the problem. For humans it is the same. Some can pull out of it but for some it becomes an endless loop and it warps the rest of their view of reality. Plato's teachings became a basic part of Western thought, philosophy and religion. The concept of "perfect forms" contaminated philosophy until Hagel pointed out that the atomic theory showed that different people's perceptions of reality were the same. While this issue is discussed elsewhere in this story, this essay is mostly about how Plato's concept of "perfect" created an unusual view in religion that effects us to this day. In terms of a strategy of survival, it is probably a bad idea in the future. It really does need to be understood.

I appreciate any answers or thoughts. Thanks, Mikey

Well, maybe it is a confusion, but if we mention the ideas of, for example, a perfect circle or a perfect equilateral triangle, that is a very clear and exact meaning.

This perfect meaning would also apply to any other geometric form idea - but never to a physical object representing them.

That does not work for something complex like - a perfect car - perfect in what way? What does perfect mean in that context?

Common misuse of the "perfect" adjective applies to:
The perfect woman.
The perfect life.
The perfect marriage.
The perfect [whatever].

In the above, we can substitute "perfect" for "ideal", but even then, that necessitates the definition of qualities or measures that make it ideal - and that is impossible because the judgement of those qualities are are always subjective.

For example: The perfect woman for me has to have nice hips, while for someone else that is irrelevant but she must be a really good cook. Notice that there is no measure of what "nice hips" or "good cook" means.

As to his incompleteness theories, I do not think you understand them - maybe at all.
— tim wood

No, I have a pretty good understanding of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. — Wallows

I used to have a dog that read the New York Times and the Montreal "Gazette" regularly. He was an expert of foreign affairs, and on thick mustaches and bad teeth on women.

But of course he read the papers silently, without saying out the words. That would be stupid... nobody reads the papers aloud.

That dog, my dog, never even moved his lips while reading.

Is it possible that "triangles" and other geometric shapes, as well as numbers and other exact concepts can exist in some sort of higher dimension beyond what is readily perceivable by our senses as base reality? — Diagonal Diogenes

I'm not answering your question, but rather observing that (imo) a lot of care in defining terms is needed to make good sense. And it may happen (often does happen) that within that process the question is resolved.

It was or could be seen as an awfully strong insult what I wrote, Wallows. I did not mean to be insulting, not even cuttingly sardonic, only funny, but it came out this way, sorry, I apologize.

But then again, there is my criticism. What does anyone understand that we can only test with his or her self-reporting of his or her own understanding?

Anyone, actually everyone, understands everything, and they will even give you an explanation, right or wrong, except when they can't understand something.

what I am trying to say is that a self can't give a measure of the same self with how much or not he does or does not understand something. One can give a measure neither quantitatively, nor qualitatively how correct his own understanding of topic or subject is.

Are Plato's Forms considered a problem in philosophy? — Mikey

Fair question - an echo of the OP. I submit only a problem for folks who think it's a problem or encounter some problem with it. The encounter part might well be between people on different sides of an idea, the status of Platonic forms being part of their resolution.

You see, he was looking for perfection. — Mikey

I think he was looking for some way to give an account of the world. The Pythagoreans were looking at, into, math. But how can numbers accurately depict and give an account for the moist, messy, and imprecise world that we meet every day?

" I submit only a problem for folks" - That seems to be the problem. I have a buddy and he's a fanatic on a couple subjects - religion and free will. He is "opposed" to both, which is fine, but he's obsessed! I mean 20 years of arguing obsessed even when you ask him to go away. I'm into studying my biology. I have weird views, but I'm not nuts about it. The link goes to an article that follows up some discussion with him and sort of says that Gods were good concepts until someone applied "perfect" to one of them and a lot of bad things happened. Maybe Plato wasn't a nut case, but the people that took his ideas and ran with them seem to be.
I can go with math being called perfect if you want, but they warn you up front not do multiply by infinity or divide by zero. ... More pertinently, there are answers to those problems. "Perfect" can throw a person like my friend into an endless loop.
... Per my friend, he's also obsessed with replacing humans with machines because they are so superior to humans. "It must happen".

How are abstracts externalized in the first place?

Compare:
Some are loved, some are hated, many have known love, many have known hate. After an extinction, love and hate could be rediscovered. So, love and hate are existentially independent of any one person.
Love and hate are phenomenological experiences, qualia. Phenomenological experiences are existentially mind-dependent, i.e. subjective. So, love and hate are subjective.
Thus, commonality (independence) does not entail existential independence of persons.
Asserting otherwise might be charged with hypostatization (love and hate aren't somehow independent, though I'm sure some would say so).

What are the implications for abstracts and (the inert lifeless) Platonia, if any?
The unit-less number 7 (not a concrete count) isn't like love and hate, yet any/all concrete counts of 7 are subject to some ((re)discoverable) common rules and reasoning and such (algebra).
So, how are abstractions externalized anyway, supposedly inhabitants of some strange Platonia...?

So, how are abstractions externalized anyway, supposedly inhabitants of some strange Platonia...? — jorndoe

They aren't. And supposing they were, how would any individual or group of individuals know it/them? The extension of this is that nothing abstract or general exists in itself, but rather instead they exist as ideas, which is to say for the sake of their efficacy in certain applications in certain conditions.

The counter to this is easy. One need merely exhibit a generalization or an abstract idea that exists in itself.