You didn't answer my question.A statement that does not answer a question or solve a problem is not a fact. It is just a string of words that has no meaning or value. It does not contain a scintilla of 'truth'. — ovdtogt
So... I've misunderstood then.
What is truth a property of? — creativesoul
I did not express a position on propositions... — Bartricks
So... I've misunderstood then.
What is truth a property of? — creativesoul
Propositions. — Bartricks
...what I am interested in - what we are being asked when we are asked "what is truth?' is not what a proposition is, but what this property of truth is. — Bartricks
Truth is a property of propositions. — Bartricks
If truth is a property of a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is all truth. That is what you obligate yourself to hold... on pains of incoherence, self-contradiction. — creativesoul
Truth is a property of propositions. — Bartricks
Do you believe that that statement is true? — creativesoul
I'm calling bullshit here. — creativesoul
I've shown how your criterion for what counts as "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. Truth cannot be false. Therefore, your criterion is rejected. — creativesoul
I thought you were going to argue for true propositions having the property of truth. But, if you do not know what propositions are, then that's a bit too much to expect and/or ask of you... — creativesoul
The Universe is not filled with facts. Facts are constructs of the mind. And they can only be considered 'Facts" if they contain 'truths. And 'truths' solve problems or answer questions.How is this any different than saying that the universe is filled with information/facts that is the answer to some question? — Harry Hindu
I am taking the question at face value. It really doesn't matter why Pontius Pilate asked it, or whether he was sincere in asking it. — Bartricks
Face value. What is that? — Valentinus
I think Pontius was trying to ask that question along with the others. — Valentinus
On the basis of what would reason assert anything to be the case? Is it not possible that the bases could differ in different contexts? — Janus
How about blending all of these various positions and look for truths that correspond to reality, are useful and cohere with whatever that needs cohering, IF that's possible. — TheMadFool
What about pragmatism and truth? — TheMadFool
trying to take the Pilate reference seriously. — Valentinus
Where do you have them, and how do you know? You're claiming no questioning. What summons them, then?If we weren't ignorant we wouldn't ask questions because we'd already have all the facts. — Harry Hindu
If Reason is not what someone does (small-r reason?), but is instead Reason not done by someone, then what is it?but in your quote it suddenly becomes a performative of 'my' reason. But 'my' reason (and 'your' reason) are faculties, not Reason itself. — Bartricks
If she thinks something is the case, then it is the case. On what basis does she think things? Well, I am not sure. Surely some thoughts are just basic - they are not 'based' on anything else, they are just thought. — Bartricks
My reason is a faculty just as my sight is. But my reason does not acquaint me with sensible objects - not directly, anyway - but with what Reason commands, values, and asserts. Not infallibly, of course - no more than my sight infallibly acquaints me with the sensible. The important point, however, is that though my reason acquaints me with what Reason asserts, my reason does not assert anything. — Bartricks
For surely it is a good idea to ask the question "when would we be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands?" And what is the answer to that question? Well, that we - we who are using reason to find out what's true - will be satisfied when it is clear to us all that Reason asserts the theory in question to be true. — Bartricks
So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it. — Bartricks
For example, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to be a theory of truth at all, but a theory about when a proposition is true. So it is not a rival view. It is a vacuous view about something else. — Bartricks
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