Just because you believe they are not justified to hold a certain belief does not mean they hold unjustified beliefs. What a solipsistic creature you are. — ovdtogt
No, I should assume neither until I have good evidence to do so. You are fallaciously mounting a kind of "argument from authority" here. — Janus
This claim:
Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values
is 'true'. — Bartricks
What makes it so? — creativesoul
See the thread on Truth! And our evidence that such claims are true is that our reason represents them to be. — Bartricks
What makes that claim true? What makes the other claim false? — creativesoul
Reason does not use language. All assertion, direction, and prescription is language use. Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe. — creativesoul
Yes she can and does. — Bartricks
It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons.
— creativesoul
Yes she is. — Bartricks
This is just ridiculous. I cannot take it seriously. — creativesoul
I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground. — creativesoul
I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.
— creativesoul
Christ, this is tedious. No. You. Haven't. — Bartricks
Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent of "the man" is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.
Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.
Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.
I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground.
We all know this is true.
It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky. — creativesoul
As for being well-grounded - well, I refuted that view. That view is refuted by cases in which someone's belief is based on another true belief, but fails to qualify as knowledge. — Bartricks
Is Quantum Physics the End of Dualism?
by
Thomas Herold
Dualism seems to be the biggest concept in history ever. Quantum Physics may lead us to a new paradigm shift in consciousness.
Our consciousness is programmed with the basic concept of dualism. Either it is this way or it is the other way, either it is good or it is bad. If you think about this you may find hundreds of other examples in your daily life. Wherever you look, look closely and you will find the concept of dualism.
The belief in matter is another big concept science has come up with. In the last century Newton, Kepler and some other persons made sure this concept made it into every school book in the western world.
Both concepts, dualism and matter are living on such a big scale that most people don't even realize that they are concepts.
Is there a Hidden Purpose Behind the Concept of Dualism?
This is more a philosophical question and it may lead to other concepts and not to the truth. So what is the truth? The truth is that every concept leads to an experience and by experiencing it we may fulfill it's purpose. — Thomas Herold
That's not a problem for well grounded true belief. Invalid inference is not well grounded. You seem to be a bit confused. — creativesoul
That's not a problem for well grounded true belief. Invalid inference is not well grounded. You seem to be a bit confused.
— creativesoul
Er, I think you're the confused one. You don't seem to understand how Gettier cases work, or have any stable notion of what a 'well grounded' belief is.
Gettier style cases can be constructed for any mechanism of belief acquisition that does not guarantee the truth of the belief.
Here's why. A belief can be justified, or well-grounded, or warranted, or whatever, yet false. — Bartricks
I'm going to attempt to get you to understand something... one more time... — creativesoul
So, Smith believes Jones will get the job — Bartricks
By the way - the example I gave in which the person, by fluke, looks at the one working clock in a town in which every clock bar one has stopped.....does that remind you of a case? — Bartricks
Do you understand that? Do you follow me here, so far? — creativesoul
OMg - you really don't understand Gettier cases. No, in the original case Smith believes that Jones - Jones - will get the job — Bartricks
I suggest you peruse the paper. — creativesoul
CASE I
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that
Smith has strong evidence for the fol1owing conjunctive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him
that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the
coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e)
on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is
clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the
job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket.
Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred
(e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is
true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in
believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not KNOW
that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's
pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and
bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he
falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.
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