A statement that does not answer a question or solve a problem is not a fact. It is just a string of words that has no meaning or value. It does not contain a scintilla of 'truth'. — ovdtogt

You didn't answer my question.

Statements are about facts. You making a statement is another fact for a different context.

So... I've misunderstood then.

What is truth a property of? — creativesoul

Propositions.

But what I am interested in - what we are being asked when we are asked "what is truth?' is not what a proposition is, but what this property of truth is.

A proposition - whatever one of those is - is true when it is asserted by Reason. That is, the property of 'truth' and the property of 'being asserted by Reason' are one and the same. As long as we agree that propositions can be asserted, it does not really matter - for the sake of my analysis of truth - exactly what a proposition is.

I did not express a position on propositions... — Bartricks

So... I've misunderstood then.

What is truth a property of? — creativesoul

Propositions. — Bartricks

:death:

...what I am interested in - what we are being asked when we are asked "what is truth?' is not what a proposition is, but what this property of truth is. — Bartricks

If truth is a property of a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is all truth. That is what you obligate yourself to hold... on pains of incoherence, self-contradiction.

The problem is that that is not true.

Furthermore, if you cannot set out what a proposition is, then it does not belong in the lexicon.

This is getting painful.

Truth is a property of propositions.

That is not an analysis of truth. Nor is it an analysis of propositions.

For an analogy, "water is wet". That's not an analysis of water. Not is it an analysis of wetness.

Now, my view about truth - truth and not another thing - is that it is made of Reason's assertions. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for it to be being asserted by Reason.

That's not a theory about propositions. It is a theory about truth.

So, again, my theory is about truth, not propositions. In saying that truth is a property of propositions I am not thereby taking a stand on what propositions are, anymore than in saying that apples are spherical I am taking a stand on what shape is.

Truth is a property of propositions. — Bartricks

Do you believe that that statement is true?

If truth is a property of a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is all truth. That is what you obligate yourself to hold... on pains of incoherence, self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Yes, if those dubious theses are true, then truth could not exist independently of a language.

So? How does that contradict my analysis of truth?

Again - I don't sign up to those claims (not until I see powerful evidence in support of them - which there may be, of course). I am just pointing out that none of them are inconsistent with my analysis of truth.

Truth is a property of propositions. — Bartricks
Do you believe that that statement is true? — creativesoul

Yes, clearly. I am being sincere.

From the Pontius Pilate question, it is presented in the accepted Gospels as an observation upon the process of judgement Pilate is carrying out. Something like:

I make decisions all the time so how would this be different?

So, if one was to present an argument to a question that is largely rhetorical, how would one proceed?

I am taking the question at face value. It really doesn't matter why Pontius Pilate asked it, or whether he was sincere in asking it.

I'm calling bullshit here.

I've shown how your criterion for what counts as "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. Truth cannot be false. Therefore, your criterion is rejected.

I thought you were going to argue for true propositions having the property of truth. But, if you do not know what propositions are, then that's a bit too much to expect and/or ask of you...

I'm calling bullshit here. — creativesoul

Well, bullshit isn't a performative of creativesoul. It isn't bullshit, it is an analysis of truth that you simply do not understand. Not my fault.

I've shown how your criterion for what counts as "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. Truth cannot be false. Therefore, your criterion is rejected. — creativesoul

I have already replied to this unargued for claim, and you have just blithely ignored what I said.

Tell you what, you tell me what the status of "this proposition is false" is (is it true, or false, or both?) and then we'll see if your answer - your answer - is consistent with my analysis of truth (pssst, it will be).

I thought you were going to argue for true propositions having the property of truth. But, if you do not know what propositions are, then that's a bit too much to expect and/or ask of you... — creativesoul

Er, yes, true propositions have the property of truth. Duh.

I do know what propositions are, but this thread is not about them. This thread is also not about sparrows, which is why I am not talking about sparrows. I know what a sparrow is, but this thread is not about them.

An example of your reasoning:

Bartricks: Truth is a performative of Reason

Creativesoul: Sparrows depend on worms, therefore truth depends on worms

Bartricks: eh? This thread is about truth, not sparrows

Creativesoul: Do you agree that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true?

Bartricks: Well, no - I don't think sparrows depend on worms. But even if they did, how would the truth of that proposition show that truth depends on worms?

Creativesoul: Because if the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true, then truth depends on worms, because it is only if sparrows really do depend on worms that the proposition is true.

Bartricks: That doesn't follow at all. I am talking about what the property of truth is. The fact that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true - not a claim I have made, incidentally - does not show that truth itself depends on worms.

Creativesoul: do you agree that worms?

Bartricks: eh? that doesn't make sense.

Creativesoul: well, I'm calling bullshit on this - you clearly don't even know what a worm is.

If you believe that that's a true report of our exchange, then I've nothing further, it says all that need said about how well your notion of truth actually works in practice...

How is this any different than saying that the universe is filled with information/facts that is the answer to some question? — Harry Hindu

The Universe is not filled with facts. Facts are constructs of the mind. And they can only be considered 'Facts" if they contain 'truths. And 'truths' solve problems or answer questions.

Jolly good. It was hurtfully accurate wasn't it?

I am taking the question at face value. It really doesn't matter why Pontius Pilate asked it, or whether he was sincere in asking it. — Bartricks

Face value. What is that?
I think Pontius was trying to ask that question along with the others.

Face value. What is that? — Valentinus

I mean taking it as a sincere question.

I think Pontius was trying to ask that question along with the others. — Valentinus

Doubt it, as he didn't stay to hear the answer.

But anyway, I am asking the question sincerely and I am offering an answer to it.

On the basis of what would reason assert anything to be the case? Is it not possible that the bases could differ in different contexts? — Janus

If she thinks something is the case, then it is the case. On what basis does she think things? Well, I am not sure. Surely some thoughts are just basic - they are not 'based' on anything else, they are just thought.

How about blending all of these various positions and look for truths that correspond to reality, are useful and cohere with whatever that needs cohering, IF that's possible. — TheMadFool

Well, because some of those theories are false and some are not competitors (because they're different kinds of theory).

For example, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to be a theory of truth at all, but a theory about when a proposition is true. So it is not a rival view. It is a vacuous view about something else.

Everyone agrees that a proposition is true when it corresponds to reality. But what does it mean - are we any the wiser about what truth itself is? No, for it is really to say no more than that a proposition is true when it is true. It can't be denied, but it says nothing substantial.

As well as being uninformative, it doesn't even address the question. For the question is not "when is a proposition true?" but "what is truth?" My answer to that question is that truth is made of Reason's assertions. That is, what it is for a proposition to be true is for its content to be being asserted by Reason.

Why try and blend a theory with others when the theory in question appears to be true and rival views appear false or vacuous or to be theories about something else?

What about pragmatism and truth? — TheMadFool

This was addressed in the OP. A useful proposition can still be false, as is manifest to the reason of virtually everyone. So pragmatism is false.

I do not mean to question your sincerity. I was trying to take the Pilate reference seriously.
Now that you abandon it, I am not sure what it has to do with something.

I am not sure what you mean by

trying to take the Pilate reference seriously. — Valentinus

He did ask that question, or did if the bible is accurate. And no doubt Jesus would have taken him seriously. But, as Francis Bacon put it "what is truth? asked jesting Pilate, but would not stay for an answer".

Anyway, as this is a philosophy forum and the question "what is truth?", like the questions "what is morality?" and "what is time?" is squarely philosophical, I am attempting to answer it.

The answer, it seems to me, is that truth is a performative of Reason. An answer likely to please Jesus, of course, as this would make Reason into God.

If we weren't ignorant we wouldn't ask questions because we'd already have all the facts. — Harry Hindu

Where do you have them, and how do you know? You're claiming no questioning. What summons them, then?

but in your quote it suddenly becomes a performative of 'my' reason. But 'my' reason (and 'your' reason) are faculties, not Reason itself. — Bartricks

If Reason is not what someone does (small-r reason?), but is instead Reason not done by someone, then what is it?

Your argument isn't so bad, it's just built on sand. In no way do I claim that we do not and cannot arrive at something we call the truth is this case, or the truth in that case. I do claim that the thing called "truth" in any case resists being generalized in any way, and remains itself the particular truth in question. That is, that which is true in that case. In a completely abstract sense we can refer to a collection of trues as "truths," but it doesn't get us closer to any goal.

If you're relying on JTB, do some research on it.

I suppose the difficulty I have with your argument isn't so much that it's all wrong in some sense, but rather that it claims to be categorically all right. But let's try this, if your reason, or what you call Reason, persuades you that something is true, what exactly does that mean?

You are still conflating my view with a quite different one.

I have argued that truth is a performative of Reason. That is, when Reason asserts a proposition, that proposition is true. It is not that she confers truth on it, it is that being true and being asserted by Reason are one and the same.

My reason is a faculty. We can distinguish between sight and what is seen. Sight is a faculty. but we do not see sight. We see sensible objects. We see sensible objects with our sight.

My reason is a faculty just as my sight is. But my reason does not acquaint me with sensible objects - not directly, anyway - but with what Reason commands, values, and asserts. Not infallibly, of course - no more than my sight infallibly acquaints me with the sensible. The important point, however, is that though my reason acquaints me with what Reason asserts, my reason does not assert anything.

Another analogy: I give you a note on which is written "shut the window!" I am clearly telling you to shut the window. But the note isn't telling you to do anything. I am, via the note. Likewise, my reason tells me what Reason wants me to do, and to believe, and what Reason herself asserts. But my reason itself doesn't want me to do or believe anything, nor does it assert anything.

So, there is Reason - the asserter, the commander, the valuer - and then there is our faculty of reason (the means by which we gain some acquaintance with what Reason asserts, commands, values).

there's a world of difference between the two and it is a category error to confuse Reason with our reason.

Anyway, truth is what Reason - that which my reason gives me fallible insight into - asserts.

My faculty, being a faculty, does not 'assert' anything. That's like thinking my sight sees. My faculty of reason asserts nothing. Nor does yours.

Reason does assert things.

Reason, being assertive, must be a person, for only persons can make assertions.

Note, this is something that can be validly concluded from this analysis of truth.

Now you have said that my argument is build on sand. I see no justification for that claim. My argument appears to me to be very strong.

For surely it is a good idea to ask the question "when would we be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands?"?

And what is the answer to that question? Well, that we - we who are using reason to find out what's true - will be satisfied when it is clear to us all that Reason asserts the theory in question to be true.

Well, if that's what it would take for us to be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands, then it stands to Reason that this should be our working hypothesis about what truth itself is.

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it.

Now, that's not a weak argument. If you think it is, highlight the weak step and show me the firmer ground to step on.

If you're relying on JTB, do some research on it. — tim wood

What makes you think I haven't?

I was careful to say that knowledge involves - involves - having a justified true belief. That's not the same as saying that those elements are sufficient for knowledge.

If she thinks something is the case, then it is the case. On what basis does she think things? Well, I am not sure. Surely some thoughts are just basic - they are not 'based' on anything else, they are just thought. — Bartricks

If you don't know why "she" thinks things are the case, then how do you know that "her" thinking them to be the case makes them true? Also, if reason alone can determine truth, and we are reasonable beings, then we should be able to know what is true and what not; otherwise what use is reason to us on your understanding?

My reason is a faculty just as my sight is. But my reason does not acquaint me with sensible objects - not directly, anyway - but with what Reason commands, values, and asserts. Not infallibly, of course - no more than my sight infallibly acquaints me with the sensible. The important point, however, is that though my reason acquaints me with what Reason asserts, my reason does not assert anything. — Bartricks

Fair enough. I get it. Would you allow that Reason could be metaphorically described as a (the) set of tools/filters that allow reason to judge that something is true or not?

For surely it is a good idea to ask the question "when would we be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands?" And what is the answer to that question? Well, that we - we who are using reason to find out what's true - will be satisfied when it is clear to us all that Reason asserts the theory in question to be true. — Bartricks

Giveth and taketh away. Let's set aside the circularity in this, because I don't think that's necessarily fatal. But you've give us an is when definition. Truth is when Reason says its true - and this gets a lot of the world's work done. But we agree that rReason is fallible, but does it not seem to you that if the essence of a thing is got, then that cannot be fallible, unless a thing can both be and not be under the same rule, which it seems to me truth must not be, and in any case is not very reasonable?

Two approaches: first an Aristotelian genus-species division with whatever can be added. The genus: truth is a quality of propositions such that (species) by appropriately applied standards and demonstrations what they assert compels assent. Hmm. Like but unlike yours. Do you see in this where your one of Reason becomes a many, and truth becomes that which is true?

The other is Heideggerian, using his so-called as-structure: what is truth when it is functioning as truth. But this is a matter of use and function, that is, an account, and not to my way of thinking an account of what it is - although I'm pretty sure that Heidegger would dismiss that as a waste of time.

Maybe one more question, or two. Does Reason make truth, or simply recognize it (or both, of course)? If there is any truth that Reason merely recognizes, then what is it that Reason recognizes, because it must be something prior to Reason itself? Or if truth is a product of reason, then is it a one or a many? And what does Reason use in making it? And if it's both, they must be different, yes?

Finally, maybe, if truth is propositional truth, made of words in particular combinations, you would agree that the words themselves are not the truth (being neither more nor less than just words) - but what else is there in a proposition that would lend itself to a categorical definition of truth?

My point in all this is to persuade you to see that while you can indeed slice off a bit of truth as you need it, truth itself is not at all so easily accessible, if at all!

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it. — Bartricks

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false.

For example, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to be a theory of truth at all, but a theory about when a proposition is true. So it is not a rival view. It is a vacuous view about something else. — Bartricks

You say that truths are different to truth. The former I interpret as facts of the world while the latter is a property of propositions and you claim that the correspondence theory of truth fails because you think it's about propositions rather than the world.

Well, consider what we mean by truths. If there is an actual difference between truths and true propositions we should be able to get our hands on a truth that isn't a proposition. Can we do that? No. This implies that truths are nothing more than true propositions and the truth of a proposition is best evaluated by assessing how a given proposition corresponds in meaning with the real world.

The correspondence theory of truth of propositions lets us know truths

I've got it. Truth is existence, and existence is everything humanity as a whole can comprehend, so therefore the smarter we are, the more truth there is, because in the end, if there is no one to hear a tree falling then it doesn't really make a sound.