Awesome. We agree. 'Pragmatic middle ground' is a good phrase.

I can just deny that I had a false belief that the clock was working on the grounds that I had no belief on the matter. — fiveredapples

Do you believe that such a denial is adequate here?

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working? Surely we all do. We need not wonder to ourselves at the moment of looking in order to believe that we're looking at a working clock. If we did not believe that it was working, we would not have looked at it.

Right?

That's why there is a difference between knowing that it is 3pm (which Bob doesn't know) and merely having a justified, true belief that it is 3pm (which Bob does have). — Andrew M

So, in Russell's clock example, the belief is justified but not well grounded?

This question strikes me as odd for two reasons. One, the man in the Russell example has a true belief, so I'm wondering what motivates the question about a false belief. — fiveredapples

The motivation is regarding whether or not the true belief about the time is well grounded, and/or justified.

So, in Russell's clock example, the belief is justified but not well grounded? — creativesoul

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true.

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working? — creativesoul

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. I don't think assumptions count as beliefs. After all, if you look at a clock to form a belief about the time, are you really checking to see if the clock is working? Don't we check it because we expect it to be working?
And how about its accuracy? Do we check its accuracy? How do we do that? Do we check with a verifying source -- another clock? And, then, I may ask, what source you used to verify the accuracy of the first verifying source -- and so on ad infinitum.

No, we don't do that when we check the time. We simply glance at our cell phones or watches or clocks and form our beliefs.

We need not wonder to ourselves at the moment of looking in order to believe that we're looking at a working clock. If we did not believe that it was working, we would not have looked at it.

But, as I said, I simply assume that it's working because clocks generally work and keep time accurately. Are you saying assumptions are beliefs? If assumptions are beliefs, then do correct assumptions satisfy JTB?

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true. — Andrew M

Yes. That's what makes sense to me as well; especially if we are drawing a distinction between being justified and being well grounded. If proponents and/or advocates of JTB find Russell's clock to be a problem, then I'm no such advocate.

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. — fiveredapples

The difference between assuming that the clock we're looking at is working and believing it's working is what... exactly?

I cannot distinguish between the two,

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working?
— creativesoul

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. I don't think assumptions count as beliefs. After all, if you look at a clock to form a belief about the time, are you really checking to see if the clock is working? — fiveredapples

No. That's precisely the point. You already believe it is, otherwise you could not possibly trust it as a means to tell the time.



So, we assume a clock is working, we do not check to see, we have a long held practice of looking at clocks to tell the time, but when we look at a clock to check what time it is...

...we do not believe that it is a reliable means of telling time(that it's working)?

That's nonsense.

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true... — Andrew M

Hmmm....

Would that exclude language less creatures' belief from being well grounded? That would be at odds with my current leanings.

I don't think assumptions count as beliefs. After all, if you look at a clock to form a belief about the time, are you really checking to see if the clock is working? Don't we check it because we expect it to be working?
And how about its accuracy? Do we check its accuracy? How do we do that? Do we check with a verifying source -- another clock? And, then, I may ask, what source you used to verify the accuracy of the first verifying source -- and so on ad infinitum. — fiveredapples

This is a good point. We can extend it. We don't check the meanings of the words we use as we use them. All our conscious decision making depends on unconscious/automatic/embodied skills of staggering complexity. Even much of our language use is effortless. This sentence (this one now) is immediately intelligible. In theory we could check every sentence in a simple text again and again to make sure that it said what we thought it said. Am I sure that I read and speak English?

No. That's precisely the point. You already believe it is, otherwise you could not possibly trust it as a means to tell the time. — creativesoul

I think he's making a useful distinction. While I understand the temptation to interpret trustingly reading a clockface as 'belief,' the event is so automatic that denoting it a 'belief' has a retrospective artificiality.

Do I believe that there is an external world? Do I believe that my words have meaning? Do I believe that I know what 'believe' means (or how to use 'believe')? At some point doubt becomes unintelligible.

In short, I see what you mean, and it's reasonable. But the gap between automatic trust and conscious belief seems important.

Would that exclude language less creatures' belief from being well grounded? — creativesoul

I don't think so. You, as a language user, could in principle identify the premises of any belief and check if they're true (and thus whether the belief holder could be said to have knowledge). But those premises are true (or not) independently of whether anyone does identify them.

No. Just above you were talking about our usage of knowledge terms ("know", "knowledge", etc.), but now you're talking about our knowledge itself (what we do know), which is always true, never false. — Andrew M

The key point is the distinction between Alice's knowledge claims (which can be false) and Alice's knowledge (which can't be false) — Andrew M

Well yeah, because in using knowledge terms you are referring to your knowledge. What else could you be doing with those terms? What do you mean by "use" when you say people use words? What are you doing mentally when you say that you "know" something? What are you doing mentally when you tie your shoes? I just want to make sure you're not a p-zombie.

That difference between the usage and the reality is what the observing aliens notice. But Alice also notices it as well if she subsequently discovers her mistake. She becomes aware that her prior claim was an instance of using a knowledge term when, in fact, she did not know it was raining. — Andrew M

But you're not taking this to it's ultimate conclusion and that is how do we know that the aliens know the truth? How do you know that you have acquired the truth when you only have justifications to go on? Again, as you are defining it, you'd need to know that your knowledge is true, not only justified, in order to use the term "knowledge" correctly. If you're not referring to your knowledge when using knowledge terms, then what do you mean when you use the terms? When I say "use" I mean making a particular sound or scribble to refer to the information one possesses about a particular state-of-affairs, like the steps one takes to tie their shoes, and the reasons why one should tie their shoes. What do you mean by the word "use"?

The difference between assuming that the clock we're looking at is working and believing it's working is what... exactly? — creativesoul

I think the difference is about the attitude you take towards a proposition. I say this because Person A and Person B might take different attitudes, one of assumption and one of belief, respectively, with respect to the same proposition given the same evidence and given the same background knowledge.

For example, if I see you leisurely walking in the park holding hands with a girl of about your age, which we'll say is 16 years of age, then I might assume that she's your new girlfriend. In this example, I have the assumption that she's your new girlfriend, but I haven't the belief, because for belief I hold myself to a higher standard of evidence.

But now let's take Johnny, our mutual friend, and he also sees the same scenario. He might form the belief that the girl is your new girlfriend, because Johnny forms beliefs with much less evidence than I do. He might say to me, "Oh wow, I can't believe CreativeSoul has a new girlfriend already. He just broke up with Sally a week ago." And I might respond skeptically, "Maybe." Johnny might reply, "Come on, of course that's his girlfriend. Didn't you see them holding hands at the park?"

So, in this example, Johnny seems to believe that you have a new girlfriend, while I remain skeptical enough to not assent, but of course I recognize that there's some evidence in favor of this opinion.

In the Russell scenario, the man might assume that the clock is working without believing that the clock is working.

Hmmm...I think this is a somewhat unsatisfying answer because then we'd be committed to the view that you can form beliefs based off assumptions, which I'm not exactly happy with, but let me say no more for now. I'm also not so sure the analysis is correct. So, let this post stand as a tentative response until I can think through it more.

But I hope to have at least given you an intuitive account of the difference between an assumption and a belief, which of course might be a wrong account and, more importantly, one which still leaves open your objection.

...the gap between automatic trust and conscious belief seems important. — softwhere

The former is existentially dependent upon the latter.

The gap is nowhere to be found aside from the gap in our knowledge base and thus our explanations. Trusting clocks is not always automatic, to be as clear as possible. That's learned thought, belief, and/or behaviour. It becomes operative thought and belief(automatic) when we do not consider our belief and it's role in what we are doing while we're doing it.

We learn to tell time with clock usage. Somewhere during this learning process we also learn to distinguish between working clocks and broken ones. We learn that even a broken clock tells the correct time twice a day. We learn that working clocks are a reliable means for time telling, but broken clocks are not. Thus, we are justified in knowledge claims about what time it is when we use a working clock as a means to check, but not when using a broken one.

So...

I struggle to make sense of the notion that using a broken clock offers the same justificatory ground for knowledge claims about what time it is. And yet... that's exactly what's happening in Russell's example. Those who grant that the belief is justified are completely forgetting that broken clocks are not a reliable means to tell time, and neglecting to take into consideration that the person believes that that particular broken clock is reliable(is a working one).

It's not.

In summary, belief about the time that is based upon using a broken clock as a means is not well grounded. I want to say that it is not a justified belief, because I'm partial to my own notion of JTB which seems to be significantly different than academia's if advocates for JTB tend to grant the justification aspect regarding this case.

The only difference between assumption and belief that makes sense to me involves metacognitive endeavors.

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences. Here, there is a definite difference between granting the assumption and believing it's true(between assumption and belief).

That's just not applicable in the scenario of Russell's clock though. The person is not taking an attitude towards a proposition. That person's belief was not at all about propositions. It's about what time it is, and it was based upon a broken clock. Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.

In our assessments, we examine propositions... the person's knowledge claim. It does us all a disservice of understanding to neglect assessing the person's pre-existing belief upon which that knowledge claim rests it's laurels.

So, in this example, Johnny seems to believe that you have a new girlfriend, while I remain skeptical enough to not assent, but of course I recognize that there's some evidence in favor of this opinion.

In the Russell scenario, the man might assume that the clock is working without believing that the clock is working.

Hmmm...I think this is a somewhat unsatisfying answer because then we'd be committed to the view that you can form beliefs based off assumption — fiveredapples

I agree that it is rather unsatisfying. It looks like a performative contradiction of sorts...

I do not believe that this clock is a reliable means of telling time, but I'm going to look at it anyway in order to know what time it is.

I do not believe that this clock is a reliable means of telling time, but I'm going to look at it anyway in order to know what time it is. — creativesoul

Well, you're stating it far worse than it is. You're saying that you do not believe the clock is reliable, so that alone would discount that you have justification. Then you're adding that you believe it can give you justification, in saying that you'll be able to "know" the time. I'm not saying anything so blatantly wrong.

I'm saying that I'm not comfortable with the idea that we form beliefs (justified ones) on the basis of assumptions about the source of those beliefs. But, that's not to say that this doesn't happen all the time. I think it obviously does. The question, then, is whether we want to count those beliefs as justified such that they can be knowledge. That's the question I'm thinking about, but what you've stated is not that -- it's much worse and obviously wrong.

Ok.

I suppose I'm struggling to understand the difference between being skeptical about the reliability of the clock and not believing that it is reliable.

If one believes a clock is working then they are not skeptical about whether or not it is a reliable means to know what time it is.

If one is skeptical about whether or not a clock is working, then they do not believe it is a reliable means to know what time it is. Such people would perhaps check to see, but that doesn't happen in Russell's case. So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences. — creativesoul

That's not the only type of assumption. And in this scenario, the truth or justification is not in consideration. It's simply a stipulation.

Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.

That's not what I've been considering. I have flatly rejected the view that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification for knowledge.

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences.
— creativesoul

That's not the only type of assumption — fiveredapples

I didn't say it was. What's at stake right now is the difference between assuming the clock is working and believing it is.

I said it was the only situation in which there is a definite difference between a person's assumption and that same person's belief, which is what's at issue here. You want to say that the person in Russell's clock scenario assumes the clock is working, as if that is somehow definitely different from the person believing that the clock is reliable(working).

I have flatly rejected the view that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification for knowledge. — fiveredapples

Yes.

I think that we are largely in agreement here aside from granting that the belief was justified.

You grant JTB to the person in the scenario, whereas I do not. That is puzzling to me.

Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.
That's not what I've been considering. — fiveredapples

Perhaps you should, because that's what happened, and you granted that that knowledge claim was justified.

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true...
— Andrew M

Hmmm....

Would that exclude language less creatures' belief from being well grounded? That would be at odds with my current leanings. — creativesoul

I don't think so. You, as a language user, could in principle identify the premises of any belief and check if they're true (and thus whether the belief holder could be said to have knowledge). But those premises are true (or not) independently of whether anyone does identify them. — Andrew M

This seems to arrive at a problem regarding the origen and/or content of belief. It presupposes that all belief is premiss based. I've an issue with that as a result of the fact that premisses themselves are belief.

Seems to me that it would have to be the case that some rudimentary belief are not premiss based. If they need to be in order to qualify as being well grounded then such belief cannot count... by definition alone... for if the definition is good... they do not have what it takes.

If one believes a clock is working then they are not skeptical about whether or not it is a reliable means to know what time it is. — creativesoul

Sounds right, provided he believes working clocks keep the correct time.

If one is skeptical about whether or not a clock is working, then they do not believe it is a reliable means to know what time it is.

Sounds right.

Such people would perhaps check to see, but that doesn't happen in Russell's case.

In the Russell case, there is no thought paid to the working of the clock. It is simply assumed to be working. The man is neither skeptical nor not skeptical. He takes it for granted that it's working. You want to say that he must have some epistemic attitude towards the working of the clock, but I don't think 'taking X for granted' implies (or means) that you have an epistemic attitude towards it.

Again, I'm just speculating right now. I'm not committing myself to much of anything in this post or in the previous post, as I indicated.

So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

I'm not sure I follow this. Who claimed that the man is skeptical that the clock is reliable and that he does not believe it is reliable? And isn't this consistent?

So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

I'm not sure I follow this. Who claimed that the man is skeptical that the clock is reliable and that he does not believe it is reliable? And isn't this consistent? — fiveredapples

It was a carry over from your example about the new girlfriend. I think we can leave this aspect be. We seem to be making headway elsewhere. I want to give the middle portion of the post that the quote above was copied from subsequent due attention...

Perhaps you should, because that's what happened, and you granted that that knowledge claim was justified. — creativesoul

I think you are confused here. Recall that we're working with two different conceptions of knowledge in the Russell scenario. One conception is JTB. The other conception is our vague intuition of knowledge.

I have consistently said that the man in the Russell scenario has satisfied the JTB conception of knowledge, because JTB doesn't care about the source of the belief. That's why I've been holding Sam's feet to the fire on this issue. He says he believes JTB and our intuition of knowledge are one and the same (at least that's what I think he's been saying), so he cannot object about the justification -- because, again, the man has met the justification requirement per JTB.

However, I've also consistently said that the man doesn't in fact have a justified belief given our intuition of knowledge. My intuition of knowledge dictates that a broken clock cannot lend epistemic justification for knowledge, because my intuition is more demanding than JTB -- it cares about the source of the belief.

So, I granted that the man has knowledge as conceived as JTB, but that he in fact doesn't have knowledge per our intuition of knowledge.

My apologies for any confusion.

Hmmm...

It seems we're even closer than I thought earlier. We're both rejecting the JTB criterion for what counts as being justified. It just seems that we've different reasoning for doing so...

In addition, I'm attempting to show and/or explain why the case offends our intuitions... because it forgets to keep in mind that the clock is broken.

I think we are all rejecting that the man in the Russell scenario has actual knowledge. The only possible exception might be Sam, but it's hard to pin down his view because, I think, he's been unclear about it.

You and I agree that the justification failure is due to using a broken clock to ascertain the belief. Bartricks doesn't agree with this assessment. He first said that the justification failure could be explained with the notion of luck. After I pointed out that luck can only explain the truth of the belief, he has been suspiciously silent.

Frankly, almost everyone agrees that the problem is the source of the belief, namely the broken clock. Well, everyone but Bartricks, but that's only because he's committed to some other silly view that's inconsistent with this obvious analysis. Talk about dogmatist.

What I don't understand about your position is that after you say that the broken clock can't lend epistemic justification, why the need to say more? I mean, doesn't that fully explain the justification failure? You're wanting to do some logical deduction based on having a belief about the reliability of the source and whatnot, but to me it's extraneous and puts you on dubious philosophical grounds.

What I don't understand about your position is that after you say that the broken clock can't lend epistemic justification, why the need to say more? — fiveredapples

Psychological I suppose.

:wink: