1 Knowledge should work all of the time, not some of the time.
2 Knowledge is useful.
3 Knowledge answers questions
4 Knowledge solves problems.
5 Knowledge is made of facts.
6 Facts are true
7 Facts are true because they are useful, answer questions, solve problems. — ovdtogt

That's just a string of false claims, not an analysis of knowledge.

I don't know what 'knowledge should work all of the time" means? It's confused. It's like saying 7 should work all the time.

2 Knowledge is useful. — ovdtogt

Not necessarily. "Useless knowledge" is not a contradiction in terms. And we can think of loads and loads of examples where knowing something was anything but useful. For instance, there are some things that, if you know them, can make your job harder. If you know that your friend is in the audience, it might be much harder to do a good performance or make a good speech, and so on .

3 Knowledge answers questions

No, that's a category error. Knowledge doesn't 'do' anything. It 'is' something - exactly what is the issue under debate - but it doesn't 'do' anything. We do things with it, but it does nothing.

5 Knowledge is made of facts.

No, for if there are no persons in existence then there is clearly no knowledge, yet there would still be facts (such as the fact no persons exist).

6 Facts are true

No, propositions are true, facts are part of what make propositions true.

7 Facts are true because they are useful, answer questions, solve problems

No, facts are not true - propositions are the bearers of truth. And 'true' and 'useful' are not synonymous properties of a proposition.

So you haven't answered my question or said anything true.

knowledge is for Reason to be adopting a certain attitude towards your possession of it. — Bartricks

Same problems as the truth thread. Anthropomorphism... the personification of thinking about thought and belief(Reason). Reason is not the sort of thing that is capable of having and/or adopting an attitude.

Other than that, I'm a bit impressed. Well written OP.

Plato proposed that knowledge involves having a justified true belief. — Bartricks

Justified... or "well-grounded"? Did Plato use the term "justified"?

Russell's clock is really not on par with Gettier. Russel doesn't employ entailment or disjunction; both of which amount to being accounting malpractices of Smith's belief in Case I and Case II respectively. That aside, Russell's clock problem is interesting. I'm also a huge Russell fan, so.

Is it well-grounded to believe that a broken clock is correct?

Same problems as the truth thread. Anthropomorphism... the personification of thinking about thought and belief(Reason). — creativesoul

But if Reason asserts, directs, prescribes, and so on, then Reason must be a person, for it is a self-evident truth that persons and persons alone do that kind of thing. So it is not a mistake.

Reasoning involves thinking, but not all thinking is reasoning. And reasoning can be done well or badly. It is not just 'done' in the way that thinking about thought is either done or not done. No, it is done well, or it is done badly, or indifferently.

How so? Because reasoning is attempting to listen to Reason. That is, reasoning is not Resaon - that's a category error (reasoning is an activity, but Reason is not an activity). And when one fails to hear clearly what Reason says to do or believe, then one is reasoning badly. That is to say, one is attempting to hear her in ways that she disapproves of.

So Reason is the source of the prescriptions and assertions that we are attempting to hear when we engage in reasoning. Hence how reasoning can be done badly or well.

And again, what - other than a person - can possibly be a source of a prescription? What - other than a person - can possibly assert anything to be the case?

So there is no mistake here, there's just an unothordox view about what Reason is, but that's no reason to reject it.

Justified... or "well-grounded"? Did Plato use the term "justified"? — creativesoul

I am not sure, but I am also not sure I see a distinction between the two. I take it that a belief is justified when there is a normative reason to believe it. Perhaps well-grounded means something different....

I don't see a difference - for they are all cases in which a person acquires a true belief in an epistemically responsible fashion, yet does not appear to qualify as knowing.

Is it well-grounded to believe that a broken clock is correct? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you mean by 'well-grounded'.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. That belief is false. It also serves as ground for the subsequent belief regarding what time it is. So the belief about the time is not well-grounded. It is based upon false belief.

I don't see a difference - for they are all cases in which a person acquires a true belief in an epistemically responsible fashion... — Bartricks

Well, that's not true at all actually. Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.

Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.

Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. — creativesoul

That ought be put a bit differently...

The person believes that a broken clock is working... that's better.

The difference between justified and well grounded, from my vantage point...

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims.

Being well-grounded does not require being argued for. Rather, a belief can be well-grounded and formed/held by a language less creature... on my view anyway.

I take it that a belief is justified when there is a normative reason to believe it. Perhaps well-grounded means something different.... — Bartricks

That... I would not take issue with... perhaps. I'm tentative here, though. I mean, you and me have a past so...

:joke:

It looks ok on it's face, and seems amenable to my own notion of being well-grounded. If you agree we can swap them at will without loss of meaning.

Hmmmm....

On second thought, the term "normative" could be problematic. That would amount to agreement with conventional standards. All paradigm shift begins with rejecting convention somewhere along the line. So... I'm unsettled about the normative aspect.

Plato proposed that knowledge involves having a justified true belief. — Bartricks

I am a philosophy novice, and I have never read much Plato that seems purposeful (yes, I know, everything I ever read that was purposeful was based on Plato :roll:), but don't we all have different views of justified? If knowledge relies on justified true belief...then aren't we in Descartes' arena? I only "know" that some being that I refer to as "I" is thinking. How could I justify anything beyond that?

I think this is an example (for me) of philosophy thinking itself out of relevance...why do we have to consider what knowledge "is" beyond the obvious:

1 Knowledge should work all of the time, not some of the time.
2 Knowledge is useful.
3 Knowledge answers questions
4 Knowledge solves problems.
5 Knowledge is made of facts.
6 Facts are true
7 Facts are true because they are useful, answer questions, solve problems. — ovdtogt

Works for me. (even if a bit circular) When does my knowledge of "knowledge" need to go beyond this?Would a deeper understanding of "knowledge" allow me to better explain the things I "know"? I am missing the point of delving into "what is knowledge" beyond trying to find a semantic "gotcha!"

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims. — creativesoul

I am using 'justified' far more broadly to mean just 'a belief that there is a normative reason for the person to believe'. So that it includes beliefs that have not been inferred. Some of those are, I think, correctly described as 'justified'. After all, inferences have to proceed from some beliefs and those beliefs cannot themselves have been inferred, yet we do not - presumably - want to say that all such beliefs are unjustified. So I would say that a belief is justified just if there is a normative reason for the person to believe it, a reason they may well be unaware of.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. That belief is false. It also serves as ground for the subsequent belief regarding what time it is. So the belief about the time is not well-grounded. It is based upon false belief. — creativesoul

Okay, so a 'well grounded' belief is one that is in some sense 'based' on a true belief? Okay, but that's by-the-by because we can conceive of cases in which a person has a 'well grounded' true belief yet, intuitively, does not qualify as knowing.

For example, let's say I know full well that I am in a town in which all but one clock has stopped. I see a clock. I believe that the clock is working. That belief is clearly unjustified. But it happens to be true - by fluke the clock I am staring at is, in fact, the one clock in town that is working. From that true - but unjustified - belief I draw the conclusion that it is 3 o clock (because that's the time the clock says it is). That belief is true and well-grounded, but intuitively it does not count as knowledge.

I think that's going to be something we will be able to do for any proposal that adds something to 'true belief' in an attempt to spell out knowledge's ingredients.

In the original clock case, the subject has a justified true belief, but it is not knowledge.

In this variation of the original clock case, the subject has a well-grounded true belief, but it is not knowledge.

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims.
— creativesoul

I am using 'justified' far more broadly to mean just 'a belief that there is a normative reason for the person to believe'. So that it includes beliefs that have not been inferred. Some of those are, I think, correctly described as 'justified'. After all, inferences have to proceed from some beliefs and those beliefs cannot themselves have been inferred, yet we do not - presumably - want to say that all such beliefs are unjustified. So I would say that a belief is justified just if there is a normative reason for the person to believe it, a reason they may well be unaware of. — Bartricks

We're in agreement here, it seems.

On second thought, the term "normative" could be problematic. That would amount to agreement with conventional standards. All paradigm shift begins with rejecting convention somewhere along the line. So... I'm unsettled about the normative aspect. — creativesoul

No, a normative reason can also be called a 'justifying' reason. It has nothing to do with conventional standards - indeed, we judge the appropriateness or otherwise of conventional standards by considering to what extent there is normative reason to accept them.

There are different kinds of normative reason, but they are called 'normative' just to distinguish them from other uses of the term 'reason', such as 'explanatory' reason. An explanatory reason explains why something occurred. But a normative reason is a reason to do or believe something.

So, if the clock reads 3 o clock and I have no reason (normative reason) to believe the clock is stopped, then I have reason (normative reason) to believe it is 3 o clock.

So, on my usage - which is, I think, uncontroversial - justifications 'just are' made of normative reasons. Being justified would then involve either holding a belief that you have normative reason to hold, or having acquired a belief in a manner that you had normative reason to acquire it in. Something like that, anyway.

Okay, so a 'well grounded' belief is one that is in some sense 'based' on a true belief? — Bartricks

I wouldn't say that.

For example, let's say I know full well that I am in a town in which all but one clock has stopped. I see a clock. I believe that the clock is working. That belief is clearly unjustified. But it happens to be true — Bartricks

But it doesn't matter. It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not.

normative reason is a reason to do or believe something. — Bartricks

Warrant?

What counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe?

But it doesn't matter. It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not. — creativesoul

yes, but with that example I was refuting the theory that knowledge is well-grounded true belief.

Add anything (aside from my thesis, of course) to 'true belief' and I hold that it can be refuted as a theory about what is sufficient for knowledge.

Warrant?

What counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you're asking - I was giving a definition of a normative reason. It isn't in dispute that justifications must involve them - they're also called 'justifying reasons'.

It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not.
— creativesoul

yes, but with that example I was refuting the theory that knowledge is well-grounded true belief... — Bartricks

By offering another kind of knowledge? I don't think adherents of JTB deny all other kinds of knowledge, do they? If they do not, then my quote above still applies... that's what Russell and Gettier attempted to provide, a case of JTB that was clearly not knowledge.

I was giving a definition of a normative reason. — Bartricks

The explanation(definition) seems to be synonymous with warrant, a notion that is sometimes taken up in lieu of justification. So, surely you can see the similarity?

Both lines of thought are about what counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe something or other.

By offering another kind of knowledge which is also unjustified? — creativesoul

No, by offering an example of a case in which a person has a 'well-grounded' belief yet fails to have knowledge.

If 'well-grounded' just means 'justified' then the original counterexamples will do.

If 'well-grounded' means 'a true belief that is based on another true belief' then my case described above refutes it.

Like I say, my thesis is that if you add anything to 'true belief' aside from "that Reason has a certain attitude towards you having" then the thesis can be refuted (unless what's added is the trivial 'that is known'.

If 'warrant' means 'has normative reason to believe' then yes, but then 'warrant' means nothing distinct from 'justification'.

Whatever warrant means, unless it just means 'known', we'll be able to come up with counterexamples to the idea that knowledge is true belief plus warrant.

I spoke of time because this is in the OP

Bertrand Russell came up with a counterexample, one of kind made more famous later by Edmund Gettier (and that have subsequently become known as 'Gettier cases'). In Russell's case, a clock has stopped and is reporting a time of 3pm. Someone ignorant of the fact the clock has stopped but desirous to know the time looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. By pure coincidence it is, in fact, 3pm. This person has a justified true belief. They belief that it is 3pm, and it is 3pm - so their belief is true. And their belief is justified because they have formed it in an epistemically responsible manner - they looked at a clock, a clock it was reasonble to assume was working. However, though they have a justified true belief that it is 3pm, it seems equally clear to our reason (the reason of most of us, anyway) that they do not 'know' that it is 3pm. — OP

By what authority do you claim time is not an abstract concept and therefore can not be known?

By what authority do you claim time is not an abstract concept and therefore can not be known? — Athena

I didn't say that - I didn't say it couldn't be known (I know there is time, for instance). I said that it is not an abstract concept.

An abstract concept is an idea about something abstract. 'Concept' is fancy for 'idea'.

Time is something we have an idea 'of'. It is not itself an idea.

It's like saying 'free will is an abstract idea' or 'morality is an abstract idea'. Same mistake - confusing the idea with what the idea is of.

As for what time actually is - well, it's made of the same kind of stuff that knowledge is made of, namely attitudes of Reason. But to argue for that would take us beyond the scope of this thread. We're beyond it already.

I do not think those are the same question. The latter has as no definitive answer - it would be like asking me why I find delicious what I find delicious (it varies) - but is also irrelevant to the question at issue. The question at issue is what knowledge is, not why it exists. — Bartricks

So Reason has no reasons, as it were. She is inscrutable.

As for the former question - well, our reason is our source of insight into what Reason approves of.

Take the Gettier cases mentioned earlier. It used to be thought that possession of a justified true belief was sufficient for knowledge. But then Gettier cases are brought to our attention. And, for most of us, it is clear enough to our reason that the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge even though they possess a justified true belief. Now, that isn't arbitrary - people are not just randomly deciding, on the basis of nothing at all, that the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge. No, their reason tells them that the subject in that case lacks knowledge. — Bartricks

It seems that you regard human reason as a kind of intuition or feeling that derives (however imperfectly) from Reason. Through a glass darkly, so to speak.

If so, do you regard it as futile to try to determine the conditions for knowledge? That there just are none (other than emanating from Reason)?

Three o'clock is nothing more than an idea. If we experienced time, we would not need a clock to know it is three o'clock. There is nothing concrete about 3 o'clock. You can not see it, hear it, touch it, taste it. Our measurements are manmade concepts and quite culturally bound. The crazy notion of 3 o'clock, or the 12-month calendar, were not experienced by all cultures, as say a desert, forest, water are actually experienced and known through experience, that is different from knowing time because a teacher taught the concepts of time.

"It seems that you regard human reason as a kind of intuition or feeling that derives (however imperfectly) from Reason. Through a glass darkly, so to speak.

If so, do you regard it as futile to try to determine the conditions for knowledge? That there just are none (other than emanating from Reason)?"

Reasoning and knowing are not equal. With math we can reason measurements of time. Time being intangible and not something we experience. If one lives on a desert island with only males, one can reason females are different, but can know the difference without experience. LOL I think some males can know the difference without having reasons to explain the difference, other than they are impossible to get along with. LOL

Does anyone know Kabala? Kind of a Jewish philosophy. God not having a body could not know what it is like to be human, so Jesus, God in human form, was necessary for knowledge of being human. with this knowledge, the jealous, revengeful, fearsome and punishing god became forgiving and more tolerant of humans. LOL

Knowledge is dependent on experience.

So Reason has no reasons, as it were. She is inscrutable. — Andrew M

I am not sure what you mean when you say that "Reason has no reasons", for the second word 'reason' is ambiguous. If it is an 'explanatory' reason - so, basically, a cause - then I see no reason to think that Reason's attitudes will lack causes. For instance, if I acquire a true belief in one way, she seems not to adopt the knowledge attitude towards it, whereas if I acquire it another way, she does.

Take Russell's case of the stopped clock. Well, in that case it seems as if the fact the true belief was acquired by fluke explains why Reason did not adopt the knowledge attitude towards it. Thus her 'reason' (in the 'explanatory' sense) for not adopting the knowledge attitude towards that true belief was that it was acquired by fluke.

However, perhaps you mean by 'reason' not 'explanation' but 'normative reason'. But I see no reason to think that she will lack those either. For normative reasons are also attitudes of Reason. And nothing stops her from adopting such attitudes towards other of her attitudes. Just as I can like an attitude of mine, so too can she (that is, she can approve of herself adopting certain attitudes towards things - approve of herself adopting the knowledge attitude towards whatever she adopts it towards).

So I see no reason - no justification, no normative reason - to think that Reason has no reasons.

It seems that you regard human reason as a kind of intuition or feeling that derives (however imperfectly) from Reason. Through a glass darkly, so to speak. — Andrew M

Yes, quite. Our reason is to Reason what the internet is to me - it is the means by which I am communicating with you.