No, not nonsense. Your reply is as inept as insisting that in Russell or Gettier's original they were just 'insisting' that the agent lacks knowledge. — Bartricks

Gettier and Russell put forth examples which they figured most people would agree with in terms of whether the person had knowledge or not. They relied on this general consensus to make objections of JTB.

Then you've just said "everyone's entitled to their opinion". Er, yes. That's not in dispute. That's what someone says when they've lost the argument.

Oh brother. You don't even understand your own posts. You have no argument for knowledge. You've never put forth an argument. All you're doing is putting forth scenarios with different circumstances and fishing for a general consensus. "Hey, guys, in this scenario, does the guy have knowledge? What, no? How about in this other scenario?" That's all your posts amount to. In other words, genius, you just are asking for everyone's intuitions on the matter, so when I say that "everyone's entitled to his own opinion," it's because that's all your posts ask for.

In the original clock case it is clear to the reason of virtually everyone that the agent lacks knowledge despite also clearly possessing a justified true belief.

Oh! "it is clear" -- LMAO. Okay, dude. That's so compelling. Are you forgetting that I said the person in the Russell example -- "the original clock case" -- doesn't have knowledge? Yes, he has a justified true belief on the JTB conception of knowledge. Then, again, I've already said as much.

Now, you - you - have insisted that any true belief based on the report of a broken clock does not count as knowledge.

Insisted? I've stated my view based on my intuition of knowledge. And, might I remind you, that is the putative take-away from the Russell example: he didn't have knowledge because he used a broken clock to ascertain the time, which we can generalize to "broken clocks do not lend the right type of epistemic justification needed for knowledge." You've tried to run away from that inference by invoking the ridiculous idea that luck explained why he didn't have knowledge. I explained why your notion of luck doesn't explain anything. So, without this magical notion of luck, what explains why the man in the Russell example doesn't have knowledge?....Yeah, that's right, you still have to explain why the man doesn't have knowledge, as you've agreed, except now you can't help yourself to the silly notion of luck in your analysis. I'm waiting for the arguments you owe us. Until then, my analysis at least exists and is commonsensical, so you're absolutely getting destroyed in this argument.

I provided a clear counterexample. I'll describe it again in case you just didn't bother reading it.

A "clear counterexample" -- but I'm insisting! And, no, you didn't provide a counter-example of someone having knowledge based on looking at a broken clock.

There's a clock that's been working fine until 3pm, when it breaks. Tom looks at that clock at 3pm - the moment it breaks - and forms the belief that it is 3pm. Now, does he know that it is 3pm?

Yes. Doesn't your reason tell you the same? Seriously, what does your reason say about the case?

CLEARLY NO. There is no meaningful difference between the Russell example and this example. I've asked you TWICE NOW to explain what the difference is. I've asked you to explain the philosophical work you think "a broken clock that's been working fine until a moment ago" is doing for you. You still haven't explained it. You want to know a secret? You can't. Why can't you? Because it does NOTHING FOR YOU. This is so preposterous. You're giving the same argument without realizing it, but I'm the dogmatist!

Note, if you just reject such intuitions on the grounds that respecting them would require abandoning your thesis, then you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis.

My intuitions say he doesn't have knowledge.

Now explain the philosophical force of "the broken clock was working up to a moment ago." And then explain why the take-away from the Russell example shouldn't be "the man lacked knowledge because he ascertained the time from a broken clock." We've already seen your "luck analysis" fail, so try something new.

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”).

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. — fiveredapples

As to the details of your reply, you’ve addressed a presumption of how the two stated facts are intended to cohere into the belief which is claimed to be knowledge, this in the first example I gave – it seems by importing the details of the second example which is coherent into the first. I’ll try for a more forthright example: Can the knowledge that planet Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color?

If so, how? Here there are no contradictions but I don’t find that there is any coherence between the two facts and the knowledge claimed.

My question, again, is bluntly this: Can a justification hold if it does not consist of givens that cohere into that which is justified, if not also into each other?

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. — fiveredapples

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth?

There are also more worn-out examples such as knowing that the sun will rise again tomorrow.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification. — fiveredapples

It's the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain @Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.”

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”). — javra

To be fair to me, I wasn't trying to address your original question. I was simply trying to analyze and understand the scenario you put forth.

I don't know what the full meaning of "well grounded" is in this context, so I'm reluctant to agree or disagree. And, let me remind you, I found both scenarios to be cases of justifications that are coherent.

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra

Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone.

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra

Yes, that's what I'm saying.

Its the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates. — javra

Oh, I wasn't suggesting I knew the appropriate terminology. I just hope it's not "valid" and "invalid," so choose whatever you like.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.” — javra

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology.

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra


Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone. — fiveredapples

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs?

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra


Yes, that's what I'm saying. — fiveredapples

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. I, for example, make numerous decisions based on things I presume within what I consider a context of knowns regarding the future - such as that gravity will apply or that the sun will again rise. But again, to me all knowns are to varying extents fallible.

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology. — fiveredapples

LOL. Yea, I get how "valid justification" might seem weird on it own. But "invalid justification" sounds about right to me. So until we can devise a different term for the matter ... I'll be peevishly using it.

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs? — javra

Yes. But I'm now suspiciously cautious that my answers are going to walk me into being a coherentist.

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. — javra

Heck, if your intuitions of knowledge are different from mine, I'm okay with that. I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it.

:grin: Just as long as it doesn't turn into a coherency theory of truth. :ok:

I don't know about any of you, but I've found some of the discussion in this thread fruitful, mainly the stuff I've been writing, but of course I've learned too. So, in order to help keep us all on track, I'm going to lay out the important developments -- ahem, just the back and forth between Bartricks and me -- as they've unfolded.

It started with the Russell's Broken Clock scenario, which Bartricks lays out nicely, so I'll just use his words:

In Russell's case, a clock has stopped and is reporting a time of 3pm. Someone ignorant of the fact the clock has stopped but desirous to know the time looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. By pure coincidence it is, in fact, 3pm.

Bartricks states his intuition of knowledge on the matter:

However, though they have a justified true belief that it is 3pm, it seems equally clear to our reason (the reason of most of us, anyway) that they do not 'know' that it is 3pm.

Let's ignore the whole “to our reason” talk. It's unnecessary. In simpler terms, in less technically loaded terms, most of us probably agree with Bartricks that the man does not have knowledge. Now, the million dollar question is, “Why doesn't he have knowledge despite having a justified true belief, which technically satisfies the definition of knowledge as JTB (Justified True Belief)? Again, I believe most us would be drawn directly to the obvious answer: namely, the man lacks the proper epistemic justification because the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification needed for knowledge. Let's call this the “Broken Clock Explanation.”

Now, if the Broken Clock Explanation is right, there are two problems for anyone – ahem, Bartricks – who wants to offer a different explanation. Heck, even if the Broken Clock Explanation is wrong, it still presents two problems in virtue of being so intuitive to most of us.

(1) The first problem is that you're going to need a different explanation for the justification failure in the Russell scenario.

(2) The second problem is that you're going to have to offer an even more intuitive explanation than the Broken Clock Explanation; otherwise, why would we abandon the more intuitive and equally explanatory Broken Clock Explanation? Or, you're going to have to show us why the Broken Clock Explanation can't be right, which isn't the same as offering a different explanation for the justification failure.

Bartrick's attempt to tackle the first problem failed miserably. He suggested that the notion of luck helps explain the justification problem in the Russell scenario. (I'm being generous, here, as he didn't know what he was talking about.) But I pointed out that luck only affects the truth of the belief, not its justification. Basically, because the man luckily checked the time at precisely 3 PM, which happened to be the time on the broken clock, he was able to form a true belief that it was 3 PM. If you can't understand this point, then open up your coloring books and forget philosophy. The result of my devastating critique is that it leaves Bartricks without an explanation for the justification failure, meaning he owes us an explanation still. Meanwhile, the rest of us have an intuitive explanation: the Broken Clock Explanation.

Bartricks whimpered that the Broken Clock Explanation can't be right because broken clocks, according to him, can lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. Notice that even if we're wrong about the Broken Clock Explanation, which is highly unlikely, Bartricks will still not have given an explanation for the justification failure in the Russell scenario, because his one weak attempt was thoroughly refuted.

Anyway, at this point, Bartricks says he has an example that refutes the premise that broken clocks can't lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. He says he has a scenario – let's call it the “Broken Clock 2” scenario – in which it will be intuitive to most people that the man in the scenario has knowledge that it's 3 PM despite having acquired his belief by looking at a broken clock. So, what is this scenario? Again, I let Bartricks speak for himself:

For example, imagine the clock has broken, but it has literally just broken - that is, it has broken at the point at which its hands reach 3 o clock. It was working fine up to that point. The agent then looks at the clock. Now, the agent is looking at a broken clock and, on the basis of its report, he forms the belief that it is 3 o clock (which it is).

My intuition is that the man doesn't have knowledge. So, the same explanation applies here as in the Russell scenario: the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification he needs for knowledge. In both instances, the clock is broken, so what is different in this scenario? Well, in this scenario, the clock just stopped working a moment ago. Okay, but why is that different than the clock stopped working 100 years ago just as it turned to 3 PM? He's still ascertaining the time based off a broken clock, so what philosophical work is “but it just stopped working a moment ago” supposed to be doing for Bartricks? He doesn't know. My answer is that it's doing no philosophical work at all, so of course the original analysis holds – because, in essence, it's the very same scenario.

And, again, I remind everyone. Even if Bartricks is correct that we can have knowledge that it's 3 PM based off looking at a broken clock, he will still not have explained the justification failure in the Russell scenario. And we've already seen how his “luck analysis” fails miserably, so he offers no insights on the Russell scenario.

So, as I see it, both scenarios are essentially the same. If you can explain to me what is added philosophically by stipulating that “the clock broke only a moment ago,” then I'm all ears. Personally, I've grown tired of doing all the philosophical heavy lifting for every scenario Bartricks conjures but can't explain.

You keep referring to how people use the term and I keep pointing out that people don't use the term correctly if their belief didnt have a truth condition. We agreed on this — Harry Hindu

We didn't agree on this and it's the key issue.

People use the term "know" correctly if their belief is justifiable. It need not be true. They only misuse the term if their belief is not justifiable.

Whereas knowledge is acquired - that is, the conditions of knowledge are met - if, in addition to being justifiable, their belief is true.

There is no guarantee or proof that any particular claim to knowledge is knowledge, no matter how justifiable.

How will she know if her belief is true when she only has justifications from which truths don't necessarily follow? — Harry Hindu

Your question assumes that she needs an infallible guarantee or proof. She does not. She knows her belief is true (if it is) by reflection on what made her belief justifiable (e.g., her observation). If her belief is not true, then she won't know that (unless she later discovers her mistake). That's the logic of the usage.

My argument is that a truth condition is not a qualification for knowledge. Justifications are the only qualifications for knowledge.

Truth is some state-of-affairs. Knowledge can be true or false, which fits how we use the term in an objective sense - outside of our awareness of whether our knowledge is true or not. — Harry Hindu

So, as you see it, knowledge is simply justified belief?

People use the term "know" correctly if their belief is justifiable. It need not be true. They only misuse the term if their belief is not justifiable.

Whereas knowledge is acquired - that is, the conditions of knowledge are met - if, in addition to being justifiable, their belief is true.

There is no guarantee or proof that any particular claim to knowledge is knowledge, no matter how justifiable. — Andrew M

We agree on the first part. We seem to disagree on what "know" and "knowledge" mean. Maybe it's because we are using different definitions.

I see "know" as the act of recalling information and using it.

I see "knowledge" as that information that is recalled.

So to say that I know something is to say that I have information in relation to some state-of-affairs that I can recall and use if necessary. It says nothing about whether that information is true or not. I gain more trust in the knowledge when the use of the knowledge accomplishes the goals I apply it to.

Truth is the actual state-of-affairs. Accuracy would be more like an external relationship between the information/knowledge in one's brain and the actual state-of-affairs the knowledge is (supposed to be) about. Knowledge is more or less accurate in relation to the state-of-affairs (the truth) it is about.

So, to know something is to recall and apply the knowledge one has. If one talks about "knowing" then they are talking about recalling and using their "knowledge", so there is no difference.

For you, there seems to be a difference. You seem to be saying that we could use the term "know" correctly since it is based only on justification, which I have said and agree, but never use the term "knowledge" because we can never actually know our knowledge is true. For you, it seems, one could never say "I possess knowledge", but can only say "I know something". I don't see any difference in what those statements mean.

Your question assumes that she needs an infallible guarantee or proof. She does not. She knows her belief is true (if it is) by reflection on what made her belief justifiable (e.g., her observation). If her belief is not true, then she won't know that (unless she later discovers her mistake). That's the logic of the usage. — Andrew M

Right, so if aliens observed our usage if the term, then they'd see us using it in instances of when we do know and when we don't. We use it when our knowledge is true, and when it is false. Truth conditions would not be a qualification for it's usage. Only justification.

So, as you see it, knowledge is simply justified belief? — Andrew M

Yes, it is the justified beliefs that you recall and apply when you say that you "know".

By now everyone should know Russell's stopped clock example as a counter to JTB. Fiveredapples has laid out the problem very well. I'm going to try and put forth my own explanation as a defense of JTB.

The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes. We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time. However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time. In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes. So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.

Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example? After all, reason dictated that your conclusion (you had the correct time) was justified. So, in one sense you believe you have JTB based on your experiences with clocks. However, later you find out the clock is broken, and so you weren't justified after all. This seems to be contradictory, but is it really? Does it really show that JTB fails? No. Why?

Because no definition, at least few definitions, are absolute. An example of an absolute definition would be, "All triangles have three sides," an example of a definition that's not absolute, is the definition of a game. Those of you who have read Wittgenstein know that there is no definition of the word game that covers every possible use of the word. The point is, do we say that the definition is incomplete or doesn't work because we find some exception. Again, no. The definition is a guide, it's not some absolute that works in every possible use of the word. The same is true of the definition of knowledge as JTB. It's not some absolute that will work in every possible use, but, I believe it's the best definition as a general rule or guide.

Much more could be said about this, but it would take about 15 or 20 pages of writing.

I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it. — fiveredapples

Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds?

The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? — Sam26

Well, no, Sam, I don't think that is the question at all. The difference is this:

(A) Are we justified in believing we are justified in believing it's 3 PM?
(B) Are we justified in believing it's 3 PM?

You are asking Question A, but that's not the question in determining whether we have knowledge or not. That would be Question B.

To be justified in believing you're justified simply requires that you are aware of the sanctioned methods for acquiring beliefs (with regard to having knowledge) and aware that you're using one of those methods.

It goes like this: You ask yourself, "What method am I using?" Answer: method 3. You then check the list of sanctioned methods: "Oh, I see method 3 is on the list of justified ways to acquire true beliefs with regard to knowledge." Conclusion: "I'm using a justified method." In other words, because you know the list and you know which method you're using, provided it's one on the list, you are now justified in believing you're employing a sanctioned method, which is just to say that you're justified in believing you're justified. Of course all of this is unnecessary and outside the realm of knowledge.

The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes.

Everyone should disagree.

We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time.

That's why "looking at clockfaces" is a sanctioned method. Note that you have now switched to Question B. I don't know if you realize it or not.

However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time.

Yes, in such cases, despite having applied one of the sanctioned methods, you will not have knowledge. This is in line with our intuitions of knowledge. Again, though, you are now discussing Question B.

In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes.

Yes, because sanctioned methods don't guarantee true beliefs. Again, this is in line with our intuitions of knowledge. But the limitation of these sanctioned methods doesn't affect justification, it affects truth.

So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.

Invoking the notion of certainty is only going to make the assessment worse, not better. I've already noted that I think you've turned your analysis into a certainty requirement. Certainty and knowledge have nothing to do with each other.

Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example?

This is a strange way to phrase it. It seems like you are misunderstanding the Russell scenario. The man has successfully satisfied JTB. He has a belief. The belief is true. And the belief is justified. If you think knowledge is JTB, then you must conclude that the man has knowledge. You seem not to appreciate this fact. You're wanting to object that he doesn't have knowledge because he was looking at a broken clock. But you can't make that objection if you subscribe to JTB.

You of all people cannot say the man made a mistake, because it's irrelevant if you subscribe to JTB, as the man has satisfied the requirements. You must say that he has knowledge. I don't know, have I missed something about your views? Frankly, I'm not sure what you're committed to, which tells me you haven't been all that clear, as I possess immaculate reading skills.

Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds? — javra

Yes, everything I know is indefeasible.

My KNOWLEDGE that the last clock I looked at was working properly and gave me the correct time is indefeasible, mainly, because the last clock I looked at was working properly and gave me the correct time.

Yes, everything I know is indefeasible. — fiveredapples

OK. Now I know your point of view. Thanks.

Are you trying to say that I'm the last Correspondence Theory of Truth dinosaur left on Earth?

No. Last I checked, the term "indefeasible" is synonymous to "infallible". You take your knowledge to be infallible. Hence, you never discover that what you once you thought you knew was in fact not knowledge - for everything you know is indefeasible. Do correct me if I'm wrong, but I can find no other way of interpreting your statement.

I don't think indefeasible and infallible are synonymous, but I get your objection.

Well, of course I have discovered many times that what I thought I knew was not in fact knowledge. That's just to say I didn't really know back then, so of course it wasn't knowledge that got defeated.

Right, so if aliens observed our usage if the term, then they'd see us using it in instances of when we do know and when we don't. — Harry Hindu

Yes, exactly.

We use it when our knowledge is true, and when it is false. — Harry Hindu

No. Just above you were talking about our usage of knowledge terms ("know", "knowledge", etc.), but now you're talking about our knowledge itself (what we do know), which is always true, never false.

So Alice can justifiably say, "I know it is raining" (if it appears to be raining) but if it is not raining then she does not know that it is raining. She has failed to acquire knowledge.

That difference between the usage and the reality is what the observing aliens notice. But Alice also notices it as well if she subsequently discovers her mistake. She becomes aware that her prior claim was an instance of using a knowledge term when, in fact, she did not know it was raining.

Truth conditions would not be a qualification for it's usage. Only justification. — Harry Hindu

Yes. The truth condition is only a qualification for acquiring or having knowledge, not for the use of knowledge terms.

For you, it seems, one could never say "I possess knowledge", but can only say "I know something". — Harry Hindu

Just to clarify this, one can say both, and they have the same root meaning. So Alice could justifiably say them in the example above. However one only possesses knowledge (or knows something) when one's belief is true. In that example, Alice did not possess knowledge that it was raining (or, equivalently, she did not know that it was raining).

The key point is the distinction between Alice's knowledge claims (which can be false) and Alice's knowledge (which can't be false).

Let's ignore the whole “to our reason” talk. It's unnecessary. In simpler terms, in less technically loaded terms, most of us probably agree with Bartricks that the man does not have knowledge. Now, the million dollar question is, “Why doesn't he have knowledge despite having a justified true belief, which technically satisfies the definition of knowledge as JTB (Justified True Belief)? Again, I believe most us would be drawn directly to the obvious answer: namely, the man lacks the proper epistemic justification because the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification needed for knowledge. Let's call this the “Broken Clock Explanation.” — fiveredapples

So, five. I want to see if I understand you correctly.

You're granting Russell's clock as qualifying for a justified true belief. Do you find that false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim based upon that belief?

In Russell's example, the person believed that a broken clock was working. On my view, false belief never counts as adequate justificatory ground from which to deduce/infer knowledge.

By the way, a couple days back I answered your request for a one page summary regarding Gettier's paper. I'm of keen interest to get your take on it.

However, later you find out the clock is broken, and so you weren't justified after all. — Sam26

I think that people would ordinarily think that your belief was justified (reasonable, warranted, etc.). Here's a filled-out example to illustrate.

Alice: What's the time?
Bob: 3pm
Alice: How do you know?
Bob: I looked at the clock just now
Alice: Ah, OK.

That Bob looked at the clock is what justifies his claim that it was 3pm. He didn't just guess or make something up. I think that, with Alice, we would normally be satisfied with his justification.

If so, then Bob's claim was justified even if the clock were broken and it was really 4pm. In which case he would have had a justified but false belief.

If the clock stopped exactly 24 hours prior and it really was 3pm, then he had a justified and true belief. But he didn't know that it was 3pm. Which is the Gettier problem.

Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims.

Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims. — Andrew M

Don't we ordinarily require them to be well grounded, to be based upon true belief? Bob believed that a broken clock was working.

You're granting Russell's clock as qualifying for a justified true belief. — creativesoul

I'm granting that the man has a justified true belief, yes.

Do you find that false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim based upon that belief?

This question strikes me as odd for two reasons. One, the man in the Russell example has a true belief, so I'm wondering what motivates the question about a false belief. Two, the truth of the belief and the justification for the belief are separate things, so I'm not sure I know what is meant in asking if a false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim. But in case you're simply asking if a false belief ever counts as knowledge, then the answer is no.

In Russell's example, the person believed that a broken clock was working. On my view, false belief never counts as adequate justificatory ground from which to deduce/infer knowledge.

I'm not sure this is something we need to consider. Nobody is asking you to verify whether the clock you used to ascertain the time is actually a working clock, nor whether it's keeping track of time accurately, so I don't think you have to have a belief about either of those two circumstances. I can simply say that I looked at a clock, which is on the list of sanctioned methods for acquiring epistemic justification, because clocks generally work and work properly. So I can just deny that I had a false belief that the clock was working on the grounds that I had no belief on the matter.

By the way, a couple days back I answered your request for a one page summary regarding Gettier's paper. I'm of keen interest to get your take on it.

Yes, I saw it. I had to do a refresher on Gettier Case I, and I remembered why I don't like talking about it: I don't think it's a case of knowledge. I think I'm the wrong person to discuss the case, as I don't think it has much of anything to teach us about knowledge. I could be wrong, a distinct possibility, so I try to keep quiet about it. But from what I read of your response, which is basically the point you're making in this post, I've answered it: I needn't concern myself with this false belief you want to attribute to me or to the man in the Russell scenario.

A distinction is sometimes drawn between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. I am talking about 'knowing that'. — Bartricks

I suggest that we be careful with this distinction. 'I know that X' is a statement that we know how to use.

Perhaps we should also be wary of grammar. 'Knowledge' is a noun. Therefore knowledge is a definite entity?

So, it is clear to our rational reflection that having knowledge does not just involve having a true belief. — Bartricks

I agree. We use 'I know X' in a system of conventions that we mostly know 'unconsciously.' I don't think we can exhaustively catalog these conventions. That said, I'd tentatively translate 'I know X' as 'X is true and I have reasons that you'd also find convincing to believe so.'

We can also contrast 'I know X' with 'I think X.' To merely think that X is to indicate less certainty or mere opinion. It makes a lesser claim on the listener.

The man has successfully satisfied JTB. He has a belief. The belief is true. And the belief is justified. If you think knowledge is JTB, then you must conclude that the man has knowledge. You seem not to appreciate this fact. You're wanting to object that he doesn't have knowledge because he was looking at a broken clock. But you can't make that objection if you subscribe to JTB. — fiveredapples

This seems correct and well expressed. This JTB & clock example is new to me and illuminating.

This seems correct and well expressed. This JTB & clock example is new to me and illuminating. — softwhere

Thank you. I find the Russell scenario illuminating, too. I am grateful to Bartricks for the thread -- even though we have become mortal enemies!

That Bob looked at the clock is what justifies his claim that it was 3pm. He didn't just guess or make something up. I think that, with Alice, we would normally be satisfied with his justification.

If so, then Bob's claim was justified even if the clock were broken and it was really 4pm. In which case he would have had a justified but false belief.

If the clock stopped exactly 24 hours prior and it really was 3pm, then he had a justified and true belief. But he didn't know that it was 3pm. Which is the Gettier problem.

Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims. — Andrew M

I agree with all of this. At the end you hint at just how complex the problem actually is. Our 'toy' examples are great for showing the problems with 'knowledge = JTP.' To figure out what we do mean ('intuitively') by 'knowledge' is something like an endless task. This noun can be understood as a tool employed by members of a community to many purposes. Only some of our knowledge about 'knowledge' can be made explicit.

Don't we ordinarily require them to be well grounded, to be based upon true belief? Bob believed that a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

Yes, for a true claim to be knowledge it must be well-grounded (i.e., all the premises that the claim depends on must themselves be true). But it's impractical to expect Bob to check every premise before he can justifiably make a claim.

That's why there is a difference between knowing that it is 3pm (which Bob doesn't know) and merely having a justified, true belief that it is 3pm (which Bob does have).

But in case you're simply asking if a false belief ever counts as knowledge, then the answer is no. — fiveredapples

I tend to agree with you. I wonder whether you'll agree with me that this follows from convention. We just don't tend to use 'knowledge' for false beliefs.

But it's impractical to expect Bob to check every premise before he can justifiably make a claim. — Andrew M

Right. Roughly he can say 'I know X' when he has done what is roughly expected to justify such a claim. Since we actually use the word 'know' all the time without an 'infinite check,' we should instead look to what tends to be accepted as justification. The problems of the word 'knowledge' aren't so different from those of the word 'justification.' We learn to act and speak within a system of conventions. In this sense, meaning is exterior to the subject.

Yes, exactly. Particular conventions have emerged because they are useful. They represent the pragmatic middle ground between infinite checking and no checking at all.