That’s how I understand it as well, in Platonism. Enlightenment philosophy subsequently dropped objects of mind down a peg or two, making them equal in degree of reality with objects of sense, calling them both representations, but arising from different faculties, thus having different rules of use — Mww
"They're objects of mind." If they're objects of mind, does not that place them in the mind in the sense that matters here? — tim wood
The key point being that this enabled philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter - as everything became. — Wayfarer
I can’t make the connection from universals, which apply to logic as I understand it and to real objects in general, re: universal forms (?) but where do whatever allowed philosophers to regard ideas as properties of matter make the scene? Even if I don’t grant logical principles as universals having a higher reality but see how it can be said to be that way, how do I get from that to properties of matter? — Mww
Substitute any empirical unity. All trees are the unity of trees, but the unity of trees doesn’t explain why some are hardwoods and some are soft, some broadleaf, some needle leaf. There’s something more needed than just being trees, to facilitate trees being hardwoods. — Mww
I won’t fight over that. Intersubjective still leaves concepts as purely subjective constructs with possibly real objects which conform to them, which we call experience. — Mww
Might interest you to know that Popper co-authored a book with neuroscientist Sir John Eccles on dualist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer
One person understands something about the world and teaches - communicates with - others so that they understand; the knowledge then, because that is what it is, becoming a general community property (of those educated and able to understand). And where is this general community property kept? Nowhere else but in the minds of individuals, there being enough of them to obscure the nature of the keeping place(s). — tim wood
I am arguing that at the point of the development of language and reason, h. sapiens is no longer understandable solely through the evolutionary perspective, but is capable of insights into the nature of being which are beyond anything available through a purely biological perspective. — Wayfarer
He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. — A
I like the idea that concepts exist in a system or a web. To make sense of one is to rely on others close by in the network. — Eee
subject is one more concept/object in the (ideally or largely) impersonal and interpersonal concept scheme. — Eee
But still, how closely did Thomist epistemology follow Platonic? We were talking Plato, yet you used Aquinas for reference, so shall I assume the latter built on the former without much advancement? — Mww
Can be boil down the question to this? Can the platonic ideas or concepts survive the death of the species? — Eee
They're not dependent on the human mind for their reality, but are independent of any and all minds.
— Wayfarer
Imo, substitute for "reality" "possibility." The realization of the possibility being the reality. — tim wood
three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ...At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.
“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extra -spatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility." 1.
He compared it to the uroboros, the mythical self-eating snake, saying, 'the hardest part is the last bite'. — Wayfarer
It seems to me worth adding that Plato also was much concerned with the abuses of rhetoric called sophistry, his notions of ideals coming into play as a defense against lies. That is, if you can say what something is in some sense, then you can say what it isn't. And if you can't the former, then the latter becomes difficult, contentious, ultimately a matter resolved by force. — tim wood
Another major theme is the recurring philosophical debate between characters espousing mathematical Platonic realism (called "Halikaarnians" in the novel and associated with Incanters) and characters espousing nominalism (called "Procians" in the novel and who are the Rhetors).
As an appendix to the novel, Stephenson includes three "Calca", discussions among the avout of purely philosophical or mathematical content. ... The third discusses a "complex" Platonic realism, in which several realms of Platonic ideal forms (called the "Hylaean Theoric Worlds" in the novel) exist independently of the physical world (called the "Arbran Causal Domain" in the novel)
As to his incompleteness theories, I do not think you understand them - maybe at all.
— tim wood
No, I have a pretty good understanding of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. — Wallows
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