He was maybe saying that relativism can't be radical. — frank

Sounds reasonable. Wondering if the others agree.

Belief is more than sufficient for X to be called true... — creativesoul

Can you clarify this? What kind of sufficiency do you mean?

If the essence of a conceptual scheme can be located in a far-ranging belief, are we back to square one? Back to an essentially (although a belief- rather than a concept-based) relativistic picture? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The difference is that a belief can be stated and understood by someone who does not share that belief. The notion of conceptual scheme being critiqued is one in which this cannot occur - one that is incommensurable with another.

What is the significance of the rejection of conceptual schemes if our beliefs continue to paint a picture of fundamentally different ontologies (and sister -ologies)? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, a belief is statable. So we have a shared discourse that allows each of us to evaluate beliefs. This is to be distinguished from having conceptual schema such that beliefs in one do not have an equivalent in another - they literaly cannot be stated in another conceptual scheme.

Belief seems just as potent in creating a kind of weltanschauung-relativism. Different people believe the world fits best into such and such a belief system. Not such a far cry from conceptual relativism. Maybe someone can clarify the distinction. — ZzzoneiroCosm

One way to consider it is as asking if language can span conceptual schemes. Davidson's argument is that it can, that what is true in one conceptual scheme will be true in the other, given suitable translations.

Davidson's argument is that it can, that what is true in one conceptual scheme will be true in the other, given suitable translations. — Banno

Your version is weaker than his. His version is unsupportable, so weaker is better.

how do you see them as differing?

What is the significance of the rejection of conceptual schemes if our beliefs continue to paint a picture of fundamentally different ontologies (and sister -ologies)?
— ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, a belief is statable. — Banno

You... or Davidson? Both, perhaps.

This is the bit that has always been a thorn in my side. Demanding that a belief be statable leaves far too much to the imagination. Statable by whom?

how do you see them as differing? — Banno

He argued that person-a can't be utilizing concepts that are untranslatable to person-b.

He said our concept of truth can't handle a situation like that.

Statable by whom? — creativesoul

Anyone.

Are you suggesting one person could state it but not another? Notice it is state not assert.

Nevermind me...

I'm on about something else, and that is irrelevant to Davidson's gripe about and/or rejection of the idea of different conceptual schemes.

There's no issue I see in this context.

I recant, and my apologies.

Cheers!

:grin:

Hm. The only difference I see is that I have a dislike for using the word "concept". I don;t see that my view is so different to Davidson's.

The only difference I see is that I have a dislike for using the word "concept". I don;t see that my view is so different to Davidson's. — Banno

Where you said 'can translate' he said 'must be able to translate'.

That he was wrong is super intuitional. I wrote the proof that he's wrong from a secondary source: a few pages back if you're interested.

I’m going going to put Soames’ explanation for why Davidson’s argument fails in my own words. I’m really not much of a logician, so it took me a while to get it. You can look at Soames' history of analytical philosophy in the Davidson section to get it straight from him.

Lets start with a language L (which isn’t English). This is an unusual language because there are only two sentences of this language. Don’t worry, it will be obvious why this generalizes when we’re done.

We’ll call these two sentences X and Y. If we translate X into English, we’ll get sentence x. If we translate Y into English, we’ll get sentence y.

Now we’re going to do something with Tarski. This is going to involve something that Tarski calls a truth predicate, but I want to make sure you don’t get the impression that this is the regular truth predicate that we all know and love. This is a special Tarskian thing. I’m not even going to call it “true” because that will cause confusion. I’m just going to call it T.

I’m going to tell you that T is a property of s iff
s is ‘X’ AND x
OR
s is ‘Y’ AND y

The above is a definition of the T-predicate. Don’t suppose this means we defined truth. We can’t do that. Just to make sure the above is clear, I’ll use Soames’ example: s is T iff s is ‘La camisa es azul’ AND The shirt is blue. It just helped me to change the sentences into variables.

Now we’ll look at something closer to the T-sentence format:

‘X’ is T iff x (‘La camisa es azul’ is T iff the shirt is blue.) This bolded T-sentence-like object is meant to create the impression we can use T to derive the meaning of a sentence of L.

Let's look at the first part of the bolded sentence: 'X' has T as a property. When does our definition of T say about this? When would 'X' have T as a property?

Either when 'X' is 'X' AND x
OR when 'X' is 'Y' AND y

The lower part obviously can't be, so we’re left with: 'X' is 'X' AND x

Now let's add the rest of the bolded T-sentence like object:

('X' is 'X' AND x) iff x

This above statement is a triviality that results from the T-sentence rule triviality it was born from. We can't use it for much of anything.

Maybe tomorrow we could talk about what happens to Davidson's argument when we actually put a dose of Truth in it. — frank

Here it is.

Better to ask what is right. Pangolin scales? What's that about. — Banno

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/2162999/consider-alternatives-pangolin-scales-traditional

Good for you. Just so long as you do not conclude , as you did, that a statement's being true requires it's being believed. — Banno

If a statement is to be true, you first have to have the statement, whether believed or not. And any statement, to be true, must be believable in principle; in other words coherent. Also any statement that will either be true or false, when considered by anyone, is likely to be either believed or not, unless it is so arcane or its truth or falsity so inscrutable as to warrant suspension of judgement.

Indirectly perceptible things and/or abstract entities - it seems to me - would be prone to resisting translation. That is where we would possibly figure out that there was no common referent for some of the respective notions.

That he was wrong is super intuitional. — frank

Then there is nothing more to say.

Then there is nothing more to say. — Banno

Understanding why his argument fails is interesting: maybe as a lesson in what not to do.

For instance...?

yep.

If I could explain it in enough detail, it wouldn't be a case. That just seems to be the only circumstance I can think of where it - perhaps - has what it takes to resist translation.

Could that be done in common ordinary language?

Could that be done in common ordinary language? — creativesoul

The argument I posted is as close as I could get to ordinary language. The problem is that Davidson's argument against untranslatability contains concepts that are artificial (the Tarski stuff).

With a really broad brush it's that Davidson should have been suspicious about supporting an ambitious conclusion with a flimsy trivial truth like the T-sentence rule.

It's bad philosophy. That doesnt mean it's not food for thought or that cool stuff couldnt be inspired by it. The rose grows from poop, you know.

It's bad philosophy. — frank

I'm sorry, Frank, that supposed argument is too fluffy to be understood.

Put some effort into it. You'll get it.

I did. I didn't.

I get the joke. But lampooning Davidson will not suffice, even if it is funny.

I referred you to the source of that argument. Take the time to understand what he was actually saying and why. You'll say the same thing. It's bad philosophy.

As i recall you referred to a book. One that might be quite interesting - so I put it on my wish list.

You have voiced your inability to articulate the criticism; it's a bit rich to insist on a reply to a critique that has not been clearly presented by

For my part, the takeaway is that T-sentences say just about all that can be said about truth, and that relativism with respect to truth is wrong. Also pretty much agree with the critique of Davidson presented by

Happy to address either of these - if you put something together.

As i recall you referred to a book. One that might be quite interesting - so I put it on my wish list. — Banno

I read the article and thought I understood it. I had misunderstood it. Judging from your responses, we have that in common.

You have voiced your inability to articulate the criticism — Banno

Where? I explained Davidson's argument, then I explained what's wrong with it.

it's a bit rich to insist on a reply to a critique that has not been clearly presented by ↪Moliere — Banno

I don't know what you're talking about.

For my part, the takeaway is that T-sentences say just about all that can be said about truth, and that relativism with respect to truth is wrong. Also pretty much agree with the critique of Davidson presented by — Banno

Regular everyday truth is not addressed at all in Davidson's essay. That is the tangle central to misunderstanding it.

Happy to address either of these - if you put something together. — Banno

You mean leave Davidson behind and just talk philosophy?