No, not nonsense. Your reply is as inept as insisting that in Russell or Gettier's original they were just 'insisting' that the agent lacks knowledge. — Bartricks
Then you've just said "everyone's entitled to their opinion". Er, yes. That's not in dispute. That's what someone says when they've lost the argument.
In the original clock case it is clear to the reason of virtually everyone that the agent lacks knowledge despite also clearly possessing a justified true belief.
Now, you - you - have insisted that any true belief based on the report of a broken clock does not count as knowledge.
I provided a clear counterexample. I'll describe it again in case you just didn't bother reading it.
There's a clock that's been working fine until 3pm, when it breaks. Tom looks at that clock at 3pm - the moment it breaks - and forms the belief that it is 3pm. Now, does he know that it is 3pm?
Yes. Doesn't your reason tell you the same? Seriously, what does your reason say about the case?
Note, if you just reject such intuitions on the grounds that respecting them would require abandoning your thesis, then you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis.
Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. — fiveredapples
As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. — fiveredapples
Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification. — fiveredapples
To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”). — javra
Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra
Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra
Its the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates. — javra
But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.” — javra
Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.
Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra
Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone. — fiveredapples
Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra
Yes, that's what I'm saying. — fiveredapples
But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology. — fiveredapples
So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs? — javra
Heck, if your intuitions of knowledge are different from mine, I'm okay with that. I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it.Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. — javra
In Russell's case, a clock has stopped and is reporting a time of 3pm. Someone ignorant of the fact the clock has stopped but desirous to know the time looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. By pure coincidence it is, in fact, 3pm.
However, though they have a justified true belief that it is 3pm, it seems equally clear to our reason (the reason of most of us, anyway) that they do not 'know' that it is 3pm.
For example, imagine the clock has broken, but it has literally just broken - that is, it has broken at the point at which its hands reach 3 o clock. It was working fine up to that point. The agent then looks at the clock. Now, the agent is looking at a broken clock and, on the basis of its report, he forms the belief that it is 3 o clock (which it is).
You keep referring to how people use the term and I keep pointing out that people don't use the term correctly if their belief didnt have a truth condition. We agreed on this — Harry Hindu
How will she know if her belief is true when she only has justifications from which truths don't necessarily follow? — Harry Hindu
My argument is that a truth condition is not a qualification for knowledge. Justifications are the only qualifications for knowledge.
Truth is some state-of-affairs. Knowledge can be true or false, which fits how we use the term in an objective sense - outside of our awareness of whether our knowledge is true or not. — Harry Hindu
We agree on the first part. We seem to disagree on what "know" and "knowledge" mean. Maybe it's because we are using different definitions.People use the term "know" correctly if their belief is justifiable. It need not be true. They only misuse the term if their belief is not justifiable.
Whereas knowledge is acquired - that is, the conditions of knowledge are met - if, in addition to being justifiable, their belief is true.
There is no guarantee or proof that any particular claim to knowledge is knowledge, no matter how justifiable. — Andrew M
Right, so if aliens observed our usage if the term, then they'd see us using it in instances of when we do know and when we don't. We use it when our knowledge is true, and when it is false. Truth conditions would not be a qualification for it's usage. Only justification.Your question assumes that she needs an infallible guarantee or proof. She does not. She knows her belief is true (if it is) by reflection on what made her belief justifiable (e.g., her observation). If her belief is not true, then she won't know that (unless she later discovers her mistake). That's the logic of the usage. — Andrew M
Yes, it is the justified beliefs that you recall and apply when you say that you "know".So, as you see it, knowledge is simply justified belief? — Andrew M
I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it. — fiveredapples
The question is: "Do I have the right, i.e., within reason, to believe that I'm justified when looking at clocks to presume that a clock is giving me the correct time? — Sam26
Everyone should disagree.The answer, and I believe most of us agree, is yes.
We know based on our experiences with clocks that generally clocks (fiveredapples pointed this out too) give us the correct time.
However, we also know based on experience that sometimes clock fail, and thus sometimes (say 3% of the time) they don't give us the correct time.
In fact, if you asked the person in Russell's example, "Is it possible you're wrong about the time?" they would probably say yes.
So, most of us know that there is a chance that we could be wrong, however small, i.e., the justification is probability based. It's rarely the case that I'm justified with 100% certainty.
Now the problem is the following: How can you not have knowledge (JTB) if you've followed the correct reasoning process in this example?
Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds? — javra
Yes, everything I know is indefeasible. — fiveredapples
Right, so if aliens observed our usage if the term, then they'd see us using it in instances of when we do know and when we don't. — Harry Hindu
We use it when our knowledge is true, and when it is false. — Harry Hindu
Truth conditions would not be a qualification for it's usage. Only justification. — Harry Hindu
For you, it seems, one could never say "I possess knowledge", but can only say "I know something". — Harry Hindu
Let's ignore the whole “to our reason” talk. It's unnecessary. In simpler terms, in less technically loaded terms, most of us probably agree with Bartricks that the man does not have knowledge. Now, the million dollar question is, “Why doesn't he have knowledge despite having a justified true belief, which technically satisfies the definition of knowledge as JTB (Justified True Belief)? Again, I believe most us would be drawn directly to the obvious answer: namely, the man lacks the proper epistemic justification because the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification needed for knowledge. Let's call this the “Broken Clock Explanation.” — fiveredapples
However, later you find out the clock is broken, and so you weren't justified after all. — Sam26
Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims. — Andrew M
You're granting Russell's clock as qualifying for a justified true belief. — creativesoul
Do you find that false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim based upon that belief?
In Russell's example, the person believed that a broken clock was working. On my view, false belief never counts as adequate justificatory ground from which to deduce/infer knowledge.
By the way, a couple days back I answered your request for a one page summary regarding Gettier's paper. I'm of keen interest to get your take on it.
A distinction is sometimes drawn between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. I am talking about 'knowing that'. — Bartricks
So, it is clear to our rational reflection that having knowledge does not just involve having a true belief. — Bartricks
The man has successfully satisfied JTB. He has a belief. The belief is true. And the belief is justified. If you think knowledge is JTB, then you must conclude that the man has knowledge. You seem not to appreciate this fact. You're wanting to object that he doesn't have knowledge because he was looking at a broken clock. But you can't make that objection if you subscribe to JTB. — fiveredapples
This seems correct and well expressed. This JTB & clock example is new to me and illuminating. — softwhere
That Bob looked at the clock is what justifies his claim that it was 3pm. He didn't just guess or make something up. I think that, with Alice, we would normally be satisfied with his justification.
If so, then Bob's claim was justified even if the clock were broken and it was really 4pm. In which case he would have had a justified but false belief.
If the clock stopped exactly 24 hours prior and it really was 3pm, then he had a justified and true belief. But he didn't know that it was 3pm. Which is the Gettier problem.
Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims. — Andrew M
Don't we ordinarily require them to be well grounded, to be based upon true belief? Bob believed that a broken clock was working. — creativesoul
But in case you're simply asking if a false belief ever counts as knowledge, then the answer is no. — fiveredapples
But it's impractical to expect Bob to check every premise before he can justifiably make a claim. — Andrew M
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