However, from our viewpoint it would appear that objectivity exists outside of ourselves.

There is at some point where truth can be defined as an object. Since the universe exists and theoretically AI could operate on the entire universe's principles, then that AI would be truth.

More inclusive... ? In what way? And, how are the principles of cause and effect, and vibration (energy) limited? — BrianW

The principles of cause and effect and vibration refer to a reality that is four-dimensional: relative to time and space. But what is real or true is not necessarily bound by time, or by cause and effect. Potential energy, for instance, is not an ‘effect’ and has no ‘cause’ - and yet we understand it to be real/true. It is a truth that exists in relation to value and meaning, but has no defined temporal or spatial aspect. The principle of cause and effect does not apply to potential energy, and neither does the principle of vibration.

Then you are not as reasonable as I am. I think our reason is our only guide to what's true. You, I suspect, like to put yourself in the mix as well and will only listen to reason if she seems to be saying things you already agree with. — Bartricks

Well, you’d suspect wrong.

Reasoning is the act of structuring and restructuring the mind for the purpose of integrating new information to minimise instances of prediction error.

Reason, on the other hand, is a limited structuring of that mind based on a system of logical significance and language. As such, it is reason who only listens to things she already agrees with. Reason has her perspective of what is true - it’s a limited perspective, but she’s not aware of this - and she ignores and excludes new information that cannot be reduced to logical argument.

So for Reason, truth is subject to logic. If you put all your faith in Reason, then you could very well be as narrow-minded and ignorant of reality and truth as someone who puts all their faith in God - just in a different way.

I have no idea what that means or why I should endorse it given that you have provided no argument whatsoever in support of it, whereas I have provided an argument - an argument you have ignored because it had assumptions (like, you know, every argument ever) - in support of mine. — Bartricks

This is because everything has to be reduced to logic and the language of argument before Reason (and therefore you) will recognise it. If I reduce it to logical argument, then it can only be argued as a truth subject to logic. And my argument is that we cannot be certain that it’s true under these conditions.

I’ll try to clarify and extend:

Truth is a shared meaning achieved without ignorance, isolation or exclusion of any information (perhaps that’s a little clearer?). It exists regardless of relativity to logic or value, and regardless of time or space.

Truth is usefulness.

Truth is usefulness. — ovdtogt

A lie can be useful, too.

There is at some point where truth can be defined as an object. Since the universe exists and theoretically AI could operate on the entire universe's principles, then that AI would be truth. — ep3265

Truth can be reduced to an object, in much the same way as a table can be reduced to three lines on a page. But are they the same thing?

some of the sentences we call true could be false. — Bartricks

Not without contradicting other sentences we call true.

If we define the universe as everything humanly capable to comprehend, and the AI is able to learn and learns everything, possibly more than human comprehension, and is able to communicate everything that it has learned to humans, then it itself should be defined as human comprehension, thus making it the universe.

The principles of cause and effect and vibration refer to a reality that is four-dimensional: relative to time and space. But what is real or true is not necessarily bound by time, or by cause and effect. Potential energy, for instance, is not an ‘effect’ and has no ‘cause’ - and yet we understand it to be real/true. It is a truth that exists in relation to value and meaning, but has no defined temporal or spatial aspect. The principle of cause and effect does not apply to potential energy, and neither does the principle of vibration. — Possibility

Firstly, as you have already accepted, "potential *energy*" is energy. Secondly, it is only potential with respect to the work it is directed towards. And, in that work, cause and effect cannot and will not be avoided. So, to me, the principles of cause and effect and energy/vibration are all-inclusive no matter the perspective or paradigm of reality one takes into consideration.

A lie can be useful, too. — Possibility

True. Do it all the time.

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. The OP hasn't even realized that all he's done is argue for logical truth(what people using Reason arrive at) which is precisely and exactly truth as coherency.

He won't see it though.

I'll waste time elsewhere. The rest of you have fun.

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul

As should be apparent, I fully agree. A tricky philosophical question that ensues: To what does reasoning’s premises (first principles at least) correspond to?

As for me, since I have idealistic leanings, these correspond to universally applicable aspects of awareness – regardless of its type or degree – such that awareness per se is presumed a metaphysically real given (rather than a physically real given). Quite the mouthful, I know, but here truth as correspondence to that which is real is maintained.

I’m curious to discover alternative understandings regarding what reality the first principles of reasoning would correlate to.

As an example, one could make the case that Aristotle's laws of thought pertain to the physical wold and we gain knowledge of them via empirical observation - such that their truth is a correspondence to physical reality. The problem I find in this is that it places the cart before the horse: we as aware beings require the laws of thought aprioristically in order to engage in empirical observations - at the very least, the law of identity - and, moreover, aprioristically require these same laws of thought so as to hold the capacity of obtaining generalities (in this case, reasoning's premises) from observed particulars.

Edit: Just realized I might have misinterpreted what you meant by "reasoning's premises". You many have been strictly addressing formal reasoning which, as such, requires premises from which to infer things. If so, please interpret my usage of "reasoning's premises" as strictly specifying the laws of thought which we premise to be required for correct reasoning to obtain.

If you don't know why "she" thinks things are the case, then how do you know that "her" thinking them to be the case makes them true? — Janus

Because of the argument I gave in the OP. You don't have to know why the burglar burgled your home in order to be able reliably to know 'that' the burglar burgled your home, or be able to explain why the serial killer did that to his victims before we are justified in believing that he did that to his victims, and so on.

The argument given in the OP allows us reasonably to conclude that our working hypothesis should be that truth is constituted by Reason's assertions. We do not need to know why she asserts what she asserts for that to be correct.

Also, if reason alone can determine truth, and we are reasonable beings, then we should be able to know what is true and what not; otherwise what use is reason to us on your understanding? — Janus

You are equivocating between 'reason' (lower case r), which refers to our faculty of reason, and 'Reason' (upper case r) which refers to the being whose attitudes our reason gives us insight into. That's akin to confusing your sight with that which is seen.

It is Reason who determines what is true - constitutively determines it, because 'to be true' just is to be being asserted by Reason - and our faculties of reason give us insight into what Reason asserts.

Because of the argument I gave in the OP. You don't have to know why the burglar burgled your home in order to be able reliably to know 'that' the burglar burgled your home, or be able to explain why the serial killer did that to his victims before we are justified in believing that he did that to his victims, and so on. — Bartricks

This analogy fails because you know why the burglar burgled your home: it was in order to steal things. We don't have access to "capital 'R' Reason", we only have access to our own reasoning.

Would you allow that Reason could be metaphorically described as a (the) set of tools/filters that allow reason to judge that something is true or not? — tim wood

No, absolutely not. If the argument of the OP goes through - and so far no one has challenged either its validity of the truth of its assumptions - then truth is constituted by Reason's assertions.

How could a set of tools assert anything? Again, it seems to me that you are continuing to conflate a faculty with 'that which the faculty gives us an awareness of'. Sight allows us to see things. But sight and the things seen with sight are distinct.

Likewise, our reason - lower case r - is a faculty. It gives us an awareness of aspects of Reason, upper case r. Now, that isn't in dispute - these are conceptual truths. Our reason is a faculty, but Reason is the asserter, bidder, commander. Reason and 'reason' are distinct, just as sight and 'the things seen' are distinct.

Reason, as we know from the argument in the OP, asserts things. For it is her assertions that constitute truth, and some things are true.

A faculty cannot assert anything. Our reason itself gives us insight into this - our reason (the faculty) let's us know that Reason says that faculties do not assert things. To put it another way, it appears to be a self-evident truth that only persons - minds - can assert things. That's not something one sees, or smells, or tastes, or hears. It is something we know via our reason, and so it appears, then, to be something Reason herself tells us is the case.

Now, it follows from this that Reason is a mind, a person. For Reason asserts things - and those assertions constitute truth - and among the things that Reason asserts, it would seem, is that minds and minds alone assert things.

So no, faculties do not assert things. And Reason is not a set of faculties, not a set of tools, but a mind.

Let's set aside the circularity in this, because I don't think that's necessarily fatal. — tim wood

No, before setting it aside describe it - what circularity?

This analogy fails because you know why the burglar burgled your home: it was in order to steal things. We don't have access to "capital 'R' Reason", we only have access to our own reasoning. — Janus

No it doesn't, you're just not getting the point. I don't have to know why someone did something before I can know that they did it.

That's so obviously true it hurts. Do you know how the internet works? I don't. I haven't the faintest idea how the words I am typing on my keyboard are getting to you. But I know - or can reasonably believe - that they are.

Again: you don't have to know why something is happening before you can know that it is happening.

Do you know why you're here, for instance? I mean, do you know the meaning of your life? I bet you don't. Yet you know that you're living a life, yes?

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses — creativesoul

Gibberish.

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul
As should be apparent, I fully agree. — javra

You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with?

The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes?

Now, no one disputes that. But first, that tells us 'when' a proposition is true, which is distinct from telling us what truth itself is.

If I ask "what is water?" and you say "the stuff that comes out of water pipes" then what you've said is true, but not a substantial answer to my question, which was not a request to locate some water or tell me something about where it comes from, but a question about what it is made of.

Likewise then, to ask "what is truth?" is to ask about what truth is made of. To say that proposition have this property of truth when they correspond to the facts is not an answer to that question, anymore than 'water comes from water pipes' is an answer to 'what is water?'

So, first point - the correspondence theory of truth is not, despite its name, a theory of truth. It is a theory about when propositions are true, it is not a theory about truth itself.

Second, what's a fact if not something that's true? It's a misguided and empty theory. But it does allow those who lack insight to talk a lot of gibberish, which given that's all they're capable of it, they're not going to give it up.

Why are you being so obscure. The OP makes an argument - challenge that argument if you think a different theory of truth is true. You haven't yet.

The point is that analogy fails because you know the burglar performed a particular action, and you also know why she performed the action.

When it comes to "Reason" valuing certain things, if you knew that "Reason" valued those things, then you would know why it values them. This is because you could have no way of knowing (if indeed you could know) that "Reason" values certain things, other than by using your own reason, and since reason operates in terms of reasons, you would have to know the reasons that "Reason" values those things in order that it does indeed value them. If you think there could be an alternative way to know what Reason values then by all means...

Reasoning is the act of structuring and restructuring the mind for the purpose of integrating new information to minimise instances of prediction error. — Possibility

Eh? Let's just recap - in the OP I provided an argument in support of a particular analysis of truth. An argument is an appeal to reason - what I am doing in arguing something is trying to show that Reason endorses the conclusion. That's just what arguing is. Someone who doesn't try to show that a given view is supported by Reason is not arguing - they're just asserting. They may disguise this in various ways, but if they're not appealing to Reason, they're not arguing.

So, I made an argument. I didn't say "this is true because I say so" I said "these claims appear self-evident to our reason, and they imply this theory of truth".

What you said is that you don't care as much as I do about what Reason says. In effect, then, what you are doing is giving yourself an out - you want to be permitted to just ignore Reason when it is convenient to do so.

And yes, be my guest - do that. But know that you're not doing philosophy when you do that. You're just indulging yourself. And apart from by pure fluke, you are not going to get closer to understanding anything about the world to the extent that you do that. You're just going to be listening to yourself, rather than looking for evidence.

Again, then, I have made an argument - I have tried to listen to Reason and report what she appears to say. You, though, have said simply that you do not care as much as I do what Reason may or may not be saying. Okay, that's your prerogative, But that's no different to a detective saying "look, here's some evidence that Jack did the crime" and you responding "well, I don't care as much as you do about what the evidence indicates". Fine - but then you're not a detective, or at least you're not a very good one.

When it comes to "Reason" valuing certain things, if you knew that "Reason" valued those things, then you would know why it values them. — Janus

That simply doesn't follow. I can know that Sarah values X without knowing why she values X. And I can know that Sarah values X on the basis of Sarah's testimony (she told me she values X) without thereby knowing why she values X (she didn't tell me why).

So, you know, you're wrong.

I can know that Sarah values X without knowing why she values X. — Bartricks

Another poor analogy! Sarah is a person who can tell you or show you through her actions what she values. How do know what this fictitious "Reason" of yours values, and how do you know it?

Sarah is a person who can tell you or show you through her actions what she values. How do know what this fictitious "Reason" of yours values, and how do you know it? — Janus

Via my faculty of reason and by comparing what my faculty says to what the faculty of reason of others reports Reason as valuing.

For example, I seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. Others who also know Sarah confirm that they too seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. On that basis I conclude that Sarah values X. But none of us have a clue why she values X, because none of us can remember if or what she said about that.

Again, then, we have a 'faculty' of reason which acquaints us - more or less reliably - with what Reason asserts.

We do not have to be able to know why Reason asserts what she asserts before we can know that she asserts what she asserts.

Via my faculty of reason and by comparing what my faculty says to what the faculty of reason of others reports Reason as valuing. — Bartricks

All you know there is what others value, whether reasonably or not. People usually have reasons for valuing what they do, and if you ask them they will tell you. If they can't tell why they value something then you might conclude that they don't really value it at all, but are merely paying lip service; just blindly following along without thinking about it.

In any case even assuming that most people value certain things doesn't tell you that there is a being "Reason" that values those things; it just tells you that most people have reason to value them, and those reasons may not even be the same. That said, I think it is likely that there are reasons in common for valuing certain things, reasons we all share just by virtue of being the kinds of beings we are.

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions” — javra

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true? — javra

I do not know what you mean by LNC. But if - if - Reason asserts that a proposition such as "this proposition is false" is true, then dialetheism will be true.

There is debate over whether it is true, and so we can take from the fact of such a debate that it is not entirely clear what Reason asserts in this respect. I do not see a problem, then, as whichever view turns out to be true, the truth of it will consist of its being asserted by Reason.

the way I see it, dialetheism is a first order theory, not a second order theory. That is, it is not a theory about what truth itself is, but about what the property of truth can attach itself to. As such it is not a rival view to mine, but a theory about something different. That is, it is a theory about how truth behaves, rather than about what truth is.

Of course, a theory about what truth is has to be consistent with how truth behaves. But note that my theory is consistent with dialetheism and consistent with its negation - and so the credibility of my view is not held hostage to how the debate over the credibility of dialetheism pans out.

All you know there is what others value, whether reasonably or not. People usually have reasons for valuing what they do, and if you ask them they will tell you. If they can't tell why they value something then you might conclude that they don't really value it at all, but are merely paying lip service; just blindly following along without thinking about it. — Janus

You're just not getting the point. The point, once more, is that we can know 'that' something is the case without having to know 'why' it is the case.

We can know that truth is what Reason asserts, without knowing why she asserts what she asserts.

You're just not getting the point. The point, once more, is that we can know 'that' something is the case without having to know 'why' it is the case.

We can know that truth is what Reason asserts, without knowing why she asserts what she asserts. — Bartricks

You're conflating the empirical context in which we can of course know that something is the case without knowing why with the rational context in which we cannot. In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, even if that merely means knowing that something is self-evident. In order to know that something follows logically or rationally you have to know why.

You're conflating the empirical context in which we can of course know that something is the case without knowing why with the rational context in which we cannot. In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, even if that merely means knowing that something is self-evident. In order to know that something follows logically or rationally you have to know why. — Janus

Gibberish